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Abstract 
This research is an exploratory single case study, which focuses on the interplay 
between aspects of Clausewitz's theory on war and the practice of aid agencies in 
Nepal between 1999-2005/06. During which period Nepal was embroiled in an 
escalating violent contlict between Maoist rebels and the ruling establishment. which 
had a severe impact on the operations of aid agencies present in Nepal. 
The study draws primarily on Clausewitz's theory on war to provide analytical tools of 
help to the aid industry and those in strategizing roles at country level in thinking 
through the challenges faced in unstable and deteriorating operational contexts, in 
order to further poverty and contlict reduction efforts. 
The research retlects on the processes of strategizing and implementing aid operations 
in turbulent environments from a Clausewitz-inspired perspective and advances two 
main findings. First, the thesis finds that one key concept used in this retlection 
process, which shows itself to be of practical help, is the 'aid trinity'. The 'aid trinity' 
is a normative reflective framework that consists of three interacting layers, being 
psychological, social and managerial, which facilitates the thinking through and 
strategizing of aid operations. 
Second, by borrowing Clausewitz notion of friction, the research demonstrates that the 
existence of multiple forms of friction present in processes of strategizing and 
implementing aid operations in turbulent contexts like Nepal, could severely hamper 
these operations. Friction can be understood as the mediating force between what was 
perceived as the ideal fonn of conducting aid operations in Nepal and their actual 
character, resulting in the inability of the international aid community to address 
appropriately the dynamics of poverty and conflict. 
The research highlights the need to factor in the reality of these multiple fonns of 
friction and to allow for their impact in policy, strategizing and implementation 
processes, in the hope of maximizing poverty and contlict reduction efforts in fragile 
states and other turbulent environments. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This qualitative exploratory study presents a series of reflections related to strategizing 
and implementing aid operations in insurgency-ridden Nepal between 1999 and 
2005/06. 1 These reflections are inspired by the thinking of the military philosopher 
Clausewitz (1780-1831), represented in his book On War. 2 The study has its 
foundations in problems encountered during my time working in relief and 
development, in perceived gaps in my own education identified during work in the 
field, and in my own curiosity as to whether these might be addressed through what 
may be for some a rather paradoxical approach. 
The research question of the study is: How might reflections on aid operations in 
turhulent operational environments, such as Nepal during the period August 1999 to 
2005106, appear when inspired by Clausewitz 's lines (?l thought and 
conceptualizations (lwar as laid out in his book On War? 
Paragraph 1.4 provides an overview of the objectives of the study. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: firstly, the journey leading to the 
research is described, followed by a presentation of research objectives and an 
overview of what this research does not intend to do. The research will be positioned in 
relation to existing development literature and my own position regarding development 
work. The chapter ends with an overview of the study. In the remainder of this 
paragraph, I outline my overseas work experiences with the hope of enlightening the 
1 Annexe 1.1 explains the meaning of aid operations within the context of this thesis. 
2 I would like to thank Sir Sam Cowan, Clausewitz expert and Nepal observer, for suggesting 
Clausewitz's work On War in the context of aid and development in Nepal, to use primarily as a source 
of reflection, rather than a basis for theory building. Chapter Three explores Clausewitz's thinking and 
his book On War. During the course of the study reference is made to an English translation of On War 
by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (1989), referred to as H&P. 
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reader of this thesis as to why I arrived at such a paradoxical topic and why certain 
choices have been made during the course of the research. 3 
Albania and Nepal My main experiences of relief and development practice were 
gained during assignments in Albania (during the Kosovo crisis in 1999) and Nepal 
(1999-2005). In Albania I worked for a Dutch/ British relief consortium4 as assistant 
manager, with two competing tasks.s These tasks required me to reconcile the 
conflicting demands generated in a chaotic context by an ongoing relief project and an 
envisaged development project.6 From August 1999 to mid-July 2005 I worked in 
Nepal. To put it somewhat euphemistically, this period saw Nepal's decline from a 
young 'democracy' into an at best a fragile state, owing to a rather un constructive 
interaction between the relatively powerful Maoist rebellion and those formally 
holding power in Kathmandu, whose political, administrative and military response 
might conservatively be described as unhelpful. 7 During these years I worked for three 
aid agencies,s the International Nepal Fellowship (IN F), The Netherlands Development 
Organisation (SNV) and the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA).9 
Though the size and resources of the three agencies varied, all three had already 
operated in Nepal for a considerable period and run significant projects and 
programmes in the country. 
Initially, I went out as INF's Research Evaluation Officer within their Community 
Health Development Programme (CHOP). However, my main role during my 6 years 
3 My educational and working experiences on the one hand explain a part of my bias in this study, 
which I hope to curb and compensate for, while on the other hand they form an integral part of this 
thesis, having shaped my perspective. 
4 This consortium was made up of ZOA Refugee Care, Christian Outreach Relief and Development 
(CORD) and Tearfund Holland. They worked together with the Swiss relief agency Medair, the lead 
agency for the management of the camp near the city of Elbasan. 
5 The first related to the consortium's involvement in the management of a refugee camp near a town 
called Elbasan. The second was to identify a long-term project, as one of the consortium members was 
keen to continue work in Albania after the Kosovar refugees had returned. By the time the refugees 
had returned to Kosovo, I had successfully identified a long-term rural development project. 
6 ZOA Refugee Care was keen to start a long-term project. In the second half of 2004 this programme 
was handed over. See also http://www.loaweb.org/Page/sp829/lndex.html. accessed on 2/09/06. 
7 See Chapter Two, also for example Gersony (2003). 
8 Annexe 1.1 explains the meaning of the term aid agencies within the context of this thesis. 
9 The first three years were with the International Nepal Fellowship (INF), a faith-based international 
agency of British origin, with its international headquarters in Pokhara. Its main involvement is in 
health and community development. SNV was mainly involved in the governance, natural resources 
and private sectors. DANIDA was primarily involved in education, governance, natural resources and 
human rights. 
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in Nepal was in security and conflict management, mainly assisting management and 
agency staff through advice and training to deal with the security risks generated by the 
violent conflict between the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) and a 
succession of governments. This gave me the opportunity to observe and to listen to 
field-level views, and question, in a sensitive way, the dynamics of aid operations in 
various parts of Nepal. In both Albania and Nepal, while I had no fixed management 
responsibility, I was involved in processes of operational strategizing within the aid 
agencies I worked for,1o Moreover, in the case of Nepal, I had access to various fora 
where representatives of different aid agencies came together to share, analyse, 
strategise and coordinate specific aspects of their operations. This provided me with 
the opportunity to reflect on situations from a participant-observer perspective. 
1.2 Contrasting education and work practice: towards a hunch 
This paragraph discusses my observations about the contrast between my education 
and the reality of working practice. 
Education While in Nepal, it appeared to me in retrospect that my education, in the 
field of Development Studies at the University of Wageningen (1991-1997), prepared 
me to become an aid practitioner able to make vertical and horizontal linkages in the 
development domain.ll Despite the work of advocates of the actor approach and 
systems theory (respectively Long 1992 and Roling. who advocated Checkland's sotl-
system approach),12 the assumption underpinning the Development Studies curriculum 
appeared to be modernist, and, intentionally or not, to be a 'linear interventionist one'. 
The focus was on 'preparing' students to level out the pitfalls of a de-contextualised, 
de-politicised, basically linear development process supporting slowly but peacefully 
progressing societies in the less developed parts of the world. During the course of my 
studies I started wondering whether the reality of aid and development was 
10 See Annexe 1.1 how the term aid agency is used in the remaining of the thesis. 
11 It seemed that I was trained to observe and understand communities at grass-roots level and to 
communicate the outcomes of these interactions to policy-makers, and in turn to convince the 
recipients of aid of the validity of the policy-makers' decisions higher up in the aid chain. In horizontal 
terms, I was 'trained' to create constructive links between the technical and social domains of the aid 
delivery process. 
12 For further reading on Peter Checkland's soft-system approach see: 
http://www.lums.lancs.ac.uk/profiles/peter-checklandl?type-000002#profilePublications, accessed on 
2/09/09. 
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predominantly linear. The widely broad casted crises and interventions of that era,13 the 
deep impressions left by several trips abroad,14 a study-term at the Refugee Studies 
Centre in Oxford,15 my involvement in the collection of some teaching material to be 
used at Wageningen University16 and my first professional assignment abroad to 
Albania during the Kosovo Crisis all hinted in another direction. 
Work practice In Albania and Nepal, the linear intervention paradigm which had 
formed the basis of my education proved to be thoroughly problematic and I felt forced 
to reject it to a very large extent in the case of Nepal. Within a few weeks of arrival, 
the government of Nepal withdrew the visas often experienced aid workers in my new 
agency, including the director of the programme I had started to work fOr. 17 Having 
recovered from this it became clear that the project intervention theory was rife with 
shortcomings given the (perceived) social dynamics in the project areas, due to factors 
such as seasonal migration. IS To complicate matters, it also became clear to me that 
Nepal was full of different types of conflict (Upreti 2002), and that beyond the hills 
and mountains, which surrounded the well-known holiday resort in which we lived and 
worked (Pokhara), a Maoist-inspired rebellion was gaining momentum. After 
reflecting on all the available information on this issue, which did not amount to 
much,19 I conjectured that if this Maoist rebellion was able to sustain momentum, the 
rebellion could be an escalating force able to bring about a rapid and radical 
reconfiguration of the social and political landscape of Nepal. At the same time, as the 
rebellion appeared to prioritize violent struggle above all else, it would also, in 
13 Iraq (1990), Somalia (1991), Rwanda (1994) and the war in the Balkans. 
14 Travel through Yugoslavia summer 1990 (start of the war in the Balkans), South-Hungary 1991 (influx 
of refugees from the Croatian town Osijek) and Nepal (Bhutanese Refugee Project! Lutheran World 
Service). 
15 Hilary term, 1997. 
16 Disaster Studies Reader (1997), Wageningen Agriculture University, The Netherlands. 
17 This left my new agency in a state of crisis and subsequently the newcomers to the programme were 
left without a proper (organisational) introduction, amongst other things. Community Health and 
Development Programme/ INF (CHDP/ INF). 
18 f As ar as I understood the project documents, it was for example assumed that the population within 
project area was made up of generally static and stable communities, while in fact seasonal migration, 
either to urban centres in Nepal or abroad, was a part of the communities' ways of sustaining 
themselves. 
19 The agency's library was rather limited; Internet access very poor, and most staff were not really 
keen to talk about it. However, one of the directors of the agency could tell from personal experience 
who one of the leaders of the CPN-M was, having taught him at primary school in Ghorka district over 
20 years previously. This informed me about the potential of the leadership of the Maoist movement 
to stay ahead of developments. 
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conjunction with the lack of a proper government response, jeopardise the efforts of 
many development agencies and expose their practices at the same time (Hutt 2004).20 
In my view Nepal became a turbulent environment. 21 
After three years of work for INF, I moved in the summer of 2002 to Kathmandu and 
joined SNV / Nepal in the capacity of contlict advisor. In the meantime the rebellion 
did indeed grow in strength and impact. The response from the political-
administrative-military centre in Kathmandu appeared to remain unconstructive. In 
addition, it appeared to me that SNV, instead of responding to the situation in Nepal, 
focused on formal ising interventions based on a blueprint corporate change process, 
which excluded the existence of (violent) conflict.22 Subsequently, the focus of my 
attention shifted from countering the pitfalls of a de-contextualised, de-politicised, 
non-conflict linear development process to raising awareness and facilitating 
discussion among the different levels of management within and outside the agency 
about the possibility of the opposite being true, and the implications of this for the 
work in which aid agencies were all involved (see for example van Duijn 2004). 
Towards a hunch Over time, alongside colleagues from other aid agencies, I regularly 
met a few expatriates with military backgrounds who were still part of the military or 
employed by aid agencies. In varying degrees, such individuals were able to analyse 
20 In 2000, I co-wrote a short report to inform the management board of INF of the possibility of 
increased turmoil in Nepal, the possible consequences for the agency's operational methods and ways 
to address these in order to remain relevant and effective (Hancock R. and l. van Duijn 2000). Despite 
initial disbelief among board members, who might have perceived the authors as 'green and 
inexperienced,' (parts of) the report slowly filtered through the organisation. The fact that agency staff 
on several occasions came face-to-face with the physical manifestations of the Maoist Insurgency was 
an unwelcome, but unsurprising help in this process. Examples included the Maoist attack on the police 
post and Army Barracks in Ghorai/ Dang (2001) and the attack on the district headquarters of Jumla in 
October 2002, causing in both cases a number of deaths and severe infrastructural damage. In both 
cases national and expatriate INF staff were caught up in the fighting. 
21 Annexe 1.1 explains the meaning of turbulence and turbulent environment within the context of this 
thesis. 
22 One might ask why aid agencies employed conflict advisors if they continued to operate conflict-
blind. I got the impression, at least for the second agency I worked for that the position was created to 
show headquarters that the conflict in Nepal was taken seriously to a certain extent, without 
committing themselves to substantial adjustments in their preferred way of operating. To summarize 
this period I would like to paraphrase Henry Kissinger when referring to a military issue: while in SNV, I 
found myself forced to be involved in designing aid interventions based on abstract criteria, 
implementing strategies I did not really believe in and ultimately being involved in development 
interventions I did not understand and could only assume to be counter-productive given the ground 
realities as I perceived them to be (Kissinger in: Mintzberg 2000). 
17 
the developments in Nepal in a dynamic way, compared with only a few of the 
development practitioners with whom I had contact. Although I did not necessarily 
agree with their views, I was impressed by their lucidity and conciseness; but from the 
angle of a development worker, their views had one significant shortcoming: the 
analyses were not necessarily satisfactorily expressed in the tenninology of aid and 
development, and therefore not necessarily easy to grasp by aid managers lacking a 
military education.23 
During the second half of 2003 I became interested in a way of thinking, an approach 
to reality or practice-related theory that could help me in my effort to make sense of 
what was going on in the course of my work; the sole focus on the organisational and 
institutional apparatus around decision-making and coordination within the 
international community did not, according to my understanding, make much sense, 
when aid agencies were not engaged in making sense beyond the logic of their 
organisational mandate, procedures or policies in their efforts to strategize and 
implement aid activities. 24 It appeared to me, without contesting its quality or 
relevance in other contexts, that literature related to fragile or failed states or 
handbooks on humanitarian aid (see for example Debiel and Klein 2002; UNICEF 
1994) could not properly infonn aid agencies about how to understand Nepal's 
increasing turbulence and its implications for the strategizing and positioning of aid 
operations. 25 It was during this period that I started to wonder if the aid and 
development industry operating in turbulent environments could benefit from military 
theory, and began to explore the possible usefulness of combining military thinking 
with the practice of aid operations in NepaP6 It was this, which triggered the idea of 
focusing on the work of a classical military philosopher as a source for exploration. 
23 Conversely, my development or humanitarian colleagues expressed themselves well about the 
activities they were involved in, but were less able to put this in a context of a dynamic analysis. 
24 In the same period, aid agency representatives engaged in getting the UN Organisation for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs into Nepal in order to facilitate different forms of coordinated 
decision-making. Libanora argues that theses discussions around the issue of coordination were a leit 
motif during donor meetings (2003:42) 
25 Two thoughts arose. Firstly, why continue looking within the aid literature for means for 
understanding of what was going on within the context of aid delivery when it did not appear useful for 
the role I had to fulfil within my work. Secondly, if this were the case, was there something outside this 
body of aid literature that might be useful, not necessarily as an alternative, but as an additional 
perspective to facilitate reflection on the practice of aid delivery in turbulent environments such as 
Nepal. 
26 See Annexe 1.1 how the term turbulent environment is understood in this thesis. 
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After some consideration, I selected the work of the German military strategist 
Clausewitz titled On WarP By doing so I assumed that Clausewitz's work, at least in 
part, could provide a creative foundation to think through the activities of aid agencies 
in turbulent contexts like Nepal. Fortunately, my position as conflict advisor offered 
me opportunities to experiment with some thoughts to see what the envisaged interplay 
might deliver. Initially, I focused on a re-conceptualisation and visualisation of 
Clausewitz's paradoxical trinity concept of war (H&P: 89) and integrated this into 
some presentations used in training sessions, which generated a positive response from 
colleagues from a variety of agencies. 28 In brief, this research is born out of a curiosity 
to address two interlinked tensions, which do not appear to be uncommon (Smith and 
Hitt 2005: 574). The first is my university education and my personal view of it, and 
the second is the development practice I worked in and my own ideas about what this 
practice should take into consideration while working in turbulent environments such 
as Nepal. Klinger, a military commentator, argues that: "in essence C1ausewif: was 
formu/afinR what we would now call a social science (?j'l1'ar" (2006). Therefore, this 
study assumes that Clausewitz's thinking as laid out in On War can provide some clues 
for reflection on aid operations in turbulent environments. The following paragraph 
provides a further justification of the juxtaposition of Clausewitz's theory on War with 
the practice of international development in fragile states. 
1.3 The rational of using Clausewitz's On War as means of 
reflection 
This paragraph explains point by point why Clausewitz's On War is applied as an 
inspirational lens to reflect on aid operations in Nepal and aid operations in turbulent 
environments in general. The points are not necessarily presented in order of 
importance, but should be seen as an interconnected series of reasons, which taken 
together, form the rationale for the juxtaposition of Clausewitz's approach to 
27 In retrospect, instead of turning to the readily available work of Eastern military philosopher Sun Tzu 
(1988) I chose the work of Clausewitz because his writing appeared to me closer to my own cultural 
background and way of reasoning than that of Sun Tzu. 
28 For example in a workshop titled: 'Conflict and Aid in Nepal', 16 December 2004, Royal Danish 
Embassy/ DANIDA, Kathmandu. Why was the response generally positive? I believe that, although the 
various presentations did not provide any answers, it offered my colleagues, who were for the most 
part genuinely interested in structuring the problems they were faced with, a visualisation of their own 
position in relation to others. Furthermore, it helped to stimulate and structure debate accordingly. 
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theorizing on war and aid in Nepal, with the goal of contributing to the existing 
literature on aid and development in fragile states. 
To begin with, as indicated earlier, I saw a particular approach being applied by a 
colleague from another aid agency, which with some reasoning could be traced back to 
Clausewitz, given the status of his work as one of the major influences on current 
military thinking in the West. I hypothesized that this paradib1J11 might to a certain 
extent prove relevant as approach to thinking through the actions of aid agencies in 
turbulent contexts. 
In addition, as indicated in Chapter Five, Clausewitz presents as a core element in his 
theory the Remarkable Trinity, a concept that brings together the psychological, 
sociological and 'managerial' dimensions of war in one conceptual model. It was 
apparent to me that there were considerable conceptual similarities between 
Clausewitz's Remarkable Trinity concept and its implications for understanding 
military operations and the main elements of aid operations, the subsequent 
interactions of these elements and the type of dynamic this generates for aid operations 
embedded in this interacting set of elements. In other words, Clausewitz's enlightening 
attempt to mix the psychological, the sociological, and the managerial led me to 
believe that his work could be a valuable inspirational basis to reflect on aid operations 
in turbulent environments. 
Moreover, as the remainder of the thesis shows, the issue of strategy was according to 
my understanding an undervalued dimension of the aid operations conducted in 
turbulent Nepal. This underlined the value of applying Clausewitz's work. since he 
focuses on strategizing and operating in environments of danger, uncertainty and 
chance. 
Despite the attractiveness of the Remarkable Trinity concept, and its focus on strategy, 
On War is not an easy read. Nevertheless, Clausewitz provides, as Sumida argues, a 
type of straightforward, though not simplistic, discourse (2001) that, in my experience, 
differs in form from that used within the Nepal's aid industry. In other words, the 
straightforward, non-technical language applied by Clausewitz appealed to me. 
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Another reason to use On War as a source for reflection related to the way Clausewitz 
expressed his views on the various aspects of the conduct of war. By contrast with 
eastern war philosopher Sun Tzu, Clausewitz- explains during the process of writing 
why he arrives at certain ideas and positions (Sumida 2001). This was not only helpful 
while working in Nepal, but during the development of this thesis, as I aimed to 
capture this train of thought in the process of reflecting on aid operations in turbulent 
environments. In spite of the use of non-technical and straightforward language and the 
explicit description of the paths to his conclusions, Clausewitz yet leaves space for 
multiple interpretations of his texts. The numerous ways in which Clausewitz's texts 
can be understood gave me the freedom to use On War in a creative and imaginative 
way which I thought at that time and still think could shed light on aid operations in 
turbulent environments. 
Last, but by no means least, On War held a personal appeal to me owing to its being 
written with a high degree of seriousness and with great passion. It is my view that On 
War reflects Clausewitz's understanding that war was a deadly serious business. under 
no circumstances to be taken lightly. He seems to have realized with great clarity that 
omissions in the various aspects of the conduct of war could have serious 
consequences on the battlefield and beyond, ranging from loss of life, destruction of 
sizeable parts of the commander's own army and the subsequent potential political 
repercussions. Such serious engagement was sadly lacking among at least some 
sections of Nepal's aid industry in thinking through interventions in Nepal's dynamic 
context. On War does not only offer a model for reflection on particular aspects of aid 
operations, but inspires a mindset of passionate seriousness. I have attempted to 
capture and incorporate this mindset in the reflective sections of this thesis. Chapter 
Three describes Clausewitz's On War in greater detail. Now we move to the research 
objectives of this study. 
1.4 Objectives of the study 
The general objective of this study is to explore the interplay between elements of 
Clausewitz's theory on war and the practice of the development industry in Nepal 
between 1999-2005/06, and by doing so enable reflection on aspects of the practice of 
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strategizing aid operations in turbulent environments. For these reasons the study has 
the following objectives. 
1. To sketch the context in which aid agencies in Nepal had to operate. 
2. To examine Clausewitz's ideas on war and strategy in particular. 
3. To devise an approach which would enable Clausewitz's thinking on war to 
become a normative analytical tool to examine the practice of the development 
industry in Nepal and to facilitate speculative reflections on strategizing aid 
operations turbulent environments. 
4. To examine the general conduct of aid agencies operating in Nepal between 1999 
and 2005/06 and based on this to reflect on strategizing and implementation 
processes of aid operations in turbulent environments. 
Chapter Four presents the approach to the research question. This chapter provides the 
hypotheses as well. 
1.5 Scope of the study 
1. The study focuses on the conduct of aid agencies in Nepal in general in relation to 
the increasing turbulence within the country, in part due to the escalating People's 
War. No attempt is made to single out particular agencies for close scrutiny. 
2. The study primarily covers the period between 1999 and 2005/06, but this time 
frame is not applied too strictly.29 
3. The conduct of the aid agencies is analysed and reflected upon within a set of 
concepts elaborated upon by Clausewitz in his work On War. 3D 
4. In order to make the reflections more specific, the study focuses on the processes of 
strategizing and implementation. In this process the aid strategist, the person who is 
involved in strategizing processes, takes centre stage (see Annexe 1.1 for an 
explanation). 
29 The reason for this timeframe is twofold. The year 1999 is chosen on personal grounds: after arriving 
in Nepal in mid-1999 I started to realise the existence of low-level violent conflict in significant parts of 
the project areas in which my organisation was operating. The year 2005 is chosen due to 
developments in the country; during that year Nepal came into the international spotlight after King 
Gyanendra staged a coup and the UN and nine western aid agencies declared that Nepal was on the 
brink of humanitarian abyss. 
(See also http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south asia/4360019.stm, accessed on 02/09/09). 
30 How these concepts are selected is discussed in Chapter Four. Chapter Five describes the conceptual 
frame for the reflections. 
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1.6 Relevance of the Study: the fragile state debate 
The issue of fragile states is currently much discussed among policy makers, 
academics and practitioners. The OECD developed and agreed on principles for good 
engagement with fragile states in 2007 (OECD 2008). Academics summarise the 
debates and highlight the dilemmas related to the notion of fragile states (DIIS 2008) 
or criticise it (Kaplan 2009), Practitioners operating in countries labelled as fragile or 
failed states most probably struggle on a daily basis to make sense of what is 
happening around them and get 'things' done. 
Representatives within Nepal's international community spent a considerable amount 
of time defining Nepal's degree of fragility, which varied from business-as-usual to 
fragile or even failed. Some points became apparent to me during these discussions, 
which are in part retlected in the literature dealing with fragile states. To begin with, 
the definitions related to Nepal's state of fragility depended more on the definitions 
provided by the representative's agency, than by the representative's own view of the 
dynamics in country. USAID took the view that Nepal was fragile because the 
government was not necessarily interested in doing what USAID wanted them to. 
Other donor representatives of agencies such as DFID or DAN IDA were more inclined 
to argue that Nepal's position was fragile because the government was weak in tenns 
of the provision of services and security to its own citizens (own observation). Second, 
and partly in line with the above, discussions tended to be Nepali government-focused. 
What this fragility might eventually mean for groups outside the government was 
discussed to a much lesser extent. In connection with this, the Maoist Uprising was 
merely seen as a development threatening the government and Nepal as a state, while 
ignoring the possibility that the Nepali government and its practices could be a 
hindrance to a smooth functioning state taking responsibility for its citizens, and 
therefore a (serious) cause of grievances and violent contlict. Thirdly, and in line with 
the points made above, fragility was an annoyance for what the agencies wanted to do; 
development in tenns of good governance, education, promoting democracy etc. 
Fragility was not directly seen as an opportunity to do the things needed, as perceived 
by actors in the operational environment, and by doing so reducing the possibility that 
aid agencies could contribute to the process of fragility themselves as an unintended 
consequence of their interventions (Sen 2008). 
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Discussions on Nepal centred on the notion of fragility and reflected the preference of 
the international community to respond to civil war or political transition with the tool 
of state-rebuilding in terms of capacity building, good governance and public sector 
refonn (Mac Ginty and Williams 2009:59). However this preference did not 
necessarily add to the understanding of the environment aid agencies worked in, as it 
was my opinion that the reality of Nepal's operational environment was not one of 
fragility but one of escalating turbulence, or a situation of turbulent deterioration. 
Therefore, without questioning the importance of policy and academic debate centred 
on the notion of state fragility, the notions of turbulence and turbulent environments 
are used throughout the thesis in the hope of contributing to the fragile state debate 
from a rather different perspective.31 
1.7 What this study does not intend to d032 
Firstly, this study neither advocates nor implies the need for increased or improved 
civil-military cooperation. Secondly, the study does not evaluate aid agencies and their 
operations,33 nor does it aim to compare aid agencies and the military. Thirdly, this 
research is not advocating a Clausewitzian approach to contemporary wars, and 
therefore will not discuss the need to replace it with paradigms on counter-
revolutionary warfare. 34 The study assumes, as in the work of two other humanitarian 
thinkers, the usefulness for the aid industry of 'borrowing' and adapting military ideas 
to further their own purposes (Hoffinan and Weiss 2005: 212). The study should be 
seen as a contribution to our understanding of organising aid operations and 
implementing programmes in environments, which are violent, (highly) unpredictable, 
and with high stakes should a mismatch exist between policy and implementation. It is 
31 Annexe 1.1 elaborates on the notion of turbulent environment. 
32 In the course of this research, it became clear that some aid practitioners, academics, or military 
professionals had (for various reasons, in part due to the way the topic was presented) difficulty 
grasping the topic of my research, or did not see the value of the exercise and subsequently rejected 
the idea of using (certain elements of) Clausewitz's military theory to reflect on development in 
turbulent environments like Nepal. Too often these groups made assumptions of about the content, 
nature, underlying aim or intentions of my research. Unfortunately, these misplaced assumptions did 
not necessarily faCilitate the exchange of ideas to further my research. 
33 The origin of the research might imply a critical view of the effectiveness of aid agencies, when 
compared with military performance in aid operations; however, this is not suggested. 
34 Western military doctrine is strongly underpinned by a Clausewitzian approach to war, but various 
authors contest these underpinnings (see Chapter Three). Military operations guided by a rigid 
approach to Clausewitz's theory may be part of the reason contemporary wars are lost or won with 
worse than expected losses. 
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not assumed that the primary outcome of this research will necessarily increase the 
effectiveness of aid operations in turbulent environments. However, it is my contention 
that some basic ideas in On War might have value for reflection on the practice of aid 
operations. This is the core task of my research. Chapter Four discusses, as well as the 
research question, the research methodology applied for this purpose. 
1.8 Positioning in the literature 
Here we will focus on the position of this research in the literature of aid and 
development. A variety of informed authors are used to show how this exploratory 
research stands out from other work in humanitarian and development literature. 35 
Firstly, this work is informed by a series of themes and concepts derived from the 
theory devised by Clausewitz (see Chapter Three). Clausewitz's thinking also inspires 
the central framework (see Chapter Five), which in turn guides the reflective parts of 
the thesis (see Part II). Moreover, it places those staff within aid agencies centre-stage 
as those who have to think through issues of strategy and implementation in an 
uncertain and messy operational environment. 
Secondly, this thesis is not criticising the idea of the existence of development or 
humanitarian aid per se (Moyo 2009; Isbister 2003) or the way it works (Bolton 2007). 
It is not highlighting from an ethnographic perspective the gap between development 
policy and practice of projects (Mosse 2005), or stressing the effects of policy 
interventions on those on the receiving end (Mosse and Lewis eds. 2005), neither is the 
thesis modestly up-beat about its successes (Riddel 2007). It is more in line with 
Easterly's view that there are no big answers to poverty eradication. but that 
'searchers' need to take over from the 'planners' in this process (Easterly 2006). The 
framework presented is an attempt by one searcher to help other searchers to think 
through the strategy and implementation of the aid activities they are responsible for. 
35 One might argue that the overview given is not extensive enough. However, Stebbins in his work on 
exploratory research argues that literature reviews in exploratory research is there to show that not 
much work on the issue under exploration is done. In addition in opposite of confirmative research, the 
literature reviews in exploratory research can be short (2001: 41-42). 
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Thirdly, the thesis stands out from a body of humanitarian and development literature 
that provides policy prescriptions or practical guidance on how to change things from a 
state of being bad to a state of being good. Examples within the policy prescriptions 
genre include addressing the poverty of the most marginalised (Collier 2007; Prahaland 
2005), fixing failed states or societies devastated by war (Ghani and Lockhart 2008; 
Del Castillo 2008), or installing democracy in societies experiencing contlict (Jarstad 
and Sisk eds. 2008). This thesis does not offer such policy prescriptions, neither does it 
intend to take on the character of the practically orientated "how to" guides. which can 
equally be found in development and humanitarian literature. Examples of this genre in 
the field of development include guides to dealing with infonnation and 
communication within development agencies (Powell 2003) or how to assess, review 
and evaluate development projects (Dale 1998; Gosling and Edwards 1996) or how to 
run community development projects (Davies 1997). Examples of publications within 
the humanitarian realm include how to manage humanitarian relief projects (James 
2008; RedR 1997) or operational security within violent environments (Van Brabant 
2000). The thesis does not indicate the minimum standards in humanitarian relief 
(SPHERE 2000), or how to respond as a humanitarian agency to extreme emergencies 
(Sanyasi 2004). Less prescriptive literature in this genre might include Cuny's work on 
how to respond as humanitarian agency in either natural disaster situations (1983) or 
situations with feature famine and contlict (1999). This thesis attempts to present the 
beginnings of a non-prescriptive approach to thinking through aspects of aid operations 
in deteriorating contexts. 
Fourthly, the thesis stands apart from literature focused on (l)NGOs and the various 
practical challenging and contradictory aspects of (l)NGO management (Edwards and 
Fowler 2004; Lewis 2001; Edwards and Hulme 1996). Suzuki, an expert on internal 
dynamics of aid agencies, highlights the internal, sometimes contlicting, dynamics of 
international aid agencies and how these might be addressed (1998). Bennett discusses 
how IN GOs could improve their coordination in times of crisis in order to reach out 
more effectively to people in need (1995). Attention is also paid to how INGOs learn 
for the purpose of improving their development or humanitarian activities (Roper. 
Petitt and Eade eds. 2003) or what the internal daily dynamics ofNGO life might look 
like (Hilhorst 2003). In addition, this work does not focus on the internal functioning 
of multi-lateral agencies (Weiss 2009; Dijkzeul and Beigbeder 2006). Within this 
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strand of literature, the negative consequences of the deepening process of 
managerialism within the development sector are brought to the front and critiqued as 
well (Dar and Cooke eds. 2008). This exploratory research takes the aid strategist, the 
agency he works for and the aid activities he is responsible for as a starting point to 
reflect on the position of an agency and its operation(s) in a wider institutional and 
operational context. 
Fifthly, this work is different from literature which focuses solely on understanding, 
either theoretically or practically, the causes and dynamics of violent conflict and how 
peace-building initiatives can be furthered (Mac Ginty 2008; Jacoby 2008; Pfetsch 
2007; Lederarch 2005; Galtung 2004; Reychler and Paffenholz 2001; Fisher et al. 
2000). However, these issues are to various degrees implied or explicitly present 
within the reflections of the thesis. This work assumes that various forms of conflict 
have their causes and parties have their evolving interests in the course of these 
conflicts, and implies that they need be taken into consideration in the course of the 
operations of an aid agency. 
Sixthly, this work differs from the literature in that it does not primarily focus on the 
political and economic processes hindering development aid (Gibson et al. 2005) or the 
political and economic processes of conflict (Ballentine and Sherman 2005) and how 
aid agencies could be entangled in these processes (Le Billon 2000; Keen 1994), or 
how (illegal) business entities gain from and maintain processes of war (Nordstrom 
2004). However, this work implies the importance of understanding and addressing the 
many different forms of friction within aid agencies and their interactions with either 
their institutional or operational environment, of which political and economic 
processes are a part. 
Seventhly, this work differs from humanitarian literature, which mainly discusses the 
dilemmas of particular issues while operating in a variety of crisis areas. Weiss for 
example elaborates on how the aid system could deal with the 'New Wars' and the 
notion of the 'Right to Protect' (2007). Minear discusses critically but constructively 
various aspects of the humanitarian enterprise between 1991-200 I in order to suggest 
improvements (2002), the Humanitarian Studies Unit reflects on the principles, ethics 
and contradictions surrounding humanitarian action (2001), Pirote, Husson and 
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Grunewald eds. focus their discussions, on the basis of a variety of field situations, 
towards new ways of analysing crisis and interventions and the skills needed to address 
the new challenges (1999). Minear and Smith allow various practitioners to elaborate 
on the art of humanitarian diplomacy in the contexts they have worked in, including 
Nepal (2007). A category in itself in this type ofliterature might be the contributions of 
Terry (2002) and Marriage (2006). Terry implies that aid agencies can hardly escape 
the challenges they have to face when they decide to operate in crisis areas, while 
Marriage, in part, appears to emphasise the importance of applying a psychological 
lens in understanding how assistance works. This research stands out as it focuses on 
one country and explores various aspects aid strategists might wish to consider during 
strategizing and implementation processes in an evolving crisis, knowing that friction 
is inevitable and will be present at all times. A significant element of dealing with it 
fruitfully is acknowledging the psychological dimension of aid processes. 
Eighthly, this piece of exploratory research stands out from large-scale evaluations or 
assessments of joint relief operations or interventions by particular individual aid 
agencies (Schumer 2008; Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006; Joint Evaluation of 
Emergency Assistance to Rwanda 1996; Minear 1991). As stated earlier this work is 
not evaluating individual agencies or a set of aid agencies and their operations. 
However, the work partially contributes to answering the question recently raised 
within Nepal's aid community as to what went wrong (Bonino and Donini 2009), and 
in that sense it adds to learning within Nepal's aid industry. 
Ninthly, this work stands out from Goodhand (2007), Mac Ginty and Williams (2009), 
and a group of authors who have devised tools that aid agencies can use to incorporate 
the issue of contlict in their operations. This is not because this study assumes that 
conflict, development and aid agencies are separate issues and should be dealt with 
separately, but rather the opposite. Goodhand focuses on the changing roles of donors 
and aid agencies in conflict situations on the basis of a series of case studies, while this 
study focuses on the single context of Nepal. Mac Ginty and Williams provide a rather 
theoretical overview of the linkages between development, contlict and the position of 
aid agencies (2009). Some authors recognise the link between contlict and 
development and devise practical tools either to further developmental interventions or 
reduce negative effects of aid in contlict situations. Anderson and Woodrow devised an 
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approach to facilitate developmental intervention strategies in times of crisis (1998). 
Others engaged in devising planning approaches to minimize the harmful effects of aid 
interventions in contlict environments (Paffenholz and Reychler 2007; RMO 2005; 
Anderson 1998). This work fully recognises that development and contlict can be 
negatively and positively connected with each other; however, the work does not 
propose a technically-orientated approach to address possible negative processes or 
further processes perceived as positive, but aims to present the rudimentary beginnings 
of a way in which an aid strategist might look at various aspects related to strategizing 
and implementing aid activities. 
Tenthly, several authors focus on either the ethical or moral dimensions of various 
theoretical and practical aspects of development or humanitarian aid (Pogge 2007; 
Chatterjee 2006; Des Gaspar 2004; Van Ufford and Giri eds. 2003; Slim 1997; Des 
Gaspar 1998) This work does not focus on the ethics of aid activities as such, but on 
how these activities could be conducted in the most effective way given the 
circumstances in which they take place. This is in line with Clausewitz's On War, 
which does not address the ethical aspects of war; the focus of both is on conducting 
operations with maximum efficacy. 
Lastly, this work is not an eyewitness report of aid in war-torn societies in the direct 
and rather optimistic style of Egeland (2008), neither is it a flowing series of 
pessimistic philosophical reflections on war and suffering (Levy 2004). However, the 
thesis is informed by my own observations of strategizing and implementation 
processes by aid agencies in a deteriorating context and by primary research among 
people closely involved or observing these processes in Nepal, resulting in a series of 
reflections, which hopefully are realistic in their goal of identifying key considerations 
for the aid strategist operating in a turbulent environment like Nepal. 
1.9 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is divided into four parts and contains 16 chapters. Part I is comprised of 
the first five chapters. Chapter Two sets the scene and explores Nepal, including its 
arnled contlict and the role and position of aid and development between 1999 and 
2005/06. Chapter Three provides an introduction into the life and thoughts of 
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Clausewitz as described in On War, together with an overview of criticism of his 
theory. Chapter Four discusses the research methodology and elaborates on the 
paradoxical interplay between Clausewitz's thoughts and the process of reflecting on 
aid operations in turbulent environments like Nepal. Chapter Five elaborates on the 
main conceptual framework in which the reflections take place. This framework is 
mainly inspired by Clausewitz's "Remarkable Trinity' concept (H&P: 89) and is called 
the "aid trinity'. 
Part II is comprised of chapters 6 to 10. Part III includes chapters II to 15. In both 
Parts the themes and the order of the chapters is, with a few exceptions, inspired by 
and structured along the lines of On War. Part II starts with an elaboration on the 
notion of the ideal form of aid in the Nepali context and mirrors Clausewitz's idea 
about the ideal war. Four chapters follow discussing various forms of friction, namely 
friction in general, physical efforts, information,36 and danger. After these chapters we 
move on to Part III and address the topic of strategy and some elements Clausewitz 
assumes to be important to consider when thinking through strategy in the context of 
war, which I also perceive as important for the aid strategist. The topics are: strategy, 
superiority of resources,37 boldness, cunning and tension and rest. A thread running 
through the chapters of Part III is the ever-returning theme of processes of friction, 
how these manifested themselves in Nepal and how they might be countered or 
mitigated by an aid strategist in the course of strategizing and implementing aid 
operations in a turbulent environment. 
Each of the chapters in Part II and III is structured in a similar way. Firstly, I indicate 
how the concept under discussion assisted me in understanding aspects of the 
operational environment in Nepal. Then, Clausewitz's ideas regarding the concept 
under discussion are summarised. This is followed by an overview of how the concept 
resonated among research participants. In the final section these two are brought 
together and reflected upon within the context of the "aid trinity' framework. 
36 Clausewitz speaks actually on Intelligence, but I thought that the term information is more suitable 
for the aid industry. See as well Powell M. (2003) Information Management for Development 
Organisations, Oxfam, UK. 
37 Clausewitz actually speaks about Superiority of Numbers, I found the term Superiority of Resources 
more applicable, as development work is not solely about deploying staff. 
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Part IV consists of the final chapter drawing conclusions from the study. Alongside 
these concluding ideas will be discussed as to how the results could infonn theory and 
practice of aid delivery in turbulent environments will be discussed. Now, we move to 
Chapter Two, which elaborates on various aspects of Nepal, including the nexus of the 
insurgency and development aid. 
31 
Chapter 2 Introducing Nepal 
2. 1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a brief introduction to Nepal in order to sketch the context for 
the remainder of the thesis and the circumstances in which aid agencies had to operate 
which subsequently directly or indirectly influenced their work. 38 The overview begins 
with geography, agricultural production and the food security situation. Then issues 
related to caste, ethnicity, and demography are covered, followed by issues related to 
Nepal's history, politics and government system. The causes of the Maoist insurgency, 
its beginning and growth will be examined and the chapter closes with a description of 
Nepal's development aid sector, the general effects of development aid and effects on 
the contlict. This section also includes an overview of the positions the foreign 
countries most relevant to Nepal, namely India, China, the USA and the UK. 
2.2 Geography, agricultural production and food securit~9 
Nepal is sandwiched between Tibet and China to the North and India to the East, South 
and West (see Annexe 2.1). Landlocked, Nepal varies in altitude from 100m in the 
southern plains to mountaintops up to approximately 8800m in the North, within a 
horizontal distance ofless then 200km. This gap in altitude is bridged by rugged terrain 
dissected by many rain-fed rivers.40 
This astonishing altitude difference divides the country, from North to South, into four 
geographical zones, each running in parallel from East to West: the TeraL the inner-
Terai, the mid-hills and the mountains. The first geographical zone is the Terai. This 
relatively narrow strip of land ranges in breadth from 15km to 40km, and borders India 
in the south. In terms of farmland and forests, the latter under pressure due to (il) legal 
logging and agricultural expansion, the Terai is the most wealthy zone in the country 
38 Due to its limited length this chapter cannot do justice to Nepal's fascinating complexity and the 
various authors attempting to describe this. It merely aims to provide sufficient baCkground to the 
remainder of this thesis. 
39 This section follows closely Bhattaria (2003). If other sources are used it will be stated. 
40 For an insight into how rugged the terrain is, see the book 'Vignettes of Nepal' (Gurung 1980). 
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(Shrestha 1999). Above the Terai the inner-Terai can be found. The Terai and inner-
Terai are divided by two ranges of hills; the Churia hills up to 1500m and the 
Mahabharat range from 1500m to 2700m. The inner-Terai is geographically 
comparable to the Terai, but climatologically circumstances are rather marginal. The 
Mid-hills form a band 50lan to 100 km to the North of the inner-Terai and form the 
historical and physical backbone of the country. The altitude of this zone ranges from 
600m to 3000m. Within this range, valleys such as the Kathmandu and the Pokhara 
valley are situated. In the mid-hills, agricultural production is the predominant 
economic activity, but the zone also suffers from chronic food deficiency (ibid). The 
most Northern zone is the mountain range known as the Himalayas, which can be 
divided into the main, inner and Tibetan Himalayas. This zone is the least populated. 
The physical features of Nepal"s terrain generate three major drainage systems. the 
Khosi in the East, the Gandaki in the centre and the Karnali in the western part of the 
country. All three basins channel their water towards the plains of India. Livestock 
grazing and trading are the main economic activities in the mountains and with any 
agricultural production concentrated in the lower valleys along the (main) rivers (ibid). 
Nepal's main sources of income are agriculture, tourism, hydropower and industry; the 
latter is mainly based in the urban areas of the Kathmandu and Pokhara Valleys and the 
Terai. 
The geographical circumstances add to the context in which Nepal's agricultural 
production takes place. In general terms the agricultural productivity reduces from the 
Terai (being most productive per hectare) to the mountainous zone. Overall, the 
agricultural resource base is deteriorating in terms of access to land and land available 
per capita (ibid 1999: 9).41 Within this context rural households struggle to maintain 
their food consumption levels. A study titled a "Food crisis in Nepal" suggests that a 
large percentage of households in a sample of villages are unable to fulfil minimum 
consumption requirements, despite the fact that members of these households are, 
according to the researchers, very active, flexible and willing to use every opportunity 
offered to them (Adhikari and Bohle 1999). The study also reveals that in the 
researched villages ethnic groups and non-Brahmin caste groups face more frequent 
food shortages and subsequently have deficient food consumption patterns than the 
41 Major food crops are maize and rice. Other food crops are barley, millet and wheat. Major cash crops 
are potato, sugar cane, oil seeds and jute (School atlas for Nepal 1997). 
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much less affected high-caste Brahmins (ibid: 174). Such conclusions might be 
expected had the research taken place in a remote far western district. However, the 
research was undertaken in Kaski district, which, due to the flourishing tourism 
industry, is one of the most prosperous hill districts of western Nepal. While reflecting 
on the developments of the last 20 years in Nepal, Blaikie et aI., close academic 
observers of Nepal, argues that the food security situation in the remoter Mid-hills has 
continued to deteriorate, while in the even more remote mountainous Karnali zone the 
food security conditions continued to be disastrous (2005: 303). Action Against 
Hunger argues in a similar fashion, from the basis of an intensive food security study 
in the Karnali (ACF 2004). Adhikari and Bohle stated in 1999 regarding Kathmandu's 
administrative-bureaucratic power centre that the ability of its inhabitants to feed 
themselves had been reduced dramatically, with many households facing a precarious 
food security situation. In addition, Kathmandu became increasingly dependent on 
India for its food supply (1999B). The Norwegian and Nepali researchers Aase and 
Chapagain, while agreeing with the general analysis of Blaikie et al. regarding the state 
of crisis in Nepal's agricultural sector, conclude on a slightly more positive note that 
the agricultural 'histories' of at least some districts go through a process of "profound 
transformation" or "agricultural recession" (2005: 54). Nepal's geography and 
challenges related to its agricultural production and food security situation were 
contributing factors to the start and development of the conflict. 
2.3 Caste, Ethnicity and Demography 
Caste and ethnicity42 According to the anthropologist Bista. Nepal's social make-up 
consists of a mix of mainly Tibeto-Burman and Indo-Aryan people. Alongside this mix 
of people, Nepal applies a caste system in which ethnic groups have found a place or a 
means of living alongside it. In his monograph Bista presents and describes at least 30 
different groups of people living in Nepal ranging from Brahmins to Rauyte. The 
Brahmins and Chethri occupy the highest position in the caste system, making up 
approximately 16% of Nepal's total population and living throughout Nepal. while for 
example the Rauyte, an ethnic group totalling less then 0.5% of Nepal's population, 
42 The information on caste and ethnicity in this section follows closely Bista (1996). Other sources are 
referenced where used. 
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survives through hunter-gatherer practices, and primarily trek around in a few districts 
in Nepal's far and Midwestern hills. The main other groups and their percentages are: 
Bahun-hill (12.7%), Magar (7.14%), Tharu (6.74%), Tamang (5.64%), Muslim 
(4.27%), Kami (3.94%), Yadav (3.94%), Rai (2.79%), Gurung (2.39%) (Rimal 2007). 
SNV reports that the high-caste groups occupy approximately 89% of all positions in 
the government (1998).43 
The 2001 census, according to Gurung, records 92 languages. However, he suggests 
that the number of languages referred to in the official statistics varies according to the 
policy of the regime in charge, as the census data for 1961, 1971 and 1981 shows a 
decrease in the number of languages from 36 in 1961 to 18 in 1981 (2005). The 2001 
census indicates that approximately 86% of the population is Hindu, 7.8% Buddhist, 
3.5% Muslim, 1.0% Kiranti, and 0.2% is Christian (Gurung 2005). 
Mikesell contests the anthropological approach suggesting that Nepali people, as for 
example presented in a book called 'People of Nepal' (Bista 1996), can be primarily be 
understood on the basis of their geographical origin and culture (1999: 29).44 A 
publication, based on the population census data of 2001 and sponsored by the INGO 
Action Aid, shows that Nepal is a complicated mosaic of caste and ethnicity rather than 
a country were specific groups live in designated areas (Rimal 2007). For example, the 
caste/ethnicity variance per district ranges from 34 castes/ethnic groups per district 
(Kalikot) to 98 castes/ethnic groups per district (Kathmandu district). This caste and 
ethnic diversity is reflected in the distribution of the 93 languages spoken in Nepal, 
varying from 9 in Kalikot district to 70 in Morang district (ibid 2007). 
Demography45 In terms of demography, the country has undergone rapid change. In 
1971 the total population was approximately 11.6 million (Panday 1999). In 2001 this 
figure rose to 23,151,423, resulting in an average population density of 157 per 
43 Respondent Al2 referred to a figure of 85%, which was still perceived as excessive. 
44 Whelpton implies a comparable point when he argues that the distinction between 'Mongolian' 
groups with linguistic links to central Asia and speakers of Indic languages (including Nepali) as recent 
migrants is an oversimplification (2006:3). 
4S The information on population and demography in this section is mainly taken from Rimal (2007), 
which is primarily but not solely based on the Population Census 2001. Other sources are stated when 
used. 
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sq/km.46 Again the variance is enonnous, varying from 4 per sq/km in Manang district 
to 2739 persons per sq/km in Kathmandu.47 However, according to Kumar, it is 
significant that the demographic growth of the country has made Nepal a country of 
teenagers, as they are the largest demographic !,,'TOUp (2005: 57).48 The caste system, 
ethnic complexity and demographic make-up were contributing factors to the conflict 
in Nepal. 
2.4 History, Politics and Features of the Government System 
Nepal's History up to 1951 49 Whelpton states in his book "The History of Nepal" that 
the state of Nepal in its current fonn emerged only during the end of the 18th century, 
when much of the Himalayan foothills and parts of the Terai were brought under the 
control of a small kingdom approximately 80 km west of the Kathmandu valley, 
initiating the Shah dynasty (2006: 1). Whelpton distinguishes four different phases in 
NepaJ"s historical development. The first of which is the period before 1743 AD, 
characterised by migration and series of unsuccessful attempts to carve out viable 
kingdoms. 50 This changed in 1743 AD when Privithi Narayan Shah was crowned as 
king of Ghorkha and started a period of conquest via a succession of rulers dealing 
within internal competition and external strife, laying the foundation of the State 
Nepal, via a process of unification and sanskritisation.s1 This took place between 1743 
and 1885. The third phase in Nepal's development is the Rana era covering the period 
1885-1951. In this period, the role of the king was merely submissive to the Rana 
family, which for five successive generations provided not only the prime minister, but 
key positions in the government and the anny as well. This period came to an end in 
1951 and the monarchical years started, which lasted till 1991. 
46 Mr. Thor Gislesen, the Norwegian Ambassador to Nepal, mentioned, in a speech given on the 1st of 
September 2009 in Trondheim, that the figure currently stands on 29 million. 
47 Note also that, according to Kumar, 90% of the population lives in villages, There are approximately 
4000 Village Development Committee (VDC) areas and some 36,000 to 40,000 village wards (Kumar 
2004) 
48 The rate of population growth combined with a deterioration of agricultural production has probably 
forced Nepal to become a net-importer of agricultural products. 
49 This section follows closely Whelpton (2006). Other sources are stated when used. 
50 Justice argues that despite Nepal being unified, its legacy of being ruled by approximately 50 small 
and separately ruled principalities still marks the differences between the central culture in Kathmandu 
and the many local cultures within the various regions (Justice 1989: 20). 
51 The process of sankritisation is connected, according to Whelpton, with the process of imposing 
certain Hindu values and a uniform caste-based moral order (2006: 56). 
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Although each of these periods has its defined political features, they have, according 
to Whelpton, at least four characteristics in common. To begin with, there is the 
dynamic nexus between the personal drivers of those in leadership, and the overall 
process of becoming a nation. Secondly, there is the complex relationship between the 
people and the physical environment they live in, which made the Mid-hill zone of the 
country the backbone of Nepal. Then, European, and in particular British, influence 
has been only relatively recent. Throughout the ages Nepal has been a cultural contact 
zone between people of different regions, which still affects the internal dynamics of 
the country. Fourthly, Nepal's history contains the story of the attempts of small and 
evolving groups of people to develop a common identity. This process started, 
according to Whelpton, even before the British introduced the modem idea of the 
nation-state. Whelpton's presentation of the history of Nepal reveals a past as 
fascinating as it is complicated. One easily reaches the conclusion that the history of 
Nepal has been shaped by the dynamics of cooperating and competing elite families, 
able to rally the less powerful to their aid as needed, turning away from them if they 
became too demanding. Those in charge at any given moment have also had to walk a 
tightrope between the ruling regimes in India and China. 
The Rana period (1885-1951)52 According to Thapa and Saijpata, the years of Rana 
rule were among the darkest in Nepal's history. The Rana family did not only supply a 
succession of prime ministers but ruled Nepal as their personal chiefdom.53 This led to 
processes of impoverishing the countryside, increased migration to India and an 
attempt to isolate Nepal from the outside world. This led to anti-Rana sentiments 
among politically aware groups ranging from the political right to the political left,54 
culminating in an armed movement resisting the Ranas. King Tribhuvan responded to 
this development by fleeing via the Indian Embassy to India. In 1951, with the help of 
the Indian government, a deal was in brokered resulting in the restoration of the King's 
52 The following two sections follows closely Thapa and Sijapati (2003). Other sources are stated if 
used. 
53 Holberg et al. describe how the Rana regime organised the practice of forced labour among the 
Tamang in a district near the Kathmandu valley for purposes such as extracting resources to maintain 
the royal herds. This labour was of the order of 41,000 days' unpaid labour per 540 to 700 household 
units (1999). 
54 Some political groups joined each other in the Nepali Congress Party adopting the line of democratic 
SOcialism, while others political groups organised themselves around communist-orientated ideology. 
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powers and the fonnation of joint government between Ranas and the Nepali Congress 
Party (NC), which in effect meant the downfall ofthe Rana regime. 
Politics between 1951 till the end of the '90's The newly fonned government failed 
quickly and a decade of political instability began, in which King Mahendhra, King 
Tribhuvan's successor, was able to gain more political power to the benefit of the 
monarchy. Tensions within the NC leadership deepened. King Mahendhra's position 
was strengthened by the introduction in 1959 of a new constitution, which weakened 
the position of the cabinet and its prime minister. The political parties conceded, 
allowing the creation of a two-power centre around the king and the prime minister. At 
the end of 1960, the King, unsatisfied with the government's perfonnance, dissolved 
parliament, arrested some of the members of the council and initiated the Panchayat 
system, which lasted for three decades. The Panchayat system was introduced as a 
fonn of party-less democracy, but was in fact a fonn of direct rule by the Monarch. 
The position of the monarch became so strong that the separation of powers between 
legislature, judiciary and executive faded into non-existence. 
Triggered by countrywide student protests, in 1980 King Birendhra offered the people 
a referendum to choose between an amended Panchayat system and a multi-party 
democracy. The Panchayat system won the majority, however the political parties used 
the outcome of the referendum as a platfonn to widen their political room for 
manoeuvre: the Nepali Congress and other parties, including communist parties like 
the United Leninist-Marxist Party (UML), started to work towards an abolition of the 
Panchayat system. Their time came in 1990, when, in part encouraged by uprisings in 
Eastern Europe, political parties and their followers were mobilised for a successful 
uprising resulting in the abolition of the Panchayat system and an introduction of a 
constitutional multi-party democracy and the basis of a new constitution. ss 
Despite the introduction of a multi-party democracy and high expectations among the 
population about the new way of governing the country, the political dynamics of 
Nepal remained unstable. Between 1991 and 2002 the country had II prime ministers 
55 Kumar (200S) argues that the new constitution was controversial from the start, asserting Nepal as a 
Hindu state, catering to a religious majority on the one hand, recognising multi-religiosity, while 
maintaining secular posturing on the other. 
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in as many years (Hachhethu 2007). This high turnover reflects the political infighting 
between and within the mainstream political parties and intrusive behaviour by King 
Gyanendra towards the end of the period. 56 Kumar suggests that the state became a 
lucrative institution for politicians in terms of access to money, power and privileges, 
subsequently focusing their attention on 'the spoils of tenure in government and their 
terms in parliament' (2005: 65). Due to this focus the challenges the country faced 
stayed unarticulated. Instead of addressing them by mediation, they were repressed, 
becoming instrumental in triggering conflict (ibid: 66). Within this volatile context the 
CPN-M or Maoists could prepare, initiate and expand their People's War (PW) 
(Mishra 2004: 35). Before addressing this issue the government structure of Nepal will 
be discussed briefly. 
Some features of the government system57 Nepal's government system during the 
study period is shaped by the system of governance during the Panyachat period. 
Paudyal concludes, from doctoral research on planned development in Ivan District 
between 1985-1990,58 that although the system appeared indigenous and democratic, it 
maintained the absolute leadership position of the King (1994: 206). Innovation was 
only possible if it did not challenge existing power structures, and space for discussion, 
debate or acknowledgement of failure was lacking, since the King, as initiator of 
development, was flawless. Furthermore, the system portrayed the idea of grass-roots 
participation while in practice the procedures of participation were used to legitimise 
resource capture by local elites (ibid). Moreover, due to a political use of the 
government bureaucracy, quality control in terms of expenditure, materials and 
services within this same bureaucracy was lacking (ibid). These features resonated 
through the government structure in place during the period of study. 59 
This administrative government structure was built around five development regions 
(the Eastern, Central, Western, Mid-western and Far-western development regions) 
56 After the Royal Massacre in 2001, when crown prince Dipendra killed a significant part of his family 
including his father king Birendra, King Gyanendra took the crown. In 2002 he dissolved the parliament 
and assumed direct power on 1 February 2005. 
57 The focus of this section is on the governance structures related to development. 
58 Ivan District is a pseudonym for a district in East-Nepal, known by the author; I had the privilege of 
sharing working space with Durga Paudyal around 1994 in Wageningen. 
59 See also Barel on leadership (2005: 20). He argues that the values and norms of the panchayat era 
continue to guide leadership practices under the veil of multi-party democracy. 
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and 14 zones.60 Each zone was administratively sub-divided in several districts, and 
each individual district contained several VDCs (3915 in total) and 58 municipalities. 
In theory the District Development Committees (DOCs) were the elected bodies at 
district level and could give direction to development activities in the district (Dhakal 
2006). They were created in 1992 by a parliamentary decision (Shanna 2004). Nepal's 
administrative and political structure is presented in annexe 2.2. 
The development community focused their attention in part on the strengthening of 
decentralisation processes within the government. SNV concludes in its 1998 
evaluation report that although there have been efforts to decentralise the government, 
development planning is still strongly centralised. In addition, political instability, the 
involvement of a large number of ministers, and overlapping functions did not enhance 
effective planning and implementation of development activities (1998: 41). Moreover, 
effective transfer of authority to local development institutions did not materialise, 
partly due to a lack of confidence on a local level, partly due to distrust among donors 
(ibid). 
To conclude this rather incomplete overview, I would like to refer to Justice, who 
during her anthropological research within the Nepali health system refers to an 
observant participant who suggests, surprisingly for a department of which one might 
expect a people-centred approach, that the objectives within the health system were 
primarily political, then employment and lastly health care (1989: 37). Assuming that 
during times of crisis processes intensify (Boin et al. 2005), it is imaginable that the 
processes described above intensified during the course of the contlict and did not 
necessarily contribute to a climate conducive to tlourishing development operations.61 
Now we turn to a brief description of the causes of contlict, the start and growth of the 
Maoist insurgency and the response of the government to the contlict with the Maoists. 
60 For example the Karnali zone, in the most northern part of the Mid-Western Development region. 
61 For example Baral argues that the local Governance Act (lGA) from 1999 had not been seriously 
implemented allowing a process whereby leaders not already based in the centre moved to the centre 
by attempting to obtain favours from the leaders in the centre (2005: 18). 
2.5 Causes, start and growth of the Maoist insurgency and 
Government response 
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Causes of conflict Upreti suggests that the underlying causes of the conflict are a 
complex combination of the imbalance of political, socio-economic and cultural 
opportunities between different groups within Nepali society resulting in a mix of 
structural inequality, political oppression, corruption, social discrimination and social 
exclusion. As indicated earlier a succession of governments failed to address these 
issues (2004). Kumar puts forward a similar mix of factors triggering and driving 
Nepal's civil war, but he highlights the behavioural pattern of the politicalleadership62 
and the problematic role of the monarch regularly antagonistically intervening in 
Nepal"s political development. Lastly, Kumar suggest a psychological factor related to 
the ethno-politics of the ruling elite in favour of high-cast Brahmins at the expense of 
the marginalised and ethnic masses (2005: 72-73). Within this context, the Maoist 
insurgency could, ..... erupt as a misdirected catharsis (?l a .,ystem never properly 
cleansed" (Gyawali in: Thapa ed.: 230-231). 
Start and growth of the Maoist insurgency To begin with Kumar argues that 
rebellions in Nepal against the state are not unique. What makes the Maoist rebellion 
different is that it is the first to have begun in the western part of the country (while 
some others started in the eastern part), ..... beinK able to polari=e the political scene 
and brinK the protagonist forces to de.\peration" (2005: 77). In that sense the Maoist 
insurgency could be labelled as 'violence .Ii·om below' to challenge the 'violence .Ii·om 
above' (Kumar 2005: 55). 
Officially, the insurgency initiated by the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists (CPN-
M) started in February 1996, with the proclamation of a list of 40 demands to the then 
ruling NC-led government.63 The insurgency had however, been in the making for a 
long time, in terms of preparing the ideological ground within the Nepali society and 
later practical preparations.64 According to Mehta the overall military aim of the 
Maoists was to undermine the legitimacy of the government, constrain movement of 
62 See also Kumar 2004. 
63 The Maoist's 40-point demand covered issues related to nationalism, the general public and its well-
being, and people's living (GTZ 2002). 
64 See as well Gersony 2003; Karki and Seddon 2003. 
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the security forces and create moral dominance by psychological warfare (2006: 21), 
which culminating ideologically in the establishment of a totalitarian communist 
regime in Nepal (ibid: 14). 
The development of the insurgency between 1996 and 2005/06 could be summarized 
along three interlinked lines. To begin with, in geographic terms the insurgency started 
in some areas in the western part of the country and moved over time to the East, 
eventually affecting almost all 75 districts in the country, creating a situation whereby 
almost 80% of the country was not under government control (A35)65. Secondly, in 
military terms the Maoists evolved from a relatively under-resourced and unorganised 
group of cadres into a relatively well-resourced and well-organised guerrilla army, able 
to organise and sustain series of sophisticated and daring attacks (Mehta 2006).66 Into 
the context of these processes the Maoists projected their revolutionary rhetoric, 
according to Kumar, with the monarchy as the centre point of all evils within Nepali 
society. The notion of a constitute assembly became the ultimate test case of the 
willingness of the monarchy to reconcile their own republican position (2005: 60). 
Thirdly, the Maoists evolved from being politically marginal within Nepal's political 
scene into a central actor, even receiving attention from powers like India and USA 
(Gersony 2003). The development of the Maoist movement cannot be separated from 
the response of the government and the role of the Royal Nepali Army (RNA).67 This 
will be discussed in the section below. Annexe 2.3 provides a time line of the growth 
of the insurgency.68 
Economically the movement could maintain itself via an internal tax regime, "taxing' 
citizen, government personnel, businesses and development agencies and project statf. 
In addition, the Maoists found support from within the Nepali Diaspora. Mehta 
estimates that they could collect approximately $150 million, including some money 
looted from local banks (2006: 16). 
65 A35 and other A-numbers in the remaining part of the text are codes of interviewees. 
66 Ashok Metha, an Indian security specialist provides an informed idea about the Maoists 
organisational structure and military capacity (2006). 
67 A fourth line in the development of Maoist movement might be from the perspective of the general 
public, which could have been evolved along lines like, being some locals taken revenge, via 
sympathetic rebels, terrorists, to those who with others (e.g. the RNA) make our lives difficult. 
68 The timeline emphaSis the military aspects of the growth of the insurgency and the subsequent 
conflict with the Nepal government. However, one should, according to Karki and Seddon, not forget 
that the People's War is a political movement, which finds its roots in political problems (2003: xi). 
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The response of the Nepali government and the RNA The response of Nepali 
government to the compounding insurgency could be described as reactive or better 
still ad-hoc (Thapa and Sijapti 2003). Mehta, an Indian Security specialist, argues that 
there was little evidence of an appropriate, well-articulated strategy covering the 
political, military and economic dimensions of a response (2006: 59-76). The lack of a 
well thought-through, comprehensive response was compounded by a continuous 
power struggle between the King and Prime Minister (ibid: 76). This reactive or ad hoc 
response to the insurgency by the Nepali government was seen for example by their 
failure to respond to the Maoists 40-point demand laid down in February 1996.69 
Further, labelling the insurgency as a law and order problem instead of a political 
problem might have contributed to its escalation (A5). Mehta argues that it might have 
been better to send in the RNA in directly, instead of the poorly trained and equipped 
police, as the Maoists could gain experience and weaponry (2006). Insufficient 
preparations, at least on the side of the government, for the various rounds of peace 
talks could also be mentioned (Upreti 2006). Gersony argues that the prime minister's 
decision not to extend the term of the elected district level representatives was unwise 
as elections were impossible, given the political-military climate at the time. According 
to Gersony, by not expanding the term a situation was created which the Maoists had 
aimed for in the first place. namely the undermining of the government's presence in 
rural areas (2003: 41). This decision might have added to psychological insecurity 
among the political leadership in Kathmandu (Kumar 2005: 65),70 
Against this backdrop the RNA came into play,71 Mehta, on the one hand, respects the 
RNA for its international UN peacekeeping missions. On the other hand, he argues that 
before and after their deployment in November 2001,72 the RNA showed a reluctance 
to fight, perhaps in part because of their history as a ceremonial force (2006). The 
RNA were deployed in around 350 locations throughout the country, but mainly 
concentrated in the urban areas (ibid: 55, 77). Despite an apparent apathy towards 
69 After the declaration of the 40-point demand on 4 February 1996, the then Prime Minister decided 
to ignore the demands and visits India (Thapa and Sijapati 2003: 85). 
70 I recall a meeting in late 2003/ early 2004 between agency representatives in which one of the 
ambassadors elaborated on a meeting held with representatives of the political leadership within the 
government. The ambassador stated that the representatives appeared to be "blocks of ice", not being 
able to discuss, despite its importance, the insurgency and the need for an appropriate response. 
71 The RNA saw action for the first time during the aftermath of a Maoist raid in Holeri, were they were 
charged to negotiate the release of approximately 70 police captured by the Maoists (Gersony 2003). 
72 The deployment was a response to a Maoist raid on the army barracks in Ghorai/ Dang district. 
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conflict with the Maoists, Mehta argues that, the RNA appears to have operated in 
"overkill mode'", not always able to keep its trigger-happy soldiers in check (ibid: 62), 
which is in contrast to its performance during peacekeeping missions under the 
responsibility of the UN (ibid: 63).73 A leadership vacuum compounded this 
behaviour, as the RNA expanded in a relatively short time frame from approximately 
50,000 soldiers to a force of 83,000 soldiers (ibid: 44). In short, under neither civilian 
nor royal leadership could the RNA outmanoeuvre the Maoists, and in particular the 
PLA. They could at best repel attacks against their fortified positions and prevent 
Kathmandu being taken over by the Maoists. By contrast with the Maoists, one of their 
key problems was a lack of clarity regarding whom they were fighting against. 
2.6 Development aid, its impacts and its implications for the 
conflict 
Development Aid Development is one of Nepal's largest 'industries' and highly 
visible in terms of signposts to aid agency offices, research centres or development 
businesses (Hindman 2002).74 Development, or 'bikas' in Nepali. entered Nepal in the 
'50s (ibid) and has been the key ideology of the state. its bureaucracy and development 
agencies in terms of increase of productivity, with the promise of the sharing of wealth 
(Mikesell 1999: 208). From 1951 up to 1995, the year before the start of insurgency, 
Nepal had received USD 3.7 billion in loans and grants (Hoftun et al. 2005: 258). 
A multitude of players in the field of development can be found in Nepal, including 
multi-lateral agencies like the World Bank (WB) and Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), members of the UN family,75 and various bi-Iateral agencies.76 The European 
73 Mehta cites a Human Rights Watch report published in March 2005 which named the RNA as "one of 
the worst perpetrators of enforced disappearances" (2006: 63). 
74 Hindman shows in her article that in the case of USAID, the lives of the first generation of American 
aid workers and way they engaged in development work in Nepal were primarily determined by the 
institutional arrangements of their agency and only secondarily by Nepal's specific operational 
environment, and that this still influences the way in which USAID staff are operating in Nepal today. 
7S Examples include: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children's Fund 
(UNICEF) and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA), OCHA 
began operating in Nepal in 2004. 
76 Examples include: Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Danish International 
Development Agency (DAN IDA), the British Department for International Development (DFID), the 
Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technishe Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), the Swiss Development Cooperation 
(SOC), the Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV) and United States Agency for International 
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Union was also represented. Various International-Non Governmental Organisations 
(lNGOs) were active in Nepal, including CARE, various branches of Save the 
Children, Terre des Homes, Helvetas and Oxfam. After 2000 when the conflict started 
to intensify, more humanitarian-orientated agencies arrived, such as Handicap 
International, Doctors without Borders France and Holland (MSF-F and MSF-H) and 
Ockenden International. A part of these agencies were organised under the umbrella of 
the Association of International NGOs in Nepal (AIN). Local Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) were also represented, some with national coverage like SAP 
(South-Asian Partnership) or Rural Reconstruction Nepal (RRN), others with a more 
local orientation, such as for example the Karnali Joint Development Forum (KJDF), 
which only focussed on issues in the Karnali. One interviewee observed that, based on 
his own experience of working in Africa and other parts of Asia, Nepars development 
scene was organised in an exceptionally complicated manner (A42). 
These agencies operated formally within the context of the 10-Year Plan or the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), covering a wide variety of sectors including 
agriculture, forestry, road building, education and health, both providing policy 
guidance in the process of addressing poverty. However, according to one close 
observer, in reality neither the 10-year plan nor the PRSP, constituted a practical guide 
for the actions of aid agencies (A13)J7 Below, an overview of opinions is provided 
about the overall effects of development aid in Nepal. 
The overall effects of development aid Among commentators, development aid 
overall appears to have at best mixed results. Former finance minister Dr. Mahat states 
in his book "In Defence of Democracy . .. that in the post-panchayat era a shift in focus 
of development aid took place from the urban to rural areas which had a significant 
impact on all social development indicators including education, literacy, life 
expectancy child and maternal mortality (2005: xv). In addition, not only did the 
macro-economic indicators, in terms of production structure, trade and balance of the 
national budget, point towards improved development, but the expansion of physical 
Development (USAID). SNV was in the process of changing from being the implementing arm of the 
Dutch Ministry of Development Cooperation towards being an INGO. 
77 I have to confess that I cannot recall one meeting in the agencies I worked for where the 10th plan or 
the PRSP were used as explicit reference points. However, it were points of reference during meetings 
with government officials. 
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infrastructure in tenns of roads, bridges, irrigation and drinking water facilities made a 
tangible difference on village level (ibid). He also argues that the gap between 
expectations raised by the introduction of democracy and the progress achieved by 
development remained unchanged. 
A series of other commentators are less positive. Dixit in his article "Foreign Aid to 
Nepal: No bang for the buck" argues that foreign aid, in the way it is provided (for 
example being top-down, with regularly changing fads and not engaging in real 
partnership) has not helped Nepal to develop. Despite the positive exceptions of some 
development interventions, Dixit suggests the need for a visionary leader with the 
courage to refuse the money foreign aid is bringing (1997). Pandey, also a fonner 
minister of finance like Mahat, goes a step further in his book "Failed Development" 
and argues that Nepal's development failed, not necessarily because of what has been 
achieved in the 50-year history of development in Nepal, but because of the lack of 
interest and commitment at the centre of power for those living outside this centre 
(1999). Shrestha is equally reserved about the overall impact of development aid in 
Nepal, partly because of its predefined and predetennined character. He argues that the 
Europe-centric economic and technical assumptions behind it led to a total devaluation 
of the local modes of life and economy, subsequently creating a culture of dependency 
on other countries (1999). Mishra in a group of essays on the sociology of Nepal states 
that the foreign aided development failed to fulfil its promises, firstly, because Nepal's 
mode of production has over the years hardly been affected. Furthennore, agriculture, 
the mainstay of the Nepali economy, has not benefited from reinvestment of the profits 
generated by the sector. Aid projects, with the exception of road projects, suffered 
from an urban bias and as a result tended to be concentrated on the Central region, the 
Eastern Terai and the Kathmandu valley. This bias is not necessarily solely caused by 
Nepal's elite, but is rooted in the behaviour of foreign donors as well (Mishra 2007). 
Dahal cites one example where a vice-chainnan of the National Planning Commission 
(NPC) stated that "the donors wish to invest in political, social, philosophical and 
business fields of their own interests, .. subsequently inhibiting investment in Nepal's 
priority sectors (Dahal 1995: 119 in: Tamang 2002: 330).18 
78 Former finance minister Dr. Mahat echo's this view by stating that: "the donor perception of 
priorities does not always conform to that of the recipients" (2005: xvi). 
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Foreign aid had its effect on the country's political dynamics as well. Mishra argues 
that the role of foreign aid furthered I) the creation of a centralised and nationwide 
power-network, 2) the westernization of Nepal's upper-class and the rise of an 
administrative, technical and business 'middle-class', which did not necessarily help 
understanding of production systems and subsequent problems of the under-class, 3) a 
crisis of institutional ising development programmes, whereby donors incorrectly 
assumed that projects would be taken over by either the government or other players in 
society and 4) the contradictory application of the notion of people's participation 
(2007: 169-172). To conclude this rather discouraging section on the impact of 
development in general, Blaikie et al. argue that the essentially negative affects of 
foreign aid, already thoroughly researched and highlighted by them in the mid-1980s, 
appear a critical feature of the political economy of contemporary Nepal (2005: 309). 
All in all, the above opinions would seem to suggest that despite the volume of 
development funding available, the multiple development interventions were at best 
perceived as having mixed success. Now we move to an overview of the consequences 
of the conflict and its impact on aid and development. 
Consequences of the conflict and its impact on aid and development This section, 
while not pretending to be complete, discusses the general consequences of the conflict 
and its impact on development work in particular. In general terms, the conflict 
produced a broad range of negative and positive consequences. In relation to the state 
of Nepal, Kumar refers to four interlinked processes or trends generated by the 
conflict: it fell into a militarization trap; 79 as a result of this social tension increased; 
the state completely stopped delivering public goods to its citizens, and finally due to 
the King's Gyanendra claim of executive power on 4 October 2002. the state moved 
towards anarchy (2005: 61). 
Within the context of these state-related processes a senes of other negative 
consequences could be observed, beginning with the direct human cost. Dhakal reports 
based on a compilation of various data sources that the number of conflict-related 
deaths between the start of the People's War in 1996 and March 2006 is 13.190. of 
which 8457 were caused by the state and 4733 by the Maoists (2006). Dhakal also 
79 Dhakal reports that the security budget increased from 4.94 billion Nepali Roepies in 1996-97 to 
17.97 billion Nepali Roepies in 2005-2006 (2006). 
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estimates that the costs related to damage of physical infrastructure could be around 6 
billion Roepies (2006).80 As to indirect costs, Pyakurayal, a professor in economics, 
argues, despite not being able to provide exact figures, that the conflict induced a 
reduction of aggregated outputs in sectors such as agriculture, tourism and hydropower 
(2004). In addition, in part due to economic circumstances and in part due to direct 
consequences of the conflict, Nepal's complex migration patterns changed (Von der 
Heide and Hoffman 2001) and an emerging category of Internal Displaced Persons 
(IDPs) could be identified (Irwin et al. 2003; Dhakal 2006).81 The position of women 
in Nepali society also underwent significant changes. Deuba records for example an 
increase in decision-making power, while also observing a process of feminization of 
poverty as well (2005: 77-78). In addition, the level of human rights abuses, 
executions, disappearances and torture increased (Metha 2006; Pathak 2005; Thapa 
and Sijapati 2003: 150-151).82 Upreti mentions further consequences including an 
increase in criminal activity and robbery (by fake Maoists) and a subsequent increase 
in insecurity and fear. Furthermore, villagers reduced their participation in social 
activities, while they were sometimes forced to join Maoist activities as well. The 
Maoists introduced arbitrary laws and due to demands for support in cash or in kind, 
economic hardship increased (2004). In addition, people lived within a culture of 
terror, causing fear and hampering the social dynamics in villages (Pettigrew 2004). 
Upreti suggests that the consequences of the conflict on society were not solely 
negative. According to him the positive consequences of the conflict might include an 
increase of entitlements to land and assets by the poor; a reduction of gambling and 
alcohol abuse in villages; a decrease of interest rates charged by moneylenders and an 
increase of political awareness at grass roots level. Moreover, the conflict created a 
situation whereby local elites had less opportunity to exploit the less advantaged. In 
addition, the sense of group identity could be enhanced and collective activities 
increased. Moreover, various forms of decision-making mechanism could be 
introduced at grass roots level (2004). 
XO Mainly caused by damaged government facilities, such as VDC buildings, post offices, 
telecommunication centres, bridges and (micro) hydropower installations. The industry sector suffered 
as well (Dhakal: 2006). 
81 Dhakal estimates the number of lOPs at around 500,000, while in 2003 Irwin et al. (eds.), provided a 
conservative estimate of the number of lOPs between 100,000 and 200,000. 
82 This was partly, but not solely, caused by the RNA. 
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The Maoists' approach to and effect on development83 Overall, the Maoist 
approach to aid and development was embedded in their military strategy if aid 
activities could benefit them they would not hinder them (Upreti 2007). According to 
Upreti (2004), the Maoist approach to development activities was contextual and 
inconsistent rather than a reflection of an anti-aid agency position.84 Upreti identifies a 
series of positive and negative effects. The negative effects were as follows: aid 
agencies were threatened with expulsion from project areas (for example Helvetas) or 
asked to leave (for example CARE and UMN); staffs were abducted85 and project 
offices had to move to safer places, which effectively meant withdrawal to a district or 
regional headquarters. The volume of development services in the districts decreased 
because of the expulsion of development workers and service providers. Moreover, 
Maoists could damage or destroy developmental infrastructure, such as local 
government buildings, roads, and facilities related to drinking water, electricity, and 
telephone connections. Maoists could also manipulate project user groups for their own 
purposes. Lastly, Maoists, seeking recognition by the international community, 
demanded from aid agencies written agreements with representatives of their local 
parallel governments. All of these negative effects intensified after the collapse of the 
second ceasefire in August 2003.86 As to the positive effects of the growth of the 
Maoist movement and subsequent escalation of the conflict, Upreti cites an increase of 
transparency by aid agencies, an improved use of resources, a reduction of corruption, 
increased monitoring of government expenditure and clearer thinking by aid agencies 
about the allocation of money who actually benefitted from it. 
Thapa and Sijapati argue that some development activities could remain unaffected by 
the Maoists, such as UNICEF's vitamin A campaign that operated throughout the 
83 This section is firmly based on Upreti 2004; other sources are stated when used. 
84 While I agree with the latter pOint, I would modify the former by suggesting that contextual 
approaches to aid agencies and their activities do not necessarily lead to an inconsistent position, 
rather perhaps to a situation outsiders do not sufficiently understand and therefore may call 
inconsistent. My overall impression was that if an agency was pressurized in any way by the Maoists, 
for example by a request to leave a project area, there was a rationale behind it. 
85 This happened in the case of staff of SNV (own observation). 
86 From my own observation, the pressure on aid agencies by Maoists intensified in the build up to the 
Nepal Development Forum in May 2004. Due to this pressure some aid agencies, for example SNV, in 
collaboration with GTZ, DFID and other members of the BOG group, felt themselves forced to withdraw 
their operations from the Karnali and had to make a statement during the forum (own involvement, 
May 2004). 
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country (2003).87 While it is not unlikely that some aid agencies could continue some 
of their operations, however, I would suggest that such operations tended to be local 
rather than national. 
Aid and development had negative and positive effects on the contlict dynamics as 
well. The negative effects included resource transfers in cash or in kind from projects 
and staff to either side of the contlict (Adhikari 2003; personal observation in 2004 and 
2005). Then, aid agencies continued financial support to various government structures 
without visible improvements in terms of poverty or contlict reduction. Donors 
continued to feed into the existing patronage system and an increase in inequality was 
noted resulting in an increase of feelings of grievances among ordinary people. In 
addition, due to continued application of inappropriate intervention models, combined 
with a consequent concentration of effort on easily accessible areas, frustration among 
people compounded. This feeling of frustration was furthered in cases of (sudden) 
withdrawal of aid activities. 
The positive effects of continued development activities were several. Some aid 
agencies started trying to address some of the root causes of the contlict, though, 
according to Upreti, with minimal effect (2004). Also, aid agencies started to support 
actors within civil society, such as advocacy and network organisations, who could, it 
was assumed, in tum put pressure on the contlicting parties to further peace efforts. 
Within this context of positive and negative effects of the contlict on development 
activities and vice versa, grass roots aid workers active in those programmes and 
projects that maintained a presence in rural areas contested by the Maoists and the 
RNA, according to Adhikari, had to walk on a metaphorical 'tight-rope' between them. 
These development workers developed several mechanisms for doing so, such as being 
alert to covert monitoring by either side of the contlict, communicating in code, paying 
levy to the Maoists, being sensitive to the psychological state of combatants, and 
87 I am not sure if Thapa's statement about the continued nationwide reach of UNICEF's Vitamin A 
campaign is correct. I recall a field trip in the second half of 2004 with a newly arrived OCHA 
representative visiting the area between Nepalgunj and Gulariya. During meetings with local 
communities and Maoist representatives at various locations, this representative asked explicitly 
several times about the existence of the UNICEF' vitamin A campaign. To my knowledge all responses 
were negative: people had not heard about it. Respondent A47 suggested that the UN family, and 
UNICEF in particular, were in denial about the conflict and its potential impact on development work. 
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checking infonnation from both sides of the conflict, without giving infonnation away 
(2003). Adhikari concludes in defence of grassroots aid workers that those in 
Kathmandu assumed wrongly that aid activities could continue with few problems and 
by doing so exposed the remaining fieldworkers to risk at great physical and 
psychological costs (ibid).88 
Key international actors and their positions regarding the growing conflict89 India 
and China, as direct neighbours, and the US and UK governments as international 
powers with interests in the region, each have their own individual historical interests 
in Nepal and were all in their own way concerned with the growth of the Maoists 
insurgency in Nepa1.9o Their positions and concerns are briefly discussed below. 
For India, the growing insurgency generated a series of challenges, not least that the 
core areas of the Maoist rebellion were relatively close to New Delhi, while the 
rebellion was also spreading to the eastern part of the country and could affect stability 
in the corridor between eastern Nepal and Bangladesh, potentially cutting off the north 
eastern part of India from the rest. Then, the Nepali Maoists could seek closer 
cooperation with Maoist groups based in South-Asia and India in particular, or even 
inspire them to reignite anned struggle within India itself. Lastly, the interest of the 
West and the UN and their willingness to mediate between the government of Nepal 
and the Maoists, could set a precedent dealing with the conflict in Kashmir, a situation 
India wanted to avoid. Against this backdrop and within a context of various levels of 
distrust, India's policy makers found themselves in a very difficult position. Supporting 
the government too much would antagonise the Maoists with the possibility of 
88 I support Adhikari's view, having conducted approximately 35 one or more-day security training 
sessions to aid agency staff throughout the country between 2000 and 2005. On one occasion (a 
training session for DAN IDA forestry staff in Nepalgunj, September 2004) each training participant 
referred, during the introduction, to at least three security incidents they were directly or indirectly 
involved in. On my return to Kathmandu I mentioned this to my director (I still worked for SNV during 
that time), who responded that this could not be true, as they did not know what they were talking 
about. This refusal to accept the idea that field staffs were affected by the conflict demonstrates the 
denial present in some aid agencies. 
89 This section summarizes Pandey (2005). Other sources are referenced when used. 
90 For information about the historical relationships between India, China, the USA and the UK see 
Hoftun et al. (1999)' People, Politics and Ideology: Democracy and Social Change in Nepal,' Mandela 
Bookpoint, Kathmandu, Nepal, or Khadka (1997) Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy: Major powers and 
Nepal, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, India. 
51 
escalation, while at the same time a large section of the elite within Kathmandu and 
foreigners suspected that India implicitly supported the Maoists. 
China had other concerns to deal with. Firstly, China's strategic interest appears to be 
stability in the region. An escalation of conflict could mean increased US interest in 
Nepal, a country close to their borders. The insurgency could inspire those sectors of 
Nepali society with Tibetan leanings, opening up the possibility of the insurgency 
spilling over into Tibet. This could then further escalate if the Maoists could acquire 
more modem weaponry. China perceives the monarchy as a source of stability in 
Nepal; for China a reduction of the role of the monarchy could lead to an increase of 
instability, which might be in conflict with their long-term goals. Lastly, a deepening 
of the conflict could lead to closer cooperation between India and the US, which could 
develop into a serious threat to Chinese interests. Thus a deepening conflict was not in 
their interest. Against this backdrop, China aimed to focus on regional stability and 
kept low profile, distancing themselves from the insurgency, while observing closely. 
The US had established diplomatic and bilateral relationships before India and China. 
It might be fair to say that the US is, since the 50s, more closely involved in Nepal and 
supportive during the panchayat days and the period of multi-party democracy than 
any other western donor country, with the possible exception of the UK. The 
involvement of Peace Corps volunteers is one significant example. However, this 
continuous development support was not always appreciated. 91 Nepal received more 
attention after 9111 from the US as part of their War on Terror. To stress Nepal's 
importance in this General Colin Powell visited Kathmandu in January 2002.92 The 
Nepali government under the leadership of Prime Minister Deuba also made use of 
9111 to portray the Maoist insurgency as terrorism. The intensification of military 
cooperation and support, going back to the 1980s, was justified by the events of 9/11, 
since from a US perspective Nepal became a country facing a terrorist threat, which in 
91 Mainali connects a USAID-funded project in the Rapti zone with the start of the Maoist movement. 
The 1S-year project finished a month and a half before the start of Maoist insurgency in the Rapti zone 
in February 1996. Mainali raises the question: "if that is what you get after 15 years of American-
funded development, we are perhaps better without it", Mainali M., Nepali Times, No. 32, 2-8, March 
2001, in: Thapa D. (2003) 'Understanding the Maoist Movement of Nepal,' Centre of Social Research 
and Development, Kathmandu. 
92 This visit should also be seen in light of a SAARC summit held later in the month, during which Nepal 
proposed accepting UN resolution 1373, as a starting point for dealing with terrorism in the future. 
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tum could generate a threat to the US.93 However, US military involvement was 
limited by the US desire not to upset Nepal's neighbours China and India. 
The UK was firmly interested in Nepars conflict as well, but categorised the Maoist 
insurgency not as terrorism. The UK line was that the conflict, while having some 
terrorist characteristics, was more about ignored political, economical and culture 
issues. Perhaps for this reason and in contrast with India and US, the UK did not 
supply any lethal military hardware. Two helicopters were provided for humanitarian 
purposes and perhaps other non-lethal material. Other than this assistance, in 2003 the 
UK appointed Sir Jeffrey James as special envoy as a response to the cease-fire. 
The growing influence and attention of the US, and to a lesser extent the UK, worried 
both India and China. This potentially hampered the involvement of countries like 
Norway and Switzerland, or multi-lateral bodies like the EU or the UN, who may 
otherwise have expanded their roles in Nepal during the conflict, for example in the 
field of mediation. To close this impressionistic chapter and this section on 
international actors, it appeared to me that, despite the various positions within the 
international community, ultimately the Maoists would not be allowed to take over 
Nepal by violent means, and this in tum influenced the aid agencies' room for 
manoeuvre in strategizing and implementing aid activities. 
93 I recall two instances whereby expatriate development workers told me that they encountered 
Americans in military uniform on some sort of reconnaissance mission. These encounters took place in 
Surkhet and Mustang, both in 2002. 
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Chapter 3 Clausewitz and On War 
3.1 Introduction 
The Gennan military philosopher Carl Von Clausewitz and his work On War are well 
debated among those with an interest in military affairs.94 This chapter introduces 
Clausewitz and On War in order to follow the exploratory interplay between some of 
Clausewitz's ideas on war and the reflections on aid operations in turbulent 
environments like Nepal.9S 
The chapter is divided as follows. First, the main philosophical characteristics of the 
era in which Clausewitz lived will be outlined, together with how Clausewitz dealt 
with these, which in turn shaped On War. Then, the structure, features and key themes 
of On War are explored, leading to a critique of the main strengths and weaknesses of 
On War, elucidating why certain choices were made in the course of the research. 
Before looking at the philosophical traditions, which influenced Clausewitz's thinking, 
his life will be briefly outlined below. 
Clausewitz was a Prussian and lived from 1780 to 1831.96 From the age of twelve until 
his death he was involved in the military, mixing military practice with periods of 
scholarly reflection. According to the military historian Howard, he died, somewhat 
ironically given the theme of this thesis, on a 'humanitarian' assignment. organising a 
'cordon sanilaire' in Poland to prevent the spread of a cholera epidemic (2002: 2). 
94 For example the Clausewitz homepage, http://ciausewitz.com/CWZHOME/CWZBASE.htm; accessed 
on 11/9/06; See also the conference "Clausewitz in the 21st Century", 21 March 2005, Department of 
Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, 
http://ccw.politics.ox.ac,uk/events/archives/tt05 clausewitz.asp; accessed on 11/9/06. 
95 Clausewitz specialists and other military thinkers might be disappointed with this chapter for its 
limited scope which cannot fully acknowledge the complexity of Clausewitz's thinking or the impact of 
On War on military thinking and the vast amount of literature available on the subject. However it 
should be stated that this is not intended to be an exhaustive review, since Clausewitz and On War as 
such are not the prime object of this research; rather they are a source of inspiration for or perhaps 
better a window through which to view aid operations in turbulent environments like Nepal. 
96 This section is based on the Clausewitz homepage, maintained by the military historian Bassford. 
http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/FAQs.htmlffChronology. accessed on 11/9/06. For those 
interested in how Clausewitz thinking developed due to developments in his time the book 'Clausewitz 
and the State; The man, His Theories and His Times, by Paret (1976) is recommended. 
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After his first battle experience, he was garrisoned for six years and made use of the 
well-stocked library of Frederick the Great, brother of Prince Henry (ibid: 6).97 In 
1801, while Clausewitz was at the Military College in Berlin, General von Scharnhorst 
became aware of his talents, and gave him access to the higher circles of Prussian 
society. According to the military historian Paret, Clausewitz's first article critiques 
those wanting to tum war into a fonn of applied mathematics (1986: 190).98 According 
to the associate professor of politics Smith, his thinking was further shaped by a lost 
battle against France (in 1808), a period of imprisonment in France (2005: 7) and a 
stint in Switzerland were he met Swiss intellectuals (ibid: 7). In 1807, after his return 
to Prussia Clausewitz started to assist General Scharnhorst in the restructuring of 
Prussian military institutions, while writing extensively on almost every aspect of war 
(Howard 2002: 9). His professorial career took off in 1810 when he was appointed to 
the Prussian War College. Alongside tutoring the Crown Prince August on military 
subjects, he had the opportunity to take on a variety of responsibilities related to the 
technical, organisational and political challenges of rebuilding an army organisation 
(Paret 1986: 193). At the end of 1811, according to the military historian Keegan, he 
defected from the Prussian anny to support the Russian army in countering invasion by 
Revolutionary France (1994: 16). His primary involvement during the Russian 
campaign was diplomatic in nature, arranging the defection of the Prussian corps from 
Napoleon's army (Paret 1986: 195). He re-entered the Prussian army in spring 1813 
and was wounded in battle together with Scharnhorst, who died a few weeks later 
(Smith 2005: 12) and later given charge of a non-descript force in northern Gennany 
(Howard 2002: 10). In 1815, during the Waterloo campaign, he was chief of staff in a 
Prussian Anny Corps (Smith 2005: 13) playing an important role in Napoleon's defeat, 
though he did not actually engage in battle himself (Howard 2002: 10). In 1818, at the 
age of 38 and with 25 years of field experience, he accepted a directorship at the 
Military College in Berlin, which he occupied until 1830 (Howard 2002: 20). He 
began, according to the military historian Bassford, a study of campaigns of various 
kinds, preparing the theoretical work that eventually became On War (2002).99 In 1829 
Clausewitz was called back to active duty to contain a Polish Revolution and to set up 
97 He studied mathematics, history and French and developed a capacity for independent thinking 
(Smith 2005). 
98 With this article Clausewitz hints at some of the key themes he develops in On War (Aron 1983:41-
48). 
99 http://www.clausewitz.com.cwzsumm!cworkhol.htm. accessed on 12/26/2003. 
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a 'cordon sanitaire' to avoid the spread of a cholera epidemic (Smith 2005: 17). He 
contracted cholera, and died in Breslau on 16 November 1831, leaving On War 
unfinished (Howard 2002: 11 ).100 
3.2 Enlightenment and counter-enlightenment at the time of 
C/ausewitz 
Clausewitz's perspective on conduct and study of war was not only influenced by 
social, political and military developments but also by the two competing paradibJms 
colouring the intellectual climate of his time: the Enlightenment and counter-
enlightenment or Romanticism (Smith 2005: 53). The Enlightenment favoured ideas 
such as the use of reason, an enthusiasm for science, and a conviction in and dedication 
to progressive development. Superstitious and religious thought were distrusted, and, 
according to Smith, there was a belief in the existence of a certain level of: 
..... un~formity in lime. place and human nature" (ibid). According to the military 
researcher Gat, this paradigm was challenged by the counter-enlightenment. Ideas of 
uniformity in time, place and human nature were countered by the belief in historical 
diversity and the complexity of society and politics (2001: 189), with emphasis on the 
importance of faith and moral values was stressed (Smith 2005: 55). 
The debate between these two competing paradigms found its way into Prussian 
military circles and was echoed in the paradigms of the military-enlightenment and 
military-romanticism. According to the historian Lynn Clausewitz's thinking was a 
reflection of this debate (2004: 194). The remainder of this paragraph focuses on the 
main characteristics of both paradigms and how Clausewitz reconciled them in On 
War. When Clausewitz entered the Prussian army in 1792, enlightenment ideas shaped 
military thinking and practice, for example in an emphasis on routine, and on 
understanding the spatial relationships between the forces available, their bases and 
supply lines (Smith 2005).101 
100 Gat suggests that Clausewitz intended to revise the manuscript in the light of new insights on the 
conduct of war and its implication for policy (2001: 201). 
101 Jomini, a representative of this strand, intended for example to construct " ... a 'system' which aimed 
to tell the commander how to conduct war on a higher level" (Van Creveld 2002: lOS). 
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The military author Von Berenhorst (1733-1814) preceded Clausewitz's challenge to 
the enlightenment hegemony within the Prussian military (Smith 2005: 57). In 
addition, according to the military historian Van Creveld, Clausewitz emphasized war 
as essentially irrational, unpredictable and dependent on chance (2002: 207). By doing 
so Clausewitz recognised the importance of the frequently changing states of mind of 
commanders and troops and the role of chance, while supporters of the military 
enlightenment portrayed war as a rational activity conforming to rules and principles. 
According to Lynn, it is precisely these ideas of military romanticism that penetrate the 
essence of war (2004: 194). However, it is these same ideas that cannot be fully 
captured in a military theory (ibid: 192). A schematic overview of some of the other 
differences between military enlightenment and military romanticism is presented in 
Annexe 3.1. 
Thus, according to Smith, "On War is a battleground between enlightenment and 
counter-enlightenment" (2005: 67). Clausewitz believed in the application of reason 
and the role of passion, chance, friction and intuition during the conduct of war. He did 
not perceive war as a purely rational exercise (ibid). Handel, a fonner professor of 
National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College, states that Clausewitz 
..... combined the best of the two worlds - the tradition of the Enlightenment. which 
emphasised rational objective ana~vsis and the search for clarity. with the German 
Romantic tradition (. .. ). which focused on the p.\)lchological. emotional. intuitive. and 
su~jective dimensions in the interpretation (~l the surrounding world" (2005a: 6). 
According to Bassford, Clausewitz was not confused by enlightenment and counter-
enlightenment thinking, even the opposite; "Clausewitz combined Enlightenment and 
Romanticism. not because he was confused. but because war has both rational and 
irrational roots and characteristics, Clausewitz did not throw the ideas (d' the 
Enlightenment alvay. but complemented these ideas with the ideas (~l the co un fer-
enlightenment. while developing his thoughts on the conduct (~l war" (2004). 
According to Smith, it is this ability to reconcile Enlightenment and Counter-
Enlightenment ideas in a single framework enabling a depiction of the complex 
activity of war, which constitutes Clausewitz' s key achievement in the development of 
military theory (2005: 68). It is this that makes parts of On War attractive as a context 
for reflection on aid operations in turbulent environments such as Nepal. However, On 
War is not without its flaws. 
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3.3 On War as a text 
On War is a lengthy and complex text, in part due to the topic, in part due to the 
attempt to reconcile military enlightenment and military romanticism, and in part due 
to its non-linear development as reflected in its structure, features, themes and 
concepts. These issues are addressed below in the light of my stated aim to use selected 
parts of On War to reflect upon aid operations in turbulent environment like Nepal. 
Development On War was not written in a linear fashion, which is mirrored in its 
complicated structure. 102 In his early years Clausewitz tended to critique ideas based 
on the military enlightenment negatively.l03 Despite this negativism, according to Gat, 
he nonetheless allowed the possibility of formulating a positive theory on war, in 
which he could integrate, the diversity of historical experience with a universal 
approach military theory (2001: 193). He made this integration possible by arguing that 
beyond the diversity of historical experience and the changing 'manners' of each 
period, universality exists (ibid).l04 In the second part of his life, while leading the 
military college in Berlin, Clausewitz thoughts on war became more comprehensive 
and started to condense. Optimistic about the possibility of developing a theory on war, 
he began to explore issues concerning Strategy, Engagement, and Defence and 
Attack.los Later, around 1828, Clausewitz opened up to two new ideas. The first was 
the possibility of two types of war: limited and all-out war. The second idea was that 
war was a continuation by other means (Aron 1983: 85; Gat 2001: 201).106 This 
change in thought influenced the structure and logic of On War, which will be 
discussed below. 
102 Gat argues states that "the opening part of On War reflects in effect the last part of Clausewitz's 
intellectual development, while the middle part of the book reflects the earliest, and the last the 
intermediate stage. Therefore ideas presented throughout the book are not necessarily consistent, and 
can be even be opposing to what is said" (Gat 2001: 254). 
103 In particular the strategic ideas of Von Bulow who interpreted war as a kind of applied mathematics. 
(Paret 1986: 190) 
104 This universal and constant element was seen by Clausewitz as the true object for theory (Gat 2001: 
193). This idea evolves in Book Two of On War. 
105 According to Gat is it possible to summarize Clausewitz theory as fighting being the nature of war, 
the primacy of the engagement supported by massive concentration of forces, and aggressive conduct 
aimed at a total defeat of the enemy (Gat 2001: 201). 
101> Raymond Aron was a French philosopher, sociologist and political scientist. 
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Structure Despite its non-linear development, On War appears at first sight to follow a 
logical sequence. 107 However, Paret argues that the organisation of the work into eight 
main parts does not constitute a sure guide for the reader, that for example its internal 
structure is somewhat less than straightforward (Paret 1986: 198).108 According to 
Paret, this translates into a network of themes and arguments characterised by 
movements, cross-references, and allusions, not only to other parts of the book, but 
also to the experience of the author and of his generation (Paret 1986: 198-199). 
Lastly, although Clausewitz was able to re-write Chapter One of Book One before his 
death, he was unable to revise the work any further to include the theoretical 
consequences of his most recent insights. Such are the flaws in the internal structure of 
On War. For practical purposes I have addressed these complexities in the process of 
reflecting on aid operations in Nepal by taking selected parts of On War as they stand 
and understand them.109 This will be further discussed in Chapter four on research 
methodology. 
107 On War contains eight books, which are divided into 128 chapters over 576 pages (Howard and 
Paret Translation 1987). This includes the author's preface, comments and two notes. The eight books 
cover a wide range of topics. Book One addresses the nature of war, in terms of purpose and means, 
the importance of genius, danger and the physical effort necessary to conduct war, intelligence and 
friction. Book Two addresses the relationship between the theory and practice of war and lays the 
methodological foundation for the entire book. Book Three deals with the issue of strategy in general, 
including the elements of strategy, the moral factors of boldness and perseverance, concentration of 
forces in time and space and the economy of force, suspension of action and tension and rest. Book 
Four covers general and specific issues related to the engagement in war, such as the Significance, 
duration and decision of engagement and the effects of victory. Book Five examines military forces, 
covering issues like the theatre of operations, the relationship between the arms of service, the 
general disposition of the army, the operational use of advanced corps, maintenance and supply base 
of operations, lines of communication and terrain. Books Six and Seven cover the nature of defence 
and attack and their reciprocal relationship and provide practical advice on how they might be 
conducted. On War closes with Book Eight, which discusses planning together with concepts such as 
absolute and real war, military objectives, the relationship of war with political aims and the idea of 
limited war. 
108 The complexities, which may be explained as inconsistencies, of On War's internal structure have 
several causes. To begin with, the practical circumstances of Clausewitz's time were not necessarily 
advantageous. Secondly, and more importantly, On War, according to Paret, is in some respects an 
almost biographical document, which not only reflects Clausewitz's evolving ideas about history and 
society, but his position in that society as well (Paret: 1986). 
109 Other ways to address these internal complexities are firstly accepting that Clausewitz's most 
developed understanding of his subject is not fully integrated with the available text, or to argue that 
On War is a united or integrated whole (Bassford: 2002). My daughter Elly suggested overcoming this 
problem by saying one morning, after overhearing a discussion on this topic, "Dad, use that book as 
you understand and used it, which seems obvious to me". It was helpful advice, which I would like to 
thank her for, as that was precisely the way I used the book in Nepal. 
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Methodological Features On War has several characteristic methodological features, 
which are presented in a somewhat arbitrary way, but should be understood as an 
interlinked whole. Firstly, according to the military historian Sumida, Clausewitz 
aimed to use simple, straightforward and non-technical language (200 I ).110 Secondly, 
the ideal-type method is applied, although not consistently (Handel 2005). Thirdly, 
according to the sociologist Kaldor, issues are often presented as pairs of opposites, for 
example reason and emotion, art and science or defence and offence (Kaldor 2005a: 
24-25). Fourthly, according to the military sociologist Klinger, Clausewitz's reasoning 
jumps back and forth from theory to practice, from the general to the practical while 
building his thoughts and lines of argument, which is characteristic of Clausewitz's 
manner of thinking and expression (2006: 87; Paret 1986: 203). Lastly, according to 
military historian Wallach, the most notable feature of Clausewitz's theory in On War 
is that it does not prescribe a particular course of action, though it does assert that 
events should happen according to lawful processes (Wallach in: Handel 2005: 213). 
Wallach comments that this naturally irritates many soldiers, who prefer to be 
presented with clear-cut instructions; the same may also be true for development 
workers and humanitarians. ll1 There follows a review of the themes discussed in On 
War. 
Themes On War deals with several interconnected themes and concepts in its efforts to 
develop a theory able to analyse war. This thesis makes use of a few of them. Although 
difficult to separate out, Clausewitz's main themes will be discussed below. 
The first theme is the relationship between politics and war, which underpins On War. 
Clausewitz states: ..... war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument. 
a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means ... the political 
o~iect is the goal, war is the means o.lreaching it, and means can never he considered 
l10 However, this may not be the impression gained by the modern English reader. The Howard and 
Paret translation of On War, despite being recognised as the best available, is a challenge to penetrate 
due to the abstract and theoretical language applied, which is not so much the fault of the translators, 
but of Clausewitz's penchant for long and complex sentences (Heuser 2002: xi). 
11l In March 2009, I was invited by ZOA Refugee Carel the Netherlands to give a presentation at their 
bi-annual country-directors' conference in Nunspeet/ the Netherlands. During the presentation of 
some concepts, one country director (a colleague educated at the same university in the same field 
and belonging to the same student batch I belong to) raised his hand and said something in the line of 
"I am a country programme manager, please tell me exactly what I should do". This comment to my 
understanding underlines the problem I highlighted in the first paragraphs of Chapter One. 
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in isolation fi'om their purpose" (H&P: 89). This implies that in Clausewitz's view 
political concerns set the agenda and govern the aims, resources used and duration of 
any subsequent military action.1l2 This idea is implicitly echoed throughout the thesis 
by assuming that development aid is politics by other means. However, it is very rarely 
explicitly addressed, as Clausewitz himself speaks hardly explicitly about this 
throughout his work. 
On War's second theme is the concept of the paradoxical trinity (H&P: 89). This 
concept is the most fundamental theoretical structure underlying Clausewitz's military 
theory. The notion of the trinity has two interlinked levels. The first is psychologically 
orientated involving the basic elements of irrationality, non-rationality and rationality. 
The second is socially orientated consisting of people, commander and army, and 
government. Clausewitz describes the connection between the first level of the trinity 
and the subordination of military means to political goals as follows: "as a total 
phenomena. its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity -composed 
of primordial violence. hatred and enmity. which are to be regarded as a blind natural 
force; of the play of change and probability within which the creative spirit is free to 
roam; and (~lits element o.lsubordination. as an instrument (~lpoli(-:v. which makes it 
su~iect to reason alone" (H&P: 89). This trinity is, according to Bassford, a dynamic, 
inherently unstable interaction of the forces of violent emotion, chance and rational 
calculation (Bassford 2007). Clausewitz goes on to link the first level of this trinity 
with the second level: "The first (?fthese three aspects main~v concerns the people: the 
second the commander and his army. the third the government" (H&P: 89). According 
to Handel, this trinity can form countless unique combinations reflecting the individual 
character of any war. He continues that, given the limitless series of possible 
combinations, no two wars are the same, and there is a need to understand the nature of 
a war before embarking on it (1997). For the purpose of this thesis an adjusted version 
of Clausewitz's paradoxical trinity is used to further reflection on aid operations in 
112 The reasoning behind this subordination of military action to political will comes from Clausewitz's 
understanding of the factors that brought French victories on the battlefield, for example the radical 
changes in politics and administration in France, and the need for statesmen to understand the 
political conditions that influence the military means available and how they can be utilised (H&P: 609). 
However understandable, this theoretical position of the military subordination to political authorities 
is not always without tension for those who support the idea that the military should be involved in 
politics (Klinger 2006). 
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turbulent environments, which is labelled the 'aid trinity'. This concept is elaborated 
upon on in Chapter Five. 
A third theme is the polarity between ideal war and real war. Clausewitz argues that 
theoretically there is no limit to the application of force in tenns of its aim, use and 
application of strength (H&P: 75-77). He refers regularly to the idea of ideal war, as an 
abstract concept, to explain certain features of war. He acknowledges however that, 
war in reality looks quite different, as it never acts in isolation, nor does it produces 
definitive results (ibid: 78-80). The thesis uses this ideal-type model. Chapter Six 
explores the notion of 'the ideal fonn of aid'. While the reflective sections of Chapters 
7 to 18 refer to this ideal type model as well. 
The fourth theme of On War is the relationship between military theory and practice. 
To begin with, the aim of theory is. in Clausewitz's words" ... to educate the mind (?t' 
the future commander. or. more accurately. to guide him in his se(f-education. not to 
accompany him to the battlefield; just as a l-vise teacher guides and stimulates a young 
man 's intellectual development. but is careful not to lead him hy the hand.tl)1' the rest 
(?lhis lUi? .. (ibid: 142). In addition, theory should keep close to practice in order to stay 
down-to-earth: " ... theoretical results must have been derived .li-0111 militalJi histOlJ' or 
al least checked against it" (ibid: 144). Moreover, the purpose of theory is, " ... to 
demonstrate what war is in practice. not what its ideal nature should he" (ibid: 593). 
Gat states that Clausewitz rejected doctrine or prescriptive theory, rather he theorised 
from the position that any theory would always be partial and require carefully judged 
application (Gat 200 I: 213 ).113 Chapter Four elaborates on the research question and 
research methodology will touch upon on how Clausewitz's ideas on theory and its use 
will be used in the remainder of the thesis. 
The fifth theme to be outlined here relates to psychology. Clausewitz puts 
psychological forces governing war at the core of his attempts to understand it. 
According to Paret, and in line with Kantian philosophy, Clausewitz recognised that, 
113 Within this context Clausewitz, according to Paret, differentiated between the cognitive, pedagogic 
and utilitarian potential of theory (1986: 204-205). Therefore, according to Gat, Clausewitz approached 
the writing of On War with fairly advanced ideas about the characteristics and contents of military 
theory (Gat 2001: 197). 
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although not all things could be understood, they should not be ignored. This 
psychological dimension is in his work linked with concepts like friction and genius 
(1986: 204-205). Chapter Five explains how this psychological theme will be used in 
the remainder of the study. 
The final theme from Clausewitz's theoretical scheme is friction. Friction is the 
intermediate idea between war in its ideal or absolute form and the practice of war in 
reality (H&P: 119). Friction affects military operations and therefore " ... cannot. as in 
mechanics. be reduced to a few points. [it} is everywhere in contact with chance. and 
brings about effects that cannot be measured. just because they are large~v due to 
chance" (ibid: 119-121). The concept of friction evolved to be the red thread 
throughout the thesis and is explicitly addressed in the chapters 7 to 10. Each 
elaborating on how particular aspects of the idea of friction played out in the context of 
Nepal. In that sense the remaining chapters are exemplars of how friction is an ever-
repeating theme in strategizing and implementing aid operations in turbulent contexts. 
We tum now to a synopsis of the various negative and positive critiques of On War. 
3.4 Negative and positive critiques 
Opinions of Clausewitz's On War vary dramatically. At one end of the spectrum there 
are authors like Keegan (1994) Van Creveld (1991) and Kaldor (2005a) who criticise 
On War for its flaws. At the other end of the spectrum there are Paret (1986) and 
Howard (1986) and the military sociologist Shaw (2005), who rate Clausewitz highly 
for his thinking as presented in On War. despite its flaws. Presented below are various 
positive and negative critiques of On War by the main thinkers on the topic; they are 
described in order to shed light on particular limitations or potential of Clausewitz's 
ideas and subsequently the way they are used in the remainder of the study. 
Negative critiques Walzer, an American political philosopher, argues that Clausewitz 
seems not to perceive war as a problem in itself and that as a result On War is 
relatively quiet on moral issues, discussing the nature rather than the consequences of 
war (2006: 22). Keegan's problem with Clausewitz is that he deals not in advice but in 
what he insists are inescapable truths (1994: 354). He refutes Clausewitz's key 
argument and probably most quoted statement, that war is a continuation of politics by 
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other means.114 In other words, Keegan argues that Clausewitz was blind to the fact 
that war differs from culture to culture and is not necessarily fought with well-defined 
armies guided by states. (1994: 23). This brings us to Van Creveld, who argues that 
wars are no longer fought in a Clausewitzian way and that the key Clausewitzian 
concept, the trinity of people, army and government, no longer exists with respect to 
modem warfare. Subsequently, he suggests that war is structured on a non-trinitarian 
model (1991).1 15 
Van Creveld is echoed by Kaldor (2005a). Her point of departure is not historical, as 
with Keegan and Van Creveld, but her own understanding of contemporary war. She 
identifies a new type of violence, which she labels as 'new wars' (ibid: 1). Features of 
'new wars' are, according to Kaldor, fragmentation of the state. low levels of 
participation among the local population, low levels of legitimacy of the warring 
parties involved and meagre domestic production (ibid: 90). As a consequence, Kaldor 
continues, war efforts are dependent on local predation and external support. Within 
these wars, battles are rare and most violence is directed against civilians; cooperation 
between warring parties is common (ibid). The distinctions between public and private, 
military and civil, internal and external have been eroded. This blurring of lines can 
even be extended to the distinction between war and peace itself (ibid: 29). She 
continues to argue that the causes that lead to failed responses by the international 
community are not so much found in short-term thinking of politicians, the role of the 
media, the lack of coordination of governments and international agencies and a lack 
114 H&P Book 1, Chapter 1. 
l1S Van Creveld argues that Clausewitz's work must be understood in its proper context (1991: 35). 
According to Van Creveld, Clausewitz saw war as being moulded by social relationships, by the type of 
society by which it was conducted and by the kind of government, which that society admits (ibid). Van 
Creveld continues that Clausewitz took for granted that 'war' as form of organised violence that could 
only be waged by the state, for the state and against the state (ibid: 36). Consequently, according to 
Van Creveld, if it was governments that made war, then their instruments for so doing were their 
armies (ibid: 38). Most of these soldiers were conscripted civilians. Therefore, according to Van 
Creveld, the civilians formed the third vital element in any war and should therefore be included in 
Clausewitz's trinity (ibid: 39). Van Creveld further reasons that the Clausewitzian universe and 
Trinitarian war, i.e. war of state against state and army against army, is a temporary phenomenon. He 
argues that Trinitarian war was unknown during most of history (ibid: 57), and that the concept does 
not automatically apply in the contexts of contemporary lOW-intensity wars. For example, some 
societies do not have armies: the civilians themselves are the armies (ibid: 56). Therefore, Van Creveld 
argues that due to rise of modern, non-Trinitarian, low-intensity conflict after the Second World War II, 
Clausewitz's world is outdated and can no longer provide us with a suitable framework for 
understanding war (ibid: 58). This is especially true in developing countries, which form the implicit 
contextual background of this study, and where non-Trinitarian warfare is the norm (ibid: 58). 
64 
of resources, but in the misperception about organised violence and the inability to 
understand the character of and the logic of new warfare (ibid: 113). In other words, 
the use of a Clausewitzian perspective by the international community contributes to 
the failure of interventions by this same community. Kaldor's position offers an 
intriguing foil to this research, as it contends the opposite view. Based on my 
experience in Nepal, it is not so much the case that a Clausewitzian understanding of 
war causes improper responses to war, rather it is a rigid, linear view combined with a 
dispassionate, non-political treatment of the design and implementation of aid 
operations, combined with insufficient consideration of the dynamic working 
environment which at the root of sub-optimal responses to violent and unstable 
working environments. An operational paradigm that addresses these shortcomings is 
lacking. 
Gray, a British-American strategic thinker and professor of International Relations and 
Strategic Studies and a 'supporter' of Clausewitz's thinking, discusses several 
shortcomings in Clausewitz's work (1999). Firstly, Clausewitz says little about the 
dynamics of policy (ibid: 101). Then, Clausewitz barely addresses the causes of war, 
the political objectives to be achieved and ways of accomplishing this through 
statecraft or diplomacy (ibid: 106). Further, Clausewitz seems to be concerned with the 
operational military level (ibid: 104) and focused on how a particular will can be 
imposed upon an enemy. He does not offer much reflection on how an enemy might 
seek to impose its will (ibid: 103-104). Lastly, Clausewitz, according to Gray, does not 
give much attention to issues such as economics, logistics, administration and 
technology, which are of vital importance to a comprehensive understanding of the 
conduct of war. 116 Gray sees these shortcomings as opportunities to further, perhaps in 
a Clausewitzian style, the fundamentals of a general theory on war (ibid: 100). 
Positive Critiques Clausewitz has, next to Grey, other supporters too, of whom a 
sample follows. To begin with, Brodie, an American military strategist and theorist, 
argues in the Howard and Paret translation of On War, that Clausewitz's work stands 
out as one of a small number of historical texts which have presented profound and 
original insights that have not been adequately absorbed in the later literature (H&P: 
116 See for example Van Creveld (2005) Supplying War, logistics from Wallenstein to Potton, Cambridge 
University Press. 
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50-53). Gat, a researcher of military history, states that Clausewitz offers a 
sophisticated theory of war, based on a highly stimulating intellectual paradigm, and 
brought the conception of military theory in line with the forefront of the general 
theoretical outlook of his time (2001: 255). However, the majority of supporters do not 
embrace On War as an unfinished theory; they value it because it provides the 
foundation for a theory on war, but recognise that it needs to be worked on and 
modified to accommodate developments in contemporary warfare. Within this context 
Roxborough, a sociologist, argues that despite On War's historically rooted theoretical 
shortcomings, its theory should not be cast off (1994: 627). 
Regarding the various critiques of, for example, Keegan, Van Creveld and Kaldor and 
the use ofClausewitz in the context of this exploratory thesis, I would like to argue that 
their critiques might be valid for the analysis of war, but that does not necessarily 
imply that aspects of Clausewitz's theory on war are by definition not useful as 
inspirational frame for reflection on strategizing aid operations in turbulent 
environments. 
Some of the strengths of On War will in various degrees be exploited in the remainder 
of this thesis. To begin with, Clausewitz has a lot to say on how to fight war effectively 
(Howard 2002). Then, although the social trinity attracts criticism, the prime, 
psychologically orientated trinity is under-explored, but, according to Gray, still has 
validity as a theoretical framework for thinking about and conceptualising war (1999: 
92). Shaw appreciates Clausewitz's theory for two other reasons. Firstly, it presents 
war as a type of social action, which can be compared with other types of social action 
such as commerce. Therefore his framework is in principle open to understanding the 
parallels and connections between war and other types of social action. Secondly, 
according to Shaw, Clausewitz's theory contains a primitive sociology that addresses 
the connections between social forces and the elements of his famous trinity of war, i.e. 
rationality, chance and violence (ibid: 41). 
Two further viewpoints conclude this chapter. The first is that of Gray, who realised 
over his thirty-year career as an academic and military adviser that On War provides 
the basic conceptual toolkit for the education of the strategist (2006: 5). In line with 
this, it is my personal view that concepts such as the remarkable trinity and other 
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concepts discussed in On War such as strategy, boldness and perseverance, which were 
invented or discussed by Clausewitz (Heuser 2002: xi), and the way these discussions 
are fonnulated and shaped are not only helpful when approaching particular military 
issues, but could, in an adapted fonn, helpfully guide reflections on aid operations in 
turbulent environments. In addition, Clausewitz's approach to discussing different 
dimensions of strategizing battle shows that he realises the severe consequence of 
mistakes made. In my view this is of considerable worth, and it is this aspect which the 
reflections on strategizing aid operations in turbulent environments aim to echo. 
In this chapter we have briefly discussed Clausewitz's lite, the intellectual climate he 
lived in and the way these are reflected in On War. We have described the 
development of On War, its methodological features, its themes and its various 
critiques for and against. The following chapter describes in methodological tenns how 
selected elements from Clausewitz's theoretical toolbox will be used in the process of 
reflecting on aid operations in turbulent Nepal. 
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CHAPTER 4 Research Question and Methodology 
4. 1 Introduction 
The apparently contradictory juxtaposition of Clausewitz's thinking as laid out in On 
War with the practice of aid agencies in turbulent environments like Nepal may come 
as a surprise to those who are suspicious of military activity or thought. 117 Why would 
those who attempt to do good borrow ideas from 'evil'? And if it is to be done. how is 
the contradiction between Clausewitzian thinking and contemporary aid practices to be 
reconciled for the purpose of reflecting upon strategizing and implementation 
processes of aid operations in turbulent environments like Nepal? Borrowing from 
Patton, an author on qualitative research methodologies, the short answer is that this 
research intends to apply a pragmatic strategy of matching a concrete method, in this 
case a single case study, with a specific research question (2002: 69).1 18 This chapter 
aims to elaborate on the research methodology of the study. 
The remainder is structured as follows: the hypothesis and research question are stated, 
following which I briefly elaborate on the philosophical and personal points of 
departure of the research position. This is followed by a discussion of how the single 
case study approach is applied in the course of the study and data is collected. Then, 
the method of data analysis is discussed. The features of the various reflections are 
elaborated upon, and issues of validity and reliability concerning this research are 
discussed. This is followed by an overview of possible biases. The final paragraph 
elaborates briefly on how the research meandered and which research alternatives were 
considered during the early stages of the study. 
117 One might argue that military activities are a practical hindrance for the advance of development 
activities in the first place, or that military theory has not much in common the field of aid and 
development. Or, as Kaldor argues, it is precisely a Clausewitzian understanding of contemporary 
conflicts and the misunderstanding that this creates which has led to failed interventions in conflict 
situations (2005: 113). 
118 Patton suggests that this implies that any study must be judged by its intended purposes, available 
resources, procedures followed and results obtained (2002: 71). 
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4.2 Hypotheses and research question 
This study has two hypotheses: 
1. That the development industry operating in turbulent environments could benefil 
from ideas within military theory. 
2. That Clausel1'itz's theoretizations on the conduct ofll'ar as laid out in his book On 
War, when applied in a creative way, form afrui((ul basis toformulate a normative 
framework which furthers (.vpeculative) reflections on aid operations in turbulent 
operational environments such as Nepal. 
The research question of the study is: How might reflections on aid operations in 
turbulent operational environments, such as Nepal during the period August 1999 10 
2005106, appear when inspired by Clausel1'ilz's lines (?f IhoURhl and 
conceptualizations of war as laid out in his book On War? 
The study mainly elaborates on concepts discussed by Clausewitz which are related to 
the ideas of friction and strategy, such as intelligence, physical effort, boldness, 
perseverance and cunning, and how these subsequently interact with friction in the 
course of strategizing and implementing aid operations in turbulent environments like 
Nepal, between mid-1999 and 2005/06.119 I assumed, while preparing the fieldwork 
that a key issue related to aid and development in Nepal related to the issue of strategy. 
However, while conducting the actual fieldwork and analysing the data, I started to 
believe that aspects related to friction are of equal importance to think through 
processes of strategizing aid operations. That is the reason why I focus in this thesis 
primarily on the nexus of strategy and friction, acknowledging that Clausewitz 
elaborated in his theory on a range of other themes as wel1. 120 
119 The period of time covered in the research is somewhat arbitrary and corresponds basically with my 
six-year period in Nepal from August 1999 to July 2005. However, I do not apply this time frame 
strictly, as respondents appeared to face challenges when answering my questions solely within this 
time frame. For example one respondent (A4) referred regularly to the beginning of the 90s, suggesting 
that during visits to the Midwestern part of Nepal there were observable indicators that Nepal was ripe 
for a Maoist-inspired revolution. 
120 See also paragraph 4.9, which indicates how this research shifted in focus. 
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4.3 Research: points of departure 
Huff, a professor in strategy and innovation, in a paper on theory-building argues that 
it is important that a researcher clarifies his/ her own views and experience as much as 
possible, as it helps the researcher to formulate his or her own position in relation to 
other researchers (Huff in: Smith and Hitt 2005: 350). In Chapter One I presented my 
practical working experience and position related to development aid. Below, I clarify 
the philosophical research position applied during the course of the research. This 
section explores the underlying philosophical point of departure and personal approach 
of this exploratory research. 
Philosophical point of departure In an ideal world it would be admirable if a 
researcher could adhere to a form of truth-finding which combines three philosophical 
research positions in one research redesign, following pragmatism, coherency theory 
and the correspondence theory at the same time (Ouweneel 1984).121 Despite this 
ideal, due to the exploratory nature of this research combined with the pragmatic 
nature of the field of study (Kennedy 2004: 235-323), I apply a pragmatic approach to 
truth in the course of the study. 
This pragmatic view on truth making assumes that no solid foundation for knowledge 
exists and that subsequently assumptions are necessary to underpin any set of beliefs 
(Hammersley 1989: 47). Furthermore, pragmatism holds that science develops from 
the problems of life and should therefore be directed towards the solutions of these 
problems (ibid: 53).122 Although many aid practitioners might subscribe to this view, 
the position has some drawbacks in relation to this research. Firstly, it might be 
perceived as a minimalist approach towards the development of a series of reflections 
on aid and development in Nepal. Secondly, the study might make sense in a 
theoretical world, but that does not automatically mean that it is useful in the practical 
121 These three approaches deviate from the more conventional distinctions of enlightenment, 
counter-enlightenment and post-modernism (Ouweneel 1984). According to Ouweneel, coherency 
philosophies, as developed by for example Kant, leibniz and Hegel, consider statements as true when 
these statements are coherent, in terms of internal consistency and connectedness. So, if the outcome 
of a study is internally consistent then it is a product of good science. Correspondence theory goes a 
step further and argues that a theory can be coherent but that does not mean that it corresponds with 
reality, even if it works according to pragmatic criteria (ibid). So in the context of correspondence 
theory a product of good science within the world of aid and development is if the outcome of the 
research is in line with the reality of aid. 
122 Chapter One describes the problem I encountered in the course of my work in Nepal. 
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world of aid and development. 123 Thirdly, following on from the second point, the 
series of reflections developed might 'work' in terms of understanding reality and 
therefore might be perceived as close to the truth, but this does not mean that its 
implications are necessarily straightforward.124 In other words, conclusions might be 
reached too early. Despite these drawbacks, I apply a pragmatic approach in the course 
of the study on the basis ofa pragmatic line of thought being that even ifan incoherent 
set of (speculative) reflections are derived from the interplay between Clausewitz's 
thinking and the development practice in Nepal, these reflections might not be 
necessarily without value or unworkable in other comparable situations. 
Personal approach Mintzberg argues that interesting theory will evolve ..... when we 
let go all scient(/ic correctness. or to use a famous phrase. suspend our helie.f. ... and 
allow our minds to roam Feely and creatively" (Mintzberg in: Smith and Hitt 2005: 
574). Despite Mintzberg's suggestion that relevance should prevail over rigour, a 
balanced approach is adopted, which is reflected by a personal approach to research, at 
the heart of which is the attempt to be an eclectic. imaginative and committed e:tplorer. 
Being eclectic is reflected in the various sources and academic disciplines used and 
combined during the course of the research. 125 The attempt to be imaginative refers to 
two issues, namely the use of creativity in the process of reflecting on aid activities in 
Nepal via some of Clausewitz's ideas and the application of Mills' approach to 
sociology as a form of imaginative craft (2000).126 Finally, the notion of the committed 
explorer refers on the one hand to remaining committed to the study's structure, for 
this purpose the case study method laid out by Yin (2003: 50), and on the other hand, 
to my desire to use the methodological freedom allowed in the course of exploratory 
research (Stebbins 2001). 
123 The idea that what works is truth might even be a paradox. Spin, which appears to me an 
unfortunate factor within the practice of aid, might work for example in the process of getting aid 
projects financed or implemented, but it is not necessarily true or ethical. Respondent A3 hinted at this 
practice within the context of the Nepali development community. 
124 For example, if aid agencies argue that rebels randomly attack development projects, it is easy to 
suggest that aid in general is under attack by rebels and therefore actions to improve security do not 
make sense or cannot be taken. The argument works in the sense that it assists the process of labelling 
rebels as terrorists and gaining the moral high ground of being a victim of their terrorism. However, it 
does not assist at all in developing an appropriate response to a wide variety of security risks, which 
might be induced by the agencies under risk. Short-sighted pragmatism is therefore not helpful. 
125 Clausewitz used an eclectic approach in his study of war; failure to acknowledge this in my approach 
could undermine my research. 
126 Wright Mills encourages using the life experience of the researcher in his work, and to examine, 
interpret and reflect on it (2000: 196). 
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Within the above context, this exploratory research comes to a satisfying conclusion 
when the following standard is applied. Mintzberg suggests that good theory does not 
necessarily need to be finished. He sees theory as a perspective on reality that holds 
until a better one is developed (Mintzberg in: Smith and Hitt 2005: 356). This implies 
that one key aspect of good theory is that, despite being incomplete and unfinished, it 
generates discussion and debate. Although this thesis is not primarily focused on 
developing theory, but on a series of reflections, one could argue, in similar fashion as 
to what might constitute a good series of reflections. Therefore, acknowledging that I 
cannot judge the product of my own reflections, this thesis takes the rather pragmatic 
and minimalist view that the minimum acceptable outcome of the research is that it 
potentially stimulates debate among those aid practitioners who read it. 
4.4 The case study method and method of data collection 
This exploratory research is qualitative and adopts a single case-study design, which 
will be elaborated upon below. The justification of the latter is twofold.127 The case is 
unique and typical at the same time. Firstly, the case is unique in terms of context, 
Nepal being the only Hindu state in the world, having to face a rather 'successful" 
insurgency based on Maoist-Marxist and Leninist ideology during the second-half of 
the 90s. Secondly, the case appears to be replicating the not uncommon phenomenon 
of an aid community, acting in general terms as 'blind' to a deteriorating operational 
context (Uvin 1998).128 In addition, adopting a single case-study design also relates to 
the exploratory nature of the research topic, which is a reflection on the conjuncture 
between Clausewitz's thinking on the conduct of war and the practice of the aid 
industry in a particular context, in this case Nepal. Moreover, it is Clausewitz himself 
who argues that studying one case deeply might be more instructive then exploring 
several cases (H&P: 170-174), advice which I have followed by conducting a single 
case study. The unit of analysis within this study is the international development 
127 Yin suggests that a single case study design is justified where the case is a critical extreme or unique 
one, or a representative or typical case, or a revelatory case, or a longitudinal case (Yin 2003: 40-42). 
128 Uvin explored the role of the aid community in Rwanda in relation to the genocide of 1994, 
including its (non-) response to preparations for the genocide. I recall a conversation with my director 
whereby I stated that SNV/ Nepal's response to the growing instability in Nepal almost echoed SNV/ 
Rwanda response to the build up of the Genocide, with the difference that Nepal would most likely not 
face a genocide (Autumn 2003). In the build up of the Rwanda Genocide SNV/ Rwanda appeared 
unaware of the dramatic social, political dynamics in its operational environment. (Task Force SNV 
2002). 
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community in Nepal in relation to the conflict dynamics within the country. On the 
basis of concepts and themes derived from Clausewitz the study investigates how in 
general tenns the aid community and their operations responded to and interacted with 
these conflict dynamics. The study does not aim to analyse individual agencies, their 
projects or programmes, though these will be used on occasion as examples to clarify, 
illustrate or prove particular points made. In addition, as stated earlier, the study is not 
an evaluation of the aid industry in Nepal, or of particular aid sectors in Nepal. 129 
Methods of data collection The study draws on secondary and primary data. A 
chapter-by-chapter overview of the data used is provided. 
Part I Chapter One is mainly based on a recapitulation of my own experience while 
studying Development Studies, and my working experiences in Nepal. In addition, 
secondary data is collected and used to elaborate on various aspects related to 
development aid and fragile states, which include literature related to anthropology, 
sociology, political science, development studies and crisis management. These 
sources helped me to position the research. Chapter Two is primarily based on 
secondary sources related to Nepal in general and development aid in Nepal III 
particular. These secondary sources are mainly anthropological, sociological or 
political science-orientated academic works, or (project) reports produced, or 
commissioned by aid agencies themselves. Infonnation from applied research 
institutes, or journalistic sources are used as well. Chapter Three is based on 
Clausewitz's work On War, the insights of various military historians and strategists 
about Clausewitz's life, his work or the theoretical and practical implications of his 
work for military practice. The methodology chapter is based on literature related to 
research methodology. These sources facilitated my explorations as to how I conducted 
this research. 
All chapters in Part II and III consist of three sets of data. Firstly, selected parts from 
Clausewitz's On War are presented, together with reference to Clausewitz specialists 
where necessary to shed light on the meaning of these excerpts. Then, interview data 
are used. The chapters in Part II and III are further infonned by my own reflections on 
129 Aid agencies themselves might be much better positioned to conduct evaluations. 
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the interplay of the other sets of data. In addition, throughout the thesis, I draw on my 
own memories of events between August 1999 and August 2005, being aware that 
these memories are partial, fading like batteries, and therefore not necessarily accurate. 
Interviewees and (grey) literature Primary data informs Part II and III, and 
interviews were conducted and (grey) material produced by aid agencies collected for 
that purpose. With respect to interview data, the selection criteria for participation in 
the research were twofold. Firstly, potential interviewees needed to have worked for 
aid agencies in Nepal or had to be in regular contact with some of these aid agencies 
between 1999 and 2005/06, or had to be a close observer of Nepal in general or 
development aid in particular. The second criterion for selection was that potential 
interviewees had to be close to or observers of central decision-making processes 
within these aid agencies. This would include Heads of Mission, project or programme 
managers, or key advisors (for example as contlict advisor or security officer), but 
expatriates, being either an academic or consultant with long-term relationship with 
Nepal and its aid community or Nepali nationals with the same background as well. 
Recruiting research participants began with an initial selection of key informants 
whom I considered knowledgeable about the dynamics of Nepal's aid community vis-
a-vis the contlict in Nepal.130 From there most of the other research participants were 
purposely selected via the snowball method (Bernard 1995: 95-98). To my benefit 1 
already knew a significant portion of the total number of people interviewed. 
Initially, I thought that a sample of approximately 36 people would be sufficient in 
order to get a reasonable cross-section of interview responses.131 This idea was proved 
reasonably correct. However, during the fieldwork in Nepal, which took 6 weeks (trom 
)30 These individuals were considered knowledgeable in this context because of the extent of their 
involvement with the aid community of Nepal and because of their social networks within this 
community. One of them has lived and worked in Nepal for the last 20 years and is conducting PhD 
research on learning in Nepal's aid community, the second has published widely on Nepal and visits 
Nepal regularly as a consultant, the third has been regularly involved in consultancy work for one of 
the biggest donors since 2003 and the fourth key informant was a former colleague, professionally 
tasked with maintaining contacts with a wide variety of actors in Nepal. 
131 Stebbins advises a minimum of 30 interviewees per process or situation studied (2001: 27). Out of 
these 36, I assumed that I could interviewee approximately 12 former aid staff who had returned to 
Europe. The remaining 24 research participants, I assumed, could be interviewed successively in Nepal. 
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the 2nd of February till the 15th of March 2008),132 I decided to go beyond this number, 
as it was easier to approach possible interview candidates than expected.133 In the end 
a total of 70 people were interviewed.134 This does not mean that I have used all the 
interview material equally intensively; after transcribing and summarizing 
approximately 45 interviews a saturation point was reached, with not much by way of 
substantial new insights connected to the themes related to strategy coming to the fore 
(Strauss and Corbin 1998: 136),135 Before starting the interview series two pilot 
interviews were conducted with two former project managers of larger INGOs, 
successively working in Sri Lanka and Sudan.136 
In the process of presenting the data, respondents are represented with a single code, 
ranging from A I to A 70.137 While presenting the material no distinction is made 
between nationalities, aid agency background, role within or outside an aid agency and 
gender. Although indicating the backgrounds of the various respondents (for example 
their nationalities)138 or even separating responses on the basis of these backgrounds 
might have been valuable for those with anthropological or sociological research 
interests, within the context of this study I am of the opinion that it would not provide 
additional information that could bring me closer to answering the research question, 
as the emphasis of the research question is the interplay between Clausewitz's thinking 
on war and the overall processes within the aid community in Nepal between 1999 and 
2005/06. In addition, it could reveal the identity of the respondents, which I wanted to 
avoid. Therefore I chose to treat all responses as having equal value for the research, 
132 As I was familiar with the context, the fieldwork period could be short. 
133 Firstly, I could draw on my network of contacts, which was stronger than expected. Secondly, but 
more importantly, there were more former 'colleagues' present during the fieldwork in Nepal then 
expected, although some were operating in other positions. Some had even returned, after a period of 
absence. 
134 21 out of the 70 respondents were Nepali. 15 out of the 70 respondents were women. 
135 This does not mean that I have not used material from the other interviews, but went back to them 
occasionally if thought necessary. 
136 Interviews took place by skype (Sri Lanka case) or face-to-face in the Netherlands (in the Sudan 
case). Both interviewees were Dutch and the results of the interviews are not used in the research. 
137 An anomynised list of research participants can be found in Annexe 4.1. The research participants 
are listed in alphabetical order. 
138 These 70 interviewees represented a wide variety of nationalities. In alphabetical order there were 
contributions from nationals of the following countries: America, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, France, Italia, Japan, Nepal, Switzerland and Sri Lanka. 
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regardless of the nationality of the interviewee who contributed a particular point. 139 
Therefore, while quoting a respondent, I do not indicate if the respondent was a Nepali 
or an expatriate. All interviews were recorded with pennission14o and notes were taken 
during the interviews. Out of the 70 interviews 3 recordings failed. 141 
The majority of interviews took place in the capital of Nepal, Kathmandu, with the 
remainder being conducted in different parts of Europe. 142 Some of the Europe-based 
interviews took place before the fieldwork, while a few other interviews were 
conducted after the field research. During the time of the interviews, at least 41 out of 
70 research participants had changed, or were on the verge of moving into another 
position.l43 I assume that this allowed them to respond more freely to my questions, 
than if they were still in the positions they held between 1999 and 2005/06. 13 
potential research candidates kindly declined to participate or did not respond to my 
invitation to participate. For my part I cancelled three interviews, one of which turned 
out to be logistically impractical and two of which were unlikely to add substantially to 
the outcome of research, given the amount of data available. The research participants 
ranged from Nepali and expatriate project managers, (fonnerly) based in (very) remote 
districts, to Nepali Nationals and expatriate staff, who were able to influence direct or 
indirectly decision-making processes within aid agencies. During the course of field 
research in Nepal, the opportunity unexpectedly arose to interview Dr. Baburam 
139 Where helpful I may introduce a quotation by indicating if the interviewee was a key advisor or 
close observer etc, but without does not reveal his or her nationality. 
140 However in one case the interviewee requested that the recording be stopped before answering a 
certain question. The interviewee allowed the continuation of the recording after giving their response. 
141 Notes were still made of these interviews. One of the respondents of these three failed recordings 
wrote a 30-page document to recapitulate the pOints made during the interview, which I gratefully 
accepted. 
142 An introductory letter and a verbal explanation of the aim of the research preceded the interviews. 
In addition I explained to research participants that questions raised during the interview were based 
on the various themes discussed by Clausewitz. The non-Nepal based interviews took place in the 
United Kingdom: St Goran (1), Penrith (1), Oxford (1), London (2), Norwich (1), Easneye (1); 
Switzerland: Geneva (2), Bern (1); Denmark: Copenhagen (1); the Netherlands: Utrecht (1), Oosterbeek 
(2), Hilversum (1) and Zwaagwesteinde (1). 
143 In a few cases respondents were in their last month or even week of their job. In one case I was 
offered the opportunity to interview a respondent in the last 48 hours before leaving Nepal, between 
the respondent's visit to the dentist and the usual final farewell party. 
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Bhattaria (CPN-M);144 however I did not interview representatives of either the 
government or the army.145 
I envisaged having only one chance to interview the majority of research participants. I 
used for the purpose a semi-structured interview plan (Bernard 1995: 209). This semi-
structured interviewing led in a small number of cases to a form of unstructured 
interview, while keeping the issues I wanted to explore in mind.146 This happened for 
example in instances were interviews were a sort of mini-reunion, or where 
experiences were very similar or were the interviewee indicated that he or she was also 
struggling with the paradoxes of aid and development in Nepal. 147 Before each 
interview I decided which issues I definitely wanted to cover during the interview, 
which in tum depended very much on the background of the interviewee (for example 
whether they were a Head of Mission or conflict advisor, or a consultant with a long 
term relationship with aid agencies in Nepal), and the amount of data already gathered 
during earlier interviews. Another factor was the time available on the part of the 
interviewee. 
Rapport-building was often not necessary as in many cases I already knew the research 
participants from my earlier work, or other research participants had introduced me and 
my research, which smoothened my introduction considerably. However, in some 
cases I had to make clear and remind interviewees that I was focusing on dynamics 
within the aid community between 1999 and 2005/06. 
144 Dr. B. Bhattarai together with respondents A18, A59 and A35 were the only four who indicated 
having read significant parts of Clausewitz's On War. 
145 This potential shortcoming is partly mitigated by the fact that some participants observed closely 
what was happening within the higher echelons of Nepal's government system. 
146 For the difference between semi-structured and unstructured interviewing see Bernard (1995: 209). 
147 For my part I perceived some of these unstructured interviews as re-unions and 'therapeutic' 
moments in which common experiences could be freely shared and reflected upon. I had the feeling 
during a number of interviews that interviewees felt they were being understood and listened to (for 
example in case of respondent A63). In addition, in those instances of unstructured interviewing there 
were, other than discussing the paradoxes of the past, also moments of learning from each other. In 
that sense the interviewee and me as interviewer were often equally pOSitioned (see also Craig and 
Cook 2007), for example in case of the interviews with respondent A8 and A59, which in part circled 
around the question as to why the international community only focused on 'Maoist conflict' and was 
not able to 'see' the existing ethnic problems in the Terai. 
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In tenns of grey material, reports produced by aid agencies were collected in the course 
of the fieldwork, though these were not actively gathered,148 since this material is quite 
often the official agency line, and not likely to deal with those issues the study is 
directly interested in. However, if material was provided it was used if found 
appropriate for the research. 149 
4.5 Method of data analysis 
The central aim of this thesis was to develop a set of (speculative) reflections on aid 
and development in Nepal, based on the interaction between selected parts of 
Clausewitz's thinking about war and the processes of aid and development in Nepal 
between 1999 and 2005/06. This aim shaped the structure of the chapters in Part 11 of 
the thesis, each chapter consisting of four sections. The first section of each chapter 
provides an idea how I used the concept in Nepal and why I think the theme under 
discussion is relevant for development practice. This is followed by a brief summary of 
Clausewitz's view on that particular theme (for example titled 'Clausewitz and 
Boldness'}.15o This section is followed by a presentation of how the various 
interviewees responded to this specific theme (for example titled 'Boldness and 
Nepal's development community'). The final section of the chapter is a reflection on 
the conjuncture of the second and the third section of the chapter and is simply titled 
'Reflection'. This reflective part is infonned by the 'aid trinity' concept, which will be 
explained in chapter 5. Paragraph 4.6 elaborates on the features of the reflections. 
The selection of themes and summary of Clausewitz's thinking of regarding that 
particular theme is based on a mix of three elements. Firstly, it reflects what I perceive 
to be key elements in Clausewitz's thinking about a given topic. Secondly, it retlects 
what I think 'resonated' positively or negatively with the responses of actors in the aid 
community of Nepal. And thirdly, the summary reflects of what I thought could inspire 
reflections on aid and development in Nepal. 
148 So, for example material produced by agencies from which I did not interview staff was not 
collected. 
149 In once case, I received a full document on how individual staff members of a donor agency 
experienced the conflict. However, I was asked not to make use of it in the course of my research. 
150 Definitions of the various Clausewitzian themes presented will not be given by me, but merely 
presented. The reason being that Clausewitz himself was not concerned with definitions but with 
phenomena. I follow this line. (See as well Strachan 2008: 427). 
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Relevant interview material was collated theme by theme from the whole of the 
interview material. This collated material was then thoroughly thematically analysed, 
and a 'code map' (Crang and Cook 2007) was constructed laying out the various 
storylines, views, factors, and elements around a particular theme. lSI 
The analysis focused on showing how a particular Clausewitzian theme or concept 
resonated among research participants and what this said on the one hand about aid and 
development in Nepal during the period under research and on the other hand what it 
could eventually mean conceptually. During this analysis issues and storylines 
emerged which I structured within the context of the theme under exploration. 
Although all interviewees had given consent to be interviewed, implying that the 
interview data could be used, I decided more than once not to include material or to 
anonymise it entirely, in order to avoid harming individual research participants, their 
colleagues or the agencies they worked for. However, I decided, contrary to the advice 
of Stebbins (2001), to quote extensively and by doing so obtained a well-informed 
impression of the overall performance of the aid industry in Nepal between 1999 and 
2005/06. 
Each reflection was equally based on a summary of Clausewitz's ideas about a 
particular theme and the stories that emerged from the interview data related to this 
theme. In addition, three concepts or devices guided each reflection. The first notion is 
the "aid trinity", which is described in detail in Chapter Five. The second notion is that 
of the ideal form of aid (discussed in the first Chapter of Part II). Lastly, the idea of the 
aid strategist is used to frame and focus the reflections (See Annexe 1.1). To a large 
extent the order of themes as presented by Clausewitz is kept intact; however 
deviations have taken place to bring the themes and their sequence more in line with 
aid and development. 1S2 
4.6 The features of the reflections 
The reflections are on the one hand guided by the summary of selected parts of 
Clausewitz and the various stories which emerged from the interview data. On the 
151 During the analysis of interview material no special software package was used. 
152 For example Chapter 9 focuses on information, instead of intelligence. 
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other hand the reflections are to various degrees guided by the triad of the' aid trinity', 
the ideal fonn of aid, and the notion of the aid strategist. However, there is more to say 
about the features of these reflections. They have other Clausewitzian methodological 
marks, which were mentioned in the chapter on Clausewitz, not least the attempt to use 
plain, uncomplicated and non-technical language. In addition, the reflections will jump 
between practice and theory and the specific and the general. However, in contrast with 
Clausewitz's non-prescriptive approach, the reflections sometimes suggest courses of 
action to consider. 
4.7 Validity and reliabilityts3 
Validity and reliability in this exploratory research should only be applied to the extent 
that the research is able to provide an accurate picture of how interview participants 
responded to the questions related to the Clausewitzian concepts and themes with 
regard to the practice of the development industry in Nepal between 1999 and 2005/06. 
The issue of validity and reliability is in the course of this part of the research resolved 
in the first place by interviewing more than the double number of people required for 
exploratory research. 154 Then, at the end of the fieldwork in Nepal, where the majority 
of interviews were carried out, tentative results were presented to an audience of 
research participants. 1ss This confinned to a large extent the initial findings as well as 
providing new insights. I have not, however, provided tentative written texts to 
research participants to validate the extent to which Clausewitzian concepts and themes 
resonated among those interviewed. In spite of this, and in light of the rather 
pessimistic outlook of Nepal's development industry, I made every effort to find any 
counter evidence in the interview material, and included this in the presentation of the 
material. Regarding the issue of reliability, it is my opinion that a researcher with 
comparable background, in tenns of experience in Nepal, methodological approach 
and access to and rapport with the group of research participants would be able to 
provide a similar overview of observations.156 A report published in June 2009 
153 According to Stebbins, in explorative research validity refers to gaining an accurate and true 
impression of the phenomena under study. In addition, reliability points to the possibility of another 
researcher to replicate the research (2001: 25). 
154 70 interviews vice the recommended minimum of 30 advised by Stebbins (2001). 
155 11 out of the 54 people interviewed during the fieldwork in Nepal. 
156 According to Stebbins, the issue of reliability in exploratory research relates to the reproducibility of 
the observations of a researcher (2001). 
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covering aid and development in Nepal during the period 1996-2008, written by well-
respected researchers, confirms the general tenor of my research. 157 
The reflective component of the research should not be arbitrated on the basis of 
validity or reliability but on the basis of the criteria laid out above, namely the 
pragmatic view that an acceptable outcome of the reflective part of the research is the 
potential stimulation of debate among current or future aid practitioners. Should the 
reflections tum out to be useful in terms of operational or even theoretical value, this 
would be an added bonus. 
Throughout the research opportunities were taken to present research material and 
receive comments and critique. Firstly, initial research results were presented at the 
end of the fieldwork in Nepal to an audience made up of the interviewees. The 
presentation produced positive critique and discussion among participants. Then 
presentations were given to various groups of students following courses in 
Humanitarianism or Development Studies.1s8 Again, these were generally 
constructively perceived. In addition, a presentation was given in Oxford during a 
study day organised by the Nepal-British Academic Society (Autumn 2008).159 
4.8 Biases 
Several factors could have biased the research outcome: 
1. My own evolving perspective on aid and development in Nepal during the period 
1999-2005/06 as being an insufficient response to the conflict and changing 
situation of poverty in the country. 
2. The perspectives of the various respondents who were to a certain extent 
emotionally or even politically engaged with Nepal and their own understanding of 
157 This study concludes While it will be impossible to correct the errors of the past, the soul searching 
exercise within the aid community around the core question of "what went wrong?" is a positive sign.' 
Bonini, F., and Donini, A. (2009), Aid and Violence: Development Policies and Conflict in Nepal, 
Feinstein International Centre, Tufts University. 
158 These groups were located at Uppsala University/ Sweden, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen/ The 
Netherlands, BirkBeck College/ London and Oxford Brookes University. 
159 The main comment here was made by Sir Sam Cowan, to use Clausewitz solely as a source for 
reflection on the aid industry in Nepal. 
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how they understood the questions around the concepts used in the course of the 
interviews.160 
3. In addition, the majority of research participants had a rather pessimistic view of 
the performance of the aid community in Nepal in general. I did not perceive an 
especial difference between Nepalis and expatriates. 
4. The imbalance between men and women in the interview sample. 
5. The rather unusual concepts used to reflect on strategizing and implementation 
processes within turbulent environments, namely the triad of the ideal form of aid, 
'aid trinity' and aid strategist, tend to make the research aid agency-centred. 161 
4.9 A meandering research trajectory and research alternatives 
The research did not follow a straight route. Below I describe briefly the journey this 
research underwent and the research alternatives developed and looked at. 
Shifting focus The study 'travelled' in terms of focus. This shift of focus did not affect 
the inclusion or exclusion of Clausewitz's thinking throughout the thesis. The idea of 
applying the ideas of Clausewitz to aid and development stayed the same throughout 
the thesis. However, the research meandered on two levels towards its current position. 
On the first level, the initial, but rather ambitious idea was to tum selected parts of 
Clausewitz theory on war into some sort of new theory on aid operations in turbulent 
environments. The second level concentrated on which element(s) of Clausewitz's 
work to focus on. At first, while in Nepal, I had the idea that a transformation of an old 
theory on war into a new theory on aid operations would be achievable in the context 
of a PhD thesis. In addition, I thought that the issue of leadership, or in Clausewitzian 
terms genius, within the development sector, could evolve as the central theme within 
this transformation process. 162 However, while in Oxford, the transformation of old 
theory into new appeared to be less straightforward than expected.163 So, the research 
160 As stated earlier a large number of research participants had changed or were on the edge of 
changing jobs. It is not unlikely that interview responses would have been less outspoken if this had 
not been the case. 
161 Despite this aid agency-centric approach, the research itself is not aid agency-centric, as due to the 
use made during the reflections of the 'aid trinity' concept, a 360!! degree view is advocated. 
162 lowe this idea partly to Jean-Marc Mangin, Former Head of the Humanitarian Department within 
CIDA and CIDA/ Nepal. 
163 This coincided with the discovery of the complexity of Clausewitz's theoretical world, which led me 
to spend some time researching military history. 
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became focused on developing a set of reflections instead. In addition, the focus of the 
research shifted away from the notion of leadership towards the notion of strategy. 
This idea was still prominent while preparing the fieldwork; however during the course 
of the fieldwork this focus shifted towards the notion of friction, without ignoring the 
importance of strategy, as various aspects related to strategy turned out to be sources of 
friction. To bring the study full circle, this thesis reflects on how someone in a 
leadership position could potentially understand and overcome various forms of 
friction, which are primarily related to different aspects of strategy. 
Research alternatives Several alternative research approaches were considered during 
the initial stages of the study. Based on the idea of maintaining the central nexus 
between Clausewitz's ideas on war and aid operations in turbulent environments. a 
multi-case study was considered to conduct, exploring how in two or more different 
contexts representatives of the respective aid communities would respond to the 
various Clausewitz-related concepts and themes. 164 Another option considered was 
rather than solely applying aspects of Clausewitz's theory on war to the Nepal aid 
industry, comparing his thoughts within this context to that of the well-known eastern 
military philosopher Sun Tzu (1989). After due consideration both of these research 
alternatives were rejected as being impracticable for exploratory research. Aware that 
the product of this thesis is not definitive, these approaches could be considered in 
follow-up research. Now, we move to Chapter Five, in which the concept of 'aid 
trinity' is explored. 
164 These case study contexts could be selected on the basis of the identification of four different 
clusters of countries labelled as fragile states (DECO 2004: 21). Alternatively, particular themes could 
have been addressed within the context of a multiple case study approach, for example a single issue 
such as an aid community's response to an lOP or refugee crisis. 
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Chapter 5 The Aid Trinity 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to describe the 'aid trinity', which builds upon and echoes 
Clausewitz's 'remarkable trinity: briefly touched on in Chapter Three. The notion of 
the 'aid trinity' is the basic theoretical framework used in Part II to further reflection 
on various aid activities in Nepal during the Maoist insurgency between 1999 and 
2005/06. This chapter visually constructs and presents the 'aid trinity'. Although the 
'aid trinity' echoes Clausewitz's remarkable trinity, it goes beyond his model in 
crossing into the realm of aid and development. In addition, the way in which the 
different elements of the 'aid trinity' fit together and relate to each other is described. 
5.2 Constructing the 'aid trinity' 
The 'aid trinity' is an attempt to frame, from the perspective of an aid strategist, 
essential elements' in analysing and understanding the dynamics of aid operations in 
connection with the turbulent environments in which they operate. The 'aid trinity' 
echoes the remarkable trinity, while also being based on an eclectic combination of 
partial and not necessarily consistent interpretations of Clausewitz's remarkable 
trinity.165 This paragraph constructs the 'aid trinity', indicating layer by layer which 
ideas have been taken from Clausewitz's 'remarkable trinity' and how it transmutes 
into the 'aid trinity'. To support the above-described process the model is presented as 
a whole, instead of being introduced in stages. The visualisation of the 'aid trinity' is 
shown in figure 5.1.166 
165 The following sources are extensively used (and (very) closely followed) in this chapter: Smith's 
work entitled 'On Clausewitz' (2005), especially Chapter 10 which discusses the distinction between 
'Pure and Real War' (2005: 111-124); the work of military historian Rothe-Herberg entitled 
'Clausewitz's Puzzle' (2007), in particular Chapter 4 which discusses 'Clausewitz's legacy: The Trinity' 
(2007: 91-118). In addition, ideas from the actor-orientated approach are used (Long: 1993), as briefly 
described in Chapter 1. Furthermore, my field experiences in Nepal are utilised as well. 
166 I am not very content with the way the 'aid trinity' is visualised and actually prefer a three-
dimensional model consisting of three eclipses, circling around each other in an irregular fashion. 
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The 'aid trinity' framework consists of three interacting layers or trinities: a 
psychological triad (outer layer), a social triad (inner layer) and a managerial triad 
(middle layer). Layer by layer a description of the model is given. Simultaneously, the 
source of ideas related to the different layers is indicated and where they differ from 
Clausewitz's remarkable trinity model. 
Figure S.l: The aid trinity 
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The outer layer of the 'aid trinity' model is a psychological trinity consisting of the 
notions Passion! irrationality, Chance! non-rationality and Reason! rationality. This 
triad of psychological qualities borrows from and expands on Clausewitz's 
psychological dimension of the trinity, and subsequently pulls it away from its military 
psychological orientation. 
Several caveats are necessary. To start with, Clausewitz's, psychological triad speaks 
about the ideas of primordial violence. hatred. and enmity . ... the play l?t' chance and 
probability ... subject to reason' (H&P: 89). This has been simplified to passion or 
irrationality, chance or non-rationality and reason or rationality'. Passion! irrationality 
refers here to emotional qualities not to notions such as foolishness, insanity or sheer 
stupidity. Chancel non-rationality refers to notions of possibility in the form of chance 
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and probability. Reason/ rationality refers here to notions related to the spectrum of 
logic and reason. 
Secondly, Clausewitz's psychological trinity has a military orientation, not so much 
because it recognises the existence of non-rationality (chance and probability) or 
rationality (to ensure subordination of an activity to policy), but due to the idea of 
'primordial violence. hatred and enmity. which are to be the regarded as a blind 
natural force'. (H&P: 89). I contend that these emotional characteristics are able to 
interfere with an aid operation (for example as exhibited by a belligerent actor), but are 
not the right motivational basis for initiating or maintaining an aid operation. 
Therefore, it is proposed that we shift the notion of Passion/ irrationality towards a 
more humanitarian or developmental orientation, allowing room for notions such as 
sympathy, compassion or solidarity, without excluding negative emotions like hatred. 
So, the 'aid trinity' implies the existence of various forms of emotions in the course of 
an aid operation. These emotional motivations might range from 'passionate 
compassion' on the part of those actively involved or benefiting from it. to pure hatred 
for the aid activity itself and/ or those conducting or benefiting from it. 167 
Thirdly, Clausewitz's schema of the qualities of irrationality, non-rationality and 
rationality appear to be primarily linked with distinct social entities, the people 
(civilians), the military and the government, and appears therefore rather static. This 
thesis puts forward that in the theoretical concept of the 'aid trinity' no special links are 
made between the individual qualities of the psychological trinity and the groupings in 
the social trinity. Each psychological entity is related to each social group 
simultaneously. In addition, the qualities of these relationships are not fixed, but may 
vary with time. 
Fourthly, and in an extension of the last point, the psychological qualities in 
Clausewitz's scheme appear to be fixed qualities as well. In the 'aid trinity' 
psychological qualities can blend with and transform into each other. For example, 
irrationality can transform into rationality or might follow a rational course. Decisions 
167 Mac Ginty and Williams underline the importance of the psychological dimension when they state 
that the affective dimension integral to human life. including hate, rage, revenge, hopelessness, 
bitterness, ignorance, love, joy and mercy, is most often overlooked during the analysis of processes of 
conflict and development (2009: 4). 
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taken on the basis of emotion can be followed by a response, which not only appears 
rational, but is well thought through as well, as one interviewee recognised while 
reflecting on his agency's response after the Royal take-over of February 2005 (A 70). 
What does the above entail? As the 'aid trinity' echoes Clausewitz's psychological 
layer of the remarkable trinity, and appreciates non-rationality in tenns of chance and 
probability, an aid operation in a turbulent environment can be portrayed as a rather 
unpredictable affair in tenns of process, consequences, opportunities and set-backs. 
Reason! rationality, Passion/ irrationality and Chancel non-rationality might collide in 
rather unpredictable ways; consequently it is more likely that the route an aid operation 
takes will be different than that which originally planned. This has partly to do with the 
turbulence of the environment in which the aid operation is embedded and which it is 
contributing to. The 'aid trinity' assumes, like Clausewitz does in relation to war, that 
luck and chance cannot be excluded from an aid operation, and that they are an integral 
and inseparable part of it. In addition, the 'aid trinity' suggests that an aid operation is 
not merely a technical exercise, which can be initiated, planned and executed solely on 
the basis of rationality. However, chance and probability with perceived negative 
consequences can be addressed by prior rationality, for example by thinking through 
what might go wrong during the various stages of an aid operation. Moreover, chance 
and probability cannot be overcome by rationality alone. A combination of rationality 
and emotion with an active awareness of the roles chance and probability might 
overcome the various fonns of bad luck. 
The inner layer of the ·aid trinity' consists of the interacting triad of Local people, 
Conflicting parties and the Institutional sphere. Six interconnected caveats are 
suggested. To begin with, Clausewitz's model suggests a social trinity consisting of 
government, anny and people as suitable for the analysis of war. This triad might be 
appropriate for the analysis of war but it is postulated here that it is not suitable for the 
analysis of an aid operation in a war-like scenario. Therefore, based on discussions 
with Nepali colleagues while conceptual ising the challenges faced by a particular 
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project, an alternative social trinity is suggested: Beneficiary groups, Conflicting 
parties, and the Institutional sphere.168 These discussions resulted in figure 5.2. 
Figure 5.2: The dynamic aid trinity 
groups 
Own Source: ZOOI 
Secondly, in Clausewitz's social triad the three entities, (government, army and 
people) are conceptualised as single entities or as being homogenous. The social triad 
of the 'aid trinity" implies the opposite: the social groupings consist of a diverse range 
of multiple actors. In addition, each group represents various sub-groups of actors, and 
within each group some actors operate centre stage, while others are more peripheral. 
For each grouping, subgroups can be identified on the basis of several criteria. For 
example, the institutional sphere might contain four sub-groups based on a matrix 
consisting of two spectra: having or not having an institutional direct or indirect 
relationship with the aid operation and being in or out of country. The local population 
group might contain four sub-groups based on a matrix consisting of the spectra: (non-) 
168 In mid-2001 while discussing with some colleagues (Padam Shresta, Kum Gurung, Shaha Gurung, 
Phil Lindsay, Russell Hancock and Bert Jan Bouman) and others the challenges faced by the project we 
were worked on, they argued that the project faced pressures from three sides: firstly, the 'Conflicting 
parties' (for example the Royal Nepali Army and Maoists, but branches of local government and 
political parties as well); secondly the various communities and groups in the project area, those 
caught up and linked with these belligerent groups, and thirdly the 'Institutional sphere' the project 
was part of, namely the headquarters of the organisation and the project donors. By appreCiating these 
various pressures and resisting them by acting flexibly, the project was able to challenge to manage 
them to a certain extent. 
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victim of violence and (non-) beneficiary of aid. The group of Conflicting parties 
might comprise four sub-groups based on a matrix consisting of the spectra: violent or 
non-violent and belonging to the core group or being peripheral. Of course, boundaries 
between each category are not black and white and other distinctions are possible. 
However, in line with the actor-oriented approach, each of these actors has their own 
agency. 
Thirdly, in Clausewitz's social triad the social groups appear to be linked with each 
other via single relationships. Based on the point above and the actor approach it is 
suggested that the 'aid trinity' framework assumes that the various actors in the 
different social groups maintain multiple different dynamic relationships with each 
other. The type of relationships might range from unconditionally wann and positive 
via mildly antagonistic to violent. The dynamic relationships might be direct or 
indirect, intentional and unintentional, extremely cordial or violently antagonistic. One 
example of the direct and intentional way in which belligerents might try to influence 
the institutional sphere of an agency is to use the media or send a representative (Bob 
2005). Another example of direct and intentional influencing of relationships might be 
the way in which local women's groups might express their discomfort with the 
behaviour of one of the conflicting groups, such as the uprising of women's groups 
against the Maoists in Dailekh District in 2004. 
Fourthly, Clausewitz's trinity appears to a certain extent to assume a primarily 'uni-
directional' influence over war, whether it is people showing enthusiasm for war, 
governments setting policy or annies conducting battle. The 'aid trinity' suggests 
something slightly different. Although the triad of Local people. Conflicting parties 
and Institutional sphere influence, from initiation to end, the course of an aid operation. 
it is suggested that the relative (transfonnative) influence of each grouping over the aid 
operation varies with time and is multi-directional. 
Fifthly, Clausewitz implies that the social triad of his trinity is mutually exclusive. 
Based equally on the actor-oriented approach and my own field experience. the 'aid 
trinity' assumes that the groupings in the social triad are not mutualIy exclusive. 
Overlap between the Conflicting parties and Local population are feasible. Or, more 
rarely, but not less importantly, overlap between actors in the Institutional sphere and 
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the group of Conflicting parties or Local people could exist as well. In one such case a 
Nepali working for a renowned international dialogue centre in the heart of Europe was 
involved in facilitating negotiation processes between the government and the Maoists 
(CPN-M).169 
Lastly, Clausewitz's trinity suggests that war is composed of the social triad of people, 
army and commander and the government. The 'aid trinity' assumes that the triad of 
the Institutional sphere, Conflicting parties and Local people not only makes up the aid 
operation, but that the aid operation is embedded in and shaped by this social trinity as 
well. From this perspective the opposite is also assumed, i.e. that the aid operation is 
able to influence the three social groupings and their interactions as well. 
The middle layer of the 'aid trinity' The managerial triad closely follows Smith's 
model for explaining Clausewitz's approach to the essential activities constituting war, 
namely fighting, strategy and policy (2005: 111-126). As the concept of fighting in this 
triad of essential activities is unhelpful when thinking through aid operations, it has 
been replaced in the 'aid trinity' with the concept of 'engagement', a term in use in the 
aid industry.17o 
Below the triad of engagement, strategy and policy will be explored, together with how 
they fit with the other elements of the 'aid trinity', again building on Smith's model. 
Smith argues that :fighting is the interplay between passion and chance' (2005: 122), 
In the 'aid trinity' engagement becomes the nexus between passion/ irrationality and 
chancel non-rationality. Aid agency staff must to a certain extent feel compassion for 
and solidarity with the local people they work with. Simultaneously, chancel non-
rationality influences the intensity and direction of the engagement, and the element of 
reason/ rationality should not be bypassed in the analysis. For example, reason within 
the institutional sphere of the aid agency might overturn passion in the course of an aid 
operation, should one of the conflicting parties threaten the operation with violence. 
On a social level the engagement of an aid operation primarily takes the fonn of 
169 One of the Interviewees, being the best man at the wedding of this person pointed me to this 
connection. 
170 See for example: Paffenholz T. (2006) Nepal: Staying Engaged in Conflict: experiences and lessons 
learnt from Conflict sensitive programme management (CSPM) in fragile context and armed conflict, 
SDC, Bern Switzerland. 
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various interactions between conflicting parties and local people. For an aid operation 
to be effective, the local people should at the end of the day be positive about the aid 
operation. At the same time, actors within the institutional sphere influence the 
engagement of an aid operation for better or worse. An aid operation as an act of 
passionate solidarity dealing with Chancel non-rationality is removed from Reason/ 
rationality, however the institutional sphere of an aid operation seeks to moderate this 
via policy constraints and strategy guidance. 
Secondly, in Smith's explanation policy 'represents a comhination (?l reason and 
passion', He states that policy draws on the interplay between government and people 
(2005: 122). The 'aid trinity' suggests to approach these linkages less strictly: policy 
regarding an aid operation is indeed a collision between Reason/ rationality and 
passion/ irrationality, but the 'aid trinity' model proposes not to underestimate the 
potential influence of Chancel non-rationality in the process of policy formulation, 
Moreover, on a social level, in the process of formulating policy it is unlikely that an 
aid operation is solely generated on the basis of the nexus of the institutional sphere 
and (their perceptions of) local people. Even the most people-focused aid agency must, 
at a certain point consider the turbulent dynamics of the operational environment of the 
aid operation. An open-minded institutional sphere will consider equally the social 
grouping of conflicting parties and how they interact with the nexus of the institutional 
sphere and local people. In theory, the policy underpinning aid operations should be far 
removed from the notion of Chancel non-rationality, as the policy aims to grasp in 
logical terms not so much the process of aid operations, but what aid operations 
subsequently aim to address in terms of the reduction of poverty and turbulence. In 
reality however, the logic of the policy underpinning the aid operation is violated by 
unanticipated and unknowable factors in the operational environment of the aid 
operation and its institutional sphere, the sphere that formulated the policy in the first 
place. Therefore, policies concerning aid operations should be flexible to respond to 
ways in which the nexus of engagement and strategy might enter the domain of chance 
and non-rationality, 
Thirdly, Smith argues that strategy in war 'can he seen as reason comin~ to terms with 
change and uncertainty, seeking to impose a pattern on .fighting in order to achieve its 
()~ieclives' (2005: 122), The 'aid trinity' applies this to the conceptualisation of 
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strategizing aid operations as well, implying that strategizing is rationality accepting 
turbulence in the operational environment of the aid operation, coming to the fore via 
chance, so that the aid operation can achieve its objectives. Simultaneously, the 
strategy of an aid operation is an expression of Passion/ irrationality, which in turn is 
influenced by Reason/ rationality and Chancel non-rationality. The 'aid trinity' 
suggests that the strategy of an aid operation is the hinge between the theory of policy 
and the practice of engagement. Strategy is central, and must be reasoned enough to fit 
the policy, while able to engage constructively with the uncertainties in the operational 
environment. 
On a social level the task of strategy is threefold. First, theoretically it would be ideal if 
local people could design strategy. In practice this is most often unworkable, 
depending on the character of the institutional sphere governing the aid operation. 
However, a strategy is tasked to address the issues of local people as closely as 
possible. Furthermore, strategy needs to be acceptable to the institutional sphere and 
conflicting parties to such an extent that it is supported and allowed. In other words, 
even if a strategy is impressively elegant on paper, if it does not enable full 
engagement, it will fail to be (fully) effective. It is not argued here that conflicting 
parties should have a say in the scope of the aid operation, rather that a key task of 
strategy is to seek acceptable forms of engagement. So, although strategy is closely 
connected to reason in its attempt to minimize chance, it must take into account the 
dimension of Passion/ irrationality regarding both local people and conflicting parties. 
The nexus of engagement between local people and conflicting parties is thus a point 
of concern for the strategy of an aid operation. Thirdly, following on from this, it must 
not be overlooked that it is the aid agency staff that implement the strategy. They are in 
the front line and face direct consequences if the interplay between Chancel non-
rationality and Passion/ irrationality has negative consequences. To face these 
possibilities constructively, staff needs to be motivated by strategy to accept them in 
the first place and, equally important, to guide them in the course of their engagements. 
5.3 Conclusion 
To conclude, the aim of this chapter was to unpack the remarkable trinity and construct 
the 'aid trinity'. The 'aid trinity' builds upon Clausewitz's remarkable trinity and the 
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commentaries on it and is a transmutation of this model applied into the realm of aid 
and development. What the 'aid trinity' concept and the actor-orientated approach have 
in common is that they both refute the traditional linear intervention model as 
mentioned in Chapter I. Advocates of the actor-oriented approach might not be content 
with this model, with its attempt at visualisation and strong Clausewitzian echoes of 
the psychological, social and managerial triads. Therefore, advocates of the actor-
oriented approach might cal1 the 'aid trinity' concept' a retrograde step in the process 
of reflection on aid operations in turbulent environments. However, aid practitioners 
might take the contrasting view that the model is a step forward in relation to 
understanding processes of strategizing and implementing their particular aid 
operation. From my own perspective, as a 'theoretically-orientated' practitioner, the 
'aid trinity' model offers a practical blend of approaches by which to enhance 
reflection on aid and development, primarily in the particular case of Nepal between 
1999 and 2006. As this is the primary aim of this thesis, the model can most helpfully 
be judged on this basisPl 
171 Annexe 5.2 presents two models each conceptualising aid activities. Their disadvantages as tools for 
understanding the dynamics of aid management in turbulent contexts and with regard to the 'aid 
trinity' are briefly discussed. 
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Part II 
-
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Chapter 6 On the Ideal Form of Aid 
6.1 Introduction 
Clausewitz regularly uses the concept of the ideal fonn of war in his work. This is a 
heuristic device to think through the question as to why there is a difference between 
war in theory and war in reality. In retrospect, I did not use the concept of ideal war to 
understand the political military interaction of the conflicting parties and how this 
played out in the struggle to gain control of significant parts of rural Nepal. Without 
elaborating on it, with the benefit of hindsight one could argue that the government 
preferred to be there without being present, while the Maoists opted for a presence 
without actually being there. However, sometimes I used, as an aid practitioner, the 
idea of an ideal type as an heuristic methodological device to think through the 'ideal' 
way of forging fonns of development in the context of compounding instability: "What 
is, without considering the limitations and preferences of the agency I work in, the 
ideal way to further development and peace in this dynamic contextT 1T2 
6.2 Ideal form of aid in Nepal 
Smith (2005) calls Clausewitz's idea of ideal war a "logicalfclntwy ". The idea of ideal 
fonn of aid, as presented below, can be seen likewise. However, throughout the 
remainder of the thesis the concept is used intennittently. For that very reason, a 
description is given of what the ideal fonn of aid might have looked like in Nepal 
between 1999-2006. The description emerged from respondent's suggestions. and does 
b h · . 173 not purport to e ex austlve or consIstent. 
Ideal-type presentations might sometimes suggest moral judgement (Bruce and Yearly 
2006: 143). Although the notion of an ideal type of aid is used throughout thesis, it is 
not intended to provide moral judgements about Nepal's aid community in tenns of 
right and wrong. The overview provided below should be understood as an 
172 So, here the idea of ideal does not relate to what is (ideologically) ideal in 'normal' circumstances, 
but what is seen the ideal way of operating in a given operational environment. 
173 Ideal types do not have to be necessarily consistent (Berlin 1990). 
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accumulation of elements of what respondents in general terms longed to see in the 
operational modalities of the various aid agencies between 1999 and 2006. 
The responses regarding the features of the ideal form of aid ranged from rebuttal of 
the whole idea of aid in general (A2l), to a rather defensive response, expressed as 
follows: "it has been proven that development projects do exist" and "that they should 
not be threatened hy humanitarian agencies" (A3), to a rather negative reply from a 
very well-informed aid practitioner: "/ do no see il ... in lerms l?/"the ability l?l any 
agency or an INGO actually 10 deliver on a prl~iecI ... there are so many complications 
and there are so many limitations on lvhat you can do ... .. (A24), via suggestions that 
this is a big issue with no right answer (AS/ A24/ A33) to a series of answers with a 
more positive tenor that, if taken together, might constitute a basis for the ideal fonn of 
aid in the context of Nepal between 1999 and 200S/06. 
Respondents related responses to questions about features of the ideal form of aid 
between 1999 and 200S/06, allowing the following six interrelated ingredients to 
emerge. 174 To begin with, it was suggested that aid activities should have been 
contextualised and contextual (A4). Contextual did not relate only to the issue of 
having a historical understanding of poverty in Nepal but being aware of the history 
between the political and conflict dynamics as well (AS/ AS2/ A27). In addition to this, 
within the context of having contextual understanding, it was suggested that the issue 
of social and political exclusion should be understood in combination with technical 
connected issues like education, health provision and government capacity (A29). 
Secondly, the ideal form of aid relates to conflict-sensitivity on two levels, being 
conflict-sensitive in a narrow and a wider sense. Conflict sensitivity in a narrow sense 
relates to ideas of staff security and the avoidance of conflict-fuelling resource 
transfers (A29) Conflict sensitive in a broad sense relates to the procedures, 
mechanisms and modes of working of an aid agency working in a conflict situation 
(AI ). 
174 The order in which the six features are presented does not suggest the level of importance. 
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Next to being contextual and conflict sensitive the ideal fonn of aid is demand-driven 
based on "the principle of the poor first" (A56) with a bottom-up approach to 
development focusing on grassroots and community-driven support (A21 A31 A6), in 
addition, focusing on the local civil society (A6), enabling strong community 
participation (A3) and reinforcing local capacities throughout the whole process (A42). 
The concept of the ideal fonn of aid also relates to the idea that aid is " .. . Iocullv led 
not donor or security led" (A26) subsequently directly addressing the needs of the 
poor (A53). Within this process, the relationship between recipients and donor should 
be well considered (A391 A67) ensuring that the people and government both have a 
stake in the process (A56). 
Fourthly, the concept of ideal fonn of aid relates not necessarily to poverty reduction 
per se, but to addressing the underlying drivers of poverty (A 15), namely pertinent 
social issues (A4) such as the hierarchical power structure, exploitation of labour and 
social injustice (A 15) and social exclusion (A2). Some argued that this should be 
ideally underpinned by a rights-based approach (A31 A39). In the case of Nepal, the 
ideal fonn of aid does not necessarily relate to material issues alone, as suggested by 
one respondent when he argued, .. ... No hand-outs but refhrm (~lthe government via 
inclusive participatory transparent reform itse(r»'ould be the peace-dividend" (A33). 
Another respondent felt that development work related to the notion of regime change 
(All). 
The ideal fonn of aid relates further to the way in which conflicting parties are seen 
and approached. It was suggested that the War on Terror hindered the treatment of the 
Maoists as political entities instead of outlaws or terrorists, which would have been 
beneficial at an earlier stage of the conflict (A52). In addition, and as a consequence, 
the Maoists and the government could have been equally approached more rapidly in 
the conflict (A3), such that programmes or projects could be used sooner as platfonns 
for dialogue and conflict transfonnation (A52). The focus should then be on remaining 
engaged, enabling to move from "a really d{tficull situation 10 at least a slight~v 
improved situation" (A52). 
To close with, the ideal fonn of aid relates to ideas of organisational flexibility (A26/ 
A3), allowing a .. ... little support here and little support there" (A29), for example 
97 
using Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) (A3), capable of delivering a mix of responses 
covering long and short term needs, whereby the latter is not disturbing the fonner 
(A26). Furthermore, requests for assistance should be legitimate (A24), and agencies 
must be able to understand "what aid can do and what it cannot do" (A29). 
Furthermore, intermediary organisations should be avoided if possible (A4S) or if 
necessary partnerships would be sought with intermediary organisations (A3) as long 
as they were capable of proper implementation (AI]). It was also suggested that the 
ideal form of aid implied a serious input by aid agencies towards the local people (AS) 
and downward transparency (A3). 
To conclude: some respondents suggested that there was a form of synergy in the 
agendas of the Maoists and the aid agencies (A 11 AS8). Although, it is not clear to 
what extent aid agencies actually cooperated with the Maoists, it is possible to argue 
that the ideal concept of aid has a lot in common with what Maoists officially aimed 
for: aid being initiated by the people, with the people in control of it and with it being 
based on people's potential and resources (AS8). The agencies and the Maoists ditTered 
in their approach, however, with the former focusing first on attitude change, while the 
latter aimed to change behaviour (AtS). Now, we turn to the reflection. 
6.3 Reflection 
The series of ingredients presented above are part of what those respondents, 
questioned on this issue perceived as essential elements underpinning an ideal 
programme or project, relevant during the compounding conflict between 1999 and 
2005/06. There might be further elements, which did not emerge from the data. 175 
The responses highlighted above, might present a romanticised VIew of what is 
possible for aid agencies to achieve within turbulent environments. They could equally 
be understood as a critique of aid agencies. Following this line of thought, the 
responses suggested that aid agencies were deficient in being contextual, conflict-
sensitive, being focused on the poor or on the drivers of poverty. In addition, it was 
175 It is worth noting that none of the respondents indicated that they had been involved in or had 
observed what they could call an ideal programme or project given the dynamic in the operational 
environment. 
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suggested that aid agencies fell short of approaching the Maoists as political entities 
and being insufficiently responsive towards the dynamics of the contlict. What the 
various responses appear to have in common is that a central element of the ideal fonn 
of aid delivery during the compounding conflict in Nepal should have been a finn 
focus on the capacities and demands of local communities on one hand and a tlexible 
response to these capacities and demands at the other. 
The above does not mean however that there were no programmes or projects 
containing one or several ingredients of the ideal form of aid provision. Moreover, I 
would suggest that there were programmes and projects with elements that would 
come close to the ideal as indicated above. DFID's Livelihood and Forestry 
Programme (LFP) and the Helvetas Trail Bridge Building Programme (TBBP) might 
be examples in this respect, as the first was tlexible in its response to the contlict, 
while the second could almost double the production of suspension bridges despite the 
compounding conflict. Both LFP and TBBP were very much guided by local needs and 
local capacities as well (A2/ A51). 
There might appear to be an underlying assumption that, had the various ingredients of 
an ideal form of aid been present, aid delivery could have been more appropriate 
during the compounding contlict in Nepal; of course this is speculation. However, 
when we look carefully at the various elements, we might see that they have something 
in common, namely that almost all elements constituting the ideal form of aid suggest 
first seeking a good fit with the operational environment in which an aid operation has 
to take place. Next to "bottom up" and "rights based" approaches, respondents do not 
appear to provide suggestions based on prescriptions driven by the institutional sphere 
of an aid agency. However, one should be aware that the elements mentioned might 
very well be context-specific and therefore irrelevant for other operational 
environments. 
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For an aid strategist the notion of 'ideal form of aid' as a tool for thinking through the 
strategies of aid operations might have some advantages and disadvantages. 176 We will 
consider the disadvantages first. 
The idea of the ideal form of aid, as a heuristic device to strategize aid operations has 
three inter-related drawbacks. To begin with, the 'ideal form of aid' or the ideal way to 
design an aid operation in a given context is not necessarily easy to identify or to 
recognise, as it assumes being informed by its operational context. Gaining an 
understanding, as an aid strategist, of this context takes not only time but probably 
requires considerable intellectual efforts as well. Both might be attractive reasons to 
drop efforts to understand the context and to think about the implications of an aid 
operation, which might unconsciously have been the case in Nepal among at least a 
small portion of development managers. 
Second, next to understanding the features of what an ideal aid operation might be 
given the operational environment, designing and implementing an aid operation in 
these terms might be a challenge as well. Taking the case of Nepal, the ideal aid 
operation would have been primarily guided by local communities and less by aid 
agencies or the government. Shaping an aid operation towards an ideal form, as might 
have been attempted via DFID's Community Support Problfam (CSP), could be 
(unwittingly) hindered by the preferred way in which the institutional sphere of an aid 
agency operates or is resisted by one or more conflicting parties present in the 
operational environment. 
In the specific example of CSP, according to one respondent observing CSP modality 
first hand in one district, DFID's focus on low overhead costs forced CSP to employ 
inappropriate staff (being too young and without technical skills) to initiate and to 
support communities in their process of identifying, designing and implementing small 
scale projects of a primarily technical nature (A26). In addition, the Nepal government 
was not content with it, as CSP by design was an attempt to bypass government 
structures in order to directly reach communities living in Maoists controlled areas. 
176 The ideal form of aid is firstly discussed from the perspective of the aid strategist interested in 
making a positive difference within local communities. 
100 
Thirdly, once identified, the features of an ideal aid operation do not stay static, but 
might change according to the dynamics of the conflict. So, ideally pro-actively re-
strategizing needs to take place. This again requires understanding of the operational 
environment and indications of change. When the turbulence in an operational 
environment is increasing an aid strategist might prefer to focus on those things that 
can be understood which are within his control. Deepening understanding of the 
context and modifying a program or project quickly might not be part of this. Now, we 
will consider the possible advantages of using the idea of ideal form of aid in the 
process of strategizing aid operations. 
The benefit of using the notion of ideal form of aid is that it might force an aid 
strategist to lower expectations of what an aid agency could do with an aid operation. 
In other words, it could help an aid strategist to make the strategy and implementation 
modality more realistic. How does this work? To answer this question, I would like to 
start with a key point made in Chapter Eleven "On strategy". This chapter appears to 
suggest in general terms that the aid community within Nepal lacked strategic direction 
during the period of compounding conflict. By and large, aid activities were planned 
on the basis of development plans of the Nepali government as set out in a particular 
year and how the (individual) agencies could support it (A28). This process does not 
appear to encourage clearly thinking through the reality of the operational environment 
and subsequent frictions an aid operation might face in the course of its 
implementation. The notion of the ideal form of aid could be used to reverse this by 
drawing attention not to what should be done in an ideal world, but what is realistically 
possible given the specificity of the context and the possible multi-faceted (un) 
expected challenges an aid agency might encounter in the process of implementing an 
aid operation. 
What the sum of the various chapters in Part II and III suggests in part is that it appears 
that the overall process of aid allocation in Nepal was not so much focussed on the 
specificities of the context and what that might have meant for individual aid 
operations, but on the aid agencies corporate intervention preferences. 177 
177 This process might have been reinforced within individual agencies and within the collective of aid 
agencies by increasing levels of uncertainty and a subsequent decrease of confidence on an individual, 
organisational and collective level, there by augmenting the processes of friction. 
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I would like to make a few closing remarks, though by no means closing the matter. 
First, in the process of strategizing an aid strategist needs to be confident in the process 
of looking into the specificity of the operational environment and to reflect on what 
that might mean for the ideal form of aid intervention, if anything, as it might mean 
that he has to look for new ways of working (Domer, 1986). Secondly, using the 
notion of the 'ideal form of aid' in strategizing processes might not guarantee a 
successful aid operation, as the ideal might be not well-thought through or acted upon, 
or unforeseen factors might affect the running of an aid operation negatively. 
To close, the use of the concept might, in extreme cases lead to a form of inertia, 
should an aid strategist be unable to comprehend the context. In this case, he must 
judge whether to further his understanding of the context or to act without further 
considering the context, eventually acting on the basis of what has proved itself in the 
past (ibid: 158), in the hope that any unforeseen friction can be overcome and that it 
does not simultaneously deepen the turbulence in the operational environment of the 
aid operation concerned. 
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Chapter 7 On Friction 
7.1 Introduction 
Clausewitz introduces the notion of friction in On War Book I Chapter 7. In less than 
two and half pages he proposes a concept that expresses simply why war on paper 
differs from war in reality (H&P: 119-221) and refers to the idea of friction in war as 
being "movement in a resistant element" (ibid: 120). Chapter 8, 9 and 10 discuss 
successively physical efforts, information and dangers. These are dimensions of the 
concept of friction Clausewitz elaborates on. 
The concept of friction enabled me to understand further the hampering factors faced 
by both conflicting parties, in relation to their military and political manoeuvring. The 
concept relates to minor and major practicalities, which take place (un)expectedly in 
the course of political or military action. This idea could also be transferred to aid 
operations taking the fonn of events, which hamper progress, which were not 
necessarily foreseen during the preparation or implementation of an activity. The 
concept of friction provides a perspective to assess how an aid operation might be 
hampered and how this could undennine implementation of the aid agency's strategy. 
In other words, the concept of friction enabled me to be more realistic about what was 
realistically possible. 
I therefore suggest that the concept of friction is of key importance not only to 
understand how operations can be hampered, due to unexpected or undesirable 
circumstances, and how friction can have a negative impact on the possible strategic 
success of an aid agency or group of aid agencies, but more importantly to foresee and, 
if possible, appropriately address friction in the process of aid delivery, which of 
course should not be an aim in itself, but must further the reduction of poverty and 
conflict in a given turbulent operational environment. 
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7.2 C/ausewitz's Friction 
Clausewitz argues, "everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is d(fficult, 
The difficulties accumulate and end by, producing a kind of Fiction that is 
inconceivable unless one has experienced war". According to Clausewitz, the notion 
of friction resembles a concept that, "more or less corre.\ponds to the factors that 
distinguish real war.fj·om war on paper " (H&P: 118-120). 
The reason for friction, is according to Clausewitz, that "de,\pite that the militlllJ' 
machine -the army and everything related to it is hasical~v l'e,:v simple and 
therefore .. ,easy to manage- ... is that none of its components is (?lone piece: each part 
is composed of individuals, eve,:v one of whom retains his potential (?l.fi·i£:tion ",17'1'. 
Thus, Clausewitz argues that the conduct of war and its management appears 
straightforward, however as humans are central to every part of the process, it is 
vulnerable to friction throughout the course of implementation. 
Clausewitz argues that experience in battle is essential as the reality of friction cannot 
be understood by the one who: " ... has never personally experienced war ", and cannot 
therefore "understand .. , what the d!fficulties constantly mentioned real~v consist (?t: nor 
why a commander should need any brilliance and exceptional ability", From the 
outside, "Everything looks simple: the knowledge required does not look remarkahle. 
the strategic options are so ohvious that by comparison the simplest prohlem (?lhigher 
mathematics has all impressive scient(fic dignity", So, although the theory used to 
engage in battle might look flawless without allowing room for friction, war in reality 
uncovers this apparent theoretical flawlessness as, according to Clausewitz: "el'e~v 
fault and exaggeration of the theory is instantly exposed in war ".179 Clausewitz seems 
to suggest perceiving war as "a string l?lsmall incidents .. , everywhere in contact l1'ilh 
chance .. , ", subsequently, "causing Iremendous friction". To overcome this, the best 
commander is not the commander with an "iron will power ", or "the one ·who is most 
familiar with the idea l?(f;';ction", but the one who is able "to overcome il whenever 
possible", Clausewitz asserts that in this process, instinct, based on experiences about 
what is possible and what not, is essential. 
178 This point might be seen as an early military precursor of the contemporary sociological notion of 
multi-actors, See for example Long N, and Ann Long (eds,) 1992, 
179 This might be the case in war, but is not necessarily true in the realm of aid and development. For 
example a lack of monitoring might mean that aid agencies are not confronted with their omissions, 
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7.3 Friction and Nepal's international aid communityt80 
Interview responses to the concept of friction varied hugely, which might be a 
reflection, as one respondent suggested, of the positions respondents were holding and 
the sectors they worked in (A55). One respondent indicated not having seen any 
friction during the course of implementation of his programme, except of some local 
disturbances, traffic jams and blockades of some roads to remote district headquarters 
(A45). Despite this rather limited interpretation of the idea of friction, respondents 
suggested two interconnected sources of friction which stood out in relation to the 
implementation of aid and development. 
The first source related to not understanding the conflict (A55). The second, which is 
an extension of the first, related to the widespread denial of the contlict within the aid 
agencies and the government (AI2), repeatedly arguing, "there is no con.flict. there is 
no con.flict·· (A2). Not understanding the conflict related to difficulties grasping the 
nature of Maoist movement -ranging from being a copy of the Vietnamese Vietcong, 
via the Maoists as a group of rebels which mislabelled themselves to a "hunch (?l 
outrageous people aiming for revenge on the local elite" (A69). Denial within the 
government and aid agencies was in case of the fonner in part imposed by those 
leading the government (A4! All) and in part a retlection of insufficient reporting by 
government staff working at field level (A2). Within aid agencies denial of the contlict 
and its programme implications originated, according to one respondent, in the 
"tendency 10 maintain Ihe shop instead (~lchallenging models and strategies" (A6). 
Against this backdrop respondents mentioned a wide variety of examples of sources of 
friction. Friction appeared more to be inter-connecting, causing knock-on effects, 
which might yield a picture of what friction is and how it interacts with an aid 
operation. The sources of friction are grouped around four clusters being: the 
institutional sphere, the contlicting parties, the internal dynamics of aid operations, and 
h . I' t 181 t e operatIOn a envlronmen . 
180 These will exclude friction related to physical efforts, information and danger. 
181 Surprisingly, respondents did not imply the cluster of local communities as a source of friction, 
perhaps because, as one of the respondents suggested, these local communities were relatively 
powerless (A60). 
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The institutional sphere of aid agencies This domain of friction could broadly be 
divided in two sets of factors. According to one respondent the first set related to the 
complex set-up of the international aid system, in terms of multiple actors, multiple 
mandates and multiple approaches, which was retlected in Nepal (A33). In addition, 
the drive for harmonisation and pursuing the Paris Declaration was a point of friction 
(A33), contributing to a focus on the application of "ethnographicallypoor" economic 
and politically oriented development theories (AS), which, it was argued, hindered 
smart and intelligent responses by agencies on the ground (A33). The second set 
related to commonly held perceptions and the difficulty in diverting from a given 
narrative. If there was a smart response, there was disbelief about the appropriateness 
of programmes (A60). This disbelief was partly shaped, according to the respondent, 
by a un-nuanced view of security specialists as they " ... had to sell as well their 
business to theirfunding agencies and the whole world ... they were right in 99%/ (?lthe 
cases. as the government could not work and was vulnerable. but they had a storyline 
and could nol divert from that ... as it was d{fjlcu/tto acknowledge that 111.1' progra1l1me 
was one (~fthe better programmes" (A60). 
Conflicting parties A second source of friction related to the domain of conflicting 
parties. One respondent spoke about the so called "tenshm triangle" of Maoists, 
donors and government, and the centre of gravity in this triangle of actors related in 
tum to the centre of gravity of each actor (A 18).182 This implied that friction faced by a 
programme was partly shaped by how a contlicting party perceived a particular aid 
activity. For aid agencies, the overall process of friction related to the domain of 
conflicting parties originated in the compounding inability of the government to work 
outside most of the district headquarters. This in tum hampered the ability of these aid 
agencies to work outside these headquarters (A33). Subsequently aid delivery was 
often seen with suspicion, hampered by red tape and therefore not supported (A26), 
while those on the side of the government in higher government positions ignored the 
existence of contlict (A2). 
If aid delivery was possible outside district headquarters, Maoists were not necessarily 
obstructing aid delivery, but often "standing in the way", not allowing operations if 
182 Clausewitz uses the notion of Centre of Gravity in his theory, but it will not be discussed in this 
thesis. 
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certain 'requirements' where not fulfilled, for instance payment of donations and 
signing agreements, which needed to be negotiated via Nepali staff (A26). This led, in 
tum, to more suspicion on the side of the government and often more restrictions. (n 
this environment, conflicts and tensions between aid agencies and the government 
could take a long time to resolve (A2). 
Aid operations themselves Friction also occurred in relation to the internal dynamics 
of aid operations. These can be grouped in four different but inter-connected and 
overlapping sets: personal dynamics, organisational dynamics, planning aspects and 
the use of intermediaries. 
Personal dynamics provided a varied source of friction within aid agencies. To begin 
with, there were tendencies among staff towards "a trust in one ',\' own goodness and 
invincibility" (A 17). In addition, "Warnings by new expatriates were received as 
'scare-mongering' by Ihose already longer in Ihe counlry" (A 17). Furthennore, 
emotionally attached expatriates had at least some difficulties accepting the changing 
realities, while at the same time the national and international "experts" were resisting 
change (A6). Moreover, (expatriate) managers, insecure in their understanding of the 
context (A5), might find themselves simultaneously caught up in the rigidity of the 
rules of their organisation while clinging to these same rules for safety (A6). 
Organisational dynamics within aid agencies constitute the second set of sources of 
friction. To begin there can be the natural tension between office and field stafT (A 17), 
which in the case of one respondent was compounded by poor internal communication 
and a lack of trust in those making decisions (A 17). Then organisations could face 
within the agency a "dy,~'fill1clionalteam bordering on naively" (A 12). Furthennore, it 
was also suggested that agencies did not value outside information, or the knowledge 
and insights of anthropologists (A5). 
One other respondent put the idea of friction in a more historical perspective; arguing 
that the respondenfs organisation, due to a rather unhelpful succession of directors. 
had no idea about the existence of the conflict. Moreover, the way the agency was 
structured did not allow the development of a cohesive or corporate strategy. The 
respondent concluded, "j think it was lolal ignorance (?f'whal was going on il1 the 
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country and what the implications might be (A 12). Another respondent referred to 
agencies collectively suffering from "the hoiled frog syndrome "(A 17), 11\3 meaning that 
there was a tendency within aid agencies to respond only when forced to adapt or even 
to stop (A6), and therefore to respond too late. 
Aspects of planning were also mentioned as sources of friction. To begin with, it was 
suggested that a lack of clarity in terms of mission and goals together with "not hu"in~ 
a clue how to deal with the conflict", added to friction (A 17). Then, the tension 
between long-term decision-making by the agency versus short-term needs and actions 
led to friction (A 18). Next, one respondent suggested, one could have sufficient 
resources, but a lack of staff for proper monitoring, subsequently causing friction 
because timely adaptations to decrease failure could not be prepared for. "The COI?flict 
triggered an increase of overhead costs (?f 20% to 25%, paired with u increasedfai/ure 
rate. up to 20%" (A6). In addition, it was suggested that possible negative turns in the 
course of the contlict were not always incorporated in the planning of programs. The 
breakdown of the 2003 ceasefire was given as example, leading in this case to 
inappropriate programme assumptions and the implementation being hampered, as the 
programme was intended to be locally led, but became in the end centrally led (A60). 
To close this section, it was mentioned that it was difficult to move away from 
operating on the basis of a preferred implementation theory towards a mode that was 
acceptable in the operational environment (A 17). 
Intermediaries are the fourth source of friction related to the internal dynamics of aid 
operations. Within this context the lack of quality and quantity of intermediaries used 
by aid agencies was mentioned (A6). Friction occurred as well because of the complex 
reporting mechanisms between intermediary and donor (A33).11l4 This correlated with a 
lack of transparency (A6) and a tendency among intennediaries to tell donors what 
they wanted to hear. "In that sense there was a willingness on the side (d' 
intermediaries to avoid anyfj'iction with donors" (A31 ). 
183 The 'boiled frog syndrome' is a metaphor used to describe aid agencies not responding to gradually 
increasing security threats. Here the respondent used the metaphor to describe the aid agencies as not 
responding to the compounding conflict and growing instability. 
184 According to respondent A33 a donor initiative supported by the National Human Rights 
Commission and administered by the UNDP was a good example of the existence of complex reporting 
mechanisms. 
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The operational environment Friction sources originating in the operational 
environment could be grouped in two overlapping sets. The first set related to the 
international community in Kathmandu and was primarily friction within and between 
agencies about their mandates (A26), "psyches" (A 18) and different opinions as to 
how to understand the insurgency in particular and conflict in general (A 181 A261 A31 I 
A67). This was compounded by a lack of coordination between Kathmandu-based 
donors (A33). In addition, it was felt that the strength and capacities of donors were 
under-used, such that the small agencies followed the big ones "as small.fishffJllowin~ 
the sharks, without conducting political or contextual ana~vsis not knm,ving where they 
were heading" (A33). Moreover, this led, according to the same respondent to a lack 
of risk-taking and the absence of flexible and responsive reactions to the contlict 
(A33). 
The second set of sources of friction originating in the operational environment was 
related to the national staff within the agencies. One respondent suggested that the 
Nepali elite -those holding key positions within western agencies- were not the right 
people to handle the task of poverty reduction. "Most aid stajl were .fi"om a certain 
caste group ... who were English-speaking and elite ... we got the ~r()win~ perception 
that these people were not the ideal people to deliver programmes fhr the poorer and 
excluded groups ... and lhat perhaps some l?lthe decisions they were l11akin~ would not 
have heen made ~l they had been filled hy people who were from those poor and 
excluded ~roups themselves ". This contributed to an "elite workshop cu/ture" 
whereby, "the rich were constantly al1ending workshops to empower this or that, hut 
actually did nol do anything to change things" (A29). This might suggest that, if you 
want, as an aid agency, to avoid action, the organisation of workshops is indispensable. 
Another source of friction in the aid delivery process related to the multiple layers of 
dispersing parties (A29) and the subsequent corruption, mis-management and misuse 
of resources involved (A2/ A29). Lastly, there was growing suspicion on the side of 
the government towards aid agencies, which was partly accelerated by the arrival of 
humanitarian agencies (A26), subsequently increasing additional control measures and 
red-tape (A60). Here, we close the section on sources of friction originating in the 
operational environment. 
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Above we have examined friction occurring in four domains: the institutional sphere of 
aid agencies; the domain of conflicting parties, the domain of internal dynamics within 
aid operations and the operational environment. Now, we move on to conduct a 
reflection on the issue of friction. 
7.4 Reflection 
The above clearly shows that the aid community in Nepal was subject to the effects of 
friction, which moved beyond issues of physical efforts, information and danger 
discussed in the next three chapters. If we could generalise the situation of the aid 
community in Nepal during the research period, I would like to contend that an aid 
strategist could not strategize and implement a friction-proof aid operation III a 
turbulent environment, because friction can not be fooled as it is fool-proof itself. 
An aid strategist who assumes that he has strategized the perfect aid operation deceives 
himself and his judgement could be questioned. However, accepting the possibility of 
friction and being blase about its existence in either the operational environment, the 
operation itself or its conjecture, is thoughtless and might lead to at best sub-optimal 
results in terms of the reduction of poverty and turbulence in the environment. In other 
words, it would be nai"ve to be lay-back about friction. Such naivety allows the possible 
negative consequences of friction for the progress of an aid operation to be 
underestimated, potentially with harmful results. Hence, being naiVe about the 
possibility of friction might be easy for an aid strategist, but it is not wise; however 
taking an opposite position and seeing friction everywhere might maybe very realistic, 
but it risks slipping into fatalism. Indeed fatalism might be in tum a source of friction 
in itself, preventing the practitioner or the agency to take hold of opportunities if they 
occur. 
An aid strategist could easily be irritated about the friction within the institutional set 
up of the international aid community. And, in the case of the Nepal perhaps many 
within the international aid community were. At the same time, the aid strategist 
should, despite this potential frustration, also pay considerable attention to the 
organisational processes of friction. 
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This might appear logical as the first can be relatively easily understood and might be 
perceived as unnecessary, while, the second type of friction can be assumed to be in 
check by the aid strategist without too much difficulty. However, in the case of Nepal, 
this type of friction was most likely not the most when it came to hampering processes 
of strategizing and implementation of aid operations. One possible source of friction in 
reaching local communities underestimated by the international aid community could 
have been 'the atn1mphere of cunning· within the Nepali bureaucratic establishment 
while dealing with the international aid community. ISS 
Clausewitz suggests that a good commander is not the one who can identify friction, 
but is able to overcome it. 186 Before exploring how an aid strategist could overcome 
friction, it might be helpful to examine various characteristics of friction. 
Clausewitz talks about the military machine, which is perhaps easy to manage. 
However, he also says that this machine is an assembly of individual people each 
potentially contributing to friction, and it is just the same with aid agencies. In other 
words, friction is, in part, caused by people and has to be dealt with by people. This 
makes friction not only person-specific, but agency- and context- specific as well. The 
context of an aid operation is turbulent; friction might therefore change over time, in 
part due to the changing conflict dynamics. In the case of Nepal, this could be for 
example intensified pressure from the Maoists to force aid agencies to sign up to their 
'local governments', if they wanted to work beyond district headquarters. One could 
expect friction to increase when the turbulence within an operational environment 
increases. In turn, when turbulence in the operational environment decreases, friction 
might decrease as well. Should the level of friction increase, opportunities for an aid 
strategist to further the ideal form of aid might decrease. The opposite might be the 
case when the level of friction in the operational environment goes down. In the case 
of Nepal, examples of the fluctuating levels of friction might be the two ceasefire 
periods. In these periods, aid agency staff had more opportunities to move to the field 
than in the periods of active violent conflict between the PLA and the Security Forces. 
185 See Chapter 14 On Cunning. 
186 This might imply that successful commanders try their best to identify and understand the widest 
range of friction as possible in the course of strategizing and implementing operations, as it is only 
possible to overcome frictions what you have identified and understood. I would like to thank Brigitte 
Piquard for this thought. 
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However, periods of lesser turbulence do not provide a necessarily clear view on what 
the future political-military interaction might be between conflicting parties. The risk is 
that the periods of reduced turbulence might be seen too positively, as respondent A60 
did while planning his program during the second ceasefire. Periods of reduced 
turbulence in an operational environment might just be interludes between intensified 
turbulence. 187 
In addition, friction affects an aid operation most likely not in a sequential manner, but 
it can come in many different forms and combinations of sources. In the case of Nepal 
one respondent suggested that as a response to the Royal Coup on the 1 st of February 
2005 (a source of friction in the process of program implementation), the donor he 
worked for became very restrictive in allocating funds to the program, compounding 
the totality of friction the program had to face in the process of implementation (A60). 
Moreover, friction could be further divided into technical and non-technical friction. 
Technical friction relates to flaws in internal procedures, the lack of technical skills or 
the absence of certain instruments etc., while, non-technical friction might relate to the 
socio-political dimensions surrounding an aid operation. Furthermore, friction can be 
understood retrospectively, but it is much more challenging to foresee it and take 
avoiding action, which for the process of strategizing an aid operation might be a 
source of friction in itself. Having briefly explored the nature of friction, now we move 
to the question of how to address friction. 
The key question for the aid strategist is how the reality of friction can be dealt with in 
a balanced way, neither ignoring it nor completely focussing on it, to further the ideal 
form of aid in a context of turbulence. 
Friction is not a phenomenon that will go away in a turbulent environment, as it is 
grounded in human nature, as Clausewitz indicated. Therefore, a good starting point 
for the aid strategist might be the realisation that an aid strategist himself does not only 
face friction, as he is producing and reproducing it as well in processes of strategizing 
187 See also Chapter 15 On Tension and Rest. 
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and implementing aid operations. So, self-awareness is vital to understanding not only 
how you respond to friction, but how you contribute to its reduction as well. 
Skills and knowledge might playa role in addressing friction as an aid strategist, but so 
does attitude. One well-informed aid practitioner stated "I do nol see il ... in terms olthe 
ability o/an agen"y or an INCO actually fo deliver on a pn?ieCf in the current context. 
there are so many complications and there are so many limitations on what you can 
do .... .. (A24). This quote might show a sense of fatalism. An aid strategist should, 
however, realise that an attitude of fatalism, however correct the assessment of friction 
in a given context might be, does not encourage a creative or imaginative approach 
towards overcoming the various sources of friction in order to get aid operations 
strategized and implemented. 
As stated earlier Clausewitz argues that the successful commander is not the one who 
can identify friction, but the one who can overcome it. It is not that identifying friction 
is not important, but rather that it may be inadvisable to try to gain an exhaustive 
understanding of it. For an aid strategist, this might mean that he should not focus all 
of his attention on researching in detail how friction might surface and develop during 
the course of an aid operation. Having said that, although friction is difficult to pre-
empt, it might be wise to think imaginatively about the nature of friction in a given 
operational environment and how it might hamper an aid operation. A realisation that 
friction might manifest itself, chameleon-like, in different shades or guises might help. 
It is perhaps as much a question of sensing the character of the main 'domains of 
friction' an aid agency and its operations are caught in, with the hope of generating 
productive insights to help in the processes of strategizing and implementation and to 
avoid or mitigate foreseen sources of friction. 
At this point it might be worth asking, as aid strategist, to what extent one should try to 
avoid or mitigate friction. Is the goal a total elimination of friction? Do you concentrate 
on addressing the key foreseeable sources of friction? Or do you for example, attempt 
to create a mixed approach, addressing foreseeable sources of friction beforehand and 
creating a mitigating capability within the agency for unforeseen friction at the same 
time? There is no right or wrong answer, but attempting to eliminate friction altogether 
is most likely not helpful, as it might lead to aid activities far removed from their ideal 
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form. One such example from the Nepal context might be the agency of respondent 
A67, which, owing to decisions on corporate level, shifted its operational attention 
away from the field-level to Nepali partner organisations (mainly the government), 
apparently with hardly any concern as to what actually happened to the input of the 
agency to the benefit oflocal communities. 188 
Next to understanding self and 'domains of friction', it might be advisable to realise 
that staffs, despite their inherent fractious nature, are an essential organisational asset 
in the process of overcoming friction. For that reason, an aid strategist need to ensure 
that they are not only enabled to deal with friction if and when it happens, but are to a 
certain level protected as well against friction (for example danger). Staffs are useful 
for an aid agency and an aid operation when they are able to remove more friction, 
than they create in the process. It is advisable for an aid strategist to understand within 
the context of the dynamic of the 'aid trinity', which types of circumstances the staff 
within his agency is capable of dealing with and were his staff needs additional support 
or training, or need to be replaced. In the case of Nepal, it appears that at least a few 
aid staff preferred to deal with challenges in the turbulent environment in a rather 
technical way, while the situation was precisely not a situation that could be solved 
constructively with ..... another aid instrument" (A47). In other words, aid staffs in 
Nepal were overall, in varying degrees, technically capable people and could deal 
relatively well with technical related friction. However friction of a more political 
nature proved more difficult to deal with, due to a lack of preparation or experience. 
However, an aid strategist should be aware of deficiencies in dealing with politically 
generated friction, which could partially be mitigated by training or experiences. One 
such example of the latter would be the growing ability of aid staff to interact 
confidently and comfortably with Maoists (A2). In other words, certain fonns of 
friction, caused in part by staff themselves, for example being lacking in confidence, 
might reduce over time, assuming that they accumulate learning throughout their work. 
Though much more could be said on the issue of friction, I want to close this chapter 
with one last remark on how friction could be dealt with in a balanced way. Based on 
the whole of the data gathered in Nepal, it might be possible to argue that pushing an 
188 See also the Chapter 11 On Strategy. 
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aid operation towards an ideal fonn generates, although not necessarily in a linear 
fashion, a certain level of friction. To build a constructive approach to the reality of 
friction, an aid strategist could review where the cut-off points may lay for him and his 
staff, beyond which an un constructive approach to overcoming friction might get the 
upper hand and stands in the way of engagement with local communities. While there 
are flaws in any approach, this might, depending on the context, be preferable to an aid 
strategist who is not willing to or capable of dealing with the fundamental sources of 
friction in the operational environment. He may succeed in keeping his agency 'alive', 
but in tum reduces the agency's capacity to contribute constructively to the reduction 
of poverty and turbulence at the same time. The next three chapters discuss particular 
aspects of the concept of friction, namely physical effort, infonnation and danger. 
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Chapter 8 On Physical Efforts 189 
8. 1 Introduction 
Clausewitz discusses physical efforts, as a dimension a war strategist should take into 
consideration, in Book I Chapter Five. According to the German military theorist it is 
important to understand the physical efforts involved in a war as it is .... .Iike 
danger ... one of the greatest sources oitriction in war" (H&P: 115). 
In a mountainous country like Nepal, it is likely that the RNA and the PLA did 
incorporate the dimension of physical efforts required during strategising and planning 
of their operations. For example, it is reasonable to suppose that if case studies on 
Maoist military operations were conducted, for example for the attack on Jumla 
Bazaar, the administrative headquarters of Karnali region, that they would have shown 
that in most cases the physical efforts necessary to make the attack militarily successful 
would be more than sufficiently incorporated into the planning of their military 
operations, simply because of the harsh, sometimes inhospitable mountainous terrain 
and fluctuating climate. 
One could equally reasonably expect that development agencies would do the same 
and would incorporate the idea of physical efforts needed, firstly on the part of staff to 
travel and navigate the terrain and secondly by the local communities targeted by the 
aid agencies. However, it appears that this is not always the case. A field worker from 
the Karnali -the remote North-western development region in Nepal, with mountains 
up to 7S00m and mountain passes up to 4000m- once told me something along the 
following lines: "These guys in fhe counfry (~tfice in Kathmandu do not seem to realise 
that 1 need to ,'pend approximate(v 50% ~(the time on my own sun'iva/H'hen 1 am up 
there. How can the)' expect to get such ambitious results? ",190 The point here is not 
that this person is exactly right in his time estimate. The point is that this insight 
189 The coming three chapters address explicitly aspects of the notion of friction. It was decided to 
change Clausewitz order of topics in friction in general, physical efforts, intelligence and danger, 
190 Conversation with a SNV field worker, Nepalgunj, Autumn 2002. The term survival related to 
arranging food, clean drinking water, shelter, keeping clean, warm and safe etc. 
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suggests that the higher management within aid agencies do not always understand or 
consider the physical hardship field staffs go through and the physical efforts required 
to work successfully in an unforgiving operational environment. If aid agencies do not 
always understand the circumstances field staff work in, it might mean as well that aid 
agencies insufficiently understand the conditions local communities live in. 
This chapter contends that, just as in war situations an understanding of the physical 
efforts required from soldiers is important to strategize operations properly, it is 
important during the strategizing processes of aid operations to incorporate the 
physical efforts required by aid workers to navigate the physical environment they are 
operating in. 
8.2 Clausewitz and physical efforts191 
Clausewitz perceives physical efforts as an important source of friction in the course of 
a war. However, the degree of friction it can cause in the course of an operation is very 
difficult to assess, as irs" ... limits are uncertain .... , due to its ..... elasticity ... .. In other 
words, the physical. efforts of people can vary depending on personality and the 
circumstances, which are difficult to estimate. 
While discussing the concept of physical efforts, Clausewitz focuses on ..... the e/ti)l'/S 
that a general can demand of his troops, a commander (~f his suhordinates, in other 
words although we are concerned with the courage it takes to make the demand and 
the skill to keep up the response, we must not forget the physical exertion required (~f 
the commander himse({". So, this might suggest that the way in which Clausewitz 
approaches the issue is rather 'own army-centric', including the efforts required of 
those commanding it. 
Clausewitz implies that the task of a commander, in relation to physical efforts of the 
army under his command is to be like .. ... a poweliul archer ... " bending his bow, 
..... beyond the al'elw~e, so it takes a powel:!iJl mind to drive his army to the limit", 
However, according to Clausewitz, the limits of an anny in physical terms are difficult 
to judge objectively, However, according to Clausewitz, it can be done subjectively 
191 H&P: 115-116. 
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based on the validity of "the speaker's experience ". In other words, the practical war 
experience of the commander himself. So, Clausewitz stresses the importance of actual 
field experience on the side of the commander in understanding the physical efforts 
required to operate in harsh terrain and to what extent physical demands might 
I b 19" reasonab y e met. ~ 
8.3 Physical efforts and Nepal's international aid community 
Chapter 2 of Part I suggests that Nepal in tenus of physical circumstances is a very 
challenging country to work in. However the interview data suggest that aid agencies 
did not necessarily match the physical circumstances of Nepal with physical efforts of 
staff. A couple of issues could be mentioned in this respect. 
To begin with, it was suggested that aid agencies did not always take the physical 
circumstances of the project areas into consideration while planning and strategizing 
aid activities (A35/ A39). This bordered almost on assumptions of Nepal being as flat 
as some countries in Western Europe (A9).193 
Secondly, it was suggested that aid agencies, if not working via basket funding or a 
sector approach, worked in rather physically limited areas. For example, one agency 
was active in only a few districts covering, within each of these districts, only a limited 
number ofVDCs (A22). 
Thirdly, a link was suggested between at best insufficient physical efforts by aid staff 
to reach communities in need and the growth of the Maoist insurgency. A respondent 
told the following story based on observations obtained during various project 
192 I am not sure if Clausewitz suggests here that only a commander is able to access the phYSical 
efforts necessary for a particular operation. I think he underlines that a commander need to access for 
himself the challenges of the field so that he can understand better the information he receives on this 
matter. 
193 I can remember a story about a community development program that operated both in the Terai 
and in the hill districts. Despite the distinct geographical differences of these districts, the program had 
allocated an equal number of staff to each district, while staffs operating in Terai district were given 
motorbikes as well. However, the expectations about the number of staff needed to visit communities 
was the same as well. Thus staff in the Terai district could relatively easily travel from one community 
to another nearby community by motorbike, while the program staff operating in the hill district might 
had to walk for between half a day to two days to bridge the distance between one community and the 
next. 
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evaluations and field visits in different parts of the country: "The social composition (?/' 
a hill in a project area is rough~v as follows: first you have the Brahmins. then the 
Chetris. above them are the Gurungs. The Tamangs have their villages on the highest 
altitudes. Although the last group faced the biggest problems. the project worked on~v 
with the Brahmins and Chetris. This process works as follows. When 'Boris' and the 
rest of the project team arrived in a village close to the road on the valley floor the 
smartest of the Brahmins and Chetris say: 'hey ... that is 'Boris', he must have money, 
let's reserve him for ourselves. Then they engaged with 'Boris' and the rest (?/'the 
project team. The engineer of the team was a bitfat. the other team-memher was a hit 
lazy ... Next, the Brahmins and Chefris said that the few villages on top (?/'the hill had 
only a few small problem compared with theirs ... then the p1'l?iectteam discussed it and 
said: yes ... in addition. the villages on the higher altitudes are rather small as well. so 
let's work with the poor people here, they can use our assistance as well ... . So, the 
p1'(?iect and the money stayed close to the valleyfloor ... close to the l'Oad ... and on top 
(?/,the hill no prl?iect arrived ... 'Boris' and his team were happy with this, hecause they 
did not have to climb the hill to remoter villages. they did not have to eat with the velY 
poor. and they could fulfil their targets more easi~v. So everyone is very happy ahout 
this" (A9). 
However, those not receiving any form of assistance, "were less educated, and faced 
more unemployment and more poverty and were less happy with the governme11l". 
(A9) In this climate the Maoists could flourish, " ... as it was more ea.'), to recruit. 
easier to control and to manipulate by the Maoists. As a consequence. it became more 
d(fflcult to have pr(?iects on the higher altitudes ... " (A9). In addition, the Maoists were 
less vulnerable to attack by the Security Forces at the higher altitudes. The process 
described above is visualised in figure 8.1. 
The same respondent saw a comparable process while visiting a GTZ/ WFP project in 
a mid-western hill district. "Also there, the Brahmins and Chelris lived relafively neal' 
the valley floor and received two out (?f the three projects. while the ma.i()ri~v (?f the 
district was in/wbited by Ma[!.ars ... " (A9). So, these examples appear to suggest that 
the physical effort of aid agency staff did not always match the physical circumstances 
in the operational environment, and therefore limited access to assistance from aid 
agencies to groups more in need of assistance. 
Figure 8.1: Physical efforts and 
focus of development efforts 
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The notion of physical effort was not only linked to aid agencies being active in limited 
areas and planning on the basis of particular assumptions about the physical 
circumstances in project areas, or the unsatisfactory efforts of aid agency to match the 
physical features of the terrain. The notion of physical effort was linked to the idea of 
moral standing of aid agency staff as well. It was implied that a part of the essence of 
an aid worker ' s job in Nepal is showing physical effort (ASO) and the ideal aid 
practitioner should be willing to match their physical efforts with the physical 
challenges of the operational environment (A 18). 
There were specific examples of aid agency staff trying to match physical challenges 
of the operational environment with personal physical efforts (A21 AS31 A631 A6S). 
However, these would appear to be the exception rather than the rule and not 
necessarily part and parcel of the organisational culture of most aid agencies; only a 
few key managers of smaller (donor) agencies seem to lead by example, in tem1S of 
actually going regularly into the field and attempting to stay there longer then usual 
(ASOI AS21 All). 
120 
It was suggested that the majority of key aid managers within aid agencies did not visit 
the field regularly, perhaps going just once a year (A43), or shied away from 
..... visiting the remote areas/or any length o/time" (A35) beyond places like Pokhara 
or Surkhet, which are easy accessible by plane and road. 
There were various reasons given why country office staff could not visit the field 
extensively. The reasons varied from work pressure in the office (A9), to field staff not 
being keen to receive visitors from the Kathmandu office (A35). The first reason might 
retlect the priority setting of country office staff, while the validity of the latter was 
strongly contested by a well-informed aid practitioner. One respondent stated; ..... 1 
actually remember. while I was al the American club ... a head o.lIN(JO saying lhat he 
would not go to the field in order to avoid unwelcome attention to its stap: I think it is 
99% of the time complete~v wrong. It is my experience that. (lsta.tf.~ do a decent joh. 
then they want that support and appreciate that (l it happens. Persona/~v. I would he 
worried as head (~l an INGO (lmy slaflsaid '1 do nol want you there . . I am wondering 
lvhatlhey have got to hide and why they got themselves in that situation" (A35). 
Those agencies and staff who, during the contlict, were willing to provide assistance 
beyond the areas close to roads or district headquarters in remoter parts of districts, and 
by doing so were challenging the physical challenges with an equal physical effort, 
faced set-backs due to damaged infrastructure, such as suspension bridges disrupted by 
contlicting parties, sometimes extending travel times to four to five days (A2). Other 
events disrupting travel plans included bandhs, blockades, strikes, landslides and bad 
weather conditions preventing planes and helicopters from tlying regularly. Now we 
move to the retlective section of this chapter. 
8.4 Reflection 
Allowing for the relatively small amount of data on this topic, it might nonetheless be 
possible to paint an initial of a process, namely that the physical reality of Nepal was 
not always sufficiently taken into consideration in the process of strategizing and 
implementing aid operations. In addition, agencies did not always encourage staff to 
tackle the physical challenges of the operational environment, with personal physical 
efforts, or by providing sufficient additional (human) resources to overcome them. 
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Both processes caused friction in the process of aid delivery, subsequently excluding 
communities located in the rural areas. 
Without doubt there might have been exceptions however, as a rule this process could 
have added to an imbalanced allocation of aid resources in the country, to the benefit 
of those communities in easy reach of aid agencies staff and the aid agencies 
themselves. These communities were often, though not always affiliated by caste with 
aid agency staff. As a consequence, communities located at remoter places had less 
access to the aid agency resources and this, in tum, added to a situation whereby these 
peripheral communities were more open to the Maoists and their ideology. And 
because in a later stage of the conflict, the Maoists gained control over these peripheral 
areas, it became even more difficult for aid agencies to provide assistance to 
communities in these areas, while these communities were in greater need of support 
from aid agencies due to increased pressures they had to cope with. 
So, what might the issue of physical efforts mean for aid strategists operating III 
turbulent environments? First of all, the physical environment is a relatively 
predictable feature of a given operational environment. However, conflict situations, as 
in Nepal, might make it harder to travel through, for example due to disruption of 
infrastructure, which is more readily damaged than constructed. Moreover, physical 
constraints in the operational environment have an effect on physical efforts required 
from aid staff to engage with communities. It might be worth considering whether 
physical constraints might not be a contributory factor when deciding whether or not to 
engage with inaccessible communities, which in tum might reflect the lack of 
willingness on the part of an aid agency or its staff literally to 'walk the extra mile', or 
in the case of Nepal to engage with communities living at the higher altitudes of hills 
and mountains. Secondly, with the usual caveats, the story of respondent A9 implies, 
that the more physical efforts are needed to reach peripheral communities, the more is 
required from aid staff, the greater the likelihood that a minimalist approach is taken by 
the same staff, to the detriment of peripheral groups and to the benefit of the less needy 
groups in the population and the aid agency itself. This brings us to the question of 
how to overcome this in processes of strategizing and implementation of aid 
operations. 
122 
Suggested practical measures might include matching staff composition with the 
ethnic! caste composition of communities in living in remoter areas, increasing the 
number of staff, or improving monitoring to ensure that aid operations are focused on 
the more physically demanding locations. These measures might help, but Clausewitz 
encourages us to think in a different direction. He refers to the metaphor of the archer 
stretching his bow beyond the average to suggest that a commander, by force of will, 
could encourage his army to go to its limits. This metaphor does not provide an aid 
strategist with advice on what to do in practical terms, however suggests that the will 
of the leadership within aid agencies can be essential in the process of attempting to 
match the constraints of the physical environment with the statT's physical efforts to 
reach communities in peripheral areas. 
The archer needs to have a feeling of what pressure the bow is able to withstand, how 
often and for what purposes it is useful. In other words, the archer needs to understand 
if the bow, under a given set of circumstances, is able to deliver an arrow to its 
intended target. Likewise an aid strategist needs to gain a feeling for whether the staff 
within his agency fits the (physical) challenges at hand, to what extent they can be 
encouraged to go to their limits to deliver services to peripheral target groups, and 
ultimately what this might mean for the strategy of an aid operation, and its actual 
implementation. 
Is a correct judgement about the capability and willingness of staff to reach out to 
peripheral communities sufficient for strategizing processes? The data above might 
suggest that if aid agencies could have increased their physical efforts to reach 
peripheral communities, these communities would have had easier access to services of 
aid agencies. However, it must be borne in mind that it was not merely a question of 
staff being willing to walk 'an extra mile', but their affinity with these peripheral 
communities in terms of caste or ethnic background. So it is not only capability and 
willingness that are important, but caste or ethnic background of staff as well. 194 
It might also be helpful to take into consideration that in thinking through the human 
resource side of aid operations, aid strategists, might be incorrect if they assume that 
194 This stresses the point as well that an aid strategist should know the context in which he works. 
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local staff, just because they are local, can cope with the physical hardship of the 
operational environment and are able to exert the physical efforts required to contribute 
substantially to an aid operation. 
At the same time it is not very likely that the institutional sphere will offer a 
sympathetic ear to the argument that local staff cannot cope with the physical demands 
of the operational environment so as to successfully implement an aid operation. In this 
respect an aid strategist might have a double task, encouraging staff to do more, while 
educating actors in the institutional sphere to lower their expectations of what is 
actually possible. 
The metaphor of the archer suggests one further line of thought: if an archer might in 
case of need stretch his bow to the limit, he must also handle it with care. The same 
can be said of an aid strategist: he could push his or her staff to the limit of their 
physical capabilities, for example by postponing leave, but if he goes over a certain 
threshold he might 'harm' a staff worker. We might also extrapolate from Clausewitz's 
archer metaphor, that the single bow is more important than the arrow, of which there 
may be many. If applied to the realm of aid and development in turbulent environments 
this could mean that an aid strategist might need to take more care of its staff then for 
the aid operations they are involved in. However, although good staff are important 
and are not easy replaceable in the short term, they can be replaced in time, while in a 
turbulent environment there might be only a few small windows of opportunity to 
reach communities via the activities of an aid operation. Hesitating to make extra-
demands on staff could have therefore negative consequences in tenns of what benefit 
peripheral communities might eventually receive from aid operations. 
Assuming that in the process of compounding conflict, the level of physical hardship 
among various groups of the local population increased and therefore the need for 
assistance, we could have expected, in the case of Nepal, that aid agencies tried to 
demand more of their staff in physical tenns, in order to reach these communities. 
However, it would appear, with the usual caveats that the opposite happened: demands 
for services increased, while organisational demands of staff to reach out to 
communities lessened. One could speculate that in the case of peripheral communities, 
not having access to the limited services in the district headquarters, created first of all 
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a need for additional resources and agency's efforts to get staff in contact with local 
communities might have seen as less important. 
Another issue to consider in connection with physical effort is that of morale among 
staff. Aid strategists should be aware of the possibility, especially in physically 
demanding operational environments, that low morale could undennine the physical 
effort being made by staff. Decreasing levels of morale could be countered with some 
fonns of success. 
One possible process might be that if an aid operation does not produce success and 
subsequently demoralizes staff, a downward spiral could be countered by demanding 
more from the staff, for example by increasing working hours, operating in more risky 
places and facing more physical hardship. If it results in a successful operation this 
might be for a set time the right course of action. However, if it does not bring success 
closer, demanding more physical effort from staff will not counter but reinforce 
demoralising processes amongst aid agency staff. 
Low morale and subsequent low appetite for physical effort amongst staff might 
indicate a mismatch between operational strategy and conditions in the operational 
environment, as success is not forthcoming. If perceived appropriate from a policy 
angle, an aid strategist might consider changing the strategic approach of an aid 
operation. For many reasons staff might be encouraged by this change and willing to 
make increased physical efforts, going beyond their limit to make the aid operation 
successful. There is of course no guarantee that this strategic change and extra physical 
efforts from staff will make an aid operation successful, however, this is less 
demoralising then the first option, as staff have at least the feeling that different 
approaches have been tried. Such strategic change however, does not necessarily 
satisfy all actors within the operational environment, especially those within the cluster 
of conflicting parties. These groups might prefer an unchanged operation, with 
demoralised staff even if it does not benefit them completely, since a change of 
strategy for the aid operation might even be less beneficial for them. 
The opposite might also happen, where actors within the operational environment 
might be encouraged by the strategic change of the aid operation, while agency staffs 
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are not. If it leads to success, and during the process staff are pushed beyond 
acceptable limits in terms of physical effort, then an aid strategist could take the long 
view: the progress made in terms of the reduction of poverty and contlict may 
outweigh staff discontent and the physical efforts they have to make to overcome the 
physical constraints of the operational environment. However, the aid strategist, owing 
to his distance from the field and, in all probability, the less risky, more luxurious 
environment he works in, tends to forget, but must really understand and take 
responsibility for, the consequences of the hardship and risks his staff are undergoing. 
It appears to me that in the case of Nepal managers were not always aware of this. 
Although there might be more things to say on this issue, this concludes the retlection 
on physical efforts in turbulent environments. 
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Chapter 9 On Information 
9.1 Introduction 
Clausewitz suggests in a short chapter titled "On intelligence" that intelligence 
constitutes a key source of friction in the course ofa military confrontation (H&P: 117-
118). This chapter uses the tenn infonnation, instead of the tenn intelligence, and 
suggests that infonnation processes were indeed a source of friction within the aid 
community in Nepal. 195 Like intelligence in war, infonnation is important for decision-
making during the course of an aid operation. Infonnation is here loosely defined as 
every sort of infonnation about the operational environment in which the aid operation 
takes place, ranging from quite factual infonnation about the geography of the area 
concerned, through poverty statistics, to quantitative and qualitative infonnation 
regarding the political-military dynamics as well. What I want to stress here is that the 
infonnation necessary to address poverty and conflict in a turbulent environment is not 
only gathering quantitative data about poverty or assessing the causes of a conflict. 196 
Although not the object of this thesis, Clausewitz's thoughts on intelligence make it 
possible to assume that the conflicting parties lacked at various stages of the conflict 
and in various degrees sufficient reliable infonnation about each other's military and 
political positions. In addition. the application of Clausewitz's ideas on intelligence 
enabled me to understand the infonnation processes within the aid agencies in relation 
to the data gathered from the operational environment development projects were 
located in. Over the years, the increasing military and political turbulence created 
difficulties in gaining a sufficient understanding of the overall conflict dynamics. The 
manifestations of the conflict also contributed to unsatisfactory collection of reliable 
infonnation and interpretation of infonnation on the impact aid activities were having 
on poverty reduction and the conflict-peace dynamics. A respondent acknowledged 
195 For that reason I have titled this chapter On Information. 
196 For example, the agency I worked for excluded a proper conflict assessment in the process of 
planning activities on the basis of the argument that they were an agency focussed on poverty 
reduction. Personal communication with the Country Director. 
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that at one point the situation of his program was that of a submarine being underwater 
and without sonar (A41). 
This chapter will show that information related-friction did exist within the aid 
community in Nepal between 1999 and 2005/06. From this I want to suggest that an 
aid strategist active in turbulent environments should pay special attention to the issue 
of information related-friction to mitigate the consequences for the activities his 
organisation is involved in. 
9.2 C/ausewitz and inteiligence197 
For Clausewitz intelligence is one of the most prominent sources of friction in war. For 
him intelligence means "... every sort of information about the enemy. and his 
country- the hasis, in short, of our own plans and operations ", At first sight this 
appears a narrow definition if the enemy is only emphasised as an object for 
information gathering. The scope of the definition is much bigger if the emphasis is on 
information needed to plan and conduct operations successfully, because this might 
entail the need to gain information beyond that which relates directly to the enemy. 
Clausewitz does not disagree with those theorists who argue that in war only reliable 
information should be believed, but gives a realistic warning stressing that reports in 
these situation are most often ..... contradictory; even more are false. and 1110st are 
uncertain ". To counter these contradictory, false or uncertain reports, Clausewitz 
suggests, that those in command, " ... should posses a standard (~l.iudJ{ement ". This 
judgement however varies with difficulty. It is challenging "when plans are drqlied in 
an office. far from the (jphere o.laction; the task becomes infinite~y harder in the thick 
o.lfighting itself,' with reports streaming in. ., After pointing to the challenges related to 
the issues of reliability and judgement, Clausewitz argues that it is more likely that a 
"novice" will need to rely on chance than a more experienced commander when 
assessing the information received. What Clausewitz might mean here is that the lack 
of experience makes it more difficult for the novice to appreciate information 
appropriately and that luck in this process could be of help. 
197 H&P: 117-118. 
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Although Clausewitz recognises the need for intelligence to plan and conduct war, his 
overall assessment of its value is rather bleak: " ... most intelligence is false. and the 
effect of fear is to multip~y lies and inaccuracies. This is according to him partly 
caused by the fact that" ... most men would rather believe bad news than good. and 
rather tend to exaggerate the bad netvs ". 
To counter this process Clausewitz suggests something that is not easy. .. ... A 
commander must trust his judgment and stand like a rock on which the waves hreak in 
vain .. )f he does not have a buoyant disposition. ({ experience of war has not trained 
him and matured his judgment. he had better make it a rule to suppress his personal 
convictions. and give his hopes and not hisfears the henefit l~fthe douht. On~v thus can 
he preserve a proper balance ". 
Clausewitz appears to suggest here that in the process of judging information human 
nature, which tends to focus on the negative aspects of infonnation, should be 
compensated for with a hopeful attitude to overcome the gap between the execution of 
a war and its preparation. 
9.3 Information and Nepal's international aid community 
Actors in the Nepali aid industry recognised the importance of reliable information, as 
"misin./ormation leads to mis-development" (A22). It was suggested that reliable 
information within aid agencies is " ... important ./01' evelything . ./i'om strategic 
decision-making to day-to-day decision making ... il is everything" (A29). In other 
words, the quality of infonnation has an effect on organisational perfonnance (A8). 
During a conference held in London in June 2002, the need to improve the information 
sharing processes about Nepal was recognised (A44). However, despite its perceived 
importance and agreement to improve information sharing, the interview data suggest 
that it still remained a significant source of friction within Nepal's aid industry. 
This paragraph provides an overview of how the idea of information resonated among 
respondents while reflecting on their experiences with (sections) of the aid industry. 
First, the context in which information processes took place is sketched and then 
various aspects related to infonnation processes among the aid agencies, together with 
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how they subsequently added to the friction in the process of their work, are laid out. 
The paragraph ends with an overview of measures taken by sections within the 
international community to reduce information-related friction. 
The context The context in which information sharing on developments about Nepal 
took place was characterised by four perspectives. First, it was seen as a competitive 
field, in which the UN family and donors .. ... see their common ground in many cases 
as a competitive ground. wherehy individual personalities and institutional rivalries 
playa role" (A 18). In other words, it was argued that potential gains in the process of 
information sharing via possible common ground were often cancelled out by rivalries 
between individuals or institutions. As a result a wide variety of viewpoints sprang up 
about situations, and about what kind of information to look for and how to analyse it 
(A47). Secondly, and in relation to the dynamic described above, it was suggested by 
one respondent, based on his rich field experiences in other crisis settings, that the 
formal and informal networks in which information was processed was dynamic and 
" ... were not only wry' complex. but permanently on the move" (A42). A third 
dimension characterising the context in which information processes took place is put 
forward by Joergensen, the former head of the WFP in Nepal. She states that within the 
development and humanitarian arena of Nepal, " ... information seemed completely 
unsystematic and disorganised" (Joergensen in: Minear and Smith (eds.) 2007). 
Fourthly, in this context it might be useful to know that during the build up of the 
conflict in the early years of the People's War, a dichotomy arose between local 
knowledge and the bigger picture which became a source of information-related 
friction. It was suggested that this dimension played a special role in the early stages of 
the conflict. It took the aid community in Kathmandu some time to realise and react to 
the nature and scale of the insurgency. Two elements appear to have influenced this 
process. Firstly, although evidence of the conflict was available from observations in 
project areas, project staff did not always pass the information on, because, as one 
respondent suggested .... . the conflict was seen as an internal thing and we did not 
expect it in '98 and '99 to turn into a national si=e conflict" (A61). Secondly, if 
information from a field office was passed on to a country office in Kathmandu, it was 
not always valued appropriately. " ... it was WI)' easyfor people to say. 011 ... this isjust 
a local disturbance. hecause (?f'the .'pec(fic conditions in that particular area" (A5). 
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This stance led to a situation, whereby pieces of local knowledge were not always 
connected with the bigger picture and mistaken conclusions could be drawn, as events 
were seen as discrete and not connected with each other as part of a larger whole. 
Moreover, it was suggested that information could also be discredited by agencies in 
Kathmandu by arguing that messages coming in were very area-specific or that the 
messenger showed a lack of political understanding as well (AS). This meant at least 
for one agency representative that he only became aware of structural disruptions to the 
programs he was involved in around 2002 (A22), six years after the start of the 
People's War, and more or less coinciding with the London Conference held in the 
same year (A44). 
After it became evident that the conflict in Nepal was more then a law and order 
problem, various other aspects contributed within the aid community to infonnation 
related-friction, namely intra- and inter-agency dynamics and some processes 
summarized under the heading of cross-cutting issues. 
Intra-agency dynamics Intra-agency dynamics contributed in vanous ways to 
information-related friction. To begin with, the fear of blame of failure among Nepali 
staff (A47) and the possibility of job loss were suggested as a key reason as to why 
information about the situation in project areas was not reported or was under-reported 
(A4/ AS/ A26). Paradoxically, this process coincided with a process whereby aid 
activities contracted, subsequently leading to a reduction of field staff actually being 
present in the field resulting in less information about what was happening (A49). 
In addition, despite this contraction of aid activities, frontline staffs of aid agencies 
were in contact with Maoists. With hindsight it was estimated that 60% to 70% of 
frontline staff made ..... inappropriate relationships with the Maoists and ... that in C)()% 
(~l these cases this was not passed on ... .. to higher levels of the agency concerned 
(A35).198 Thus, for some agencies at least, it was difficult to estimate what the situation 
in their project areas beyond the district headquarters was, or verify the status of aid 
activities. Indeed some agencies were hardly aware of the content of the relationships 
between their staff and Maoists representatives, adding to information-related friction. 
198 It is not unlikely that a number of those aid agency staff who had contact with the Maoists were 
Maoists themselves or sympathisers. However. I am not in the position to estimate a percentage. 
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This brings us to the third process linked to infonnation-related friction. Although less 
infonnation about what was going on beyond the district headquarters became 
available, it was precisely this infonnation that was necessary" ... 10 feel Ihe pulse in 
districts" (A4) . ..... Feeling the pulse in the district" was hampered by the practice of 
agency representatives "parachuting in" for a few days in (potential) project areas 
(A5) and often solely focusing on issues of poverty during these short visits (A65). 
Along with under-reporting, the practice of "parachuting in" and focusing on a small 
range of issues, infonnation-related friction was compounded by insufficient 
monitoring of aid activities. During the compounding conflict this became for some 
agencies at best very difficult or at worst impossible (A28). So, it was not always clear 
if aid activities progressed as planned and what their impact was. 
A fourth source of infonnation-related friction was the infonnation-gap between 
program and the respective donor. One respondent explained this gap when he recalled 
his experience regarding the reduction of daily infonnation after moving from a job 
within a program to a position within the country office of the donor: .. When lief; the 
program office the noises were switched o.ff, while sitting in the country (drice (~r the 
donor, E-mail... and phone calls were not coming in from the dislricts anymore, 
hecause I was not re.\ponsihle anymore. It was like someone had lurned the sound (dt: 
It was bizarre. I suddenly realized that I was working in this 'Cocoon' in Kunaekanta, 
cuI qff from reality. While l",'orking in the program, I got the regular reporls hUI in Ihe 
donor (~ffice I did not receive the day-hy-day infbrmation any more. Sudden~v I fi!lf I 
don'l have in/iJrmalion anymore. I don'l know anymore what the realily is. So, 
communicaTion is hugely impOrTanT' (A2). This story suggests that even within one 
agency, depending on the role a staff member plays access to particular infonnation 
can vary hugely. 
Finally, notwithstanding that frontline staff might not have passed infonnation on to 
the higher levels of their agencies or that agencies might not have shared infonnation 
properly, an agency could also decide not to report. It was suggested that at least in one 
case, an embassy had instructed the staff of their implementing ann not to report any 
more on what was happening in the field ...... for a long Time we were 1101 supposed to 
reporl on what is going on ... )'ou were supposed not 10 pllf things in writing ql whal 
was happening ... the emhas.\), did nol wanllo have things in writing ... Ihis is how had 
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the denial 11 'as. but all o.f these things were happening and evelyone knew it ... hut you 
were still supposed to carryon, with the business you were doing ... .. (A39). It is not 
unlikely that this process of instructing staff not to report about the situation in the 
areas of operation occurred in more than one agency.199 Now we will look at the 
processes around inter-agency information related friction. 
Inter-agency dynamics contributed in various ways to information-related friction 
Interviewee responses tended to cluster around the issues of sharing of conflict- and 
security-related information. 
The first source related to incongruence of information available among aid agency 
representatives. Practical factors, such as poor communication facilities or difficulties 
to speak freely, since telephone conversations took often place in public spaces, were 
given as reasons why it was challenging to pass on information from the field to the 
country office in Kathmandu (A63/ A68). On a national level, information might have 
been passed around relatively smoothly within an agency or a group of agencies, but 
might struggle to get into other agencies or might have been incongruent with the kind 
of information other agencies had available. One respondent recalled an event in 2005 
whereby the Maoists had forced all aid activities to stop in a particular district for 
about 6 months. "Our staffs were vel)' honest ahout the Iaet that they could not get into 
the field. Yet the UNDP representative was reporting during meetings that they could. 
That was bizarre. because nohody was working or allowed to work in that district" 
(A2). At one point the respondent went to the district were Maoists obstructed 
development work. in order .... . to talk to all our teams. partners and other agencies. 
and it was interesting everyone was talking about the problem. but the same messages 
were not going back to the centre. So. to me there was something serious~v wrong. the 
UNDP staff basical~v said we do not report the problems and the infhrmation (~f our 
agemy was not being shared within other organizations" (A2). This story illustrates 
199 I recall a comparable occurrence in the agency I worked for between 2002 and 2005. The liaison 
officer called the agency representative in the regions regularly, around twice per month, to get 
information about the local situation, and subsequently reported on it. At one point he was instructed 
by the management not to do this any longer. After inquiring why this did not happen any more, an 
answer was given along the lines that the reports were all the same and therefore did not add to what 
was already known, and were therefore a waste of time. I do not remember exactly when this practice 
of reporting was halted, but it must have been during Autumn 2003. 
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the friction hindering the establishment of a common understanding among agency 
representatives in Kathmandu. 
A second source, linked to the first, related to the processes of formal and infonnal 
sharing of information. The latter was perceived as less problematic than the former; a 
well-informed insider reflecting on this stated ..... my impression was that 60% (?l the 
time it was pretty 0\1:lill ... in the sense that incidents and cases (?l intimidation hy the 
Security Forces or by the Maoists or whoever was not discussed properly ... it was 
hidden. On an informal level I think that the record was much hetter and prohah~v 
80% of important and sign~ficant incidents were discussed. there was a group (?l 
people. and you know who they are who discussed these things" (A35). 
The reason why Heads of Agencies were not fully sharing conflict- or security-related 
information was not necessarily to do with for example their workload or busy work 
schedule, but it was suggested that it was out of fear of the possible political 
consequences if they did ... ... Information was not (?Iien shared on heads (?t' agel1C.T 
level. hecause it automatically means that it hecomes a high tension thing. it 
immediate~v means that information given needs to go hack to their capitals .. . this is 
what they did not want ..... (A35). So, as a consequence conflict and security-related 
information was not always properly shared among those in charge ofthe agencies. 
A third source of information-related friction was associated with the issue of 
relationships with partner-organisations, which can be seen as a part of the 
implementation process of an aid operation. In cases where these partner organisations 
were local NGOs, it was suggested that they were not always transparent or 
accountable and might withhold information about failure out of fear of losing their 
contract (A5)/oO subsequently compounding information-related friction. In addition, 
Joergensen, the former head of the WFP/ Nepal argues that the atmosphere of mistrust 
among partner organisations and fear of being reported to the Security Forces or the 
Maoists hampered information sharing (Joergensen in: Minear and Smith eds, 2007).:!OI 
200 Respondent A64 stated clearly that he questioned the notion of partnership. 
201 One respondent, who will remain anonymous, suggested that the head of WFP herself forbade her 
staff to talk with staff of certain other organisations belonging to the UN family. The respondent 
became aware of this after the head of WFP was replaced and staff of the WFP mentioned the 
existence of this policy to the respondent. 
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In cases where the government was the key partner, information sharing could not only 
become sanitized, with references to the existence of contlict being removed from 
reports (A41), but it could also mean that even agencies within the UN family were 
echoing what ministers told them to say about the progress made in a program or a 
sector, " ... while all anecdotal information pointed in a totally other direction" (A47). 
Now, we will tum to three miscellaneous issues each bearing on information-related 
friction. 
Miscellaneous sources of information friction Three other information-related 
friction sources were identified. The first related to the process of denial among 
various players within the aid community in Nepal. One respondent referred to the 
presence of denial as a paradoxical process within the aid community: " ... there were 
certain parts within the UN system who did not want to know. Some qf the donors. I 
think did not want to know, while certain donors were both very conscious and that 
they need to work in conflict and be conflict-sensitive, but also did not want to know 
that there was a conflict at the same time. This was vel)' paradoxical" (A47). This 
quotation appears to suggest that information-related friction is compounded by the 
tension between knowing, and the need to act on this knowledge, and avoiding the 
acquisition of knowledge in order to ensure the need to act. This paradox was not 
necessarily exposed but needed resolve by agencies involved in these processes after 
the Royal take over in February 2005. International media exposure made the deniable 
undeniable and even agencies such as the World Bank had to accept and address the 
reality of violent contlict in Nepal (A4 7/ All). 
The second source of information-related friction relates to the media. Without 
intending to portray them as a homogenous entity, the media appeared to playa role in 
the process of information- related friction in at least two ways. Firstly, it was 
suggested that the Nepali media, owing to forms of self-censorship, "enhanced" 
rumours within the aid community, as less news about the contlict in the rural areas 
was reported, and triangulation of information by individual and the collective of 
agencies became more di fficult (A47). Having said this, there were examples of brave 
reporting by investigative journalists trying to expose the situation in remote parts of 
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Nepal.202 Secondly, it was suggested that representatives of the international media 
based in Kathmandu faced difficulties in getting news items accepted in the Western 
press about the compounding situation in Nepal (A 7). In part this problem was 
exacerbated by the sometimes-unhelpful attitude of aid agencies and the government 
towards the press in terms of the provision of information about development activities 
(A 7/ A30). However, it was suggested that the reason for this, on the side of the 
development agencies, had to do with avoiding questions back home about their 
development practices in terms of progress or applied paradigm (A5), all of which of 
course generated additional information-related friction. 
The third source augmenting information-related friction is the concept of information 
spinning. The following example is given in detail, as it describes the Royal Nepali 
Army (RNA) spinning infonnation in a security briefing. The suggested aim for doing 
so was, according to the respondent, to secure additional military assistance to fight the 
Maoists. The respondent recalls: ..... I have seen it several times. as there were plenty 
(~f briefings, which had a series of slides in the middle, that showed the link (~f the 
Maoists with the other Maoists movements in South-Asia, which is hy and large 
politically correct, then the RNA showed a slide (~f the broader rel'O/utionary 
movements in the world like the Shinning Path, just to indicate that there was a 
broader world out there. SomehOlv they managed to produce a slide with a link to AI 
Qaeda, They said this in front (~f Michael Malinovski (the American Ambassador 
LvD), .. it wasfor him, it was to help him to persuade Washington, that the army needed 
more assistance, as they were part or ~fthe Global War on Terror. But they were not. 
The Maoists have no interest whatsoever in Islamist-fundamentalism. Zero" (A47). 
The above is a good example how one of the conflicting parties spun information for 
their own ends. It is not unlikely; that in connection with the process of denial 
discussed above, individual agencies also spun the infonnation they passed on to others 
for their own ends. It was suggested by one respondent that the WFP was for a certain 
period in time involved in this, claiming that the food security situation in the North-
I ) "03 western part of the country was near nonna (A16 .~ 
202 For example Mohan Mainali. Unfriendly Fire, Nepalitimes, Nr 106, 
http://himalaya.socanth.cam.ac.uk/collections/journals/nepalitimes/pdf/Nepali Times 106.pdf 
accessed on 20/09/09. 
203 After arrival of a new head of WFP, WFP decided rather rapidly in 2006 to start up an emergency 
feeding programme in parts of North-western Nepal. See, "WFP Starts emergency food deliveries in 
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Reliable infonnation, free from spin is an asset for an aid agency. In the case of Nepal, 
aid agencies were not the only actors having to deal with infonnation-related friction. 
It is not unlikely that conflicting parties also had to deal with similar friction. One such 
example was given in which a high-ranking Nepali government official approached an 
aid agency in order to get briefed about the overall security situation in the country. 
Staff of one particular agency was known for having reliable infonnation about the 
situation in the country at their fingertips. A respondent from this agency recalled a 
situation in which he and a colleague were at one point requested to meet at a newly 
installed high-ranking Minister. During the meeting the minister, acknowledging an 
omission on the side of his government said frankly, .. ... Iook 1 do not trust what 1 am 
being told. by the army. by the civil authorities ... and by other agencies ... please can 
you tell me what is happening in the country ... " (A35). Assuming that the government 
official indeed did not trust his nonnal sources of infonnation, it appears to me that the 
government official was in need of an overall picture of the situation of the country, 
which he perceived as balanced. 
The example above indicates a government minister in need of reliable information 
about the country in general. It is therefore reasonable to assume that top-level Maoists 
at times faced similar deficiencies of information. On a local level however, it was 
suggested that the Maoists generally had access to very detailed intelligence about the 
aid community. One respondent recalled a meeting with a Nepali member of an INGO 
working in the Terai: "The sta.lfmember said: ..... The Maoists came to my (dfice and 
said. 'Right we want 10 % of your salary as tax for the war · ... so he gave them an 
amount afX hundred Roepies and they said: . No Comrade! 10% (?t'your salUlJ' is Y 
amount· ... and they knew what the salaries were ". Now, we turn to measures to reduce 
infonnation-related friction. 
Ways to reduce information related friction Respondents suggested various ways to 
reduce infonnation-related friction, which can be grouped according to whether they 
are inter- or intra- agency level measures. 
Nepal, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200606/21/eng2006062127S822.html. accessed on 
21/09/09. 
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At intra-agency level, respondents suggested four types of measures an individual 
agency could take. The first measure -and this was not necessarily a default option for 
every aid agency- related to nurturing good contacts with local communities despite 
not being able to work in their areas. This could be achieved by for example organising 
activities in district headquarters, as requested by communities (A 17). In addition, it 
was suggested that agencies should stay focused and put effort into what happened 
beyond district headquarters (A 17). An extension of this option was the establishment 
of a special liaison position tasked with maintaining communication channels with the 
Maoists and the government at district level (A52). 
Secondly, alongside nurturing good relationships with local communities, it was 
suggested that establishing and maintaining good relationships with national staff was 
essential to enable sharing of sensitive information to take place. This included not 
only knowing staff personally, but also the creation of a positive incentive culture 
whereby staff know that they can get support from the country office if needed (A2). In 
line with this, it was suggested that information sharing within aid agencies could 
improve if expatriates and Nepalis could establish family-type relationships (A22). 
Thirdly, it was suggested that a creative approach to the triangulation of infonnation 
could help to reduce information-related friction. This might mean gathering 
information via local partners, the use of second- or third-hand sources or cross-
checking via other branches of the agency of origin or like-minded agencies (A2/ A4/ 
A28). In relation to this two respondents suggested that leaving Kathmandu and 
visiting the field regularly was also a means of obtaining detailed infonnation about 
developments in districts (A52/ All). It was also suggested that getting representatives 
from HQ into the field on a regular basis was not so much a way to triangulate 
information at country level, but an effective way to explain the situation in Nepal to 
HQ via first-hand information (A52). 
Fourthly, it was suggested that information-related friction correlated with the type of 
program an aid agency implemented. Old-fashioned programs with an agency's own 
staff in the field were perceived as more useful by at least one respondent for gathering 
information from the field than sector-wide programs working via or in close 
cooperation with the government (A2). However, it was argued, that a substantial 
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presence on the ground might not necessarily lead to a better overall picture, nor would 
it necessarily improve an agency's political analysis (A33). 
Respondents indicated four different ways to reduce information related friction on 
inter-agency level. The first way, which was successful, but rather short-lived, was the 
initiative of the British Embassy around 2001 to organise monthly security meetings, 
chaired by Ambassador Nash. The success of this initiative - at one time between 40 
and 50 agency representatives participated in these meetings- made the meetings not 
impractical, but unsuitable as a forum for sharing sensitive information, as it was not 
clear who were around the table. After the departure of Ambassador Nash, the monthly 
meetings were cancelled by his successor Mr Bloomfield (AI2).204 
Another crucial element in the process of opening up the flow of infonnation and 
reducing information-related friction within the aid community was the establishment 
of the DFIDI GTZ Risk Management Office (RMO) in 2002 and the initiation of an 
OCHA unit in mid-2004. It was suggested that both enabled inter- and intra-agency 
sharing of information (A21 A47), firstly, by the products they delivered. The RMO 
delivered field-based security briefings and analysis focused on safe and effective 
delivery of aid (A 18), which were shared with in the DFIDI GTZ network and made 
accessible for colleagues from other agencies,20s while OCHA established an online 
database, including maps. The implicit task of OCHA was perceived as: " ... 10 ~el 
across to people that assumptions behind programs were invalid" (A47). It was 
however doubted by some whether the briefings produced by the RMO went beyond 
DFID and GTZ and their partners (A33), while it was suggested that the downside of 
the OCHA products lay in the retrospective nature ofthe infonnation generated (A 15). 
Thirdly, the formation, in mid-2003, of the Basic Operation Guidelines group, chaired 
by the head of SDC, created a key forum; one regular participant reflecting on this 
forum said that" ... Ihe discussions we had in the BOG group were invaluahle. hecause 
one of the things was that it did allow people to see that they were not the on~v one 
dealing with these problems" (A47). Despite improved communication among donors, 
204 This happened under the pretext that the new to establish Risk Management Office supported by 
DFID and GTZ was better positioned to gather, analyse and disseminate security related information. 
205 Based on my own experience. 
139 
it was suggested that the existence of the BOG group had its down side as well, as it 
hindered agencies from connecting with a wide range of other networks, preventing 
access to ..... a particularly broad band of political per~peclives ... ", resulting in a bias 
towards listening to the moderate left (A4). 
Finally, in addition to the initiatives detailed above, various informal meetings were 
organised by aid agency staff. The first initiative was called the Conflict Advisor 
Group (CAG) and was initiated in mid-2002 (A29). This group met regularly and was 
attended by those staff within the donor agencies focusing on the political dimensions 
of the contlict (A29). The second initiative was the Security Information Group (SIG), 
initiated and hosted by the UN and aimed at agency staff focusing on the security-
related dimensions of the contlict (A35). Designated staffs of INGOs (Nepali and 
expatriates) were allowed to participate in these meetings. 206 At INOD level, AIN 
organised monthly one-hour meetings to discuss security-related issues.207 
Having described the dynamics and dimensions of information-related friction, 
including factors, which might reduce it, and before moving to the reflection part of 
this chapter, I would like to refer to a point made by one respondent suggesting that 
there was no lack of information in Nepal, but that it was not always actively sought. 
.. There was plenty of information. but they were sitting in their compounds" (A51). 
Those agencies, units within agencies or individual staff members actively gathering, 
analysing and disseminating (balanced) information about what was going on in the 
country gained a certain reputation (see the example given above). This reliable 
information and a good reputation could be used to their benefit to intluence their own 
government, other agencies within the aid community, or even the national government 
itself (A35/ A 11), because a government representative does not or cannot always rely 
on the information he or she has access to. 
9.4 Reflection 
The material above suggests that information-related friction was a factor in Nepal 
during the period under study, and that information was, as a consequence, not 
206 I attended these meetings on regularly basis. 
207 I had access to all these four forums and it appeared to me that the AIN meetings were least 
informative, due to the one-directional presentation of information. 
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necessarily always reliable, if not contradictory, adding to the existing levels of 
uncertainty. The data appear also to suggest that aid agencies were seeking ways to 
address this friction, with varying degrees of success. In the light of this it is therefore 
advisable that an aid strategist should always remain alert for processes of information-
related friction in his task of strategizing aid operations, even though it might appear 
easier and therefore preferable to assume that the (limited) information available does 
not have to be questioned for its reliability and can be taken as providing a complete 
picture from which operations can be adequately strategized. 
The down side of ignoring or avoiding processes of information-related friction in this 
way might lead to ill-informed decisions and unexpected outcomes. The aid strategist 
may for example discover that the progress made in project areas is less than had been 
suggested, or that information received from other organisations, which was thought to 
be reasonably correct, was in reality all but false, perhaps forcing the strategist to 
question fundamental assumptions behind the strategy of an aid operation, which may 
even be generating or contributing to processes opposite to what was intended. In other 
words, understanding the various ways in which information- related friction can 
surface in a turbulent environment is important to strategize aid operations effectively. 
Having said that, it is not helpful either for the aid strategist to assume that all 
information is unreliable because of the reality of information-related friction. A 
default position of distrust might lead to ignoring potentially reliable infonnation, or 
putting unnecessary effort into scrutinizing information to understand its value in tem1S 
of reliability. This requires a lot of resources and time that could be spent differently, 
and may hamper thinking through an aid operation strategy and its implementation. So, 
being aware of information-related friction becomes impractical if taken to the 
extreme. However, one might argue that the more turbulent an operational 
environment, the greater the likely processes of information-related friction are, the 
less reliability the information an aid strategist has to work with. 
The reflection here will focus primarily on how to obtain reliable infonnation to 
understand an operation in a given turbulent context, rather than how to obtain reliable 
information about a turbulent context in which an aid operation functions. To help with 
this analysis we could formulate the following question: how could the existence of 
information-related friction be approached in the context of a compounding conflict in 
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order to strategize aid operations successfully? Before investigating this question, the 
relevant interview data will be summarized. 
The context in which information sharing on developments in Nepal took place was 
characterised by competition (A 18), being permanently on the move (A42) and 
according to the former head of WFP, by being unsystematic and disorganised 
(Joergensen, in: Minear and Smith (eds.) 2007).208 I tend to believe that these 
characterisations are reasonably accurate. However, we should be aware that these 
characterisations might also have been used as arguments to disqualify infonnation in 
order to avoid the need to act on it. 
Information-related friction occurs in the context of several processes. First, fear of 
blame for failure by staff, resulting in at best sub-optimal reporting. Secondly a process 
emerged related to a contraction of aid activities and a reduction of staff present in the 
field (A49), which did not help aid agencies to stay in touch with the local dynamics in 
their project areas. Then, the practice of 'parachUlinK in . and focusing, as short-term 
visitor, on a small range of issues (AS/ A6S), did not bring about a deep understanding 
of the context in which aid activities took place. Fourthly, infonnation gaps within 
parts of the same agency could add to information-related friction (A2). And lastly, the 
suggestion of a non-reporting instruction does not serve to deepen an understanding of 
the operational environment (A41). 
On inter-agency level, sharing of information at an informal and formal level was not 
necessarily smooth (A3S), or available information between agency representatives 
was incongruent, hampering the process of collective understanding of what might be 
going on in particular parts of the operational environment (A2). Lastly the role of 
partners was seen as a potential source of friction in relation to obtaining reliable 
information (AS/ A47/ A41). In terms of crosscutting issues, the process of denial 
(A41/ A47), the role of media (A7) and instances of spinning information (A47) were 
linked to processes of information-related friction. 
208 In addition, it appeared to me that the to my understanding unhelpful dichotomy between local 
knowledge and the 'bigger picture', played a role as well. 
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Next to processes contributing to infonnation-re1ation friction, measures or processes 
addressing them could also be identified. On intra-agency level these included for 
example nurturing good contacts with local communities (A 17), gaining and 
maintaining good relationships with staff (A2/ A22), applying innovative approaches 
to triangulated infonnation (A2/ A4/ A28), or attempts to exploit the benefits for 'old-
fashioned programs' (A2). On inter-agency level, fora to discuss conflict and security 
related infonnation such as, the monthly meetings organised by the British Embassy 
(A12), the establishment of the BOG group (A47), and other groups like the SIG and 
the CAG (A29/ A35) were useful in easing infonnation-related friction. 
Now we focus on the question raised at the beginning of the reflection: how does the 
aid strategist deal constructively with the issue of infonnation-related friction? 
To begin with, I would like to mention a few caveats. Firstly, the 'overview' of 
infonnation-related friction processes might be incomplete. Respondents did not 
mention for example issues such as cultural differences among staff and between 
agencies, and language barriers. Neither was any reference made of the possible impact 
of continuous uncertainty about the next steps of either Maoists or government. 
Secondly, the processes of infonnation-related friction highlighted above might be 
context-specific and may not be present in other turbulent environments. Thirdly, 
certain means of addressing infonnation-related friction might not work in other 
contexts, as the initiatives might have been successful due to the existence of a rather 
unique mix of enabling factors, such as for example in the establishment and 
functioning of the GTZ/ DFID Risk Management Office. 209 For this reason I will 
refrain from detailed exploration of practical measures to reduce infonnation-related 
friction, in the remaining part of this chapter. 
The above implies that it is advisable for an aid strategist to understand the notion of 
infonnation-related friction within the contextual characteristics of his operational 
209 Without going into too much detail, it is my belief that idea of the Risk Management Office worked 
as a concept because certain conditions came together which made it into a success. For example, the 
position of the two donor agencies regarding the conflict, the quality of Nepali and expatriate staff, the 
nature of the conflict (allowing (knowledgeable) expatriates to walk relatively freely into areas out of 
government control), the timing of the initiative and the absence of alternatives during the first phases 
of the project. 
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environment and not to hold any preconceived fixed ideas on it before engaging in a 
particular environment. 
Below, a couple of suggestions are formulated which an aid strategist could consider in 
relation to strategizing aid operations in turbulent environments. To begin with 
Clausewitz suggests that "the only situation a commander can know.titlly is his own: 
his opponent's he can know only from unreliable intelligence" (H&P: 84). To deal 
with the reality of information-related friction in the context of compounding conflict, 
Clausewitz might suggest an aid strategist should begin by understanding himself and 
how he deals with various pieces information. In other words, reliable infonnation is 
only as good as its user. 
There might be several pertinent questions in this respect. Does the aid strategist 
recognise within himself preferences towards particular sources of information, for 
example giving more credence to information provided by those high up in the 
organisational hierarchy than to that from lower down the hierarchy? In a similar vein, 
does the strategist consider information to be trust worthier if the source has an 
international reputation, or are they willing to consider the insights provided by near-
anonymous people in a remote district? Then, questions related to the quality of 
information might be raised. For example, does the strategist need a series of thorough 
analytical reports, analysing every aspect of the challenge at hand, or are they satistied 
with meeting a few key informants who brush over the dynamics in the operational 
environment? Third, an aid strategist might have preferences for certain types of 
information over others. Does the strategist tend to believe bad news more readily, than 
good news or vice versa? Linked with this, what might be the strategist's emotional 
response to actually seeing or hearing news about violence, injustice and suffering? To 
what extent might this affect their capability to analyse information rationally? Finally, 
the strategist might consider their aptitude for dealing with sets of not necessarily 
closely linked pieces of information. Do they tend to treat these pieces on an individual 
basis, or are they capable of connecting apparently disconnected pieces of intonnation 
as part of wider dynamic system? How would they respond if information about the 
operational environment turns out to be contradictory to earlier intonnation or to their 
own preconceived ideas? How would they deal with the above under time pressure, 
through long working days and the possibility of extensive periods of uncertainty? Do 
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they have an instinctive recognition of the value of infonnation on how it might infonn 
understanding of the past, the present or the future? 
These questions, while by no means being exhaustive, might offer an aid strategist 
some help in getting to grips with fractured, incomplete and sometimes inconsistent or 
entirely conflicting infomlation and it might help understand how that might affect the 
input of the aid strategist in strategizing processes. This implies that an aid strategist 
should be aware that not only he, but others as well, respond differently to infonnation-
related friction and playa role in these processes as well. To enhance their judgement 
of the reliability of infonnation aid strategists are therefore first tasked with trying to 
gain understanding of themselves and others in these processes of infonnation-related 
friction. This understanding might start within the aid strategist's own organisation and 
could expand to those outside this agency with whom he has regular contact regarding 
the situation in the operational environment. 
This brings us to the question of whom to focus on within aid agencies in order to 
obtain reliable infonnation. It was suggested that those at Head of Mission level were 
less willing to share infonnation fonnally amongst each other than the second layer of 
staff within aid agencies (A35). However, the latter group, although perhaps showing 
more appetite to discuss and speculate on the available infonnation, might have a less 
developed capacity to judge infonnation on its true merits than the former group, 
owing to their age and experience of working in turbulent environments. 210 
This might bring us to another issue for consideration: the importance of understanding 
how different agencies, and networks within these agencies, might approach 
infonnation and what their own (political) reasons might be for doing so. 
With reference to the case in hand, I have to confess that I was rather sceptical about 
the way aid agencies in general dealt with infonnation, with some exceptions. On the 
basis of my partial observations with the aid community in Nepal it appeared to me 
that a few tendencies played a role among key decision makers within the aid agencies. 
210 Having said this, one respondent, a former agency head, perceived by many as one of the leaders in 
the international aid community, acknowledged not having had any experience of working in conflict 
zones before (A64). 
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Firstly, hard data was preferred above soft data, for example statistics, even if it could 
be reasonably assumed that the information, precisely due to the conflict-induced 
dynamics, could be out of date. Secondly, information produced by an agency's own 
information system was perceived as more reliable than information that originated 
outside the agency or group of like-minded agencies. Thirdly. 'positive news' (about 
practical success), which at the same time was not contradictory to an organisational 
mandate became highlighted, overvalued or exaggerated and was more readily 
accepted than 'bad news', which, if it surfaced, was downplayed and undervalued 
because of the possible consequences for programmes, especially if this bad news 
contradicted the assumptions behind the aid agency's activities. One very practical 
explanation for this is that human nature has a tendency consciously or subconsciously 
to use information in a way that is beneficial for those generating the information. In 
Nepal, it was evident that humanitarian agencies tended to stress the possibility of a 
looming humanitarian crisis caused by the conflict, and reported as such, while 
development agencies tended to minimize the impact of the conflict on development 
activities on one hand and highlight their importance in the process of addressing the 
structural development problems in the country on the other hand. 211 
In addition, aid agency networks concentrating on particular issues in the country had 
their own (limiting) foci. For example, meetings held by the Security Information 
Group (SIG), hosted by the UN, tended to focus on discussing the various security 
incidents, which had happened since the last meeting, without necessarily pro-actively 
considering security trends and possible repercussions for aid operations. 212 However. 
the Conflict Advisor Group (CAG) worked on a different basis. It tried to understand 
the present in order to think through possible future political scenarios and the meaning 
of these scenarios for development agencies and their activities. 213 So, in short, 
understanding the approach of aid agencies and the various fora within the network of 
aid agencies, in order to understand the information generated by them. might 
considerably enhance the functionality of the aid strategist. 
211 See for example ACF/ Nepal (2005) Field Assessment Report, Kathmandu Nepal. 
212 Own observation (period 2002-2005). 
213 ibid. 
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Alongside gaining an understanding of themselves as an aid strategist, as well as an 
understanding of others, be they individuals, agencies or networks, and an 
understanding of how information-related friction is produced, an aid strategist should 
also take into consideration the assumptions behind the . aid trinity', namely the 
dynamic interactions between the local populations, conflicting parties and the 
institutional spheres of aid agencies involved. Even if an aid strategist has a full range 
of reliable information available, enough to plan an aid operation successfully in 
strategic terms, the availability and usefulness of this full range of reliable infonnation 
is not necessarily a guarantee that the implementation of the aid operation will 
automatically be successful. Why? Because, between strategizing design and actual 
implementation of an aid operation, the situation in the operational environment will 
more than likely have changed. This gap between design and implementation adds to 
information-related friction, as strategizing aid operations is an activity based not so 
much on information about the past and the present, but rather on what the aid 
strategist thinks that might happen in the future in a given operational environment, 
which information is necessarily unavailable. This observation is not original, however 
it appeared to me that during the period under review more than one aid agency 
preferred to strategize their aid activities on notions which related more to the Nepal of 
the past, than to the present reality or to what Nepal might become. One respondent 
elaborated on the lack of a capability among his agency's expatriate and Nepali 
colleagues, during a scenario building workshop for thinking through scenarios related 
to the possible futures of Nepal (A16). Having said this there was also one example of 
an aid agency thinking in terms of a range of potential future scenarios and making 
preparations, so that it could function in each of them (AS2/ All). 
By contrast with the need to take into consideration an unknown and unknowable 
future, an aid strategist must also deal with real-time information. The research data 
suggests that estimating future developments in an operational environment may be 
easier for an aid strategist than obtaining reliable real-time information about what is 
actually happening in aid operations and their operational environments. 
To elucidate this seeming contradiction: on one hand, real-time intonnation is by 
nature specific, and due the combination of processes described above is not easy to 
obtain quickly, though swift transfer of information might be necessary. On the other 
147 
hand, it might be easier to gain an understanding of the overall direction in which the 
dynamics of poverty and conflict in a country are heading, because these overall 
processes develop at a slower pace than the time necessary for formulating an educated 
guess regarding the future overall dynamics in a given operational environment. 
Although the presented data might not seem to express this very clearly, I would like to 
suggest that, paradoxically, the overall focus of the aid community in Nepal was biased 
towards obtaining 'real-time' information about the situation in their project areas, 
over informing themselves about possible futures directions of the country. For 
example security information was obtained by aid agencies in order to get an 
(retrospective) understanding of the targeted risks against them, or research was done 
into the causes of conflict. However, it is my impression that much less attention was 
paid by the collective of aid agencies to how the conflict might develop. In other 
words, the relatively easy, though not necessarily straightforward, task of informing 
aid agencies strategically was bypassed by the much more difficult, but less relevant 
task of obtaining tactical information from project areas. I am not implying that an aid 
strategist should only focus on obtaining information about how possible future 
developments in any given operational environment, but that a balance must be struck, 
since responding only to real-time information might generate a paradox whereby only 
small pieces of information become the whole story of what is going on. 
To close this chapter, though not the discussion it generates, I would like to suggest 
that information received which is out of line with expectations might put an aid 
strategist and his agency off balance. The realisation suggested by Clausewitz that 
there is a distinction between planning and actual execution of an operation might be a 
key to dealing at least in part with this aspect of information-related friction. 
To this end it might be helpful if the aid strategist accepts the possibility that the 
agency's intent mandate and vision, which is embodied in the design of an aid 
operation, might not fit a given operational environment, since the intent, mandate and 
vision are most likely a reflection of the power balance in the institutional sphere of the 
agency, rather than a reflection of the power dynamics in the operational environment, 
and it is the latter that needs to be engaged with to make a positive difference in tenns 
of poverty and conflict reduction. Conflicting information, therefore, should not be 
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measured against an agency's intent. mandate or corporate policy. but judged on the 
merits of the information available within the operational environment of the aid 
operation itself. This also means that an aid strategist should question the capability of 
an aid operation to make a significant difference or to operate without flaws. 
Therefore, information that challenges an aid operation should be trusted over 
information suggesting its success. The first attitude keeps things realistic and 
attainable, while the second paves the way for (excessive) optimism, which could 
eventually lead to recklessness. Negative though this may sound, it might also save the 
aid strategist from disillusion. In other words, he should consider the negative 
information he receives about aid operations to be more reliable than the positive, until 
the first are disproved and the latter proven. 
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Chapter 10 On Danger214 
10.1 Introduction 
Clausewitz experienced danger throughout the course of his career during several 
campaigns. In a less than two page chapter, he makes the case for the importance of 
understanding what a soldier goes through when he experiences danger (H&P: 113-
114). 
For me the notion of danger points to three things. Firstly, the array of feelings of 
individual RNA soldiers and PLA fighters when confronting each other in battle. 
Equally importantly, Clausewitz's writing added to my own understanding of the 
feelings of the various aid workers, whom I knew personally, who ended up by sheer 
coincidence or pure naivety near or in the midst of these battles. I had colleagues based 
in district headquarters such as Ghorai, Jumla, Gamghadi, Beni, Nepalgunj and 
Tansen, who were actually present during attacks by the PLA on the SFs. Thirdly, as 
an extension of the second point, the concept of danger underlines the importance of 
understanding the perception of danger by aid workers, and perhaps more importantly 
by local communities during the evolving conflict and how that might affect their 
motivations to be involved in aid activities. 
This chapter highlights the importance of understanding and incorporating into 
strategizing processes the implications of perceived and real danger from violent 
conflict in the operational environment on conflicting parties, local populations in 
general and aid workers in particular. Perceived and real danger can constitute a major 
source of friction in the course of an aid operation and as a consequence might 
contribute not only to misallocating valuable aid resources but to a prolongation of 
turbulence in the operational environment as well. 
214 The term danger here is closely connected to the term security. See also Van Brabant K. (2000) 
Operational Security Management in Violent Environments, Good Practice Review 8, Humanitarian 
Practice Network. 
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10.2 Clausewitz and Danger 
For Clausewitz danger is part of the friction of war and therefore demands thorough 
understanding, Danger, he argues, might for those who have never experienced war 
appear attractive, rather than alarming, "You charge the enemy. ignoring hullets and 
casualties. in a surge of excitement ", So, Clausewitz points to a human nature as 
initially being drawn to or excited by danger (H&P: 113-114), 
Then Clausewitz points to the realities of battle by describing the first experiences of a 
novice to the battlefield, " .. , the rumble of guns grows louder and alternates with the 
whir of cannonballs. which begin to attract .. , alienI ion. Shots hegin to strike close 
around us, We hurry up the slope where the commanding general is stationed with his 
large staff Here cannonballs and bursting shells are frequent. and N/i! hegins to s(.'(.'m 
more serious than the young man had imagined .. , " (H&P: 113), Clausewitz points 
here to the harsh reality of battle, which is more alarming than exciting, 
Clausewitz continues, suggesting that intensifying levels of danger influence rational 
thinking and " .. , that the light (?l reason is refracted in a manner quite difrerent .Ii-om 
that which is normal in academic ,\peCUlalion ", He continues stating that the 
exceptional man is he who" .. ,keeps his powers (?lquick decision intact (lhe has never 
been through this experience before ", Furthermore, he argues that people can get used 
to danger and that " .. , after ha?f-an-hour we hardly notice our surrounding anymore ", 
He suggests, .... ,the ordinmy man can never achieve a state qlperfect unconcern in 
which his mind can work with normal flexibility". Therefore, he argues ordinary 
qualities are not enough to operate as needed. Moreover, .. ... the greater the area (?l 
re.\ponsibility. the truer this assertion becomes" (ibid: 113-114). 
Clausewitz points to the possibility that when danger is present, a logic or rationale 
might come into play that is different than that which occurs in a more stable, less 
violent situation. At the same time, people can become used to danger and he puts 
forward that it is only extraordinary people who are able to see through what is 
happening and to act accordingly, and that this becomes more important where the 
responsibility of the individual increases. 
151 
10.3 Danger and Nepal's international aid community 
Respondents across the board approached the issue of danger more from an 
organisational angle, i.e. in terms of the management of security risks, than from a 
psychological perspective, as Clausewitz appears to do. This rather organisational 
focus might retlect the way interview questions were phrased, or it might indicate a 
sub-optimal insight into the various psychological pressures on field staff generated by 
the contlict. 
However, the focus on the organisational perspective might not be a surprise given the 
suggestions of one respondent that although ., ... agencies claimed to he concerned wilh 
the grass roots level ... they were on the contrmy at the same time hardly aware (?(the 
huge political tran.~'f(mnation on the ground" (AS). If we take this line, that the 
management of an agency is hardly aware of the political transfonnation on the 
ground, then it is also not very likely that there was much awareness or sensitivity 
within an aid agency to the psychological issues of field and other staff generated by 
this rather rapid political transformation. Where this was the case, aid agency stafT 
could have picked up 'signals' from field staff about the changing field realities. 
Consequently, this paragraph provides insights as to how security risks and their 
management by aid agencies add to the totality of friction in the operational 
environment of an aid operation. 
In any case, in the context of violent transformation, aid workers are most likely not 
immune from the indirect or direct actions of contlicting parties during the course of a 
violent conflict. In Nepal's context, one respondent described his personal position and 
that of his colleagues as being either 'tortured' by the Maoists or 'pre,\'suri=ed' by the 
Security Forces (A25). 
Although this chapter does not aim to quantify and specify the number and type of 
security incidents and threats faced by aid workers, it is fair to say that aid workers 
experienced various real and perceived contlict related security risks, ranging from the 
continuous daily rumour of (possible) threats to staff by either side of the contlict to 
being actually enclosed in live battle situations for as long as the battles between 
Maoists and Security Forces lasted. This range of possibilities added to the levels of 
anxiety among staff. Box 10.1 below presents a list of 'danger situations/ security-
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related incidents' aid agency staff could face in the course of their work up to 2005/06, 
drawn from my own field experience, from running numerous security management 
sessions in different parts of the country, and from the interview responses. 
Box 10.1: Selected overview of security incidents 
• Bandhs, blockades and torching of vehicles (A45/ A35) 
• Being caught up in crossfire or bombing (for example in Nepalgunj) (personal 
communication with various aid workers based in Nepalgunj) 
• Damage to aid agency offices (for example, UMN office in Jumla and CARE office in 
Achham) 
• Detention, abduction, kidnap or arrest (personal 'management' involvement) 
• Demands and threats made by phone or face-to-face by fake or genuine Maoists 
(personal communication) 
• Helicopter raids (personal communication, 2004/ A68) 
• Hijacking of agency vehicles (personal communication, 2004/2005) 
• Physical harm by drunken soldiers (personal communication, A17/ A62) 
• Publicly announced death threats to field staff (A12) 
• Killing of local staff (for example RCIW staff/ Kalikot, 2005) 
• Landmine/IEDs incidents while on the road (or example, personal communication with 
drivers of project based in Ghorai/ Dang district, 2000. Also lED incident with UN marked 
vehicle ferrying five government forest rangers, personal communication with 
programme member, 2004 Parsa district) 
• Regular and irregular road-blocks manned by either Security Forces or Maoists 
• Resource diversions of aid agency assets by either Maoists or RNA (personal 
communication, A63/ A65) 
• Threat of rape made to female aid worker by a soldier (personal communication, 2004) 
It is reasonably fair to say that in a context where the Maoists were over time able to 
influence at least 70% of the countryside (A241 A33), '/oreiKn aid workers were never 
attacked, except through being at the wrong place allhe wrong lime" (A 15). And, if in 
the wrong place at the wrong time, they were often treated with respect (by the 
Maoists) (A63). 
153 
Although, the list above might fit with Nepal's "warrior culture" (Van Houten 2009), 
the various perceived and real dangers, however, did not, according to my 
understanding, contribute to a conducive environment for the conduct of aid 
operations. In other words, it added to the process of friction. The following danger-
related sources of friction emerged from the interviews. 
To begin with, the deteriorating security situation intluenced processes of trust within 
communities, between communities and aid agencies and amongst agency staff (ASI 
A8). One respondent took the view that due to deteriorating security situation, 
"Nobody trusled anybody anymore" (A63). This might be a quite unqualified position, 
however it makes clear the levels of trust were at least negatively affected by the 
contlict. 
A second danger-related source of friction related to the understanding of danger faced 
by staff and agencies' capacity to manage it. Not only was the contlict itself 
acknowledged relatively late on within aid agencies, the fact that statT experienced 
danger because of the contlict was realised equally late on. A respondent from one of 
the leading agencies stated "Our agency started around 2002 to realise that there was 
a security problem fiJI' stafr (A22). Someone else observed that, "most hig 
organisations did no1 have dedicated staffwho knew something about security", while 
the same respondent admitted receiving " ... only a few hours (~r security training prior 
to departing 10 Nepal" (AI2). Overall, it was suggested that security management 
responses by aid agencies, for example in terms of security and risk assessments, were 
rather pragmatic (A 1), It was also suggested that the deteriorating security situation in 
the country required a different leadership style in agencies and that, in addition, 
organisational mechanisms to improve security needed to be changed (A 121 A 17). The 
latter, it was suggested, was hindered by administrative complications (A 1), while 
those in conflict and security advisory roles were often ignored or not listened to (A471 
A59). 
A third danger-related source of friction comprised differences in perception and 
responses vis-it-vis conflict-related danger, It was suggested that Nepali staff perceived 
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danger differently than foreigners in their agencies,2IS but that the latter introduced 
rules and regulations to deal with it, which were not perceived as appropriate by the 
former because these rules and procedures were generic and not context-specific (A6). 
This discrepancy was illustrated by a story of a respondent about a consultant of 
International Labour Organisation (lLO) on a field trip not being allowed to stay 
overnight in a certain hotel close to the project area, such that they needed to travel a 
total of 60 km for adequate accommodation. This, according to the respondent, did not 
make sense given the local security situation (A46). Moreover, it was argued that 
security messages (from for example the UN) often did not relate to the ground 
realities, subsequently causing "a lot of psychological fear .. among Nepali staff: while 
..... it is safer to be a foreif{ner than a Nepali. apartjhnn random incidents" (A46). 
Another respondent confirmed this view stating that, " ... Nepali stqlf' faced more 
pressure than me. as it appeared that they were on somebody 's side" (A63). 
Another difficulty contributing to danger-related friction were the dilemmas of 
balancing security risks with other considerations. Agencies faced a dilemma between 
staff security on one hand and programme continuation on the other hand (A 171 A62). 
These dilemmas were approached differently by different agencies. One respondent 
suggested that his organisation balanced personal field security and income security 
(A24). Another agency representative suggested approaching security management and 
subsequent risk-taking by balancing staff security against the interests of the poor 
(A40). Another agency, influenced by fears from his headquarters, appeared to balance 
staff security with the possibility of resource diversion to conflicting parties (A 15). 
Another respondent suggested that the intended introduction by the Nepali government 
of the Integrated Security Development Plan (ISDP) around 2003 posed a dilemma for 
agencies (A64). In this plan the Nepali army would provide protection for the 
development activities of aid agencies. Although the plan appeared initially attractive it 
was, after internal debate, resisted by the various aid agencies, because "although ill 
some conflicts sensihle to do in this case development v.'ould he taken out (~(the middle 
.\pace and put to one side; the corner (?lthe f{ol'ernmenf and the army" (A64). 
215 To my understanding was the risk profile between and within Nepali nationals and expatriates 
different. 
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To close with, danger-related friction was also linked to perceived risk-averse 
behaviour by aid agencies (A33), with serious threats such as abductions being the 
prime reason to suspend or to close some aid activities (A24). The existence of danger 
was, for some, the prime factor in deciding to stop aid work (A61). Others used the 
security situation as an excuse to withdraw field offices to regional centres like 
Nepalgunj (A53). While others used the security situation to justify the wind-down of 
dysfunctional programmes (AI2). One respondent suggested along similar lines, that in 
relation to the security management of aid activities it was often not necessarily about 
protecting programmes, but about the cutting of unsuitable programmes (A64). Now 
we tum to the reflective section of this chapter. 
10.4 Reflection 
The points raised above suggest that danger affects aid operations by its perceived or 
actual existence and by an aid agency's responses to it. In addition. real or perceived 
danger did not only affect local communities or conflicting parties, but it also hit a 
psychological point of gravity within aid agencies as it stifled the operations aid 
agencies were involved in and therefore their internal workings. 216 Moreover, real or 
perceived danger in the operational environment does not bring an aid operation closer 
to its ideal form, even if the ideal form of an aid operation has included the existence 
of danger. 
Clausewitz argues that danger, like physical effort, is a source of friction. Therefore, an 
aid strategist should not take the existence of danger in a turbulent operational 
environment lightly. At the same time, to allow the existence of danger to overshadow 
all other considerations vital to getting an aid operation on track is not wise either. 
Considering all options of how conflict-related danger in the operational environment 
might threaten the success of an aid operation may further a strategy, which has the 
protection from danger as a core aim. In other words, an aid strategist who thinks that 
everything in the operational environment is dangerous becomes a victim of his own 
fear, and risks creating a space whereby security management could transfom1 itself as 
the goal, whereby the aid operation is the means. 
216 Idea of the 'psychological point of gravity' borrowed with thanks from Kilcullen (2009). 
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The question remains as to how, within the context of the 'aid trinity', an aid strategist 
might strike a balance between keeping staff and aid operations free from the negative 
consequences of danger, without on the other hand hampering the aid operation they 
are involved in. In other words, how could aid operations successfully be pursued 
despite danger in the operational environment? The answer to this might vary 
according to context, but three issues stand out as requiring consideration in any 
context, namely the initial response to danger, the understanding of danger and the 
approach to danger. 
Responding to danger To begin with, danger could be real but is an issue of 
perception as well. An aid strategist, assuming he is a foreigner with lots of overseas 
experiences, might have more experience of aid operations than the national staff in his 
agency, but, to borrow Clausewitz's expression. is more of a 'novice " to danger in a 
given operational environment than national staff, who could be seen as the experts as 
they might have been confronted with the reality of danger from the beginning of a 
conflict. 
From the perspective of being a 'novice' it is not unlikely that an aid strategist will 
underestimate that which he has not himself experienced or cannot see, At the same 
time, he might overestimate what he clearly can 'see' and what actually happens close 
to him. In Nepal, decision-makers based in Kathmandu were not only far removed 
from actual danger. not necessarily able to 'see' what was actually happening in the 
operational environment, they were, as expatriates and partly due to high turnover rates 
within the aid agencies, also most often relatively new on the scene.217 This process 
might have contributed to slow organisational responses to the existence of danger 
adding to processes of friction. However, what might be out of sight for an aid 
strategist and subsequently be underestimated and probably not responded to, might be 
vital for the functioning of an aid operation and its staff in particular, who may be 
directly and personally exposed to danger. A relaxed response to danger, for example 
by not taking staff concerns seriously, might influence morale negatively and therefore 
217 It was suggested that going on field-visits was a good antidote to the so-called 'Kathmandu bubble' 
(A64). 
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add to friction.218 Ideally this should be avoided. In the case of Nepal, this was 
addressed by, at least in the case of some agencies, to visit staff in the field (A 18) and 
making clear to staff that the country office could provide back up (A2). However, the 
data presented above equally suggests that an organisational response to danger, which 
does not fit the reality as perceived by (national) staff, might unnecessarily have a 
negative impact on actual operations, with a knock-on affect on staff morale, resulting 
in increased danger-related friction. 
The data suggests that at least a few agencIes improved their security capacity 
relatively late on. This does not mean that national staff had not developed their own 
mechanism to deal with conflict-related danger at a much earlier stage of the 
conflict.219 In general, those new staff tasked with security emphasised merely 
managerial responses, to danger, which tended to be general in nature and de-
contextualised. This heightened a situation whereby the initial reasons for aid 
operations could have been sidelined, as these aid operations tended to become rather 
restrictive in nature, hampering aid staff s efforts to reach out to communities beyond 
the reach of the government system. In the Nepal case, this process might have 
antagonised local communities and have played into the hands of the Maoists, as the 
implications of security restrictions added to sentiments of distrust towards aid 
agencies. Therefore, an aid strategist should be aware that security measures might fit 
the culture of the agency he works for, but might not necessarily fit with what is 
actually happening on the ground and the cultural context in which these measures 
have to be implemented. In this case they might have hampered poverty reduction 
efforts and processes of conflict de-escalation. In other words, a response to danger 
implies the need to understand danger in the context in which it occurs. This 
necessarily means that an aid strategist needs to move beyond the 'novice' stage as 
quickly as possible. 
218 Respondent A35 suggested that it was not uncommon that staff had to buy safety with money and 
project resources. 
219 I can recall a field visit in 2000 to Ghorai, The district headquarter of Dang district. During this visit 
and conversations with local staff, I became aware of the risk of 'explosives on the road'. I asked them 
what they were doing about it. The answer was approximately as follows: "it is quite simple, if we go 
with a vehicle on field trip, we avoid being the first one or the second one that day making use of the 
road. We allow the police patrol to go first, as they are the targets of the Maoists, and then we let 
buses go afterwards. If nothing has happened we will use the road". 
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Understanding danger in the context In Nepal, danger within the operational 
environment of aid operations was mainly perceived by aid agency staff from a single 
epistemological perspective; namely a managerial one. This perspective focused on the 
existence of risks in the operational environment and their management.220 Without 
rejecting the practical importance of this approach, I would like to suggest that an aid 
strategist might gain a fuller understanding of danger if he adds two additional 
perspectives when thinking through danger within the context of the 'aid trinity' .221 
The first additional perspective, is not focused on questions such as what are the 
dangers in the operational environment and what to do about it, but focuses on the 
relationship between danger and the various interactions between structures and 
processes of various local communities, institutional spheres and conflicting parties in 
which aid operations are embedded. This does not mean rejecting managerial 
approaches to danger, but invites the aid strategist to look into the way danger is 
produced and reproduced in these dynamic interactive processes within the 'aid trinity' 
and what that might mean for aid operations. This perspective invites the aid strategist 
to look beyond the direct dangers an aid operation is confronted with, and to get a feel 
for how danger is perceived, produced and reproduced by aid agency staff and other 
actors in the operational environment. 222 
The second additional perspective on danger focuses on the way danger is discussed by 
various actors in the operational environment and staff in particular, and what the 
overall responses to danger in the operational environment might be. In this case, an 
aid strategist is invited to look, within the framework of the 'aid trinity', into what aid 
staff of their own and other agencies understand to be a danger, how they discuss these 
and practise their responses to them. One might have 'discovered' biases among statT 
in how they perceived and acted upon danger and perhaps used the excuse of the 
'existence' of danger to further the goals of those actors in the 'aid trinity' they had an 
affiliation with or were loyal to. 
220 This is an approach promoted by for example RedR, a UK based security-training agency. 
m Lupton (1999), Risk, Routledge, London, UK. Lupton refers to weak and strong constructivist 
positions towards risk, which are thankfully used in the discussion below. 
m This approach is maybe reflected in an approach developed by Risk Management Office of DFID/ 
GTZ, and is titled Safe and Effective Development in Conflict (SEDC) (RMO 2005). SEDC combines Mary 
Anderson's Do No Harm approach and RedR security framework approach. A respondent saw merging 
these two approaches as a "light-bulb moment" (AlB). 
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In the case of Nepal, I would like to contend that this threefold approach could have 
been equally as fruitful if not more so than using the managerial approach to security in 
isolation. It would have encouraged the aid community to do some soul-searching 
about their own way of working, for example how they interacted with and were 
perceived by local communities and conflicting parties. By examining the way danger 
was produced and reproduced, aid agencies might have learned that by their very way 
of operating they could have created, despite all good intentions, resentment that might 
on occasion present itself as security problem. In addition, aid strategists might have 
realised that national staff perceived the existence of danger in the operational 
environment, exactly because of their position in the operational environment. 
Overall, the managerial approach to danger practised in Nepal, tor example by the UN, 
was mainly about getting the security measures right and ensuring their 
implementation, while an aid strategist should have been on the whole more concerned 
with the interaction between the various actors in the 'aid trinity' on one hand, and the 
aid operations he was responsible for on the other, in order to contribute to strategic 
modifications to lower the overall levels of danger in the operating environment. This 
sounds easy, but requires, alongside changes in the policy given by the institutional 
sphere of the aid strategist, changes to the wayan aid agency wants to engage with 
actors in the operational environment, which, in tum, might influence the political 
dynamics. This, however, if not handled well, might provoke responses that may 
perhaps threaten an aid operation or the agency involved as well. Now we move to the 
issue of risk averse and risk taking behaviour in relation to aid operations. 
Risk behaviour One respondent argued that: ..... tlthere is no willingness to take risk 
then you have to go home" (A29). However, in general terms, the aid community in 
Nepal was seen as showing risk-averse behaviour. The approach to danger was part of 
this as well. This was partly reflected in the restrictive nature of the security measures 
implemented to deal with potential security risks. However, the data do not indicate if 
this was the aid community's default position or a clear choice. Despite the overall 
risk-averse nature of the aid community examples could be found whereby agencies or 
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(networks of) individuals within these agencies took a risk-taking approach (A25/ A63/ 
A29).223 
Risk-averse behaviour by agencies and the notion of the ideal fonn of aid do not 
necessarily go hand in hand. The ideal fonn of aid more or less implies risk-taking, as 
the concept implies a positive aim: reaching out to local communities, despite possible 
danger. However, within the context of the 'aid trinity" a risk-taking approach is not 
necessarily better then a risk-averse approach or vice versa. Therefore, the art of a 
good aid strategist might include being able to grasp which approach might be 
appropriate and being able to realise it in the strategy and implementation of an aid 
operation. 
An aid operation could be based on risk-taking, if alongside the willingness of staff to 
navigate danger,224 it is clear that potential violent actors within the operational 
environment do not respond directly with violence if their interests are threatened by 
presence of an aid operation. A risk-taking approach might become problematic if 
violence can be expected towards staff of an aid operation, if the operation is not well 
perceived by one or more of the conflicting parties and if the expected benefits of the 
aid operation are perceived as minimal by those responsible for implementing it and 
actors in the Institutional sphere supporting the operation. 
If the operational environment does not favour a risk-taking approach and agency statT 
are not willing to navigate through dangerous situations and are not prepared to deal 
with the eventual consequences, a risk-averse approach might preferred.225 However, 
an aid strategist should be aware of the possibility that by allowing security measures 
to become too stringent he could cripple the modalities of aid operations which in fact 
could be acceptable to key actors in the operational environment, and by so doing deny 
local communities potentially the benefit from them. This might sometimes have 
m These risks did not necessarily related with risks related to violence produced by the conflict, but 
with the political and social dynamiCS of the conflict within the operational environment. Examples are 
expanding or initiating programmes or projects, or maintaining a physical presents in the field. 
224 One respondent showed a willingness to take risks and by doing so reduced personal risk: "I realised 
that I would end up in danger, if would not leave the district headquarter and work in the villages, as I 
will be perceived by anybody else doing nothing" (A63). 
225 The Basic Operation Guidelines, emphasizing the reasons why aid agencies were present in Nepal, 
could be perceived as a collective and strategic attempt to rectify the risk-averse approach within the 
aid community. 
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occurred in Nepal out of fear of possible violent consequences of pushing the 
boundaries of the conflicting parties in order to obtain operational space for aid 
activities. In one such case a road project in Eastern Nepal was suspended for a 
considerable amount of time (A291 A31). 
Although much more could be said, I would like to close with one remark. Overall, it is 
more comfortable, but not necessarily more satisfactory, to be risk-averse vis-a-vis 
danger in a turbulent environment, than risk-taking. To counter this trend an aid 
strategist might, instead of asking how the effect of danger can be nullified or managed 
thoroughly, ask to what extent security measures within the agency can be applied, 
without compromising the ideal fonn of aid in the given operational environment. This 
said it is still possible that, by approaching the problem of how to deal in the process of 
strategizing with danger in the operational environment in this way, the description of 
what the ideal fonn of aid might be might tend to shift in favour of managerial 
measures to reduce the possibility of facing danger and its consequences. In other 
words, the responsibility for staff safety does not necessarily lead to a clear and 
creative assessment of how the ideal fonn of aid delivery in a given context might be 
furthered. Now we move to Part III and elaborate on the notion of strategy and some 
related aspects. 
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PART III 
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Chapter 11 On Strategy 
11.1 Introduction 
Clausewitz offers his perspectives on strategy in merely 8 pages in Book 3 Chapter 1. 
In retrospect, the notion of strategy was important to me during my time in Nepal in 
the sense that it helped me to reflect on the strategies of the international aid 
community as a whole and the agencies I worked for in particular, and how this related 
to the compounding conflict. At first sight one could gain the impression that the CPN-
M in conjunction with the PLA operated on the basis of a war plan, with a well 
fleshed-out strategy, while the government and the army embarked on the conflict with 
a series of ill-prepared and disconnected campaign plans, and actors within the aid 
community in general strategized their activities within this context as they were only 
involved in and concerned with battles for the benefit of their own turf. 
This chapter does not aim to elaborate on the strategies applied by the conflicting 
parties; neither will it suggest that aid agencies were solely focused on 'IUli-hallles', 
The chapter contends that, owing to friction, strategizing aid operations in a turbulent 
environment such as Nepal is a difficult process. The strategy of an aid operation is 
liable to fail if it does not allow for friction in general, and friction in the process of 
strategizing itself. This friction may give the impression that aid agencies are 
embroiled in turf-battles, while they actually may try to strategize and act accordingly. 
11.2 Clausewitz and StrategYl26 
Clausewitz defines strategy as" the use of an engagement/i)r the pUlpose (?lthe war ", 
Within this context the strategist shapes individual campaigns and decides during these 
campaigns on the individual engagements. The reason for this, according to 
Clausewitz, is that most of the assumptions on which the war plan is based might not 
be correct, and therefore" ... more delailed orders cannot he determined in advlInce al 
all, it/hllow.\' that the strategist must go on campaign himse(j"', 
22O H&p: 177-183, 
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Clausewitz states, "Everything in strategy is very simple. but that does not mean that 
everything is velY emy". On the one hand his task appears simple, bordering on 
continual repetition of action due to the means and forms employed. On the other 
hand, Clausewitz suggests, this is not the case due to the political conditions and 
questions around what "a war is meant to achieve and what it can achieve ... ". It is 
therefore "in the highest realms ~lstrategy that intellectual complications and extreme 
diversity ~r.factors and relationships occur . .. Clausewitz implicitly ridicules those 
critics who exclude from strategic thinking .. ... all moral qualities ... and reduce 
everything to a few mathematical formulae ~r equilibrium and superiority. (~(time and 
space, limited by a.few angles and lines ". 
Clausewitz suggests that in the case of strategy, in opposition to a tactical situation, 
.. ... everything has to be guessed at and presumed. Conviction is there.fiJre weaker. 
Consequent~y most generals. when they. ought to act. are para~yzed by unnecessm:v 
doubts ", 
Partly due to this guesswork and need for presumption on the level of strategy there is: 
.... , ample room .for apprehensions. one's own and those of others: .fl}r oNections and 
remonstrations and. in consequence, jar premature regrets ". It takes therefore 
according to Clausewitz .. ... more strength ~l will to make an important decision in 
strategy than in tactics ". As in the realm of tactics "one is carried away hy the 
pressures (?l the moment. caught up in a maelstrom where resistance would he 
fatal... ". Now, we move to how the term strategy resonated within the Nepal's aid 
community. 
11.3 Strategy and Nepal's international aid community 
The interview data appear to suggest that during the research period the role of strategy 
within Nepal's aid community vis-a-vis the efforts to reduce poverty and conflict were 
rather ambiguous. This does not mean that there were no strategies at all within the aid 
community; the opposite may even be true: .. There were many types (?l stratewes " 
(A39).227 From the data five interlinked themes emerged, which in general tenns 
227 Ghani and Lockart, in their book Fixing Failed States, argue in relation to the issue of strategy in 
comparable lines. They observe, after first referring to Clausewitz's military theories, that the term 
strategy adapted by development and humanitarian agencies are not using the term correctly, but 
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appear to suggest that the strategic behaviour of the international aid community as a 
whole and individual agencies in particular did not necessarily reduce friction in the 
process of aid delivery. Overall, it seems that strategic behaviour compounded friction 
already present in the process of addressing poverty and contlict. 
The six themes identified relate to the definition of strategy, elements of strategy, the 
character of strategizing within the international aid community as a whole and within 
individual agencies, factors related to strategic changes, and factors related to friction 
on a collective and individual level within the aid community. These six themes are 
inter-related but will be presented separately. In addition, it must be made clear that the 
following overview might provide an incomplete and rather descriptive picture and 
does not necessarily touch on the inner workings of strategizing processes. 
Definitions of strategy Overall the responses appear to suggest, with the usual 
exceptions, that the issue of strategy across the aid community in Kathmandu between 
2000 and 2005106 was not necessarily given a great deal of attention. This was partly 
retlected in responses related to the meaning of strategy. Four quotations are presented 
below, all taken from aid practitioners whom I greatly admire for the way in which, as 
far as my observation went, they sincerely struggled in the face of many challenges to 
keep development and humanitarian work going. 
The first respondent is rather precise in his definition, while the other three respondents 
faced challenges pinning down the meaning of strategy in the context of an aid agency. 
According to the first respondent a strategy is .. ... £1 deliberate and considered plan/or 
achieving your goals and purposes. There are lots (~l steps in that process ... .. (A 17). 
The three other interviewees were less precise in their definitions. One responded to 
the idea of describing the notion of strategy with: "Oh dear ... it is a high leve/thing ... 
it has to do with the way you work ... you have your o~iectives or your P1l11'O.\'eS or 
your goal or how you want to call it ... your vision perhaps and you have a strale1{l' to 
get to that vision ... it sets out what you want to achieve ... .. (A26). Another reasoned as 
follows: "/ suppose ... it is what you do in response 10 whal the analysis says ... il is Ihe 
way forward ... to gel to where you want to get 10. So. it is your appro(.l(:h ... it is the set 
adopt multiple strategies instead violating the underlying prinCiple of the notion of strategy, being 
unity of purpose and focus (2008: 170). 
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0/ things you do. There must he a nice way to say what strategy is" (A29). The last 
interviewee responded with: "Strategy? ... I never thought ahout this. I guess ... I would 
say that the mission that I rememher/rom my agency was: reduce pOl'er(v and tackle 
social exclusion in order to lay a has is for any permanent and sustainable peace. The 
strategy should have heen along the lines of. .. undertaking development" (A35). 
This thesis is not concerned with the correctness of the responses given, but rather with 
the fact that there is not really a common idea of what strategy might mean in the 
context of an aid agency operating in a turbulent environment. For interviewee A26 a 
strategy relates to "what you want to achieve ... ". In case of respondent A29 the notion 
of strategy relates merely to " ... the set of things you do ... " and respondent A35 
appears to relate strategy to an undefined set of parameters activities need to fulfil: 
..... assistance Ihat provides the optimum output and optimum improvement (?/,people 's 
lives in the short and medium term ... ". Only interviewee A 17 seems to suggest that 
strategy relates -not necessarily primarily- to the 'how' of achieving goals and 
purposes, which in turn is reflected in a plan. 
Such diverse responses could indicate at least two things. Firstly, they might retlect the 
watering down of strategy's original meaning. 228 Secondly, they might retlect an 
underestimation of the importance of strategy and strategy formulation within aid 
agencies and the communities they are part of. Whatever may be the case, I would 
suggest that the lack of a clear, common idea of what strategy is compounded the 
processes of friction. Now, we turn to how insiders and close observers of the 
international community spoke about the elements applied within the process of 
strategizing. 
Elements of strategizing Respondents pointed to several elements important to 
consider in the process of strategizing. Firstly, it was suggested that the aid agency 
itself is a key element, in terms of the overall and long-term vision of the agency 
(A49). the agency's mandate and capacity (A29). and organisational strength (A 17). 
Then, respondents pointed to the potential target groups of aid agencies, which were 
228 See as well Strachan H. (2008) The lost meaning of Strategy, in: The Strategy Reader, Mahnken T.G. 
and J. A. Maiolo (eds.), Routledge, UK. 
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defined in terms of needs of local communities within target areas, or communities or 
the country as a whole (A29, A49), and subsequent priority areas (A17}.229 
Next, varies actors and their actions were highlighted in terms of "(im'ernment in all 
forms, legitimate or not the official government structures and umdficial de-facto 
authorities, other aid organisations and local groups" (A26). The same respondent 
said that especially considering the other aid agencies is essential in strategizing 
processes, because" ... nowadays il is very rare thaI you are the only a~en(Y in Ihe 
area and the way these agencies are operating provides expectations alld sets 
precedents" (A26). Furthermore, one respondent suggested that the agency 
headguarter should be considered in the process of analysing and strategizing as well. 
He acknowledged however that as head of agency " .. . you are not a f;-ee agent. YOli 
have to take your headquarters with you, you have a position which is aClua/~v defined 
by your agency. But you are able to influence thaI" (A64). The same respondent 
argued that strategy comes to a certain extent from shared analysis. But that this shared 
analysis could be a battleground of ..... of departmental views and conflicts or 
d~fferences ofviel1's about the situation and what is going on and what should he dOlle 
about it" (A64). 
In addition, it was argued that global developments in relation to international 
development aid in general (A 12) and events with global ramifications like 9111 and 
the War on Terror (A31) should be included as well as they could influence agency 
headquarters' position. Moreover, a theory of change was also seen as an element of 
strategy formulation (A29). Another element suggested in the process of strategizing 
related to the time dimension related to the interactions between an aid agency and 
needs within the operational environment (A49! A29), this included as well the 
experiences of a given agency in addressing particular needs in the past (A49), how the 
situation in the operational environment might develop (A29), and this subsequently 
could influence emerging needs and how much experience the agency has with these 
new needs (A49). To finalise, two respondents elaborated on some of the processes by 
which aid agencies gained understanding of their operational environment in relation to 
229 However it was suggested that these local communities should not be seen as homogeneous or stable. 
The notion of community is ..... misleading as there is not a communi~l'. there is a l1'/w/f! hunch oj' 
interactive communities and groups, which change and sh!fi over time" (A26). . 
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analysis and its use in strategy formulation. The first respondent explored the need for 
experience in the operational environment: "it is absolutely essential to have some 
'modicum of experience' and that cannot be gotten .. .from reading background 
material and briefings and stuff like that. You have to go out and that see it actua/~v 
yourse!f. Should eve,y aid worker have a two-week intensive immersion experience in 
a village? Maybe. 1 think that learning takes place in a embodied manner. there are 
different environments which cannot be understood without actually living in them" 
(AS). Another respondent focused primarily the importance of local knowledge and 
knowing how this local knowledge is actually produced (A4). Now, we move to a 
storyline related to the character of strategy within the international community. 
Strategy within the international aid community Despite the somewhat 
heterogeneous nature of the aid community in Kathmandu, a rather consistent view 
emerged about the overall character of the strategy employed by the international aid 
community as a whole vis-a-vis poverty and conflict reduction. These views ranged 
from a lack of coherence, to a situation whereby strategy was replaced by a fonn of 
tactics. This range of views is presented below. 
Firstly, In relation to the issue of coherence one respondent saw a lack of a coherent 
strategy among donors. "{{you talk about donors, the donors do not have a coherent 
strategy in Nepal. There are donors who think that growth and equali~l' are 
complementary and there are donors who think that growth and eqllali~v are 
contradictory" (A 15). 
Secondly, the perceived lack of coherence was also reflected in the strategy of the aid 
community regarding the compounding conflict in Nepal. One insider was quite open 
regarding the absence of strategizing within the donor community and what they could 
do as group to help prevent a further escalation of the situation: "There was not milch 
strategizing going on. There was a lot of discussion (as to) whether Nepal was in a 
humanitarian crisis in some parts, but there was not a lot strategy about what should 
be done to prevent things .f;'om gelfing worse ... It was more (~{l1'hat has Nepal said ill 
terms ~f development plan .fhr this year and what are we going to do to support 
it ... what money have we gOT. how are we going to use this and how does This ./iT in with 
whatever they say ... No. I would not say that there was a lot (~{strategi=ing ... .. (A28). 
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Next, another equally well-infonned interviewee argued regarding the presence of 
strategy and strategizing along similar lines: ..... in genera/they did not [strate~i=eJ. 
and of course there were exceptions. but it was an issue that was avoided. {{'you look 
at the ideas (?{' working around conflict. ·working in conflict and working on C01?flict. 
most of the agencies worked up to 2003 or 2004 with a Vo'orking around C01?flic:t 
strategy ... they were avoiding the conflict" (A34). Another, equally well-infonned 
respondent argued that the international community did not apply so much a 'working 
around conflict' strategy but an avoidance strategy resulting in a conflict-blind 
approach by the aid agencies (AI). 
A similar well-infonned respondent offered a (slightly) more positive view, arguing 
that the agencies did not apply so much an avoidance or 'working around' contlict 
strategy, but that most of them applied a 'working in conflict' strategy. A respondent 
suggested .. We were working with an in conflict mode. as on(v a few donors realized 
that they should work on conflict addressing hierarchical power needs. working on the 
issue of social i'"?iustice (A 15). 
It is doubtful if this focus on a working around or working in conflict strategy was a 
clear and conscious choice. One respondent argued in relation to this matter, "For 1I 
start, my overall impression is that there was a velY long delay until most l?f'the aid 
agencies ... governmental or non-governmental started to recognize the nature and 
severity q{'the co'"?f/ict and the fact that it meant that they could not carl:V on with their 
business as normal" (A44). Another view suggested that most of the aid agencies did 
not have so much a strategy on their own, but that the government drove this. "As an 
overall obsen'ation it could be said that most development aid organisations were 
more directed by the government than by their concerted strateK}' as chal1~e agent",,, 
(A67). However, the problem of this was not so much that the government of Nepal 
drove strategies, but that the government of Nepal was in denial of the conflict and 
"pursuing the co'"?f/ict " (AS). 
This line of thought was echoed and expanded by a respondent who suggested that the 
aid agencies not only followed the government line on strategy, but that this strategy 
actually became a fonn of survival tactics, with a consequent growing inattention to 
communities at grass roots level: ..... in pursuing a strategy the internalional 
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development agencies used only tactics ... they had only tactics in other 
words ... appease. agree and endorse the government and do not engage with them on 
core issues. othent'ise they might chase you out... by doing so the groups on the ground 
were ignored ... "(A34). 
One might expect that, after the official end of the conflict in 2006, the aid industry 
would have adjusted its strategy in order to address the causes of Nepal's conflict. 
According to one well-informed insider, this has not been the case: "!l)'ou look at the 
current three-year plan. recently produced by the government and agreed by most (~l 
the donors. you don't see a real clear cut strategy to address the structural causes (?l 
the conflict" (A 15). This might imply that the Nepali government, in conjunction with 
the majority of donors, are reasonably well equipped to adapt slowly to the reality of 
civil war and its aftermath. 
Having explored issues relating to strategy in the international aid community, where 
we have seen terms such as "lack of coherence ", "absence (?l slrale}{)' ", "avoidance 
strategy" and "survival tactics ", we will move on to elaborate on strategy in relation 
to individual agencies. 
Strategy within individual agencies The above section suggests that the overall 
strategy of the aid community in Kathmandu was perceived as being at best not 
formulated in a timely fashion nor optimally addressing the compounding situation in 
the country. This view is echoed in the 'strategic' responses of individual aid agencies. 
While a full overview of strategic responses of individual agencies cannot be given, 
four different responses are presented below to give an idea of the strategic responses 
of the various individual agencies. The four identified strategic responses could be 
labelled as: I) reactive and inattentive, 2) formally non-reactive, but informally 
adaptive, 3) gradual, and in step with the conflict, and 4) taken by surprise, but switlly 
adapting. 
The first type of strategic response to the compounding situation in the country could 
be described as rather reactive and inattentive to local needs and consequences. One 
respondent suggested that his agency, instead of responding to the changing situation 
in the operational environment and in particular to communities at grass-roots level, 
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shifted its attention to the needs of intennediary organisations, subsequently 
relinquishing its role as a change agent. "My agency became basically reactive. They 
responded basical(y to the needs of the Nepal government and the local intermediary 
organisations ... rather than that they knew why certain requests had evolved. nor what 
the effect would be of the interventions. Before their separation from the development 
ministry (around 1998-1999) most projects were based on a spec{fic development 
policy for an equal(y spec{fic target population, and had a detectah/e course (d' 
development. With the introduction o.lthe agency's new mission statement the straleg.l' 
analysis was not needed any more as they were driven by the demand ... (?f'their new 
clients: the local intermediary organisations and government ministries" (A67). The 
respondent continued arguing that his agency, by not having its " ... own strategy 
anymore" lost its function as a change agent and basically followed other aid 
organisations with a ..... wait and see altitude" (A67).230 
The second type of agency response could be described as non-reactive, but infonnally 
adaptive to the changing situation in the country. One respondent argued that the 
agency he was heading up felt, like other agencies, sandwiched between the 
government and its unofficial equivalent and subsequently felt the need to make a 
strategic choice between a continuation of activities as usual or a cessation of 
operations. The agency decided to continue, but in the words of the respondent to "stay 
back" at the same time and to educate and sensitize the Maoists about the importance 
of development aid as means "to keep the people happy ... ". It was suggested that this 
strategy worked very well (A40). However, the respondent acknowledged that real 
adjustment of the agency's strategy was slower than it could have been. While the 
People's War started in 1996; the respondent said "/n 2005106 we renewed our 
strategy ... what we actually did was reviewing our strategy and tried to contextualise it 
in a way, so that it can address all the social and political problems we were seeing ill 
the country" (A40). 
A third type of aid agency response could be labelled as gradual, but in step with the 
conflict. One respondent seemed to imply that his agency moved from working around 
to working on conflict almost in parallel with the growing intensity of the conflict, 
230 See as well the Nepali Times number 235 (18-25 January 2005), Interview with SNV Director Jan de 
Witte, http://www.nepalitimes.com.np/issue/235/interview/1205 accessed on 06/03/2009. 
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stating that: "We started to/eel the heal in 2000 and ... worked/irsl around cOl~flict, hut 
slowly moved 10 working on con./lict" (A43). 
A fourth type of strategic response could be described as taken by surprise, but swiftly 
adapting. One respondent, reflecting on the period around 2001, when he started to 
lead the agency concerned, observed on arrival a connection between the absence of 
corporate strategy and level of awareness of conflict-related dynamics in the 
operational environment: "In those days you need 10 rememher that this organization 
was split into several departments ... there was no cOlporale straleKY ... there was no 
corporate anything here ... there were delineated departments and each was run hy 1I 
director or a coordinator. So, I think it was a total ignorance (d' what was rea/~v 
happening in this countlY and what the implications might he..... (A 12). The 
respondent suggested that from the moment this unpreparedness was realised a change 
process started, gearing the agency up to the conflict and the needs generated by it 
(A 12). It is not clear however, when the agency realised their unpreparedness and 
when organisational measures were put in motion to counter it. 
The material presented above suggests at least that a small proportion of aid agencies 
did not employ proactive strategies vis-a-vis the compounding conflict. In that sense 
the presented data are in agreement with the views presented about the role of strategy 
within the international community. Having said this, agencies did change strategies. 
In the section below factors related to strategic changes will be presented. 
Strategy and factors for change Although respondents were generally not impressed 
by the way the international community responded to the growing turbulence in a 
strategic way, the interview data appear also to suggest that strategic changes took 
place at either a collective level or at the level of individual agencies. Without 
elaborating on the changes themselves, I would like to provide an overview of factors 
leading to these changes. According to the observations of one insider, these factors 
had neither to do with " ... new strategic insights or learning .li'om tacl ic:al .\'lI(.'cesses .. 
(A59). Factors contributing to strategic changes could be divided into two groups. The 
first group related to pressures from the institutional sphere of the aid agencies, the 
second to developments or events in the operational environment. 
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The pressures from the institutional sphere were perceived as rather top-down and the 
overriding factor in the operational environment when it came to changing agency 
modalities strategically. One respondent reflecting on the possibility of strategizing in 
the course of his work said, "the whole strategy, which was the overarchin}{ principle, 
came from the headquarters and o.f course the nitty-gritty and the details (~I' all (~f'this 
were formulated here. But the main and overarching principle came from the 
headquarters ". (A45) This statement does leave room for the inclusion of needs or 
dynamics in the operational environment in the strategy formulated by the institutional 
sphere of a given agency. It was suggested, however, that these specifics in the 
operational environment were not always considered. According to one insider. 
strategy and changes in strategy within the aid community of Kathmandu were mostly 
driven by top-down policy changes in the institutional sphere of the agencies 
concerned. He argued that strategic changes were " ... usually top-down ... the policy will 
(~ften be informed by a form 0.1' needs analysis or ... this year it will be this type (~f' 
excluded person, while another type (~f excluded person is ,liJrgoften. It is open lo.fads, 
[lyou see what I mean ... trends and fashions ... or po/ie-y chan}{es al the centre. This 
year we concentrate on women only ... or women '.'I education ... etcetera " (AI8). This 
view was strongly echoed by another respondent arguing that in the case of the agency 
he worked for, the headquarters did not take Nepal's situation into account. The 
respondent stated: "In the case o.l my aid agene-y, strategic chan}{es in Nepal were 
driven by policy changes on a corporate level, without considering Nepal's dynamic,,'" 
(A67). 
Despite the view that strategy and strategy changes within the international aid 
community of Kathmandu were mostly formulated through a top-down process, some 
respondents suggested that this was not necessarily always the case. Dynamics in the 
operational environment could make managers aware that (substantial) changes in 
agency programme strategies were needed. The actual reasons for these changes were 
phrased in rather general terms, were legally oriented or related to clearly identitiable 
conflict events subsequently affecting the political-military dynamics, in some cases 
substantially. 
Examples of factors for strategic changes being phrased in such general and ambiguous 
terms were "the situation in Nepal" and the slowly deteriorating "security situalion" 
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(A 12). One example of a legal-oriented factor was a new law regarding the functioning 
of international aid agencies, the so-called 'Social Development OrKanization Act', 
which during the time of the fieldwork had not been passed officially by the Nepal 
parliament, but was in the process of being implemented, hindering INGOs running 
their own projects (A 12). 
Strategic change within an agency or programme could equally arise from acute, high 
profile events taking place in the operational environment affecting the political-
military dynamics of the conflict, and presumably intensifying the existing pressures 
and generating new pressures on existing and new programmes; an example follows 
below. 
Shortly after the failure of the first ceasefire and subsequent series of peace 
negotiations between the representatives of the government and the Maoists, the PLA 
overran the barracks of the RNA in Ghorai, Dang district. By doing so, they not only 
took the RNA but the Nepali establishment by surprise as well and supplied themselves 
with substantial amounts of weaponry and ammunition. Which in tum forced the RNA 
to become actively engaged in the contlict as well, significantly changing the dynamics 
of the contlict. One respondent referring to this event in the context of strategy changes 
said, ..... in 2002, just after the Ghorai allack, we realized that we needed much more 
tangible benefits. things up front. as long term programmes as ollrs are not going to 
win the 'hearts and minds', As the community needed quick impact, tanKible hene.fits, 
so in 2002, we designed that ... as the changes were vel)) much Kl'Ounded on what 
happened in the districts" (A2). According to the interviewee this led to substantial 
changes to programme implementation and which programme elements got prioritised. 
The programme focus shifted from forestry to livelihoods and introduced a 
geographical cluster approach .. ... so that people could see what was happen inK. Ihe 
idea was then to engage were we could, ... 10 see what was possible and that was to a 
certain exlent impacted by the army. lelling liS in. or the Maoists £II/owing liS Ihae" 
(A2). 
One case was identified whereby a respondent recalled balancing the possible political 
dynamics in the institutional sphere with dramatic changes in the dynamics of the 
operational environment in Nepal at the time of the Royal Coup of I sl February 2005. 
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Just after the Royal Coup, the respondent, as a key agency's representative, made a 
strategic choice to propose the closure of a programme of particular significance in 
terms of district coverage and potential impact on local level. The proposed closure 
was not primarily based on an assessment of the political-military dynamics of the 
operational environment in Nepal, although perceived as strongly negative, but rather 
on a political analysis of his agency's institutional sphere and the possible 
consequences for the agency's presence in Nepal as a whole (withdrawal), if no action 
was taken (for example the closure of a development programme). The agency 
representative speculated that by proposing the closure of a programme quickly, even 
before his superiors could respond to the events in Nepal by demanding total 
withdrawal, such a withdrawal could be avoided. This turned out well (A 70). 
These responses might suggest that there are not necessarily clear-cut reasons why 
agencies change their operational strategies. However, it appears that strategic changes 
took place primarily reactively rather than pro-actively. In addition, it seems that most 
often external factors precipitate change, either in the institutional sphere or in the 
domain of conflicting parties. 
Strategy and friction within the international aid community This section tries to 
present, in relation to strategy various sources of friction within the international aid 
community as whole. The following section presents various sources of friction within 
individual agencies. These sources of friction are not presented in order of importance, 
and it should be noted that in reality the various sources of friction could be interlinked 
and strengthen each other. Taken together these sources of friction highlight the 
difficulties of strategy formulation by aid agencies in times of compounding 
turbulence. 
The first source of friction related to strategizing within the international aid 
community as a whole is connected to the development policies applied by the 
government and subsequently backed by donors. One respondent stated that "the 11L'(}-
liheral strategies afthe government were matc/zed hy World Bank and IMF strategies 
in most of the period hetween 1992 and 2000, and as a result National Plans prepared 
during this period did 1101 really address Ihe structural callses (?/'poverl.l''' (A 15). This 
might have added indirectly to the initiation and growth of the People's War. 
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Secondly, processes of denial within the Nepali establishment and among expatriates 
on management level in various aid agencies appear to have been a source of friction 
affecting strategy formulation. It was suggested that the Nepali elite mainly denied the 
existence of the Maoists, while at least some of the foreign aid managers largely denied 
the consequences of the conflict on their programmes. 
One respondent referring to the issue of denial among the Nepali establishment stated: 
"The biggest problem here ... was that people within the estahlishment and actua/~v the 
Nepali establishment were more guilty of this than the foreign estahlishment in my 
view, because it was the Nepali elite who shaped the perspectives (~lthe development 
donors ... .. (AS). According to this respondent, the Nepali establishment, suffered from 
a "distancing strategy" and made the fundamental mistake of denying the Maoists at 
an ideological level, not taking them seriously and perceiving them as "a hunch (d· 
crooks out fiJr power or money or something like that and not as a legitimate or 
genuine movement" (AS). According to the same respondent, in the beginning - and 
even to my knowledge half way through the People's War- a myth was created and 
maintained that the Maoists were outsiders, not even appearing Nepalese, without a 
national perspective and trying only to disturb the peace (AS). In other words, "the 
Nepali elite simply did not want to acknowledge that there might he such a serious 
problem" (AS). 
Another respondent presented an alternative view of friction caused by denial which 
did not focus so much on a Nepali establishment denial of the Maoists, rather on 
expatriate management levels within the aid agencies denying the conflict and its 
consequences. The respondent argued, " ... there was a lot (?l denial, not among those 
working on conflict, hut amongst management and emhassies that things were going to 
get worse or that anything could go wrong. There u'as always a thought and lip to this 
day there still is this idea that this cannot happen to Nepal ... that kind (?l 
language ... within donors as a group ., (A28). 
The process of denial of the conflict by expatriate managers might have heen 
influenced by perceptions of risk within the international aid community. According to 
one respondent: "They'/eel a high risk hecause q(their orientation and .\·ensitil'i~" and 
all these instructions /i'om their headquarters. They compared standards l1'itl1 
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standards within their own countries and if they do start comparing West-European 
standards, then obviously Nepal is a risky country . .. Thus processes of denial within 
the international aid community coincided with "an avoidance strategy" (A I). 
Thirdly, another respondent argued that sources of friction affecting strategizing lay 
mainly in the expatriate part of the aid community, where unclear decision-making 
processes and personality issues played a role, and in tum led to risk aversion and 
survival behaviour. The respondent recalls: "The whole point is that we had 
individuals who could have made a difference, but here the collective was less then the 
individuals, normally it is the other way around, the collective is weater. But here ... we 
had a situation in the international community... whereby the collective was 
less ... because the collective was not able to do anything ... dedsion-making was 
terrible and a process was not there. There were hierarchies ... there were individual 
personalities. So what individuals think is sometimes better then what the collectivC' 
thinks. Here, the collective became the lowest common denominator and it is clear that 
the lowest common denominator is about aversion and survival, the blame game ... A II 
(~lthose things were going on here ... .. (A34). 
Fourthly, the above mentioned factors might also have coincided with the historical 
and political dynamics between donor countries themselves: "I think the terrihle thing 
here is that the international community is still divided on its headquarters and 
political lines .. , and those distinctions could have been blurred here ... because this was 
so unnecessary here ... . , (A34). In addition, this process might have been compounded, 
as one respondent suggested, by the political dynamics generated by the Global War on 
Terror and reluctance of some donor countries to be associated with it (A31 ). 
Fifthly, friction in the process of strategizing and finding an appropriate strategy for 
the compounding situation in Nepal could, according to one participant, be related to a 
lack of perspectives within the international aid community on the process of analysing 
and subsequently strategizing. For example, according to the respondent, expatriates 
with deep insights into the workings of Nepal and its development were sidelined: 
"Analysis is about negotiating on d({rerent per,\pectil'es... (l you do not have that 
(breadth) (~fperspecfil'es and you negotiate on some small kind (~r understcmdil1g your 
implementation runs into problems ... and that is where ... the donors really were weak ... 
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I don't think that the donors actually embraced a wide enough perspective. There was 
a group of us in Kathmandu around 2002 to 2004 and 2005 who had heen in Nepalfi)r 
many years ... with good Nepal experiences. good development experiences. hut the 
donors did not want fa know it ... Ifelt at limes that I was seen as a threat ... " (A4). 
In the view of one participant, the war itself was a source of friction, which explains 
why the agencies as a rule did not immediately focus on addressing the conflict, since 
at least for some their own survival was perceived as more important: ..... Some donors 
started to work on conflict, hut other donors were still working H'ith an in cOl~flict 
mentality: focusing on positioning themselves in order to secure safe operations in the 
conflicl environments ... " (A 15). 
One respondent suggested that turnover of key staff within aid agencies augmented 
friction in the strategizing processes, assuming that the international aid community 
could have identified an appropriate strategy to address the compounding situation in 
the country, but was not able to stick to it. Regarding the various heads of mission and 
their key advisors and the attempts to formulate strategy and to keep it on course, it 
was said: "This is not a one man army, this is an alliance (?(people and i(You replace 
the generals along the way, then you end up with a different strate~y" (A59). Assumed 
there was one in the first place. 
Strategy and friction within individual aid agencies Thus far we have showed 
sources of friction in relation to strategizing within the international aid community as 
a whole. We will now focus on points of friction related to strategizing within 
individual aid agencies, while acknowledging that there may well be some areas where 
the two levels overlap and even reinforce each other. 
The first source of friction prevalent at agency level was the depth and organisational 
requirement for analysis of the operational environment by agencies. One respondent 
implied that from his observations that this was insufficient, stating that: .. There needs 
to he much more political ana(vsis ahout the area you are going into and ohtaining as 
much in/iJrmation as possible and investigating what the potential prl?iectiol1s might 
he ... " (A3). Another respondent clearly stated that in his agency in depth analysis was 
perceived as no longer necessary due to corporate policy and the introduction of a new 
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mission statement: "With the new mission statement of the agency a strategic analysis 
was not needed any more as the agency was driven by the demands (~f its new 
clients ..... as a consequence the agency, ..... became a free milking cow fiJI' technical 
assistance, training courses. travel and institution building" (A67). 
A (perceived) lack of leadership within the aid agencies was a further source of friction 
regarding the at best sub-optimally perceived presence of strategy within the 
international aid community. One respondent reflected: "they were looking more over 
their shoulders, what is the US doing ... what is DFID doing ... .. (A34). It can be 
problematic for smaller agencies to wait for strategic analysis and direction from the 
larger donors, because there is no guarantee that the larger donors have a correct 
analysis quickly available, assuming that they want to share it. One respondent argued 
that it was not so much denial of the Maoists as a political movement or the increasing 
turmoil in the country that hampered strategizing processes within agencies, rather it 
was the time required to understand fully the nature of the Maoist movement, in tenns 
of its origin, goals, modes of operation and strategy (A64). 
The last source of friction regarding strategizing within agencies was the 
discouragement by senior management of strategic thinking on the part of individual 
staff members. One respondent argued that positive change required development 
workers with critical, analytical and strategic mindsets to translate the global agenda of 
an agency into a local perspective. However, "this is not ea,\),. hecause you l1'illnot he 
liked by your senior management ... even seen as troublemaker and you risk losing your 
job ... " (A6). The above presentation of the various sources of friction affecting 
strategy formulation within the aid community as a whole and within individual 
agencies suggests that strategising aid operations in a turbulent environment is by no 
means a straightforward process and that progress is impeded at every stage along the 
way. 
11.4 RefiectionZ31 
The above overview presents a rather sombre picture of the character and 
appropriateness of the strategizing processes within Nepal's aid community and their 
outcomes regarding poverty and conflict reduction during the research period. 
231 In this section use is made of Gray's views on the difficulty of strategizing (2006: 74-80). 
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However, this does not automatically mean that development-related activities were 
not happening. The overview portrays elements of the strategic culture present within 
the aid community of Nepal,232 and at the same time indicates that the chances of 
formulating successful aid operation strategies are slim, because strategizing aid in 
turbulent environments like Nepal is for at best very difficult and should therefore 
receive close attention. 
Definition of strategy Clausewitz is clear what strategy is, namely the connection 
between engagements for the purpose of war. Those interviewed were less clear on the 
subject with views ranging from "what you want 10 do" (A26), via "the sets (~lthin~s 
you do" (A29) to "undertake development" (A35) and "a plan .fiJI' how you w£lnt to 
achieve your purpose" (A 17). I would like to contend, in line with Clausewitz, that for 
the aid strategist a strategy is the connection between aid operation(s) (as a form of 
actual engagement) for the purpose of reducing poverty and conflict. 
The aid strategist should consider which logic he primarily follows in the process of 
formulating strategy. Is it the logic of the given policy and how poverty and conflict 
reduction should look according to that policy and the aims behind it, or is it the logic 
of the reality on the ground in the operational environment? 
The interview data appear to suggest that interventions were at least equally driven by 
the logic of policies dictated by headquarters as by that emerging from field realities. 
According to my understanding, efforts to strategize based on the logic of policies 
handed down from headquarters were more likely to lead to attempts to understand 
what to do with the policies as representatives of the international community, than to 
attempts to understand the actual structure of the problems in Nepal and to work from 
there. This process might be compounded by the fact that each of the aid agencies 
involved operated on the basis of policies initiated by their own headquarters, 
subsequently hindering the process of gaining a collective and deep understanding of 
the issues at hand. Due to these processes, there was a tendency within aid agencies to 
circumvent or play down the importance of thinking through future scenarios and their 
232 The term 'strategic culture' is gratefully borrowed from Gray (2006). 
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potential implications for aid operations, but more importantly the consequences for 
poverty and conflict. 233 
In this context an aid strategist might want to ask what his or her agency's definition or 
understanding of the term strategy is, how this term is internally practised and what 
that means for the perception of the nature of problems identified? If the institutional 
sphere of an aid agency tends to prefer implementing aid operations on the basis of 
policy, thinking about strategy might become focused on what to do with the given 
policy, while, according to Brodie, strategy is precisely the art of the how. (Brodie in: 
Gray 2006: 5). 
An aid strategist could balance the above-described process by focusing initially on 
gaining an understanding of the dynamics of the operational environment and what an 
ideal aid operation might be given the context. This might help to direct the focus of 
the aid operation away from being fulfilling policy demands towards contextualising 
poverty and conflict reduction efforts. Of course how this might look like varies from 
context to context and depends on the individual aid strategist and his abilities to create 
the required organisational space. 
Elements of strategy While Clausewitz has a rather comprehensive idea of elements 
to be included in strategizing war, the individual respondents were far less 
comprehensive then one might expect from people involved in strategizing aid 
operations. The elements highlighted by each individual might indicate what they 
really perceived as being essential elements, but it might equally indicate their personal 
preference and what they might have overlooked while strategizing their activities. If 
the latter were true then it might be argued that aid agencies in Nepal appear to have 
strategized their operations on the basis of a rather limited range of elements, most 
likely adding to the already existing processes of friction. 
233 I clearly recall four occasions on which I tabled the importance of discussing future developments in 
Nepal, its possible consequences for the work we were doing in terms of relevance and 
appropriateness given the context and how we eventually could address these consequences. In each 
case, superiors or colleagues found the issue hardly worth discussing. (INFI 2000 and 2001 
Management board meetings in Pokhara and Surkhet, SNV-NI Autumn 2002 and 2004, Planning 
meetings with sector managers and advisors). 
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The aid strategist might ask himself how he could avoid reducing strategizing 
processes to a limited or unbalanced set of elements and by doing so unnecessarily 
contributing to the processes friction. A first worthwhile realisation could be that there 
might be a natural tendency to simplify reality in order to get to grips with it (Dorner 
1986). In addition, aid strategists might have tendencies to give preference to certain 
elements or to downplay the importance of others, or simply to ignore what is 
inconvenient. 234 This is not desirable, but it seems unavoidable, given the pressure the 
aid strategist faces in the course of his work. The aid strategist could try to strike a 
balance between his ability to deal with a number of elements and their inter-
relationships on the one hand, and the key elements important for a proper strategizing 
process on the other. The first requires understanding of his own intellectual 
capabilities and the second entails understanding of what might be important, but 
might be beyond his comprehension.235 The aid strategist should however not he 
deceived by assuming that strategizing on the basis of a small set of elements, while 
being able to comprehend them all, including their interrelationships, is a safe way to 
go. Not only might important elements be excluded, but also data relating to the 
elements used might be unsatisfactory. 236 
Since none of the respondents came up with a broad view of elements to he included in 
strategizing, as stated earlier it could be argued that respondents had their own personal 
bias or preferences. An aid strategist could mitigate these preferences and biases with 
the help of "aid trinity'. As the "aid trinity' implies a 360-degree approach to the 
process of strategizing, it helps to identify those elements, which could he important in 
a given operational environment. The suggestions made by respondents A4 and AS 
about the need for a '"modicum of experience" and an understanding of how local 
234 I recall a discussion with the operational manager of the second agency I worked for about the 
importance of including the aspect of conflict in the programming of the agency's activities. The 
operational manager asked something along the lines of: "okay, if I include the aspect of conflict in the 
plan for 2005, what do I have to change?" to which I replied: "quite a lot; basically we have to do it all 
over again". The operational manager responded in the line of: "We do not have time for that so we 
will stick with what we have". Autumn 2004, Kathmandu/ Nepal. 
235 It might be worth noting that the number of elements and interrelationships which the aid strategist 
reasonably could digest might vary over time, depending for example on his growing knowledge of the 
operational environment or the duration and levels of stress he might have been under. Improved 
understanding of the operational environment might be benefiCial, while excessive stress might be 
disadvantageous. 
236 To use an example from Nepal, statistical data about poverty was too much aggregated to provide 
an adequate picture of the various levels of poverty at district level, subsequently leading to 
inappropriate allocation of aid resources on village and ward levels (A34). 
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knowledge is produced might be helpful in this respect, as these contribute to !:,Tfounded 
ideas on how an operational strategy might look like. It is not unlikely that in this 
process the gap between the aid strategist's understandings of what is appropriate in 
the operational environment and what representatives at headquarters understand of the 
operational environment will widen. Thus the aid strategist must alongside identifying 
elements for strategizing aid, also bridge the gap of understanding between himself and 
HQ representatives. Not addressing this gap, or being totally absorbed in closing it will 
add to friction. 237 Next, we will address move the issue of strategizing within the 
international community. 
Strategy within the international community The interview data offers a rather dim 
view of the general character of the overall strategy employed by Nepal's somewhat 
heterogeneous aid community. Respondents suggested a lack of coherence (in the field 
of poverty reduction) (AlS), absence of strategizing in relation to addressing the 
conflict (A28), resulting often in a conflict-blind approach (A I) and strategy 
regressively moving towards a form of survival tactics (A34). 
The meaning of strategy and its application in processes of managing of aid resources 
could have played a role in avoiding such a downbeat impression of the strategic 
culture present within the aid community in Nepal. Clausewitz offers a psychological 
insight, which may help us understand the difficult position aid managers were in with 
relation to strategy formulation. Clausewitz argues that in strategy .. ... evelJ'thin~ has 
to be guessed at and presumed. Conviction is therefore weaker. C()nsequent~v most 
generals. when they ought to act. are paralyzed by unnecessmy doubts ". I do not wish 
to suggest that individual aid managers were necessarily paralyzed, they might have 
been even the opposite: being over-active and focused within their own organisations 
on the question of what to do with the immediate problems at hand. However, a 
collective strategy was to my knowledge difficult to reach and never agreed upon, due 
to a form of collective paralysis within the aid community. At least two interlinked 
factors contributed to this process. To begin with, the institutional spheres of the 
involved aid agencies hampered the making of a collective strategy, which was further 
237 Respondent A2 told me that the conflict advisor in his agency, although intending to assist 
programmes in becoming conflict-sensitive, became almost fully absorbed with communicating with 
Headquarters, explaining what was going on in Nepal and what could be done about it. 
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compounded by the complex nature of the Nepali government structures. Then, despite 
the large group of actors with the international aid community, it appeared to me that 
attempts to strategize collectively rested on a minority of people within a limited group 
of aid agencies. At the same time the outcome of the collective of this rather small 
group became less than the product of individuals. So despite efforts to strategize 
collectively a collective strategy never materialised. In other words it seems that in 
general terms, individual agency representatives were more focused on trying to 
'safeguard' the programmes of their own agencies, than attempting as a collective to 
transform a regressive situation in the country towards a more positive one, despite 
collective actions such as the introduction of the BOGs. 
The above might suggest that communities of international aid agencies operating in 
turbulent environments like Nepal risk creating a strategic culture of paralysis reflected 
in forms of survival tactics. How might the aid strategist respond? It might be helpful 
for the strategist to realise two things. First, although he might feel highly responsible, 
he has little real power, despite the large size of his agency or its good standing, as he 
does not only have to relate to his superiors (as indicated by respondent A64), but a 
wide variety of other actors as well. Secondly, it is not very likely that a single 
individual is in the position to counter the paralyzing processes within an aid 
community. It is more likely that a collective of well-placed and personally secure 
individuals could make a difference, such as the informal group who plotted the 
introduction of the OCHeR in Nepal (ASS). 
Therefore, I would like to argue that the usual call for more or better coordination 
between aid agencies is not necessarily very helpful. It is more helpful to try to counter 
processes of strategic paralysis and survival tactics within a collective of aid agencies 
by investing in the creation of a framework for common understanding of the overall 
structure of the problem.238 The first suggestion might augment fellow feeling among 
those agencies that join these coordination structures, but it does not necessarily take 
away the structural feelings of insecurity by individual aid agency representatives due 
to insufficient understanding of the operational environment, thus adding to the process 
23B In retrospect, I am rather surprised that although agency representatives came together regularly, 
for example at the BOG meetings, they came, to my knowledge never together in a more informal 
setting to discuss with Nepal specialists the country's underlying historical and structural dynamics. 
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of friction. The latter might assist aid strategists to see events and developments in a 
wider perspective, accordingly reducing the feeling of insecurity due to better 
understanding of the dynamics in their operational environment and being able to grasp 
the unexpected. 239 As consequence they might gain understanding of where, how and 
why friction in the process of aid operations might occur and could be mitigated. Next 
we will look at the topic of strategy and individual agencies. 
Strategy and individual agencies The strategic culture of the international aid 
community appeared to be close to paralysis and embracing forms of survival tactics. 
The Strategizing processes of individual agencies were shaped by this context, which 
made individual agency responses not wholly alike, but comparable. The interviewees 
indicated that strategic responses ranged from being reactive and inattentive (A67), to 
formally non-reactive, but informally adaptive (A40), to gradual, but in sequence with 
the conflict (A43) to taken by surprise, but swiftly adapting (AI2). 
All these responses could be placed on the reactive side of strategic behaviour. This is 
understandable for at least two reasons. Firstly, strategy development is about the 
future (Grey 2006): to think through the future, which is unknown. as it has not 
happened yet (ibid), is intrinsically difficult and requires a certain level of 
organisational capacity. 
Turning to the four different organisational responses. it is easy to see that each 
individual organisational response created a certain level of friction in the process of 
implementing aid operations, which in tum required a response from each individual 
agency. For example, it is easy to imagine that the agency which was fonnally non-
reactive (till 2006), but informally adaptive, had to struggle with the need to handle a 
double discourse, being on the one hand the illusion of Nepal as peaceful state with a 
functioning state apparatus (A47) and on the other hand the reality of a country facing 
an intensifying civil war where two equally incapable governments tried to gain and 
maintain control (A 18). I wonder if the organisational capacity spent on dealing with 
this friction could have been better used if the organisational strategy had been 
adjusted much earlier on in the conflict and had been in line with the reality of 
conflict? We cannot be sure but I suspect this to be the case. 
239 See also Dorner about the mental advantage of expecting the unexpected (1986). 
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There might be many reasons why this adjustment did not happen. It appears to me that 
it is much easier for an aid strategist to tolerate friction which is caused by a known 
and appreciated way of working, than to face friction caused by (forced) adaptation. 
while not knowing if this adaptation actually fits with what might happen in the future. 
In the case of the agency which was taken by surprise, but adapting swiftly. I 
speculate, however, that the friction caused by adaptation in the context of an unknown 
future was preferable to the severe risk of not surviving as an agency (A] 2). 
Overall, the responses of the four individual agencies imply that responses to the 
compounding conflict were rather reactive. It is possible to argue that this was 
unhelpful as it compounded friction by pursuing counter-productive interventions. 
However, the aid strategist should be aware that that misguided, pro-active strategies 
could be equally counter-productive. 
The notion of the ideal form of aid implies that, in theory, aid operations should be 
strategized in a pro-active manner. On a practical level, the aid strategist could ask if in 
turbulent environments such as Nepal pro-active strategies are actually possible. This 
depends not only on his ability to initiate organisational change, but equally 
importantly on his ability to understand how the dynamics within the 'aid trinity' might 
develop.24o From these two considerations he has to gauge if the cost of strategic 
change is affordable or too high. I speculate here, that in the case of the four agencies 
and their re-active strategic responses to the conflict, the cost of developing pro-active 
strategies was for whatever reason perceived as being too high for the individual 
agencies concerned, despite the possible counter-productive effects of the various aid 
operations on the dynamics in the operational environment. 
Strategy and factors for cbange The interview data suggested the strategic changes 
within aid agencies were at least equally driven by policy directives from higher up in 
the aid chain (A 181 A451 A67) than by bottom-up initiatives grounded in the processes 
of the operational environment (A21 A 12). I am not arguing that aid agency strategies 
were always pre-cooked by the institutional sphere of the agencies concerned, but 
240 Dorner argues that, with regard to time, humans tend to focus on the status of a particular moment, 
instead of the characteristics of a particular development, while the latter is more important then the 
former (1986: 115). 
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owing to the prescriptive nature of the policies, operational strategies were more often 
guided by a top-down approach, than grounded in the realities of the operational 
environment. 
Assuming that these top-down and bottom-up approaches were in various complex 
ways competing with each other within the aid community, it was my impression that 
the aid agencies found themselves (un) consciously facing a double and interwoven 
dilemma. 
The overarching dilemma might have been as follows. While subconsciously 
recognising the need to do the practice of development in Nepal differently, aid 
agencies could hardly do so due to pressures from their institutional spheres and key 
sections in the bureaucratic elite of the Nepali government. The latter may not have 
been happy with donor practices in general, but at least their support legitimized them 
to a certain extent. However, by doing so local communities could hardly be assisted 
on the basis of what was actually needed, nor perhaps could the underpinning causes 
and dynamic of the conflict be appropriately addressed the latter outcome being 
probably even more serious than the former. 
Within this context the position of the aid strategist does not become easier. The top-
down and bottom-up pressures, which represented themselves differently, could 
confront the individual aid strategist with a further dilemma. 
On the one hand, the organisational policies handed down from above, might not 
necessarily correspond with the realities in the operational environment, and turning 
these policies in actual engagements might in tum contribute to compounding contlict 
and further impeding poverty reduction. As a consequence, the aid agency of the 
strategist concerned risks being evaluated as under-performing, which in tum, could 
have consequences for the career of the aid strategist concerned. On the other hand, if 
the aid strategist pursues strategic changes in the manner the aid agency wants to 
operate on the basis of (a good understanding of) the ground realities in the operational 
environment, while going against the overall policy of his agency, he might be seen as 
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unmanageable or disobedient by his oversees superiors,241 which is not favourable for 
the career of the aid strategist either, while the attempt to strategize aid resources on 
the basis of the ideal form of aid, could contribute more likely to the reduction of 
poverty and conflict, than a top-down approach. 
In turbulent contexts like Nepal it is not easy for the aid strategist to reconcile this 
double and interwoven dilemma. Responses among agencies appear to vary. At one 
end of the spectrum, one aid agency dealt with this complex dilemma by following HQ 
policy as close to the letter on the one hand while on the other hand trying to avoid 
negative evaluations, by keeping these evaluation teams away from the project areas 
and away from people with possible counterproductive views (A67). At the other end 
of the spectrum an agency adapted a different approach, which came close to 
Clausewitz suggestion that a strategist should .... . go on campaign himse(l". This 
agency regularly invited staff from headquarters into the field, so that they could 
observe for themselves the local field realities (A52). By doing so, this aid agency was 
able to change HQ policy, subsequently providing the agency with more political clout 
vis-ii-vis the key people in the Nepali bureaucracy and by doing so enhancing the 
agency's operational space to work on the reduction of poverty and conflict. 
However, the latter approach -preferable from the perspective of the ideal fonn of aid-
depends not only on the position of the aid strategist in his agency, his willingness to 
face (career-oriented) risks, or his creativity. It also depends on the willingness of those 
within the institutional sphere of the agency to allow a more contextualised policy. 
Notwithstanding, even if such an approach can be followed, success is not guaranteed. 
As there might be other unexpected sources of friction standing in the way of a proper 
strategy. 
The interview data appear to suggest that strategic changes within the aid community 
were not only driven by top-down processes, but driven by changes in the operational 
environment as well. However, these changes seemed to be, across the board, equally 
re-active in nature. 
241 Several respondents (A4/ A33) indicated a head of mission who was replaced by his headquarter 
exactly for this reason. 
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Other than the process of denial, what might have played a role in this process? 
Without an exhaustive discussion I would like to speculate that at least two interlinked 
factors played a role in this process. The first was the rather 'invisible' nature of the 
conflict242 and, suggested by Dorner, our preference to think in tenns of moments or 
events instead of processes (1989). A second reason might be our inability to describe 
precisely what we think that we observe. One example might be the ambiguous tenns 
used by respondent A 12, such as "the situation in Nepal" or the deteriorating "security 
situation ". An aid strategist should be aware that the invisible nature of a conflict and a 
weak ability to describe what is happening in the operational environment does not 
help to negotiate with actors in his institutional sphere for the organisational space for 
pro-active strategic changes. However, an aid strategist who waits till the moment a 
conflict becomes visible (in the international community) by for example an escalatory 
act of violence, could of course use that act of violence to argue space for strategic 
changes in a programme (as respondent A2 did after the attack on the PLA on the 
Anny barracks in Ghorai after the breakdown of the first ceasefire), but he still remains 
in a reactive mode of strategizing. So, this implies that an aid strategist aiming to 
strategize aid operations pro-actively has to make the invisible visible and has to 
articulate the unarticulated. But again even if the institutional sphere of his agency 
allows pro-active changes success is not guaranteed, as the chosen course of action 
might not fit with the direction a conflict takes. 
Strategy and friction In relation to strategizing processes, interviewees mentioned 
several sources of friction. Sources of friction associated with the international aid 
community as whole included the neo-liberal development policies introduced by the 
government and supported by donors (AI5), processes of denial within the Nepali 
establishment (A5) and expatriate management levels (A28) and their perceptions of 
risk (AI). In addition, it was suggested that the way in which decision-making 
processes were structured and personality clashes added to friction in processes of 
strategy making within the international community (A34). These were compounded 
by the historical-political dynamics between donor countries (A34). and the limited 
range of perspectives within the aid community (A4). Ambiguous approaches vis-a-vis 
242 I recall a conversation with a Pokhara-based expatriate aid worker in around 2003 who told 
something along the following lines: "you can cut a tree in many ways, with an axe or with sandpaper. 
In this case, the various political forces are not felling the three with an axe, but with sandpaper. You 
can hardly see it, but the tree will finally fall" (Spring 2003/ Kathmandu). 
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the conflict itself added to strategy-related friction, and individual agencies faced a 
relatively high turnover key of personnel (A59). 
On aid agency level, interviewees pointed to the numerous sources of friction in 
relation to strategizing processes: a lack of requirement for in-depth analysis (A3), a 
leadership vacuum within individual agencies (A34), institutional discouragement 
within aid agencies to allow individual staff to think strategically (A6), and the time 
required to understand the nature of the Maoist movement (A64). 
The existence of so many forms of friction in relation to strategizing processes within 
the international community as a whole, and the lack of encouragement to think 
strategically, together with other sources of friction at individual agency level, did not 
offer the ideal circumstances for generating firm strategies within the international aid 
community in Nepal to address either poverty or the compounding conflict or hoth. 
Based on the above it might be possible to argue that the processes of strategy-making 
were not necessarily processes to disentangle the aid agencies from the reality of 
friction present in the operational environment, rather, the processes of strategy-
making either on the collective or individual level of aid agencies were in themselves 
sources of friction. This is in line with Gray's argument that military strategy, is 
difficult, not only because of its very nature, but due to the sheer variety of sources of 
friction (Gray 2006: 75). This seems to echo in the processes of strategizing aid 
operations in turbulent contexts such as Nepal. 
What might the strategisfs options for dealing with friction in the process of 
strategizing aid operations be? At one end of the spectrum the aid strategist might 
decide to ignore the existence of strategy-related friction, while at the other end of the 
spectrum he could choose to include the existence of friction fully. The tirst option is 
according to the psychologist Domer .. ... a trap that experts are particularly apllojllll 
inlo ", which has sheer, but false, advantages. In other words, according to Domer, 
ignoring friction makes strategy simple. (1986: 168) However, Clausewitz suggests, 
"Everything in slrale}O' is vel)) simple, hut Ihal does not mean Ihal el'C!ITlhin~ is W'/:V 
emy". In other words, the false advantage of ignoring the reality of friction in 
strategizing processes is that the products of these processes will most likely fail. This 
191 
is most likely equally true for aid operations in turbulent environments as for war. So, 
ignoring friction, although aid strategist might prefer it, will not help the actual 
implementation of aid operations. Does this mean that an aid strategist, in order to 
avoid producing flawed plans, should work from the opposite position? Taking all 
sources of friction into account during the strategizing process might be far too 
complex and will lead, according to Clausewitz, to intellectual complications. 
So where does this leave us? In the context of friction-related strategy making it might 
be helpful to bear in mind that it is all about engagement, which, from the perspective 
of the ideal form of aid, should be focused on addressing poverty and contlict. As not 
all friction can be dealt with at once, the aid strategist could start by addressing those 
sources of friction which can be dealt with easily and/or which are key barriers to 
furthering poverty and conflict reduction. 
What these sources of friction related to strategy-making are, depends from context to 
context and agency to agency. Examples from the Nepali context to deal with this type 
of friction could be to move beyond the historical dynamics between donor 
headquarters vis-a-vis Nepal (A34) and making use of people with an extensive and 
rich experience about the workings of development activities in Nepal (A4). 
Another aspect I wish to highlight here relates not to the amount of friction an aid 
strategist needs to take into consideration in the process of strategy-making, but which 
of these frictions he should initially focus on: that related to his own agency or to the 
aid community as a whole. An aid strategist might prefer to focus his or her own 
agency and its intended operations first. However, if this strategy is not set within the 
collective of aid agencies, then the strategist's own success - in terms of being able to 
formulate a strategy which compensates for or absorbs sources of friction- might not be 
very significant vis-a-vis the overall attempts to address poverty and conflict. 
Alternatively the strategist might decide to focus time and effort on improving the 
overall strategy within the community of international aid agencies. This might 
however, not be appreciated by his own headquarters, even though it might be 
preferable given the potential positive overall effect of a collective effort, which moves 
strategically in the same direction. In the case of Nepal, it were the heads of missions 
of agencies like OFIO and SOC spearheading attempts to stimulate and harness an 
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overall strategy within the international community for the reduction of poverty and 
conflict. 
To close this chapter I want to make one final comment. Of course the various aid 
agencies were at least partly involved in defending their own organisational 'tll1:(. 
However, to argue that the aid agencies in general were mainly involved in turf battles 
is too simple, as there might be multiple inter-connecting sources of friction, as 
mentioned earlier, compounding the difficulties of strategizing aid operations In 
turbulent environments. Therefore, it might be helpful to realise that for those involved 
in strategizing aid operations, advising on strategy is probably easier than actually 
implementing an aid strategy and taking responsibility for it. 243 Clausewitz argues that 
it requires" ... more strength of will to make an imporlant decision in stralegy than il1 
tactics". What in Nepal's case appeared as turf battles may in fact have been the 
actions of over-active aid staff" ... carried away by the pressures (~lthe moment" (to 
use Clausewitz words), not necessarily realising that the lack of (a collective) strategy 
could not be compensated with hyper-activity on the part of individual aid agencies, 
subsequently adding to friction in the process of attempting to reduce poverty and 
conflict. 
243 Idea is taken from Gray (2006), who argues this line in relation to the conduct of war. 
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Chapter 12 On Superiority of Resources244 
12. 1 Introduction 
Clausewitz argues in a four-page chapter (H&P: 194-197) that in the process of 
strategizing a war, superiority of numbers is one of three crucial factors along with 
time and location,245 in reaching a successful outcome in battle (ibid: 194). He argues, 
with the usual caveats, that ..... as many troops as possible should be broll~hl into Ihe 
engagement at the decisive point ". 
The idea of superiority of resources resonated during my time in Nepal in two quite 
different ways. Firstly, it enabled me to understand in part the dynamic of violent 
confrontations between the SF and the PLA. The SF were in tenns of numbers 
significantly the stronger, as they were able to field more soldiers than the PLA. 
However, the need for the SF to be present in all 75 districts of Nepal meant that they 
were spread thinly, unable effectively to defend all facilities of military value let alone 
the facilities valuable to the administrative government. So, in actual attacks on 
government facilities and the SFs, the PLA was probably the stronger force in terms of 
numbers as they were in the position to mobilise and channel more resources to the 
specific points they wanted to attack. 
Secondly, after adapting the idea of superiority of numbers into the idea of superiority 
of resources,246 I became aware of the possible discrepancy between the levels and 
dynamics of poverty and conflict and the amount of resources available to aid agencies 
operating in Nepal to address them. Clearly the application of the concept is 110t 
straightforward and has its drawbacks. For example, it could be inferred from the 
concept that only sufficient money could solve the problem of poverty. Or, as one 
respondent suggested it might strengthen the idea that only programmes and projects 
244 Clausewitz actually titles his chapter On Superiority of Numbers. In other to transmute his ideas to 
aid and development I titled the chapter on Superiority of Resources. 
245 The dimensions time and location are not explicitly discussed in this thesis. 
246 Which by definition is broader than Clausewitz's idea of superiority of numbers. In the interviews I 
did not use the notion of superiority of numbers but the idea of superiority of resources. 
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with "high financial burn rates" are successful (A34).247 However, despite these 
drawbacks, I contend that, as various respondents implied, the concept of superiority of 
resources is a useful device to think through the relationship between objectives, 
resources realistically needed for success and the resources realistically available to a 
given aid operation, In the remainder of this chapter the established structure is 
applied, 
12.2 Clausewitz and the concept of Superiority of Numbers248 
Clausewitz argues that the most common element in a victorious outcome is the 
superiority of numbers. He advises therefore, with some caveats, to bring as many 
forces as possible to the battlefield. Why? Because -, Whether these fiJr('es pro\'(' 
adequate or not, we will at least have done everything in our power ". Superiority of 
forces should ideally be created at a strategic as well as a tactical level. However, in 
reality Clausewitz suggests that it is most likely the commander's government or other 
factors that decide the size of the forces at his disposal, potentially undennining 
superiority on the battlefield. Here, Clausewitz reasons, the commander's skill is 
paramount. He must tum likely absence of absolute superiority into relative 
superiority. For Clausewitz, relative superiority relates to "the ski(jitl concentration (~l 
superior strength at the decisive point ... and on the resolution needed to sacr~fic:e non-
essentials for the sake (~f essentials ... ". Although, Clausewitz stresses the importance 
of superiority of forces he does suggest that, " ... depending on the circumstances ", it is 
not a guarantee of success and may only make a slight difference. The real reasons 
behind victorious engagements, he argues, are not necessarily to do with superiority of 
forces, but with" ... the possession of strength at the really vital point", and 
" ... willingness to risk facing them for a time with inferior .thrce.\', energy.tiJr rapid 
movement, holdness for quick attach, and the increased actil'i~v which danger 
generates in great men ... ", Numerical superiority is important for victory in battle, hut 
it should not be confused with the idea that it is always necessary: Clausewitz 
" ... merely wished to stress the relative importance" of the concept. 
247 Respondent A7 referred to a women's income generation project located in the eastern Terai, which 
although successful among local women groups was stopped by its funder (USAIO), because it did not 
spend 'enough' financial resources (and therefore could not be good). 
248 H&P: 194-197, 
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12.3 Superiority of Resources and Nepal's international aid 
community 
Responses to the notion of superiority of resources varied, with three different but 
inter-related storylines emerging. The first relates to the meaning of the concept, the 
second to the nexus between the level of superiority of resources and the poverty and 
conflict dynamics in Nepal, and the third to the impact of the (mis-) match of the aid 
provided to Nepal. This last generates an overview of inhibiting factors in the process 
of trying to deploy resources in a superior way. Overall, with the usual exceptions, the 
interview data appear to suggest that there was a mismatch between resources otlcred 
and the level and complexity of poverty and conflict. 
The meaning of the idea of superiority of resources Respondents generated six 
interpretations of the notion of superiority of resources, which move beyond 
Clausewitz's rather narrow focus on numerical superiority. Firstly, one interviewee 
linked the concept to the availability of and access to sufficient additional finances to 
run projects or programmes (A39). Respondents referred to the quality of staff (A351 
A39) and their ability to respond to new circumstances and information and to work 
flexibly and opportunistically (A2). Connected to this, it was suggested that the 
organisational ability to call in additional expertise from inside or outside the country 
was a form of having superior resources (A67). Fourthly, the superiority of a 
programme or project could be bolstered by its duration (A2) and if an agency could 
develop a long-term view (A26). A fifth dimension related to the level of patience 
among donors (A2) together with the channels in the aid delivery process and the 
ability to implement activities (A291 A2). Lastly, the ability of an aid agency to 
allocate resources well was seen as a means of achieving superiority of resources (AS). 
The above suggests that the idea of superiority of resources translates into the realm of 
aid and development as a rather broad concept, encompassing elements which moves 
from staff numbers to the ability of an agency to target its financial and human 
resources to maximum effect. The section below elaborates on how the notion of 
superiority of the resources deployed by aid agencies was perceived in connection with 
dynamics of poverty and conflict in Nepal. 
Superiority of resources vis-a-vis the dynamics of poverty and conflict A rather 
complex spectrum emerged when looking at the specific relationship between 
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superiority of resources and the levels of poverty and dynamics of conflict in Nepal. At 
one end of the spectrum responses appeared to suggest that as a rule insufficient 
resources were allocated to deal with both the poverty and the conflict dynamics in 
Nepal, while at the other end responses indicated that there were individual aid 
agencies that felt that they did in the main have sufficient resources to operate. 
The more negative responses were expressed in a variety of ways. One respondent 
suggested that there was an overall mismatch between what was offered, its 
prioritization and what was perceived as being needed in Nepal. "No ... in various 
directions this was not the case, fhe reality of poverty and conflicf, on one side and 
allocations of resources or prioritisation of the development agencies to respond fo 
was not matching ... " (A 1). Another respondent, with an equally rich working 
experience in Nepal, while reflecting on the projects he was involved in, came to a 
similar conclusion suggesting a mismatch between (financial) resources, issues at 
hand, and objectives set. He stated: "In the pr(~jects I worked the money Ihal was al 
hand was not s~fficient and the o~jectives were too unrealistic and could never he 
achieved. They were grand plans which had not been Ihought out .... '-,'o. (ll look al 
prqjects where I was involved in any period qftime, the money inl'Olved was 100 small 
to have enormous impact... which made them rather like a slicking plasler ... " (A3). 
Another respondent argued that although the aid provided by his and other like-minded 
agencies was not satisfactory, as it focused mainly on stabilising the situation, 
improving aid allocations in terms of strengthening transformation processes instead 
would not have been an option given the risks involved. He said; " ... yes prohahly whal 
we delivered was prohahly not very good ... sure it was not vel)' good ... Ha(l(~llt'hallt'e 
were aboul was about mitigating ... and actually mitigation hy its nature is nol 
tran.~formative, we .\pend a lot (~f effort in mitigation, hecause a .thclls Oil 
lran~formation would have been far far riskier ... then YOll are into the drastic 
medicine ... so to say ... " (A29). 
The above quotations appear to suggest that the aid resources provided were not 
always perceived as superior relative to the situation at hand, in terms of size of 
allocations and prioritization, and the focus of the allocations, and that the t()CUS was 
on mitigation of the consequences of poverty and conflict rather than on transt<.mning a 
society to deal constructively with both poverty and conflict. 
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Other respondents referred to practical points indicating that aid agencies were not 
always delivering good quality resources to deal adequately with the situation at hand. 
References were made to the quality of the food delivered in food-for-work 
programme's implemented by the World Food Programme and the quality of 
development staff. What development programmes or projects delivered to villages 
was not necessarily always of good quality. One very well informed respondent 
commented on the rice delivered by the WFP and the quality of development staff. He 
stated "In terms of resources ... I know the WFP rice was always a real prohlem, they 
were always accused of getting inferior rice. WFP said: 'we buy the rice loca/~ll lind 
want to help the local market' Yet, but what they got was very bad rice ... 1 do not know 
why that was really ... Maybe it wasjust a lack o.lquality control" (A35).249 
This respondent, referring to the quality of staff, recalled an example of poor recruiting 
practises within one of the agencies he was connected with: "I rememher one 
programme that was sent a lady who must have he en around 62. She could hard~l' 
walk. She was extremely nice and very committed but utter~v useless in terms (~{' 
working in Nepal as a programme manager. There were many many better Nepali.,· 
who could have done ha!{' the job for half the costs with far greater effect and been 
able to meet heneficiaries and get to understand what was happening in the/ield at the 
same time, so .from that perspective I do 110t think that the quali~v lvas there \1'ith 
occasional great success ... " (A35). He continued: "I do not want to point to any 
particular agency ... but I do not think that superior people came to Nepal liS some (~r 
them were actual~v not particularly high standard ... " (A35). Now we turn to the 
relatively positive views expressed with regard to the idea of superiority of resources 
and their application by the aid industry in Nepal. 
Several slightly more upbeat views of the balance between the (financial) contribution 
of the aid community in Nepal on one hand and the challenges generated by the 
poverty and conflict in Nepal on the other could be identified. At the same time, these 
same respondents raised questions about the extent to which the available resources 
were useful and well targeted. 
249 I recall a meeting with an RClW technical advisor in the second half of 2004, who had just returned 
from a field trip to the Karnali. He showed me several samples of rice handed out by WFP to local user-
groups, as payment for their work. It was clear that none of the samples were fit for human 
consumption even if very low standards were applied, the samples being largely rotten. 
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One respondent, while reflecting on his programme, stated that in relation to the notion 
of superiority of resources the programme was more than able in financial terms to 
address both poverty- and contlict- related challenges ... Yes, my proJ(ramme was hy 
default, as it was a ten-year 18.6 million pound-programme, which is substantial, 
nearly 2 million pounds a year. Part~v because of the conflict, and part~v as a result (?I' 
slightly slower start in hoth the Terai and the Midwest, the programme had savings. 
So, we had additiona/funds anyway. We used them where we needed to. So, we )1'"re 
actually negotiating with the donor for additional funding. At the end we could get an 
additional 200,000 pounds out of them, for quick impact-type activities. That was 
available to us to make the programme more effective in the Mid-West" (A2), This 
example suggests that due to its financial size, the possibility of saving money at times 
when it could not be spent, the possibilities of additional funding for new activities 
when they became necessary and acceptable, the programme could maintain some 
form of superiority given the situation. 
Another respondent argued in a similar vein in relation to finance, but points to the 
problematic nature of implementation: "Money is not so much the prohlem. I am not 
sure il'more money makes a difference. it is really the implementation ... we don't get 
the things out, the people are not there to implement it, the quali~v ql'the work is mayhe 
not good enough, the relevance (?r the work is mayhe not there, so it is much more an 
implementation problem. It is not the resource side. qr course you can always use 
more resources, hut at the end (~r today the implementation is the big challenge .fiJI' 
us ... .. (A52). 
Another respondent suggested that overall sufficient money was spent in Nepal, 
however insufficient attention was given to the area of conflict resolution, which in 
tum was at least partly caused by the political considerations of the various conflicting 
parties: "A lot of money was spent here, but I think the big deficit was in COl?f/ict 
resolution stuff, but the Nepali politicians made that very d(fficult, while the Maoists 
were interested in it in the .first place tlying 10 get the UN involved ... .. (A33). Thus 
high levels of financial input do not necessarily mean that agreement or acceptance 
could be gained about the implementation of relevant interventions. 
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An example follows of a programme that was initially perceived by its manager as 
being more than sufficient to meet the poverty-related challenges in the programme 
areas, but this perception altered as the programme had to change its objectives due to 
conflict-related tensions in the original areas of work. "1 never/elt that the proKramme 
was lacking resources ... they were not really a problem. We were l'et:v well res()urced 
in our donors, who were very patient and understanding (?f our situation. We had 
plenty o/stafr .. however. cerlainly not working filII-time because they had no access to 
the field for probab~v six to nine months ... and yet our donors were sati,~'fied enouKh to 
keep us supporting through that period ... 1n addition. we could get assistanc:e fi'om our 
headquarter (f needed to help us. However, the thing 1 rememher is that 1 was 
dissati.~fied with the last 111/0 years of the programme. 1 do not think that we did 1I 
real~v good job in those last two years (?f the programme qcle (2002-2004). Because 
(?f the conflict we mod(fied the program, and withdrew from the COl?/lict-ridden areas 
and started to work in different areas with a d(tferent approach, but 1 am not sure ((we 
did that really well ... .. (AI?). This view might suggest that despite having enough 
resources and support from headquarters and donors, a forced change in objectives, 
approach and work areas can substantially reduce the capabilities or superiority of a 
programme relative to the poverty-related challenges at hand. In other words, being 
able to adapt to the changing circumstances is not a guarantee that the perceived 
quality of an aid activity can be maintained. 
To sum up, the above might suggest that the resources deployed during aid operations 
were in general terms not superior or necessarily inferior (with the exception of the 
example of some of WFP's rice deliveries) but at best sub-optimal relative to the 
challenges at hand in relation to the processes generated by poverty and contlict. Now 
we turn to factors inhibiting the delivery of superior resources to Nepal. 
Inhibiting factors leading to sub-optimal resources Respondents provided several 
contributory factors to the sub-optimal quality of the aid activities delivered. They 
highlighted the significance not only of the lack of resources but of the reasons for why 
resources were not superior. It was suggested that the way in which the resources were 
applied lessened their value. It seems that the overarching factor in this process was 
related to the analysis of power and how this was subsequently dealt with within the 
context of programmes and projects. One respondent suggested that " ... it is ahout 
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power sharing, about real power sharing, and we have to support this process 
throughout our inten'entions, and not contradict it. at least we should acknowledge the 
context and its realities instead of applying our simplistic ways l?f dealing \l'ith 
realities ... so our tools are simplistic and impose them this is hypocri"y. it is a .limn l?t' 
hypocrisy and lack of analyses" (A52). Another respondent who points to the 
instrumentality of policymaking echoes this point. He argues that the mismatch 
between needs and resources in Nepal was partly to do with the .. ... primarily 
instrumental type of thinking of the policy maker ... ., (A 1). 
Not all those in policy decision-making position were instrumental thinkers applying 
simple tools for analysis. The case below suggests that some aid staff applied advanced 
analysis and a willingness to address the dynamic nexus between poverty and contlict. 
However, their efforts were overtaken by the risk-averse culture within the agency 
concerned and expanding Maoist activities. "Within my agency we looked with afil\l' to 
caste exclusion. ethnic exclusion. the lack offacilities, ident(fied the conflict-ajfi.Jcted 
and impoverished areas accidentally by using our data. which is ahlJUt the worst 
affected areas with the most vulnerable minorities and areas with the highest fiJod 
insecurity and pover(v. We had captured the Maoist strongholds, (f we had done work 
there. then the Maoists would not have been able to control those areas. It was parts l?t' 
Rukum. It was parts of the Karnali. H01vever my agency dropped the idea l?f working 
there. Why? Because they had to ,find workers, who had to walk two hours or two 
days , .. 10 a place that would not do ... to monitor it ... how could these people monilor'! 
You see, my agency rvas an agency of development ease, not an agen(:v (?fdel'e/opm<'l1t 
at all costs, they were looking to places they could travel to easi~v by plane or hy 
vehicle ... . , (A34). 
Another view indicating a friction factor related to the application of sector-wide 
approaches, which were largely seen as unhelpful during the compounding political 
crisis (A2), especially where the designs of these approaches did not acknowledge the 
realities of the context in which they had to operate (A52). This pattern could 
subsequently reinforce the existing centre-periphery model (A8).250 Compounding this 
were "the lack of coordination. the lack qf monitoring and the lack (?f proper 
250 It appears to me that the application of the sector approach in Nepal mend that actually a few 
government officials in a given sector in Kathmandu were involved in decision-making, 
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evaluation ... " (A I). As a consequence the mismatch between the levels and dynamics 
of poverty and conflict and the necessary superiority of resources continued adding to 
friction. This gap between the challenges in terms of poverty and conflict and the 
quality of resources augmented existing friction and generated consequences will be 
discussed in the next section. 
Consequences of sub-optimal resourcing Several respondents pointed to the 
consequences of the various levels of inferiority of the aid resources deployed. These 
consequences ranged from having no impact on poverty reduction to having negative 
or positive impacts on the conflict dynamics. 
One respondent was very clear about the largely suboptimal quantity and quality of aid 
activities by the aid agencies at a local level, acknowledging the noble intentions of the 
aid agencies while arguing that: " ... Insufficient and mi.\placed allocation (?f're.\·olll·ce.\· 
means no impact" (A3). Another respondent suggested that in financial tenns Nepal 
received sufficient resources at a national level, but that the combination of too much 
money with the imposed sector-wide approach in many areas overburdened the state 
(A52). 
Another respondent suggested that development assistance to Nepal -and the 
government in particular- fuelled the conflict; "It is not impossible to ar~lIe thaI therC! 
was too much aid. hecause by giving all of the aid to the government you are Feeing 
up money for the military hudget and prolonging the war. you have to realise that Ihe 
RNA more than douhled in size between 2002 and 20()41()5 which must be (·().\·t~l' ... .. 
(A33). 
The respondent above suggests that the continuing aid to Nepal, mostly vIa the 
government, probably contributed to a prolongation of the war, as the government was 
in a position to expand its military. Another respondent suggested two other possihle 
effects of the continuation of aid, one negative and one positive almost to the point of 
contradicting the suggestion made by respondent A33. The negative consequence was: 
..... undoubted~v that the continuous support to the government enabled the gm'ernmel1l 
to continue to do what the government always has done, which is being grabbing (lml 
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being destructive towards the people and not delivering velY much ..... (A29). This 
process helped maintaining the underlying causes of the conflict. 
It was argued that continuous support to the government, however imperfect the result 
was in relation to addressing Nepal's poverty, did have its advantages in tenns of 
locking in government resources. Respondent A29 argued that channelling resources 
via the government: ..... did to some extent. but undouhted~v. locked in gOl'e1'11ment 
resources ... even if' the .ligures might not be 100 percent correct ... they were good 
enough to say that the government was putting in more money in development year Oil 
year. which was real~v interesting and that easi~v could have heen reversed. We could 
have easily had a situation where the government would have said: 'it is useless to 
.'pend money on health and education. Let's .'pend in this situation all our money to lin 
increased milita1Jl e.tli)rt ... '. The fact is that this did not happen" (A29). So here, 
assuming that the figures are correct, it is suggested that although the quality and 
quantity of the aid resources provided to Nepal, and particularly to the government, 
were not optimal, there was a wider effect in tenns of restraining the military and by 
doing so influencing the political dynamics enabling a de-escalation of the conflict. 
Now, we turn to the reflective part of this chapter to elaborate on the meaning and 
application of superiority of resources in a turbulent environment like Nepal. 
12.4 Reflection 
In the light of the above I would like to contend that the notion of superiority of 
resources is a worthwhile concept to consider when strategizing aid operations in 
turbulent environments; overlooking the concept, as suggested by interviewees in the 
Nepal case, could lead to friction in the processes of addressing the nexus of poverty 
and conflict. Clausewitz argued that superiority of numbers in battle is of relative 
importance in the course of planning and conducting battles. Based on the interviewee 
data, it might be argued that the notion of superiority of resources is crucial in the 
course of strategizing and implementing aid operations. Why? If resources are not 
'superior' or of very high standard compared to the situation at hand, they might cause 
adverse affects on the dynamics within a given operational environment. 
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While the Maoists were fighting an asymmetric form of warfare against the RNA, the 
interview data appear to suggest that, from the perspective of superiority of resources, 
the aid agencies were also involved in an asymmetric engagement, inasmuch as that 
they could hardly mobilise and allocate, individually and collectively, sufficient 
resources to further reduce the processes of poverty and conflict, with perceived results 
ranging from no impact (A3), overburdening of the state (AS8), maintaining (A29) or 
fuelling the conflict (A33). 
The reflection is structured as follows. A short summary of the concept is given, a key 
dilemma is highlighted, and some suggestions for dealing constructively with this 
dilemma are presented. In addition, the idea of relative superiority and a possible 
resolve are discussed. 
The interview responses generate a wide range of meanings for the notion of 
superiority of resources, including access to finance (H7) and quality statT (A35! A39), 
the organisational ability to call in additional expertise (A67), an extensive project 
duration (A2) and long-term view within involved agencies (A26), aid channels (A29! 
A2) and donor patience (A2) and finally an agency's ability to allocate resources well 
(A8). 
When we look to the respondent perceptions it might be possible to argue that overall 
Nepal did not receive sufficient resources to address either poverty or the contliet. 
Having said that, on agency level it was indicated that operations could be relatively 
well resourced to deal with aims and objectives of aid operations concerned. The 
perception of being well resourced did not only relate to having large financial 
resources available, but having for example flexible donors and headquarter support as 
well. However, the interview data appear also to indicate that policies and approaches 
contributed to a sub-optimal use of the resources available, for example the sector-wide 
approach (A2) introduced by the institutional sphere of the aid agencies and the way 
these policies and approaches were implemented by the aid agencies, for example f{)r 
not addressing existing power structures (A52). In short, a limited view within aid 
agencies of what superior resources in the context might be, the lack thereof and the 
consequences for dynamics within the operational environment might have been 
sources of friction in the course of strategizing implementing aid operations in Nepal. 
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As a consequence, aid operations, although well intentioned, did not necessarily live up 
to their potential or what they intended to do, risking not only the goals of aid agencies 
but possible creating counter-productive effects on either poverty or contlict reduction 
as well. 
Key-dilemma The following quotation illustrates the aid strategist's dilemma. in a 
turbulent environment like Nepal, when applying the concept of superiority of 
resources to the process of strategizing and implementing aid operations: ",\"(}, ;n a 
c01?flict environment you probahly need more resources to spend and you need more 
resourcesfor overhead cost as well ... " (A26). 
Although this perspective focuses on the need for increased financial resources in 
turbulent environments, I would like to contend, based on what respondents seem to 
associate with the idea of superiority of resources, that superiority of resources is about 
more than money. High quality staff and a contextualised intervention approach have 
great value in themselves, but it might be reasonable to argue that even if all elements 
are in place to make resources superior to the challenges at hand, a little luck would not 
go amiss. Luck aside, it is quite reasonable to argue that the resources an aid strategist 
has available are at best sub-optimal. 
Dealing with sub-optimal resources There are three basic options when dealing with 
the reality of sub-optimal resources. First, the aid strategist could attempt to boost the 
resources available such that they are superior to the situation at hand. This might be 
achieved by gaining access to more funds, obtaining more suitable statl~ or gaining 
more room for manoeuvre to bring the operation more in line with the ideal fonn of 
aid, thereby reducing friction in the process. Alternatively the strategist could t{)CUS on 
addressing the various fonns of friction, which are by default a part of having sub-
optimal resources available. Or the strategist might try to combine these approaches. 
Each option creates its own dynamics of friction. 
However, from the perspective of the 'aid trinity', the choice between these options 
must depend on how the strategist perceives the multi-dimensional relationships 
between the various actors within the trinity in relation to the strategist's own agency. 
Without suggesting a set order of importance, it appears to me that the key actors here 
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are those within the institutional sphere, as it might be easier for the aid strategist to 
ask for additional resources from his headquarters than to struggle against the friction 
generated due to inappropriate resources. 
However, in the case of Nepal, the interview data suggests that overall most aid 
agencies were rather reactive and operated in line with option two (dealing with the 
friction caused by inappropriate resources). An example of this approach is the Dutch 
development agency SNV. Its management was reluctant to engage in discussions with 
its headquarters about its new corporate policy and the need to contextualisc its 
mandate and operational modalities.2s1 There may be a psychological explanation t(Jr 
this in that the management of these agencies felt insecure and were theref()fe not 
willing to engage in discussions with their headquarters regarding for example the 
recruitment of additional staff (national and international) better equipped to deal with 
the turbulence in the country.252 
However, there were aid agencies following option three, being reactive in dealing 
with the consequences of the sub-optimal resources while trying to put more 
appropriate resources in place. An example of this might be DFID, who acquired more 
financial resources, got additional expertise (for example the Risk Management Otlicc) 
and initiated new programmes like the Community Support PrObTfam (Segal 2007). 
Relative superiority? As suggested earlier, Clausewitz advises that where absolute 
priority cannot be established, the focus must be on establishing relative superiority of 
resources via "the ski(!ul concentration (~r superior strength at the decisive poil1f ... 
hased on the correct appraisal of this decisive point, on suitable planning ./i'om the 
start: which leads to appropriate disposition of the .threes, and 011 Ihe r(!solWiol1 
needed to sacr(jice non-essentials for the sake (~r essentials ... ". The interview data 
suggest that aid agencies were in some cases able to generate situations of relative 
superiority, such as through the establishment of the Human Rights Monitoring 
Mission in Nepal (ASS). The key difficulty here was with defining decisive points t(Jr 
intervention. Moreover, high-quality assessments of the contextual dynamics were not 
251 My own observations during the period September 2002 and February 2005. 
252 This was suggested by Prof. Britt-Marie Orottz-Sjoberg, 30 May 2009, Trondheim. 
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always in place or shared among aid agencies.253 In addition, it was felt that planning 
processes of aid operations were not necessarily sensitive to the context in which the 
aid agencies had to operate254 while the disposition of resources, it was argued, 
strengthened a centre-periphery model (AS), basically implying that the non-essentials 
appeared to be prioritized at the expense of the essentials. 
Superiority of numbers is an important factor to achieving victory, according to 
Clausewitz, but ..... the correct appraisal of the opposing generals .. . the willingne.\·.\· to 
risk facing them fiJr a time with inferior forces, energy fhr rapid mowment, ho/dness 
for quick attacks. and the increased activity which danger generates in great men ... are 
at least of equal importance to success ". In the case of Nepal one might argue along 
similar lines: it is not necessarily the superior quality of the resources, but an 
understanding of elites, the willingness to take risks, even if an aid agency has a 
relatively weak position within the operational environment, bold actions and the 
willingness to face physical risks to reach out to target groups. As indicated throughout 
the thesis these features were not necessarily present within the aid community. Thc 
data appear to suggest that in general terms aid agencies had an insufficient 
understanding of the political-bureaucratic elites of the country,255 were mostly rather 
risk-averse256 and were not necessarily keen to employ boldness at an individual or 
collective leveP57 In general terms, it might not difficult to imagine that these 
processes combined did not facilitate the creation of relative superiority, but added to 
the processes of friction in the processes of addressing poverty and conflict instead. 
Resolving the strategist's dilemma? So how might the aid strategist deal with the 
issue of the lack of superiority of resources in a given context? Allowing for the 
strategist's own personality and the organisational and institutional context in which he 
works, it may still be possible to offer some suggestions. 
To begin with the notion of superiority of resources assumes that it is possible for aid 
agencies, individually or collectively to accumulate an amount of resources that are 
253 See Chapter 9 On Information. 
254 See Chapters 11 On Strategy. 
255 See Chapter 14 On Cunning. 
256 See Chapter 10 On Danger. 
257 See Chapter 13 On Boldness. 
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asymmetrical to the benefit of real poverty and conflict reduction. However, the Nepal 
case might indicate that this is very difficult to achieve in reality. So, for turbulent 
environments like Nepal it is worth realising that it is most likely that the resources an 
aid agency has available will be inadequate, but that the ingenuity of the aid strategist 
is key to reducing this gap. Tempting though it may be to rely solely on the policies 
and procedures of the agency, the strategist must exploit the position of his agency for 
this purpose. Similarly, while it may be tempting to ignore the friction caused by sub-
optimal resourcing, this too must be avoided; as to do so may do more harm then good. 
The Nepal case might suggest that superiority of resources in turbulent environments is 
easier to realise on paper than in practice. Since strategizing is largely a paper exercise 
this could make an aid strategist unconsciously overconfident, however the notions of 
both superiority of resources and relative superiority of resources should keep the aid 
strategist modest and curb ambition, as superiority of resources on either an 
organisational level or a collective level seldom realises, due to friction in its many 
forms. 
Lastly, it should not be overlooked that in line with the 'aid trinity', the notion of 
superior resources is a context-specific notion. What is sub-optimal in one operational 
environment might be more than appropriate in another and vice versa. Falling back on 
experiences gained in other contexts is helpful, but one should be aware that the 
appropriateness of available resources should not be compared with these other 
contexts. In addition, and in line with the point made above, what might be superior in 
terms of resources at one moment in time might become inferior or even counter-
productive later on. 
Taking into account all the available data and my own experiences, it is my impression 
that the sub-optimal level of resources available to address poverty and contlict was 
not primarily caused by the specific circumstances of Nepal, but induced by the nexus 
of the institutional sphere and the aid agencies themselves, which was reflected in a 
bureaucratisation of the aid delivery process. The notion of the ideal form of aid should 
therefore encourage the aid strategist to address the dilemma of superiority of 
resources, not via modernizing and professional ising aid operations, hut by 
contextualising operations on the basis of the context-specific ideal fonn of aid, while 
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at the same paradoxically avoiding becoming too contextual and losing the ability to 
make a constructive difference. 
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Chapter 13 On Boldness 
13.1 Introduction 
Boldness, Clausewitz stresses in a three-page chapter, is of key importance in the 
process of designing and applying strategy in the course of war. Boldness in design and 
action can deliver victory if the enemy shows signs of timidity (H&P: 191-192). 
When studying the dynamic interaction between the conflicting parties in Nepal during 
the period under review, the concept of boldness might enhance speculation about the 
possible moves conflicting parties could make towards each other and towards aid 
agencies. Furthermore, the concept could shed light on what the approaches of aid 
agencies might have been while creating and grasping opportunities in the process of 
strategising aid operations and implementing them within the operational environment 
of the simmering civil war. 
Transferring the concept of boldness from the realm of military theory into the sphere 
of aid and development has its drawbacks, for example the implication that aid 
agencies should act with boldness, which is not necessarily always the case. The 
interview data appear to suggest that bold initiatives did take place, but that in general 
terms aid agencies could have been bolder in their operations in order to further the 
allocation of aid resources more effectively. 
13.2 Clausewitz and Boldness258 
Clausewitz initially discusses the notion of boldness from the perspective of those in 
command, however he made inroads into other levels of the army as well. Boldness, 
according to Clausewitz, ..... does not consist in de,/jJing the na/ural order (~(thing.\' and 
in crude~y (~[rending the laws af probability; it is ruther a mafler (~r ene,.geriCll/~l' 
supporting that higher/arm (~lana~vsis ... conscious weighing (~lrhe possihiliries ". So 
258 H&P: 190-192. 
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boldness is not so much doing the impossible, but doing the possible m an 
unfavourable context. 
When Clausewitz states that" ... in what fields of human activity is boldness more at 
home than in war ". he suggests that boldness is central in the conduct of war. He 
suggests that boldness should be an intrinsic part of an anny on all its levels when he 
states "A soldier. whether drummer boy or general. can possess no nobler quality ... ". 
Boldness is a quality that goes beyond the ability to make a .. .... \·ucces.~'1ul calculation 
involving !>pace. time. and magnitude o.ftorces ... ". as it is focused on taking advantage 
..... o.f its opponent's weakness ". Clausewitz sees boldness as having the upper hand 
over those who are timid. He suggests that boldness should be balanced with 
reflection; the higher up in the chain of command, in order to avoid .. ... p1ll1JOse!e,\'s 
bursts o.f blind passion ", as not only the common purpose, but also the safety of the 
men under his command should be taken into consideration. However, even 
unsuccessful acts might be considered laudable in Clausewitz view, as long as they are 
bold, He admires boldness especially found in the higher ranks of the anny, but 
recognises as well that more can be achieved with soldiers who are" .. ,known.!iJrtheir 
boldness. an army in which a daring spirit has always been nurtured. than with elll 
armv that lacks this quality ", In addition he argues that it is better if victories are won 
due to boldness on the side of the soldiers than because of leadership commanding 
with them. Because, the first is driven by internal motivation, while the second is 
imposed from the outside. Next we will describe the role of boldness in relation to the 
international aid community in Nepal. 
13.3 Boldness and Nepal's international aid community 
Mentioning the notion of boldness to respondents provided a wide range of insights 
relating to strategic behaviour of the aid community in Nepal. Boldness within the aid 
community was perceived as essential: as one respondent suggested, .. .. ,ho\\' important 
is it to be bold? You have to be willing to take risks ... or you might as well go home ... " 
(A29). Indeed, to my knowledge, none of the development agencies -except a few 
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humanitarian-oriented agencies arriving after 2000- left Nepal. despite the 
compounding crisis.259 
Bold (strategic) behaviour was seen as important because. as one respondent described 
it: ..... f{ you are not bold and strong nothing moves here, the mindliet is pathetic ... .. 
(A37). This bold behaviour was perhaps not to be expected from Nepalis within the aid 
community but more from the foreigners, since owing to the resources they bring. they 
have .. ... more space to be bold" (A46). Another respondent suggested that the 
resources an aid agency brought were less important in the process of being bold than 
the position of the aid agency concerned (A29). In this process, analysis and the views 
of other actors. namely whether support could be expected. were seen as important 
(A64). Moreover, boldness should be based on personal confidence. a good 
understanding of the local situation and being able to .. ... say 'what would work and 
what not" (A49). However, boldness reaches its limit when the risks involved would 
cost lives (A54). 
Within this context several aspects of boldness emerged from that interview data. The 
first dimension relates to the overall character of the aid agencies in relation to bold 
behaviour. Then two overlapping domains are presented which are low-level bold 
behaviour by individual agencies and major bold behaviour by individuals 
subsequently supported by a wider range of aid agencies. The fourth dimension relates 
to the enabling and constraining factors affecting bold behaviour in turbulent 
environments. 
The overall character of boldness To begin with. the general impression of the 
overall character of boldness employed within the aid community vis-a-vis the 
compounding crisis in Nepal was not very positive. In other words. not everybody 
thought that the aid agencies were in general risk-takers, or bold or both. One 
respondent replied to the notion of boldness as follows: ...... (loud h,IlRhfer) .... 
boldness is not the keyword to descrihe the international aid c()mmuni~v here . .'ie(f~ 
servingly cautious is a much better phrase and probab~v a much more accurate 
description ... , they stayedfar behind the perimeters to stay sqle and walked only the 
259 Ockenden International for example had to leave due to financial reasons on a corporate level, 
Personal communication, Country Director Ockenden International/ Nepal. 
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walked paths ... .. (A30). Another respondent expressed himself along comparable lines. 
He argued that: .. ... the aid agencies held themselves at safe distance/i-om those people 
in most need o.f help ... " (A54). In addition, according to the same source ... ... serious 
efforts should have taken place here in the centre to allow agencies to work in con/lict-
affected areas. Of course diplomatically this is d(tficult as you do not want to stand on 
the toes o.f a government. hut that is lllhere courage. charisma and holdness should 
have come in, that type o.fhold effort or leadership.l have not seen il ... " (A54). 
Two areas were identified where boldness on the side of the aid agencies could have 
made a difference in relation to poverty reduction, and subsequently could have had a 
mitigating effect on the conflict. The first area related to the issue of hierarchical power 
structures (A 15), and the second was linked to, .. ... the histor}' of' implementation 
prohlems" (A4). The lack of boldness was regretted in these two areas, as the Maoists 
used the existence of hierarchical power relations as one of their arguments to rally 
support for the insurgency, while the history of implementation problems allowed the 
Maoists to be critical towards the aid agencies, So, the absence of boldness among aid 
agencies in the process of addressing structural implementation problems was an 
enabling factor for the Maoists to start the People's War and an opportunity to criticize 
the aid agencies. 
The idea of the 'theatre l?{ olltcomes . was introduced and suggested that aid projects 
and programmes portrayed themselves as producing better development results than 
before the conflict started in 1996. One respondent said .. Then. we /imnd ourseh'e.\' in a 
crazy situation. We were standing on our head trying to look to the conflict d(ffi!rent~\' 
and then you have projects and programmes reporting that they are doing fantastic 
stulf out there in an environment that is almost impossihle to l"'ork in. when at the same 
time they {programmes and projects Ll'D} had never done this kind (?f stld!' h,:fiJl'(, 
when they were not in a violent environment to negotiate themselves through ... l think 
that is another example l?l the theatre l?l outcomes ... .. (A4). This might be a case of 
boldness bordering on self-deception, perhaps precipitated by the above-mentioned 
fear among aid workers of job loss. Having presented a general view of boldness 
within the aid community in Nepal, which was perceived as not that impressive, Now. 
we move to bold behaviour by individual agencies. 
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Boldness by individual agencies Overall, aid agencies tended not to be bold in 
pursuing their aid operations. However, to argue that boldness on the side of individual 
aid agencies was totally absent is not correct. Respondents provided examples of 
situations whereby aid agencies were encouraged to take bold decisions or steps. 
Examples given included denying the warring parties use of agency assets (A49), the 
expansion or start-up of programmes (A 18) or indeed the closure of programmes 
(A37). One example of an expanded programme was the TBBP implemented by 
Helvetas (A5]); an example of a start up might be DFID's esp, and an example of a 
closure might be DANIDA's Forestry Programme, which was stopped atter the Coup 
d'etat of the King on the first of February 2005. 
Boldness by individuals The overall picture above suggests a general lack of boldness 
among the collective of agencies. However, this does not mean that next to individual 
agencies, individuals could not act boldly. The interview data appear to suggest that 
boldness tended to be initiated by individuals rather than by the agencies they 
represented, although it was the agencies they worked for which provided the platfonn 
or the scope for bold behaviour (A44). Three examples will be given describing the 
dynamics between the nexus of organisational and personal boldness within the aid 
community and the compounding situation in the country. 
The first example relates to the attempt to turn around .. ... the ship (~r c:ol1trac:til1~ 
development activities ", via the introduction of the Basic Operating Guidelines 
(BOGs) by 1 0 donor agencies at the end of 2003 in order " ... to keep del'e/opmel1l 
operating in a velY d(f!;cult environment" (A4).260 This happened not on the 
instruction of headquarters in one of the donor countries, but on the initiative of the 
head of DFIDIN, with the help of representatives of various agencies. 261 The adoption 
of the BOGs was a bold and necessary move to maintain and regain space for 
development (A4) and to reclaim the middle ground in the conflict (A64). The 
introduction of the BOGs was bold for four reasons. Firstly, it encouraged a large 
segment of the international aid community to acknowledge the conflict openly, while 
260 Which was initiated by the Head of DFID/ Nepal (David Wood), but suggested by Tony Vaux during a 
consultancy, and in 2001 suggested by Jonathan Goodhand in country conflict assessment. 
261 Personal involvement, second half 2003. In 2000, Goodhand makes the suggestion to introduce 
ground rules for development agencies operating in Nepal. Tony Vaux, during a consultancy for DFID/N 
suggests the same in spring-summer 2003 (Personal communication). 
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forms of denial were still present within that same community. Secondly, the process 
of drafting the BOGs enabled a rather fragmented international aid community to agree 
on a common, if minimal, denominator. Thirdly, those involved in the drafting process 
were able to withstand pressure from USAID to influence the character of the 
content.262 Fourth, as the document implied the existence of conflict, the undersigning 
agencies were willing to defy a host government in denial of the conflict. A respondent 
reflecting on the period in which the BOGs were drafted said: " ... they were in 
complete denial about the con/lict ... in the ministry 1 worked you could not talk ahoU/ 
it ... it was erased/i-om every document" (A4). In other words, the introduction of the 
BOGs was a wake-up call for those in the government rejecting the idea of conflict in 
the country. 
The second example relates to bold behaviour by a group of individuals, working in 
various agencies, playing a significant role in the process of initiating the deployment 
of Human Rights Monitors in Nepal, which was decided in Geneva in April 2005 
(AS5). This was bold because there was not only resistance from actors within Nepal 
(for example actors within the government) but disbelief of political actors outside 
Nepal that it could work as well. One respondent stated: "It was an activist Kroll!, (~l 
individuals of which some worked within the emhassies and some within the 
development agencies. They came together and said that there was a need to get 
international monitors on the ground, as a means of curtailing potentia/~v huge human 
rights abuses and putting pressure on the government and the Maoists and to move 
towards peace. They had to be activists, in the sense that there was a real dishelief in 
capitals" (A29). 
The last example relates to bold behaviour by a single individual, which without 
backing from headquarters turned out rather successfully; being a contribution to the 
avoidance of massive bloodshed in Kathmandu, during the end stage of Andolan II 
(during spring 2006). In that period, after 3 weeks of large-scale protests in 
Kathmandu, tension on the streets was so high that devastating bloodshed was 
262 One criticism of the BOGs was that they appeared to place the Maoists on an equal footing with the 
Nepali Government (A56), and USAID did not sign them because of this. Based on my own involvement 
in the drafting process, the document was first and foremost an attempt to deal with the realities 
faced by aid agency staff in the field and the challenges they faced to get access from both the 
government and the Maoists. 
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expected. A full and lengthy quotation follows, since it provides insight into the 
dynamics of a crucial moment in Nepal's contemporary history, the stepping down of 
King Gyanendra, and since it shows the decisive role played by a representative of the 
international aid community in a volatile situation.263 The respondent stated: 
.. ... sometimes it may be beller not to consult: a big case here. in which I did not 
consult with my headquarters was successful. which led to the King's second 
statemenl ... during the end (?lthe People's Movement when he gave up. I was deep~v 
involved in discussions hetween the army and the political parties. which led to the text 
(?fwhat the King said. I decided to trust the chief of the Army sta.frandthat he was not 
playing games with me. there was a grave risk on SundaY ... (~l huge 
demonstrations ... which might have led to large number l?ldeaths ... possih(l' ransacking 
the palace ... l was being asked to do something by people I knew personally and I 
thoughtlfit works ... it would be usefulfor Nepal. It was Sunday morning at l().()() am. 
!f I had asked my headquarter. then they would have told me not to do it. so J decided 
not to consult. hut I did tell headquarters afierwards. and they told me that ls/uJlIldl1ot 
have done it and that they would throw me out (fl would decide to repeat it ... and that 
always rankled 'i'ith me, that my headquarter did not come around and say that l1'as CI 
hell of risk man. frank(v you should not have done it ... hut it worked well-done ... They 
could never say that word well-done ". (Respondent's code withheld). This incident not 
only reflects individual boldness, but also shows that individual boldness, the joy of 
satisfaction, in the sense of contributing to the avoidance of bloodshed, and personal 
disappointment due to a lack of understanding and support from the aid practitioner's 
own organisation, can be tragically close together. Now, we move to an overview of 
enabling and constraining factors contributing to the perceived general lack of boldness 
within the international aid community. 
Enabling and constraining factors The fourth domain emerging from the data relates 
to enabling and constraining factors affecting the ability to act boldly as an aid agency. 
Respondents mentioned explicitly one enabling factor, namely the backing of superiors 
in the institutional sphere of an aid agency. This factor was referred to in the context of 
a comparison between the agencies USAID and DFIDIN. 
263 In addition, showing the rather lengthy quote is an expression of credit to the person concerned. 
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USAID's position vis-a-vis the War on Terror influenced aid agencies in their position 
towards the Maoists, forcing them not to speak to or recognise them. DFID/N was to a 
certain extent able to free itself from this influence and by doing so DFIDIN was 
perceived as acting more boldly than USAID (A44}.264 There are two probable reasons 
for this, namely the position of an aid agency within a government structure and the 
superiors' position regarding bold behaviour. Firstly, it was suggested that by 
comparison with USAID, DFIDIN had a much more autonomous position within the 
British government. Since USAID is incorporated with the State Department and 
obliged to follow State Department policy, while DFIDIN is part of a separate ministry 
with a cabinet ranking minister (A44). Secondly, it was suggested that boldness is 
possible when the chain of superiors within a given organisation is willing to give 
political backing. "!lyou have ministerial backing you can hecome ve,:}' hold ... f(your 
minister is not prepared to be brave. then you cannot put fiJrward a bold point (d' 
view ... " (A64). According to one respondent, ministerial backing enabled DFID/N to 
become quite bold in tern1S of internal policy discussions between various government 
departments, resulting in several clashes between DFID, the Foreign Office (Fa) and 
Ministry of Defence (MoD), both in Kathmandu and in London (A44). In addition. it 
was suggested that bold behaviour by an aid agency can be enhanced if the leadership 
within that agency has a certain amount of genius, such as was perceived as being 
present within the leadership of DFIDIN (A34). This brings us to the role of 
individuals in agencies, which is discussed in the section below. 
Next to enabling factors (or the lack thereof) several constraining factors were 
identified as hampering boldness within the international aid community. Various 
issues were suggested, some of which interconnect. 
Firstly, it was argued that "Noble causes of' the aid agencies themselves" could 
constrain possible bold behaviour (A37). Another possible reason was the lack of 
social imagination on the side of the expatriates within aid agencies regarding the 
interplay between the dominant and historical elements of Nepali society and what 
they were trying to do while in Nepal (A4S). 
264 I am not suggesting that DFID/N approached the Maoists directly, merely that DFID/N was seen as 
bolder than USAID, in terms of the initiatives employed to address constructively the conflict and its 
conflicting parties, in particular the Maoist leadership. 
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Then, it was suggested. that Nepali staff within aid agencies were, for reasons of group 
interest, obstructing possible bold behaviour (A46). "There was no holdness wilhinlhe 
agencies, because high-level decision-making staff and implementing sta.traref;·om the 
dominant castes. These people had also an attitude that they were not interested to 
serve the people. So, they Mocked the development process as much as possihle ... .. 
(AS3). A slightly more nuanced comment suggests the same, but adds the possibility 
that expatriates in decision-making positions could have been misinfonned about the 
situation in the country ..... what we sometimes seem to forget is that much lond stqtr 
employed in aid agencies. particular~v in the country (dfices were interested in 
preserving the impression that business-as-usual should carry on. and (~fien hOlf 
unrepresentative these people were, ethnically. caste-wise and class-wise. region-wise. 
and the influence thaI mighl have had on the perceptions ... in the top (?/,Ii1ese agene:ie.\' 
and in how they saw the situation in the counl1y" (A44). This might imply that bold 
aid activities could have made a difference to marginalised communities if properly 
implemented. 
Another constraining factor related to the organisational cultures and agendas within 
aid agencies. These seem to have played out in two different ways. Firstly. it was 
suggested that at least some NGOs were overwhelmed by donors. perceiving them as 
"complex emergencies" (A26) due to their bureaucratic complexity at one hand. and 
obsession for simplicity at the other, resulting in NGO representatives not having 
" ... the guts to stand up to their donors and say 'this is ridiculous .... hecause you do 1101 
bite the hand Ihat feeds YOll ... .. (A26). This process hampered infonnation flows, the 
acquisition of a good appreciation of local realities, and any consideration of possible 
bold strategic behaviour. Secondly, boldness might be obstructed by how expatriate 
staff felt themselves in their organisations. In relation to this, one respondent described 
his rather liberal American friends working in USAID as having lost their boldness 
within that institution, resulting ..... in nol asking 100 many questions any more" (A30). 
It was further suggested that US position vis-it-vis the War on Terror made other 
players within the international community timid about contacting the Maoists (A44). 
with the probable result that aid agencies would have set up communication with the 
Maoists earlier if the Maoists had not been put on the US terror list. To close this 
section, it was suggested that boldness or bold strategic behaviour among aid agencies 
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could also be impeded by a lack of coordination among the aid agencies (A6). This 
might suggest that boldness in strategic behaviour could have been possible had there 
been greater cooperation on certain commonly agreed issues. 
Above we have discussed briefly four dimensions which emerged from the interviews 
and related to boldness within the international aid community in Nepal: the overall 
character of the aid agencies in relation to boldness, low-level expressions of bold 
behaviour by individual agencies, major expressions of bold behaviour in the nexus of 
individuals within agencies, and enabling and constraining factors affecting bold 
behaviour by aid agencies in the Nepali context. Now, we move to a reflection on the 
plaee of boldness in the process of strategizing aid operations in turbulent 
environments. 
13.4 Reflection 
The above paragraphs show that at least some interviewees did not have a good 
opinion of the degree of bold behaviour by Nepal's international aid community 
regarding the reduction of poverty and conflict. At the same time one respondent 
indicated that bold behaviour was (sometimes) necessary to get things moving (A37). 
Notwithstanding, several cases were identified where bold behaviour was displayed, by 
individual agencies, groups of agencies, and networks of individuals or single 
individuals. Therefore, it IS possible to argue that boldness plays a role within 
processes of strategizing and implementing aid operations and that this role is. 
depending on the context, an important one. 
It is not necessarily wise for the aid strategist to turn its back on bold behaviour, either 
at an individual or organisational; refraining from bold behaviour might hamper 
furthering the ideal form of aid. In the case of Nepal however, it was argued that the 
aid agencies preferred, ..... to stagger in a swamp than rocking the hoat to mo\'(' 
forward and avoid sinking" (AS6). 
What might be the place of boldness in the context of strategizing and implementing 
aid operations? Boldness is an attempt by the aid strategist to take responsibility t{)r a 
situation in the sense of actively aiming for and engaging in contributions for positive 
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change. A strategy might be considered bold where it goes beyond what is accepted as 
possible or the norm in a given operational environment. In other words, a bold 
strategy is one, which uses the presence of an agency and its aid operation(s) as a 
means to change the situation between conflicting parties in ways they would not 
necessarily have chosen, but in general terms accept, to the benefit of local 
communities in terms of poverty and conflict reduction. 265 
By not being bold an aid strategist might miss opportunities to improve situations. Two 
respondents indicated that a lack of boldness regarding hierarchical power relations 
(A 15) and the history of implementation problems (A4), contributed to the 
misallocation of aid resources and the initiation of the conflict. So, just as being bold 
might have consequences, so being timid, although it may be more comfortable for an 
individual or organisation. 
At the same time, it is not very likely that unfailing boldness by an aid strategist will 
guarantee success. The agency concerned might face, for example, too much resistance 
from antagonistic actors in the operating environment. In other words, it is the correct 
understanding of when, where, how and with what consequences bold behaviour can 
be applied in the process of strategizing and implementing aid operations that is 
necessary for success. 
Implicit in the interview data is the fact that windows of opportunity for bold 
behaviour in contexts of compounding conflict are more likely to become limited than 
increased. Therefore, the likely opportunities to apply bold behaviour should ideally be 
considered before and during the course of an aid operation, not after the opportunities 
have passed. Within the framework of the 'aid trinity', the remainder of this section 
reflects on a few aspects an aid strategist might wish to consider if he wants to have a 
balanced approach to the application of boldness in the process of strategizing and 
265 Two types of boldness might be identified. The first type of bold behaviour is courageous behaviour, 
but will not necessarily lead to detrimental antagonistic responses from actors who can threaten an aid 
agency and its operations. This form of boldness could be characterised as courageous, sophisticated, 
measured and strategic. The second type of behaviour is that which appears to be daring, but is in fact, 
given the expected antagonistic responses, more likely lead to organisational collapse at the expense 
of the people the agency aims to serve. This type of behaviour might be characterised as na·ive, 
amateur, simplistic and reckless. In other words, boldness should not be confused with blunt, arrogant 
or irritant behaviour on the side of an aid agency and its staff. 
220 
implementing aid operations in turbulent environments. Although low-level fonns of 
boldness might have real (negative or positive) impact on particular groups within a 
local population, the focus of the discussion will primarily be on the production of 
major acts of boldness and the introduction of the BOGs in particular. 
One of the first tasks for the aid strategist in this respect to assess what I want to call 
the "history and culture of boldness": when and where were agencies bold, and to what 
benefit and costs, and when and where were agencies timid, to what benefit and costs'? 
This addresses the line between what constitutes bold, but acceptable, organisational 
behaviour, and what is perceived as rather brusque organisational behaviour that is not 
acceptable to actors in the operational environment. This is vital if a negative 
perception of an agency's bold behaviour is to be avoided (A4); as such negative 
responses are to be avoided wherever possible.266 
Next, the notion of the ideal fonn of aid implies that aid agencies work with the local 
population to improve their circumstances. Therefore, boldness in the development or 
application of a strategy should primarily be focused on improving the position of local 
communities, and should not work to their disadvantage. However. if an aid strategist 
acts boldly regarding conflicting parties. for example by suspending a programme. 
there may most likely be a short-tenn negative impact on the local population. This 
negative impact is then the unintended result of bold behaviour but not its aim. 
Therefore, the aid strategist must weigh the benefits of bold behaviour against 
anticipated negative consequences for the local population. 
The above suggests that boldness in strategizing and implementation aid operations 
should not be aimed at the local population in the operational environment. In this 
respect it might be helpful to refer to Clausewitz's suggestion that bold acts should 
focus on the enemy's weak spots (H&P: 190-191). The implication for the aid 
2661t should be noted that the "culture of boldness" is dynamic, so what might be acceptable at a 
particular stage of a conflict, might be unacceptable or impossible at another stage. This implies that 
boldness should be contextualised rather than being based on the aid practitioner's own culture. This 
requires in turn the unlearning of the home culture of bold behaviour and trying to understand the 
meaning of boldness within the operational environment. Various respondents suggested that in the 
Nepali context bold behaviour should take a gradual form (A45) and be balanced with politeness (A49) 
in order to work well. 
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strategist is that he has to identify those weaknesses of the various conflict parties. 
which need to be addressed in order to change their positions regarding an aid 
operation to the benefit of the local population. 
The BOGs achieved this to a certain extent. Neither the Nepali government nor the 
CPN-M wanted to be perceived by the international aid community as violators of a 
series of guiding principles, which explained how international actors aimed to address 
the poverty in the given circumstances of the country. Continued violation of the rules 
by the government could mean a reduction of support. Continued violations of the 
BOGs by the CPN-M would not help their attempts to be accepted within the 
international aid community in Nepal and beyond. In the case of the deployment of the 
OCHCR, those initiating the process betted on the assumption that the Nepal 
government wanted to avoid at all costs being seen as a pariah within the international 
community and being placed in the same category as countries like Somalia (A29). 
Clausewitz argues that boldness is central to the conduct of war. While this is not 
necessarily the case with respect to aid operations in turbulent environments, it is 
worth realising that in a turbulent environment, there might be a lot of agencies and 
individuals willing to see the application of bold (strategic) behaviour to change the 
dynamics within a particular operational environment. However, in spite of such 
willingness, the data from Nepal appear to suggest that individuals and agencies are. 
for several reasons, often too timid to contribute initially to the development and 
application of bold responses. 
So how, against such timidity, might the aid strategist contribute to the development of 
a significant bold response? To this end there are three inter-related issues to consider: 
his own position, the position of his agency, including the backing of its institutional 
sphere, and the position of representatives of other aid agencies and their willingness 
and capability to employ boldness. An aid strategist might personally expect to operate 
on the basis of altruism and be willing to risk the possibility of personal or 
organisational repercussions. This should not, however, be assumed from others. In 
other words, a bold response should offer a benefit for those who contribute, which has 
to be seen as more significant than the risks of being involved. This can vary from 
context to context. While formulating and maintaining this response, it should he 
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realised that not only might the willingness and capability of each additional actor vary 
over time, but the incentives to join as well. 
Regarding the issue of institutional backing, the data suggest that this is particularly 
helpful in the process of applying bold behaviour as an aid agency in a given context. 
This backing cannot be assumed: there may not be automatic support from superiors 
for bold behaviour. However, an aid strategist should be aware that he can stimulate 
such support, for example, by encouraging representatives from headquarters to visit 
the country on a regular basis (A52). Equally, bold behaviour initiated by the 
institutional sphere of an aid agency and imposed upon the aid strategist might be 
doomed to fail if the aid strategist is not able to rally support among a substantial group 
of like-minded actors in the operational environment. One such example might be the 
attempts by representatives of humanitarian agencies active in Nepal to present Nepal 
as a humanitarian crisis in need of humanitarian interventions.267 
The next point relates to staff. They can in themselves be enabling or constraining 
factors in the process of implementing a bold response as individual or collective of aid 
agencies. Clausewitz argues that boldness should ideally be embedded in every part of 
an army and that boldness is one of the noblest features of a soldier. From this angle an 
aid strategist could explore to what extent the staff within his agency are prepared to be 
bold and how it could be encouraged. Plans to work in under-serviced, Maoist-
controlled areas might indeed be bold. However, if staff cannot be found who are 
willing to enter these areas, for fear of having to engage with Maoists about issues such 
as access, then a bold idea becomes unrealistic. 
The interview data seem to suggest that boldness was not necessarily a key asset of the 
national aid staff, perhaps as a combined result of Nepal's hierarchical culture and the 
bureaucratic nature of the aid agencies. An aid strategist could therefore explore what, 
apart from training, he could do to enable boldness to flourish among statT at an 
organisational level if necessary. However, he must also assess whether the dynamics 
within the operational environment are favourable, since focusing attention solely on 
ingraining a culture of boldness in aid staff, while losing sight of opportunities to act 
267 See for example, Action Contra la Faim, Food Security Report, (2005) Kathmandu/ Nepal. 
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boldly, will not necessarily directly further the reduction of poverty and turbulence in 
an operational environment. 268 
Clausewitz points to one further factor in the role of boldness: passion. He warns that 
bold behaviour should not spring from wild bursts of passion (ibid). Was passion 
involved for example in the formulation and implementation of the BOGs? Based on 
observations I would contend that emotions were not absent from decision-making 
concerning the BOGs. However, it was my impression that this passion was most often 
balanced by considerate reflection by those involved. This said, it appeared to me that 
in cases of low-level boldness (for example the closure of a programme), agencies 
were less reflective, simply because their time for reflection was less as decisions were 
made relatively quickly, while the latter generated more direct consequences t()r 
beneficiaries, than the former. 
One last aspect of boldness is that of time and duration in relation to the fonnation and 
implementation of a bold move. In Clausewitz's context the application of boldness in 
a strategy was aimed at enabling a short, sharp decisive manoeuvre on the battlefield. 
This does not necessarily apply in the domain of aid delivery. For example, while 
Quick Impact Projects may appear bold due to their de-coupling from government 
structures, and intensive and short duration. They are, in the case of Nepal, not 
necessarily so if they uphold and reinforce processes of social exclusion or the status 
quo between conflicting parties. Ideally, bold strategies should be applied if they 
further the ideal fonn of aid in given context, for example by changing the status quo 
between conflicting parties to the benefit oflocal populations. 
To close this reflection, Clausewitz esteems bold acts in the theatre of war even if they 
produce adverse outcomes. Aid strategists with an idealistic or romantic bent might be 
tempted to apply this idea to the actions of aid agencies as well. The risk however, is 
that aid operations which fail strategically or operationally or both might be labelled as 
268 In addition, it took the ten signatories of the Basic Operating Guidelines some time to realise that 
publishing the BOGs only in the English or Nepali Dailies was insufficient, that their staff needed proper 
explanation and training on how to use the BOGs in the field and that some aid agency practices 
needed to change according to the BOGs. ClDA contributed to an extensive effort to get the message 
of the BOGs disseminated in the field (own observations). 
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bold behaviour and therefore hailed as success. An aid strategist should try to avoid 
cancelling out managerial blunders with bold behaviour. 
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Chapter 14 On Cunning 
14.1 Introduction 
Clausewitz argues in a short chapter on the issue of cunning that warring parties might 
employ cunning or cunning behaviour towards each other in order to further their own 
objectives (H&P: 202-203). Personally, I found the concept of cunning not only useful 
in grasping the military and political interactions between the conflicting parties in 
Nepal, but in giving a twofold warning as well. Firstly, if conflicting parties can 
behave with cunning towards each other in war, it is imaginable that they might not 
only be cunning towards each other but to aid agencies who work in the same 
operational context as well. Secondly, while the conflict deepened and interests of 
agencies and people in these agencies were threatened, the concept of cunning made 
me aware of the possibility of cunning behaviour on the part of aid agencies and of 
individuals within these aid agencies. Both facilitating misguided strategies and 
misallocation of valuable aid resources and supporting not necessarily the most 
suitable policies. 
The application of Clausewitz's concept of cunning to the sphere of aid and 
development is not straightforward and has some drawbacks. I contend however, as 
responses of various respondents to a certain degree show, that the use of the concept 
of cunning by an operational aid strategist is to be recommended, regardless of the 
personal willingness or capability to be cunning. 
14.2 C/ausewitz's view on Cunning269 
Cunning is, according to Clausewitz a form of deceit. Cunning is an action that allows 
the enemy to make his own mistake to the advantage of the misleaders. He continues to 
argue that 'no human characteristic appears so suited to the task of directing and 
inspiring strategy as the gift of cunning'. The use of cunning in strategy as a default 
option is therefore attractive. Clausewitz provides three warnings in relation to the usc 
of cunning in the process of strategizing. Firstly, the application of cunning consumes 
269 H&P: 202-203. 
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resources, which might not be available in case they are necessary. Secondly, the 
application of cunning might not generate necessarily the intended effect. In other 
words, deception might not always work as planned. Thirdly, the ideal circumstances 
to be cunning on the battlefield, in tenns of the room to manoeuvre, might not be 
available. Therefore, Clausewitz concludes that: "an accurate and penetrating 
understanding is a more useful and essential assetfor the commander than any g(fifhr 
cunning ... ". However, he continues, to argue that cunning will not do hann, as long as 
it is only sparsely used. On top of that he shows an understanding for commanders in 
weak positions and with bleak prospects for the future, who are using cunning as their 
only hope of success. 
14.3 Cunning and Nepal's international aid community 
Mentioning the concept of cunning to members of Nepal's aid community generated 
various responses and insights regarding its meaning in relation to the management of 
aid and its operational environment. Responses varied from antipathy, as well as 
recognition and even the perception of cunning as a nonnal practice within aid 
agencies. 
One respondent raised eyebrows after referring to the idea of cunning. The tenn was 
related to persons who are nasty, backhanded, not transparent, telling lies, and 
backstabbing if they could, implying that cunning should not have any place in the 
context of aid and development. At the same time it was acknowledged that there was 
sometimes the need for aid agencies to be manipulative at a strategic level, whereby 
the use of cunning was sometimes necessary as part of appropriate and flexible 
strategizing (A 12). Another respondent recognised the cunning behaviour of the aid 
agencies in Nepal during the contlict. For example in "chasing opportunities 
generated hy the conflict. beating their Olvn drum or getting new or additional S()UI'('cs 
of funding. expanding areas of operation and making themselves look important" 
(A44). However, the significance of this behaviour was downplayed and implicitly 
seen as nonnal within the global aid community. Because, "that is somelhin~ Ihal 
happens ... even in non-conflict situations. where organisations seek 10 nm:l' Oil 
working or find new opportunities (?f work" (A44). My interpretation of the above 
ranges of views is that there are various opinions on the idea of cunning and its 
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application. It is recognised as a common practise, but only with limited acceptability 
within the aid community. 
Purposes of cunning Respondents appeared to suggest cunning behaviour for various 
purposes among aid agencies active in Nepal. One respondent indicated that cunning 
could playa part in the way in which programs or projects are actually designed and 
presented. "You get substantial amounts o.ffunding. despite the fact that mayhe the 
targets set in the proposal are not achievable". The same respondent suggests that a 
requirement for this type of cunning is .. ... someone who is quite prepared to he 
dishonest and wheel-over donors faces. and is prepared to use the availahle resources 
for another agenda. knowing that the donor will not strictly monitor" (A3). 
Another respondent implied another form of cunning behaviour, this time related to 
maintaining operational space of aid activities in the midst of the conflict. .. You could 
not officially say that you were negotiating with Maoists or whatever. hut in practice 
they needed to keep their programs going. This probab(y required a combination (?t' 
attributes being cunning. and bravery. dogginess and termination alongside thClI" 
(A44). 
The above responses appear to suggest that the application can have negative or 
positive purposes. Negative cunning behaviour seems to be primarily focused on 
benefiting the cunning agency, for example financially. This type of behaviour can, for 
example, be invited if the cunning agency expects that the deception will not be 
discovered by the funding agency. So, negative cunning behaviour appears to be rather 
ego- or agency-centric in orientation. Cunning behaviour with a positive purpose 
appears to move beyond an ego- or agency-centric orientation of those who employ it. 
An example might be the maintenance or creation of the operational space of a project 
or a program. If an agency succeeds in this, it will not only benefit the agency 
concerned, but opens the possibility to provide assistance of communities as well. This 
type of behaviour seems to occur when agencies feel themselves obliged to do it for 
reasons which go beyond their own organisational needs. 
Levels of cunning and a strategic example Not only could different purposes for 
cunning behaviour be identified, but cunning can take place on different levels as well. 
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A respondent suggested that cunning behaviour is not only an activity, which takes 
place in the capital as part of a process to obtain donor funding, it can also be expected 
at field level. "On the local level a lot of the implementers (?l development prl?;ects. 
and some employees of large agencies. or partner organizations must have used a lot 
of cunning to be able to balance the tricky situation they were in" (A44). 
One respondent suggested that cunning behaviour couldn't only be found on field 
level, but on a strategic level within a donor agency as well. This respondent is 
extensively quoted to show how this cunning behaviour worked on a strategic level, 
how tying up of development and political objectives interacted with each other and 
how the result was perceived. "What disturbed people in my capital was the apparent 
d(flerence in position of my donor agency and the other government departments in 
relation to Nepal. in principal our Office of Foreign Affairs and the Ministrv of' 
Defence. These two departments suggested the idea of combining budgets. to havejoint 
funding. to deal with cOl?f/icts in particular countries. It is a way (?f' hringing sides 
together as you have to agree a joint strategy and you work on it. The contrihutions to 
the budget are pooled; there is one strategy and three departments implementing it. In 
this respect. my agency was pressurized to join up to this and in a way we developed 
cunning. persuading them to do things. because the other two departments had hardlv 
any money. In e;(fi~ct we became the largest shareholder, and then we started raising 
d(fficulties for the joint strategy in relation to what the other departments wallfed. It 
was a cunning re,\ponse ... it was a way to get the strategy of my agen(v adopted hy the 
other departments rather then the other way around. So. as a result we came to tl 
common minimal agreement rea/~v. However. in fact it bectlme a nightmare. hecause 
we constantly argued about these little hits o.f money under the common pool. while in 
the mean time we went our own way with our own budget. At the end it was cll11ning 
but not successful" (A64). 
The above highlights various facets of cunning as a concept. First, cunning is not only 
an activity practised by the higher echelons of an organisation, but can take place on 
various levels. Secondly, cunning might be a result of being under pressure. Due to 
their perceived need to keep aid activities going, field level staff applied cunning to 
achieve that goal. On a strategic level within aid agencies cunning might be applied to 
'influence' players within their own institutional sphere. Thirdly, the focus on cunning 
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varies with the level at which it takes place. At field level cunning appears to relate to 
practical issues like maintaining access to areas, while at a higher level, cunning might 
relate to the less practical, but not less important issues of policy and strategy 
formulation. 
Cunning by players in the operational environment One respondent elaborated 
extensively about cunning behaviour in the operational environment of aid agencies 
working in Nepal. The respondent suggested that "the masters of cunninK are the 
bureaucracy of Nepal", and that although, " ... donors may play some Kames, however 
they will never be able to out-manoeuvre the Nepali establishment with cunning. 
Historically the establishment has survived on cunning" (A4). 
It was further suggested that the reason why the donor community might not be able to 
out-manoeuvre the Nepali establishment, relates to Brahmanistic behaviour by the 
Nepali ruling elite. Bista (1994) describes Brahmanistic behaviour as fatalistic: this 
Brahmanistic behaviour also contains, according to the respondent, elements of 
cunning. These elements are described as follows, " ... It is a Brahmin tradition (~l 
working behind people 's backs. nothing is ever in front of you, it is always hehind vou, 
the wheeling and dealing. So. you are never quite sure where you are ... .. (A4). 270 
In addition, the respondent suggested that the way cunning is perceived by westerners 
is coloured by the religious tradition they are part of and the overall culture they have 
to operate in. "I think it is something which relates with the religious tradition (~lthe 
place ... you know that there are certain rules, but you manoeuvre them to suit what 
you're doing in that point of time, which I think differs from a Western positivist, some 
kind of Christian tradition where you have certain rules, rights and wrongs, some kind 
of 10 commandments .... tablets of stone ... Where I think in the Hindu tradition ... it is 
more tablets o.fsand that are movahle" (A4). Moreover, the same respondent linked a 
possible misreading of the conflict in Nepal by western players arising from cunning 
behaviour on the part of who might have initiated and backed the People's War. "All 
the ana~yses made and assumptions are hased on the fact that the Maoist's insurgen(l' 
in Nepal was a home grown insurgency The more I look hack. the more 1 am 
270 The same respondent referred to the existence of a Gallic saying: "as cunning as the Brahmin" (A4). 
I have not checked its actual existence. 
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convinced that that is not the case. Taking a wider picture it was the holdness and 
possible the cunning of other players which allowed the Maoist insurgenc:v to develop .. 
(A4). 
The above appears to suggest a few things about the concept of cunning. 271 Firstly, the 
concept of cunning implies that certain behaviour might lead to a situation whereby 
those on whom cunning behaviour is practised are not clear of what is in front or of 
what might change what is in front of them. Therefore, the comment on the gap 
between a Christian-positivist tradition and a Hindu tradition is particularly 
worthwhile. It suggests that religious cultural frameworks could be a source of friction 
in the sense that they are barriers to seeing and understanding what is happening in 
other settings, which use other religious and cultural frameworks, which in turn might 
lead to unexpected outcomes. Lastly, the comment made that the Maoist insurgency 
might not be a home-grown insurgency but supported by outsiders, points us to the 
possibility of outside players operating in secret, which in tum only can be seen in 
retrospect after the deception by these players have already taken place. 
Having presented thoughts on cunning based on its interpretation by a few respondents 
in the Nepali context, we move to the last part of this chapter in which Clausewitz's 
thoughts and the interview responses related to cunning will be brought together. From 
the perspective of an aid strategist some practical points for consideration will be 
offered, and subsequently the negative and positive implications of these points will be 
discussed. 
14.4 Reflection 
The above strands of data appear to suggest that cunning existed in a turbulent 
environment like Nepal. Therefore it might be argued that an aid strategist is nai've if 
he assumes that in conflict situations cunning behaviour is totally absent. It might be 
the easiest route to engage in processes of strategizing aid and development. However, 
as a consequence it will most probably invite unwelcome surprises, as various players 
might manipulate the allocated aid resources in ways, which at best perpetuate and at 
271 A caveat is justified. There is no attempt here to stigmatize or downgrade individuals with a Brahmin 
background. Cunning behaviour is not a trait, which should be applied to individual Brahmins. In 
addition, it is not suggested that the Christian-positivist tradition is better then the Hindu tradition. 
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worst increase the turbulence in the operational environment. In other words, 
understanding modes of cunning in the process of strategizing aid is a necessity for 
success; it is not a luxury after-thought while evaluating a finished aid activity. 
However, assuming the opposite and taking for granted that all players in the 
operational environment of an aid operation employ cunning all the time, is foolish and 
will most likely result in a de-facto absence of a strategy for the aid operation 
concerned. Speculating about all uses of cunning, might induce confusion and will 
hinder clear thinking about who might produce cunning behaviour, when, where, why 
and how, with what consequences and what can be done to mitigate the consequences. 
Accepting the concept of cunning as though everyone is always using cunning makes 
the concept as analytical tool to strategize an aid operation in a turbulent context 
impractical. In other words, an aid strategist who perceives every player to be 
employing cunning becomes, like an over-alert intelligence analyst, a casualty of his 
own suspicion, subsequently adding to processes of friction (Handel in: Betts and 
Mahnken 2003: 9). 
This leaves the question of how, within the context of the 'aid trinity', an aid strategist 
might best strike a balance between the two ends of the spectrum of how the issue of 
cunning can be dealt with in order to further understanding of the possible impacts of 
this behaviour on the successfulness of aid activities? To answer this question we look 
first to the presented interview data. move then to Clausewitz's ideas on cunning. The 
focus of attention is on cunning for negative purposes by players within the domain of 
conflicting parties. 
The interview data seem to imply that conflicting parties primarily employed negative 
forms of cunning behaviour. The data seem also to suggest that it is not unfair to 
assume that various aid agencies employed negative forms of cunning as wei\. 
However, it is equally reasonable to assume that the majority of agencies applied 
cunning for positive purposes, for example to hamper negatively perceived policies 
initiated by players in their institutional sphere or to support local communities. 
Although it might have happened, the data do not suggest positive or negative cunning 
behaviour on the part of local communities towards aid agencies. The implications of 
the above might allow an aid strategist to consider two issues. Firstly, the possibility of 
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cunning behaviour by key players as a means to an end, and the subsequent possibility 
of misallocation of aid resources, due to that behaviour, subsequently creating friction 
in the course of an aid operation. Secondly, an aid strategist might tend to focus 
attention on negative forms of cunning behaviour on the part of conflict parties, 
however he could consider as well the possibility of cunning behaviour applied by 
players within the domain of the institutional sphere. 
When focusing attention on negative forms of cunning behaviour by conflicting 
parties, it might be good to refer to Clausewitz's empathy for commanders in weak 
positions use need cunning as their only chance of success (H&P: 202-203). The 
implications for the practice of an aid strategist are that he must identify the weaker 
parties in a conflict as they are more likely to employ cunning behaviour to increase 
their chances of success assumed, in line with Clausewitz's thinking, that they have the 
means, the room to manoeuvre and a reasonable chance of success (ibid: 202-203). 
After an exploration of the weaker players in the domain of conflict parties, it might be 
sensible for the aid strategist to analyse the intent and capabilities to employ cunning 
behaviour of the weaker actor and the need for the weaker party to direct aid 
allocations in their favour. 272 In addition, it might be equally helpful if the aid strategist 
gains a historical understanding of cunning behaviour by weaker players and their 
preferred modes of cunning behaviour as well. 
Attention can then be given to the stronger players among the domain of conflicting 
parties and the two other domains of the 'aid trinity' i.e. institutional sphere domain 
and the domain of local people. Based on the above, an analysis could be carried out 
on how the impact of misallocation of aid resources arising from the use of cunning 
can be avoided, detected or dealt with. At this point it is essential to bear in mind that 
in a turbulent situation, players might become stronger or weaker, perhaps as a result 
of the application of negative modes of cunning behaviour. This in itself might bring 
about changes in their intentions, capabilities and need for cunning behaviour in 
relation to the strategic allocation of aid resources of aid agencies. Therefore the 
analysis of how cunning behaviour could affect misallocation of aid resources should 
be revisited on a regular basis. 
272 Idea inspired by Handel in: Betts and Mahnken 2003: 13. 
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How does the above relate to the case of Nepal? Based on the data available, including 
my own practice and observations, the following pattern seems to appear. The western-
oriented aid community, responding allergic-ally to the spreading of Maoism (A37), 
spent more effort in gaining an understanding of the Maoist movement, then on trying 
to unravel the political dynamics of the political-bureaucratic elite most threatened by 
the People's War and its impact on the direction of aid allocations. In attempting to 
gain an understanding of the conflict, the focus of studies was primarily on the 
Maoists, then on gaining a deep understanding of the causes of conflict and the role the 
government and the agencies themselves played in this process. 
The Maoists were perceived by the aid community as an 'unknown' threat, which 
should be understood in order to take appropriate measures. For example, training of 
development staff in personal security or the use of conflict-sensitive approaches 
towards development. This focus is understandable because the Maoists appeared to be 
the biggest threat to the operational space of aid agencies; however these etlorts took 
resources away from aid agencies' attempts at understanding those who had a history 
of surviving by cunning and needed to be understood most, precisely because of the 
history of cunning in Nepal suggested by one ofthe respondents. 
This process allowed a possible paradox to develop with the aid community. On one 
hand, the intent, capabilities and need of the Maoists to apply cunning behaviour was 
relatively well understood, and therefore their actions did not generate much 
amazement when their cunning actions in relation to aid allocations unfolded to the 
disadvantage of local communities.273 On the other hand, deceptive behaviour on the 
side of the political-bureaucratic establishment was met with surprise, as the aid 
community did not know what to expect from them. For example the royal take-over 
on the 1 st February 2005 triggered the realisation within the aid community that the 
political-bureaucratic elite was not willing to address constructively the contlict in the 
country and willing to change, implying at least some misallocation of resources in 
favour of the government (A29). 
273 The aid community did not appreciate these actions, but that is another story. 
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In the above, it is suggested that the aid community in Nepal focused its attention 
mainly on the origins, growth, internal functioning and aims of the Maoists and impact 
of the escalating conflict: despite being the relatively stronger player in the conflict in 
terms of having least to lose and most to gain. It is suggested as well that this singling 
out was not fully productive for the simple reason that it hampered deepening 
understanding of the Nepali political-bureaucratic establishment -relatively the 
weakest player as they had, within the domain of conflicting parties, most to lose from 
the spiralling conflict- and how this hampered proper allocation of aid resources during 
that period. 
The above observation draws our attention to an opposite question: is an aid strategist 
sensible if he solely focuses on the weaker player(s) in a turbulent situation to avoid 
misallocation of aid resources arising from cunning behaviour -in the case of Nepal the 
political-bureaucratic establishment? I would argue that this is not balanced either. 
Although strong players are not necessarily forced to it, they are equally eapahle of 
using cunning behaviour to divert aid allocations in their direction. They might even be 
in a better position to do so, because they might have more capacity to do so owing to 
the strength of their position in the contlict. So, focusing only on weaker players and 
how they can contribute to the misallocation of resources by cunning behaviour does 
not negate the possibility that stronger players might use cunning behaviour for that 
same purpose. 
So, what might be a sensible position for the aid strategist in a turbulent environment? 
In a partial echo of Clausewitz, I would like to suggest that a clear 360-degree 
understanding of the 'aid trinity' and how cunning behaviour might result in 
misallocation of aid resources is more relevant for the process of strategizing aid 
operations than a thorough understanding of capabilities for cunning of speei fic players 
within the 'aid trinity'. Thus, there is more value in gaining an understanding of the 
'atmosphere of cunning' which might prevail among players in a particular turbulent 
context then a 'nitty-gritty' understanding of specific uses of cunning hehaviour by u 
few players, like for example the technicalities of corruption, in that same operational 
environment. However, if they are key to the success to your aid activity, then it might 
be worthwhile to analyse the culture of cunning of that particular (set of) player in 
more detail. Acknowledging that considerations regarding cunning with positive 
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purposes employed by the aid strategist himself or his organisation are not reflected 
upon here. I would like to conclude with a caveat: the 'atmosphere of cunning' should 
be understood by the aid strategist within the context in which it occurs and not on the 
basis of pre-conceived ideas and assumptions by the aid strategist himself; otherwise 
he might be victim of self-induced deception, threatening the success of aid agency's 
objectives. 
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Chapter 15 On Tension and Rest 
15.1 Introduction 
Clausewitz tables the concept of Tension and Rest in Chapter 18 of his book on 
Strategy. Here he argues that every war has its periods of action and inaction (H&P: 
221). He advises that it is essential for a commander to recognize the rhythm of tension 
and rest within a war and" ... act in concert with their .'piri!". 
This chapter shows that aid agencies and their operations were intluenced by the 
rhythm of the contlict dynamics between Maoists and Nepali Government and its 
army. It also shows that aid agencies were not necessarily acting according to the spirit 
of this contlict rhythm, subsequently increasing friction in the course of strategizing 
and implementing aid operations. 
By way of introduction to the remainder of this chapter I would like to recall a 
presentation given in a meeting held by the Association of International NGOs in 
Nepal (AIN) in Kathmandu during the second ceasefire -during which the conflicting 
parties were militarily at 'rest'. The presentation addressed the issue of whether the 
agencies were 'prepared for peace,' and was given to a large group of aid agency 
representatives. The paper put forward the message that aid agencies were not prepared 
for the possibility that the ceasefire could become a peace agreement and urged 
attendees of the meeting to do exactly this and to start preparing for peace. 274 The 
chairmen of AIN underscored the message of the presentation. 
To a certain extent the presenter made a correct and legitimate point, as there was 
indeed hope among some aid workers that the ceasefire could tum into a peace process 
(A61), and aid agencies were not preparing for the possibility of peace. However, I 
maintained two objections. To begin with, the presenter assumed that the ceasctirc 
would indeed turn into a more stable process furthering steps resulting in peace. This 
was to my understanding a deeply questionable premise given contra-indications such 
274 The presenter worked during that time for the Canadian aid agency CECI and moved later on to 
London-based international peace-building agency International Alert. 
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as win-lose attitudes within the negotiation teams, poor preparations for talks and 
increasing levels of threatening language between representatives of the conflicting 
parties. Secondly, and more importantly, since the presentation and the paper were 
aimed at the aid agencies, it was assumed that the aid agencies had fully accepted the 
existence of war in the country. According to my understanding this was generally not 
the case either. So, although, I confess, did not express my objections openly. I had 
two main reservations. Firstly, why encourage aid agency representatives to prepare t{)r 
peace when the majority of these agencies were in some state of denial about the 
conflict and its impact on their work?275 I also wondered if it might not be better to 
draw attention to the reality of violent conflict, perceiving the existing ceasetire not 
only as a prelude to the resumption of conflict, but also as an opportunity to prepare f<lI' 
an (intensified) resumption. In other words, the presentation did not encourage the aid 
agencies to act in the spirit of the dynamic of tension and rest between the contlicting 
parties. Some weeks later the ceasefire broke down and the war resumed. 
To me, Clausewitz's ideas on tension and rest were helpful in three ways. To begin 
with, they helped me understand the interaction between the conflicting actors in tenllS 
of periods of action, resulting in various degrees of tension. and periods of inaction. 
resulting in various levels of rest. By extension, the concept of tension and rest allowcd 
me to realise that aid agencies relate to and are influenced by this dynamic. Most 
importantly, in order to strategise appropriately the aid resources at hand. either as a sct 
of aid agencies or as an individual aid agency, I realised that keeping a watchful eye on 
the political! military dynamics the conflicting parties were generating was essential: 
they were dictating the rhythm of turbulence in the operational environment and 
shaping to a large extent, but not exclusively, the available operational space t{)r the 
aid agencies at a given time. In other words, the conflicting parties were driving the 
tension and rest dynamics in the operational environment, and it was up to the aid 
agencies to incorporate into the processes of strategizing and implementation this 
rhythm of tension and rest. If that rhythm was not understood and anticipated 
intelligently, the allocation of aid resources could at best only sub-optimally address 
poverty reduction and at worst fuel the turbulence of the contlict. As with other 
concepts generated by Clausewitz. employing the concept of tension and rest in the 
275 See for example also Chapter 11 "On Strategy". 
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realm of aid and development is not straightforward. However, I contend, as I will 
show below, that employing the concept of tension and rest in terms of activity and 
non-activity can be recommended to the aid strategist. 
15.2 Clausewitz's views on Tension and Res(l76 
Clausewitz argues that .. ... period\· (?l active warfare will always he inter.\persed with 
Kreater or smaller period\' of rest ". He recognised that that there are various gradations 
of tension, and what these gradations have in common is that during those periods that 
at least one of the conflicting parties is trying to push the war to a decision in their 
favour. Subsequently, decisions in this state - in contrast to periods of rest- might have 
greater effect on the course of war, than decisions in times of rest. Periods of rest, 
Clausewitz argues, do not imply that conflicting parties are inactive, however the 
activities implemented might arise " ... ./;·om inc.:idental causes, and not d,'SiKned to lead 
to major changes. Sign(ficant engagements, even major hallles, may take plac£'; hw 
these actions are still (?f a d({ferent nature and there/hre uSlw/~v, II",'£' cI(tfi.'r(,111 
results . .. The most significant lesson in relation to the notion of tension and rest is 
according to Clausewitz .. ... that any move made in a state (?l tension will he more 
important, and will have more resulls, than il would haw (t' made ill a slall' (?t' 
equilibrium ". In addition, activities taking place during periods of rest by conflicting 
parties, are by Clausewitz ..... regarded and treated as a mere comlllllT ", as the" ... the 
state (?l crisis is the real war: the equilibrium is noti1inK hut its re.flex ". ('Jausewitz 
therefore advises that it is essential for a commander to recognize the rhythm of 
tension and rest within a war and ..... act in concer' wilh 'heir .\piri'''. 
15.3 Tension and Rest within Nepal's international aid 
community 
Between 2000 and 2005 the conflict between the conflicting parties intcnsitied. 
Overall, development activities, such as for example decentralisation programmes 
(A35) contracted as a response. 277 However, this trend was dynamic and not 
necessarily progressively linear or uniform across the country varying with each sector. 
276 H&P: 221-222. 
m At the time of finishing this research the Norwegian Ambassador to Nepal indicated in a 
presentation that not much progress was made in the decentralisation sector. (Trondheim, NTNU 
Gloshaugen, the 1st of September 2009). 
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Based on the interviewee data a story emerged around several topics. The story is not 
necessarily neat or consistent, but provides a general idea as to how the tension and 
rest dynamic among conflict parties influenced the rhythm of tension and rest within 
the aid industry. The topics are: the rhythms of the seasons and national festivals, the 
compounding conflict dynamic, sudden outbursts of violence, ceasefires and other 
periods of relaxation and finally the expansion of some aid activities. 
Seasonal patterns and national festivals The patterns of season and national festivals 
did not only influence the operations of aid agencies, but the conflicting parties as well. 
Before the war started aid agencies had to deal with the seasonal rhythm of Nepal and 
the need to incorporate this in the planning of operations: .. ... you had this mad rush 
hefore monsoon time, as you cannot do much during the harvesting time or It'hell it is 
really cold in the mountains, so there were times where things fwd to pear (A4). Aid 
agencies' activities were also shaped by the rhythm of national festivals, such as 
Dashai and Tihar (around September and October). During these festivals 1110st 
government offices were closed and national aid agency statTtook holiday to celehrate 
the festivals with families and friends. So, not much work could be done in these 
periods (own observation). 
It could be argued that the rhythm of Nepal's battlefield in terms of tension and rest 
was to a certain extent embedded in and influenced by the pattern of Nepal's seasons 
and national festivals. This rhythm provided windows of opportunity for the violence 
to flare up, move geographically or to be constricted. With regard to the seasonal 
pattern, an example might be the winter periods in the Karnali (Nepal's North-western 
development region). During the winter, the conflict in this region came almost to u 
standstill as most Maoist units relocated to the mid-hills or the TeraL severely 
constraining the Maoist military capability in the areas they left. At the same time the 
SF, based in the various district headquarters were not keen to engage in serious 
patrolling beyond the areas close to district headquarters, as the weather conditions 
were not favourable for either party (A68). In addition, the monsoon period made 
multi-facetted operations on the side of the Maoists a rather slippery atfair, as moving 
large numbers of troops from various base areas over long distances ulong narrow 
mountain and hill trails to reach targets became a complex operation. At the same time, 
Maoists military operations were also enabled by the changing seasons and could 
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therefore relatively easy be foreseen. For example, the foggy January conditions in the 
Terai enabled the Maoists to attack Nepalgunj, the administrative centre of the mid-
western development region, under cover ofthick fog (A26).278 
The political! military dynamics of the conflict were also influenced by Nepal's 
festival seasons (Deshai and Tihar). Nepalis use these periods to return to their family 
in the rural areas. If politically or military expedient, the Maoists could eventually use 
these festivals as a gesture to announce a ceasefire allowing (or even encouraging) 
people to the places from where they originated. If people had the courage and 
resources to return, they most often did, leaving bigger centres like Kathmandu less 
populated.279 Maoist rank and file might also have used these opportunities to see their 
family again, or to travel to other areas of the country in preparation for other 
operations. The Maoists would probably not have feared that the areas they were under 
their 'influence', would be 're-taken' by government or aid agencies. as government 
officials and aid workers enjoyed the festivals as well. 
The compounding conflict dynamic Next to the rhythm of seasons and festivals 
which conflicting parties and aid agencies had to live with, the compounding dynamic 
between conflicting parties in terms of tension and rest affected aid agencies and their 
activities as well. Interviewees touched on various aspects, which will be presented 
below. 
To begin with, in general terms, the tension and rest dynamic, between the conflicting 
parties, being somewhat escalatory in nature, caused a process of contraction of 
development activities. The pressures for this contraction were not only generated hy 
the Maoists, via donations demands, written permission to enter areas or the need t()r 
signed agreements, bandhs and blockades as one respondent suggested. "Also t/1(' 
security forces were definite~v gUilty (~f slowing down development ClI the end (?/'l(}()l 
beginning 2003 to 2()04 by jusl making it d({ficullfhr NGO "'''{ll'to mOl'e ... as l/7e.l' 
were IryinK 10 conlrollhem" (A35). In addition, the coverage of government structures 
278 Nepalgunj lies in the middle of a plain, scarcely providing cover for advancing or retreating forces, 
However, the annually returning mist provided the necessary cover for the military operation in 2005. 
279 Own observation, 
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beyond district headquarters reduced over the years as well,28D subsequently reducing 
aid activities, which aid agencies implemented in collaboration with these structures. 
So, while the contlict intensified, the outreach of development activities contracted and 
its pace slowed down. 
Several respondents provided examples of this process indicating that the projects and 
programmes they were involved in reduced in scope (A2) and moved towards some 
sort of 'rest-mode' (AI2/ A17/ A49/ A26). This contraction of development activities 
did not imply that aid agencies were not involved in aid activities any more, but that 
activities took place at a much lower level than originally planned (A32). Nor did this 
process mean that development activities came to a complete stop if an aid agency had 
to reduce or stop its activities. It was feasible that aid activities originally supported by 
agencies were continued by local communities themselves, as two respondents 
suggested (A21 A 17). Within the context of an evolving con tli ct and intensifying 
dynamic of tension and rest, sudden increases of tension such as outbursts of violence 
between the contlicting parties could occur as well, which in turn affected the 
operations of aid agencies. This will be discussed in the next section. 
Localised violence Outbursts of violence between the contlicting parties occurred, but 
not necessarily on a regular basis. Aid agencies responded in ditTerent ways to these 
violent episodes, as retlected in the interview data. In one case, Maoists attacked 
various government infrastructures in a district in the mid-western hills. Beti.)re 200n 
the aid agency providing health services in the district decided almost immediately to 
relocate their staff by helicopter in response. However, the suspension of the project 
was relatively short, because local Maoist representatives infonned the agency that the 
attacks were not aimed at them (A61). In another case, at a later stage in the conflict. 
the Maoists attacked another district headquarter. destroying most of the government 
infrastructure. 281 The aid agency providing health services in this particular district 
responded not by evacuating the field team, but by doing the opposite, sending in 
280 This was due to a combination of Maoist pressure and pre-emptive decisions on the side of the 
government to withdraw. The rhythm of contraction, and partly self-imposed rest, varied from district 
to district and sector to sector. One respondent suggested that his programme reached most of the 
targets set; however in order to do this he suggested that he had to decrease the ambition level of his 
programme with approximately 90% (A68). 
281 INF/ NSMP/ SNV (2002) Jumla Joint Assessment Report, Kathmandu, Nepal. 
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additional staff to assist the local team to get the clinic up and running again (A68! 
own involvement). The agency in the latter case had learned from the first how to 
interpret violent attacks by Maoists on district headquarters (own involvement). 
Where areas became contested and tension increased aid agencies could decide to 
withdraw their presence or activities temporarily or permanently from a given area 
(A21 A26). If it became clear who was in control over a given area, a decision to return 
could be made if permissible by both the Maoists and the Security Forces (A61). 
One respondent suggested that the ability to maintain relationships in a contested area 
is of key importance to maintaining a presence in such an area. He stated "when our 
Maoist contact person was killed by the army. we decided to mo)'e our activities to 
VDCs closer to the Bazaar" (A49). This might suggest that having contact with the 
Maoists was perceived as essential to operate safely and if these were not existing 
(anymore) then activities of the agency were transferred to locations that were 
perceived as safer. 
Being specifically targeted At times agencies were a specific target for either party, 
mostly, but not solely, for the Maoists. In such cases one or more of the following 
occurred: a series of warnings (own observation), damage to infrastructure (A 12/ own 
observation), detention or abduction of staff (own observation), or physical or mental 
threats to individual staff (A 12/ own observation). As a response it was not unusual to 
suspend or close down activities. Restarting projects was not always easy, and did not 
solely relate to the reduction of tension between the agency and (one of) the conflicting 
parties, as one interviewee indicated: .. We stopped in District X. we stopped in district 
Yond as far as District Z is concerned we suspended l'et:v quick~v as our (dIke was 
burned ... we tried to get going again in a small way but this was not .\·ucces.~fitl.fi>I' 
various reasons; we had three project directors in a short time span. The five Nepali 
staf!,who went hack. had a junior team leader and he did not do a goodjoh iI?/imning 
the Maobadi. the staff were terr(fied and never attended meetings tlu:v were called to. 
pretending that they were 110t called. which they 011~V told us qlierl1'ords (?l cour.,·e .. 
(A12).282 
282 Names of districts are not given to protect the identity of the respondent and agency involved. 
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It was not only the Maoists who could become violent towards aid agency staff, but the 
army as welP83 One respondent recalled an event in a district in the western-
development region, where one of his staff members, while returning from a tield visit, 
was attacked and wounded for no obvious reason by an aggressive soldier with a 
Khukuri knife (A62). This event affected the programme in two ways. Firstly, the 
incident needed to be reported to the respective army commander, which was a 
sensitive issue as, ..... we could not protect ourselves from the army or the police. as 
they could raid our (~ffice in a minute ". Secondly, fear among staff increased, reducing 
their willingness to conduct the already restricted number of field visits. "So, the 
question for us became how do you just(fy your programme, while sitting in the district 
headquarters and do hardly anything "(A62). 
As mentioned earlier, the intensification of conflict and the overall contraction of 
development activities in combination with the various fomls of pressure on individual 
aid agencies and their activities, did not necessarily lead to less activity within 
individual aid agencies. It was suggested that if the pressure on projects or programmes 
increased the 'tension" among staff within these projects or programmes could increase 
as well: .' ... when development prc4ects or programmes were under threat. Stt~fr ill 
these projects or programmes realised that their economic survival depended 011 
keeping their projects and programmes moving, whether they were ahle to do W/:V 
much or not ... they were able to keep the show on the road ... .. (A4). 
Ceasefires The dynamic intensification of the conflict also created periods of 
relaxation, which could take several forms. Firstly, tension could reduce in an area 
when it became clear which of the conflicting parties was finally in control (A21 A61 ). 
Then, tension could also reduce during the two ceasefires. One might expect that 
agencies tried to anticipate the eventuality of (these) ceasefires, as conflicts do most 
often have such relative periods of 'rest', in order to make use of possible windows of 
opportunities to 'regain' lost 'ground'. One might also reasonably expect that agencies 
283 I recall a situation during the second half of 2004 where a female staff member of the agency I 
worked for, while on a field trip in a district in the eastern region, was physically threatened by two 
RNA soldiers in a hotel. She 'bluffed' herself out of the situation avoiding the severe possibility of rape. 
A few days later I was taken aside after a meeting in the UN compound by a national UN official and 
provided with a warning that if the staff member concerned continued to use her influential family 
contacts to defame the commander in charge of the RNA in the district were the incident took place, 
than he could not guarantee her security any more in Kathmandu. 
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would in times of ceasefire prepare for the possibility of a resumption of contlict. The 
interview data available does not strongly indicate this either, suggesting a situation 
whereby aid agencies almost operated in an autonomous field separated from real 
tension and rest dynamics in the country. 
In this context, one well-informed insider suggested that during the periods of 
intensified conflict thinking within the aid community" ... ahout what to do during the 
eventuality of a ceasefire hardly took place" (A34). So, at least before the tirst 
ceasefire some aid agencies did not think about how a ceasefire could be exploited to 
reverse the contraction of their activities or contribute to conflict reduction and 
eventually peace. One key respondent retlecting on his first weeks in his new agency 
just before the collapse of the second cease-fire in August 2003 said: "/lI'as awart! (?l 
working in a crisis area. however Ifound my new (dfice operating as (l we were in a 
normal development situation. with a lew security problems" (A47). This thought is in 
line with the view of another leading figure in the aid community when referring to 
dynamics of tension and rest and ceasefires, during the period of research in particular: 
"For the majority of aid agencies. while denying the conflict. the cease/ires did /lot 
make a big d([ference. the shock on~v came afier the royal coup. Wi it rewa led the 
nature of the regime. and how seriously helpless it was in relation to the Maoists" 
(All). The above appears to suggest that in the dynamic process of contlict 
intensification and contracting development, aid agencies operated as though 
circumstances were normal throughout or as in a situation in which a ceasetire is not 
necessarily an opportunity to be exploited, nor to be used as a period to prepare tor 
resumption of conflict or a move towards a more peaceful situation. 
Despite the above-described process there were programmes and projects making usc 
of the ceasefire to design new activities. In one example during the second ccasefirc 
preparations were made within the programme for a situation whereby the ceasetirc 
would move towards peace: "While designing the programme we thought thaI Ihe 
ceasefire would turn into peace. and that accessibili~l' lI'ould imprOl'c and 
decentralization would take place. While we were designing the programme 1"(' 
cease/ire collapsed. and we didn', know how long this muM take ... .linally ln' 
constructed a design which could operate under all circumstanccs, t"at pel:fiJrmed 
hetter in case decentralization took (~(f. hut could work as well in case de('elllrali:lItio/l 
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didn'l lake place" (A60). So, in this case, the ceasefire, as a relative period of rest 
within the conflict, was used to plan new activities, though the underpinnings of the 
design were based hopes for peace, which were proved unrealistic. Later on, we will 
see that wishful thinking happened more then once. 
Expansion instead of contraction In contrast to the overall process of contraction of 
development activities in response to the intensification of the conflict, whereby aid 
agencies were in a 'rest-mode' and trying 'to keep the show going: there are examples 
of projects actually expanding despite the compounding conflict. Good examples of 
expansion might be the Trail Bridge Building Programme (TBBP) and a donor-funded 
Agricultural Programme. It was also possible for some programmes to start up with 
some success, such as the DFID funded Community Support Programme (CSP).284 
TBBP expanded between 2000 and 2005 from a production of 100 to almost 200 
suspension bridges a year. This happened somewhat accidentally rather than by design. 
According to the respondent involved three reasons contributed to this signiticant, but 
counter-intuitive, expansion. Firstly, the programme was community-driven and as 
much as possible separated from government structures, which allowed a significant 
control over activities by the local communities. Secondly, the programme was flexible 
in its approach. If Maoists or other groups, such as the anny, blocked the building of a 
local bridge, then equally suitable alternative locations were found. Thirdly, donors. 
probably unable to spend money usefully in other sectors of work, were regularly 
asking if TBBP was interested in additional funds. As long as this additional money 
did not overstretch staff capacity, it was accepted by the implementing agency (ASI ). 
The above-mentioned Agricultural Programme was equally able to expand, because 
according to the respondent it was, after the collapse of the second cease tire designed 
with the conflict in mind so that it could operate either in contlict or in peace (A60). 
So, by contrast with TBBP, the Agricultural Programme could expand not accidentally, 
but by design. 
284 esp, a DFID-funded initiative, was able to start up in 2002/ 2003 and work in more than nine 
districts. The programme worked completely independently from the government and was able to 
respond relatively quickly to local expressed needs via cash injections on the basis of project proposals 
formulated by local communities in collaboration with a esp representative in the field (A35). 
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However, paradoxically, what the above-mentioned programmes have in common 
other than a continuation or even an expansion of activities is a reduction of output 
after the peace accord signed in November 2006. TBBP received less donor funding, as 
donors shifted their attention to other sectors, subsequently affecting production levels 
(A51). The Agricultural Programme became severely affected by a re-centralisation of 
the programme by the Ministry of Agriculture, slowing down the pace at which it 
could assist local communities (this was not anticipated) (A60). Now we will move on 
to the reflective section of this chapter. 
15.4 Reflection285 
The dynamic process of tension and rest at work among the conflicting parties in N~pal 
influenced in different ways the operations of the various aid agencies. In other words, 
the tension and rest dynamic between conflicting parties added to the turbulence in the 
agencies' operational environment. However, what the data appear to suggest overall is 
that the agencies on the one hand felt the consequences of the real tension and rest in 
the operational environment (although oflow intensity), but on the other hand they did 
not necessarily (sufficiently) act upon this dynamic, subsequently not sufficiently 
preparing themselves either for a possible intensification or a de-escalation of conflict, 
adding between 200 I and 2005 to the continuous process of contraction of operations. 
In this way aid agencies contributed to the already multi-faceted processes of friction. 
To expand this point I will mainly, but not exclusively, focus on the ceasetire periods 
during the conflict. 
Seasons and festivals Although the rhythm of seasons and festivals can be seen as a 
form of friction in the process of delivering aid, it appeared to me that, in general, the 
rhythm of seasons and festivals had a place within the operational rhythm of aid 
agencies. For example, staff of the Dutch development agency SNV fonnally 
positioned in the Karnali 'retreated' as planned during the winter season to the regional 
administrative headquarters at Nepalgunj.286 Equally during the festival season. 
government offices were closed and aid staff took their holidays as well. In etlcct the 
285 I would like to thank Brigitte Piquard for making me aware of the distinction, between perceived, 
real and self-imposed tension and rest. 
286 Own observations within SNV/ Nepal. This type of 'retreat' could be seen as a form of self-imposed 
rest. 
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periods less favourable to working were taken into consideration in the planning of aid 
activities. At the same time, the real tension and rest dynamic was less well-anticipated 
within aid agencies. One reason for this might be that the rhythm of seasons and 
festivals was, by comparison with the conflict dynamics, known and predictable. The 
dynamic process of tension and rest within the constellation of conflicting parties was 
to a certain extent less predictable and knowable and therefore more challenging to 
incorporate into processes of strategizing and implementation of aid operations than 
the rhythm of seasons and festivals. The mixture of political-military actions by the 
conflicting parties were to a certain degree an echo of the Nepal's rhythm of seasons 
and festivals as well, particularly the military actions, inasmuch as the conflicting 
parties could exploit them for their own ends. It might therefore be argued that the 
incorporation of periods of tension and rest in processes of strategizing and 
implementing aid operations could have been less problematic than initially assumed. I 
am not suggesting that it would have been easy, merely that paying attention to how 
the rhythm of seasons and festivals in a given context may not only have an impact on 
aid operations, but also on the tension and rest dynamic of conflicting parties, might 
pay dividends for the aid strategist operating in a turbulent environment. 
Responding to tension and rest As already suggested above, the dynamic of tension 
and rest adds to processes of friction. The aid strategist, who in a given context does 
not understand this dynamic, will therefore most likely compound the existing friction. 
However, understanding this dynamic of tension and rest between conflicting parties 
and what the consequences and opportunities might be for aid operations does not 
necessarily substantially reduce friction between the dynamics of the operational 
environment and the aid operations concerned, as the aid strategist needs to have the 
personal willingness, and his agency the ability, to adapt according to this dynamic, 
neither of which can be assumed. Even where the aid strategist and agency are willing 
and able to adapt to the dynamics of a conflict, the aid strategist has to consider two 
questions. Firstly, how much effort should his agency spent on gaining an 
understanding of the real tension and rest dynamic? If he spends too little, the 
understanding of the operational environment in general and the conflict dynamic in 
particular might be insufficient to convince his headquarters that adaptation is 
necessary. Too much attention might detract from other issues needing attention, 
perhaps leading to complaints about the agency's performance. With both extremes 
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contributing to friction, the aid strategist must strike a balance in a given context. 
Secondly. assuming the strategist is willing. to what extent can he adjust the agency 
and its operations, and by doing so make his agency responsive to the real tension and 
rest dynamic? Again, not finding the right balance might compound friction, with the 
institutional sphere of the agency doubting the chosen course as it might go beyond the 
agency's corporate policy preferences (for example working solely with government 
structures). Alternatively, inappropriate adaptation might (continue to) hamper access 
to local communities, if one or more key actors in the operational environment is not 
willing to accept the actual changes within an aid operation, due to possible negative 
repercussions. 
Realising Tension and Rest For the aid strategist, the above points to a problem 
related to the aid agency's official view. If an aid agency de jure does not recognise a 
conflict, or in other words if the agency's perception is not congruent with the real 
tension and rest dynamic, it might defacto also be difficult for that agency to deal with 
the dynamic of tension and rest in a given conflict operational environment. A key task 
for the aid strategist therefore might be to encourage a culture within the aid agency 
that accepts the reality of violent contlict, its dynamic and need for willingness to adapt 
accordingl y. 
The importance of responding during periods of tension In the period towards 
2005, the reach of development activities diminished to a significant degree in the rural 
areas, in part because of the pressures generated by the contlict, in part because of 
decisions made by aid agencies themselves. Clausewitz makes his audience aware that 
conflicts have various gradations of tension and that during these periods at least one 
of the conflicting parties tries to steer the conflict towards a decision or situation in its 
favour. As a consequence, he argues, decisions in periods of tension, in contrast with 
the periods of rest, might have a greater effect on the contlict dynamics than decisions 
made by warring parties in times of rest. With a bit of imagination it might be possible 
to apply this line of logic to the aid agencies and the conflict dynamics they have to 
deal with. 
The Maoists induced development agencies to curb their activities in rural areas, and 
this was in tum reinforced by decisions by aid agencies themselves (a foml of self .. 
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imposed rest), for example in the form of early withdrawal from peripheral areas and a 
refocus on urban areas (A49). It appeared to me that this process benefited the Maoist 
position more, whereas a potential regaining of ground by development agencies with 
aid activities during ceasefire periods could eventually benefit the government. If true, 
it might be argued that the retreat of development agencies from rural areas contributed 
to the Maoists gaining a strong enough position to engage into fonnal negotiations 
during the ceasefire periods with the government, as the position of the latter was in 
part weakened by the contraction of precisely the same aid activities. Not being 
systematically prepared to regain 'lost ground' as an aid community during the 
cease fire periods strengthened the Maoists further at the expense of the government, 
subsequently adding to the real tension and rest dynamic. This process generates some 
questions for aid strategists operating in turbulent environments comparable with 
Nepal, assuming that they aim to support the legitimate government and have a 
reasonable understanding of the nature of the conflict dynamic.287 These questions arc: 
what might the consequences of contraction be vis-a-vis the reduction of poverty and 
contlict and could these consequences eventually sufficiently be 'compensated' for 
during ceasefire periods? What might this mean for the agency's strategy in terms of 
support of its institutional sphere and its preparations for eventual future engagements? 
The answers to these questions vary from aid agency to aid agency and from context to 
context. Even with, eventually, a correct assessment of these questions, an aid 
strategist should realise that it is most likely that at best only sub-optimal results can be 
achieved, even if a series of aid agencies work together as a collective. There might be 
several reasons for this. 
To begin with, the commencement, duration and end of a ceasefirc are not necessarily 
easy to predict. In the case of Nepal, I can recall the existence of rumour and 
speculation around these issues within the aid community, but the exact beginning, the 
duration or the end of a ceasefire was at the end of the day uncertain. This is not 
necessarily a helpful basis for planning. Then, even if an aid strategist is able to predict 
correctly the time boundaries of a ceasefire, the statf of his agency might not 
necessarily mentally be prepared to re-engage directly with the activities they stopped 
doing during the period of armed confrontation. Moreover, due to the contlict, not only 
287 I am not sure if all aid agencies in Nepal were necessarily sympathising with the government, while 
not necessarily being in favour of the Maoists either. 
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are aid activities contracted, but also the quality of infonnation about the project areas 
and the local communities left behind will most likely deteriorate.2BB Therefore, pre-
planned intervention strategies might be unsuitable. Updating infonnation about 
project areas takes time, which in tum delays the process of strategizing and 
implementing appropriate aid operations during the ceasefire period. Added to this is a 
potential attitude and expectation gap between local communities and aid agency stan: 
as both groups have experienced the same period of real tension and rest differently. 
Lastly, a ceasefire, does not exclude the possibility that localised hostility between 
conflicting parties could flare up, or that a situation at a local level remains tense in 
reality. This might hamper the already fragile attempts to re-start aid operations. All of 
these reasons multiply, if we take into consideration that it is not one aid agency that 
has to deal with these issues, but each individual aid agency within the collective of 
agencies. In the case of Nepal, it is my impression that the above factors did not 
enhance a collaborative effort to counter the processes of contraction faced by aid 
agencies and their aid operations during the periods of violent conflict. 
Ideal form of aid Now, I would like to present a somewhat speculative discussion on 
the nexus between the notion of the ideal fonn of aid and the dynamic of tension and 
rest. In the Nepal case it appears that aid operations in practice contracted overall. 
However, those aid programmes and projects, which included elements of the ideal 
fonn of aid in their operations, were better positioned to slow the pace of contraction 
than other operations, or were able to expand (for example TBBP), or to start up (f()r 
example CSP). 
Although not explicitly researched, it appears to me that aid operations largely 
modelled on the ideal fonn of aid could exploit the ceasefires more easily than other 
aid programmes and projects, because they had higher levels of acceptance with the 
conflicting parties than other aid activities. If the above is true then one way to deal 
with the dynamic rhythm of tension and rest among conflicting parties in a given 
operational environment might be to put effort into strategizing and implementing aid 
operations in line with the ideal form of aid of a given context. As always the role of 
288 See Chapter 9 On Information. 
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friction should not be ignored, such as opposition from the institutional sphere or from 
other agencies. 
The data appear to suggest that aid activities which contained features of the ideal fonn 
of aid, were more conflict-robust than those, which did not. They were less atlected by 
the tension and rest dynamic generated by the conflicting parties and subsequently 
faced less friction in their interactions with the operational environment. Assuming that 
this is reasonably accurate, then we could also assume that if an aid programme, is, at 
least in part, modelled on the ideal fonn of aid, the aid strategist should not be too 
concerned about the conflict dynamics. However, the Nepal case appears to suggest 
that aid agencies were more concerned with how the conflict dynamics could be 
adjusted to the aid activities they were offering, than to how aid operations could 
actually be contextualised.289 It appears to me that this last process actually reduced 
the aid agencies' ability to respond adequately to ceasetire periods. The conflict-robust 
or contextualised aid operations, however, faced less friction in the process of 
exploiting ceasefire periods. Those staff already with access to the field had a better 
understanding of the dynamics within local communities. Thanks to this their agencies 
could have better infonnation and therefore were better positioned to gear intervention 
strategies to local circumstances. 
One further point on this subject is that the aid strategist whose aid operations arc 
strategized along the lines of the ideal fonn of aid, should be more worried about the 
tentative conclusion of a ceasefire, than the dynamic of the ceasefire itself, as the 
implications for an aid operation in a state of tension and a subsequent relaxation in the 
fonn of a ceasefire can to a large degree be 'understood', while the political-military 
consequences of a failed ceasefire might be more difficult to 'predicf and the 
subsequent friction this might generate. 
Responses during ceasefires To conclude this chapter, I would like to refer to 
Clausewitz's statement that" ... the state (?l crisis is the rea/war, the t!ljllilihrillllljllst 
its reflection". Although Clausewitz is referring to warring parties, it points aid 
289 Van Duijn L.F. (2010) Bergen vol Verspilde Ruimte: Twee Nederlandse Hulporganisaties op Zoek naar 
Bewegingsruimte in Nepal, in: Dijkzeul, D. and J. Herman (Red.) Humanitaire Ruimte: tussen Po/itiek en 
Onpartijdigheid [Humanitarian Space: between Politics and Impartiality], Academia Press, Gent, 
Belgium. 
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agencies and their operations to the importance of the periods of tension, the non-
ceasefire periods of a conflict. These phases are important, not only for the conflicting 
parties, but for aid agencies as well. If we follow Clausewitz's logic that the state of 
equilibrium is nothing but a reflex of the real war, then we could, in general tenns, 
imaginatively argue that the lenient responses by the aid agencies to the ceasetire 
periods and the opportunities they offered to re-establish contracted aid activities to the 
benefit of local communities is a reflection of the rather lax and delayed response to 
the process of contraction of these same agencies during the non-ceasetire periods. 
What might this mean for aid strategists operating in comparable contexts? To my 
understanding it implies that the real 'battles' aid agencies have to engage in, in order 
to counter processes of contraction and to maximise expansion during ceasetire 
periods, do not take place during or shortly before a ceasefire, but during the periods of 
tension or intensified conflict between the conflicting parties. If so, then this might 
have consequences for aid strategists in settings comparable with Nepal. If the aid 
strategist aims to make best use of ceasefire periods (which will always be at best sub-
optimal), measures to avoid losing ground or to regain lost ground should start during 
the period of tension and not in the period of rest. The first step in this process might 
be resisting contraction in the first place (while acknowledging that aid agencies' 
programmes are under pressure), either as individual aid agencies or a collective, 
without being too prescriptive about the best route to achieve this. To argue in line 
with Clausewitz's advice: the act of resisting contraction should ideally be infonlled by 
an understanding of the 'spirit' of the dynamic interaction between the conflicting 
parties. However, the aid strategist should be aware that even if this understanding 
exists and features of the ideal form of aid are incorporated in aid operations, positive 
impact on either poverty or conflict reduction is not guaranteed. To close, the best 
thing an aid strategist can do in relation to the concept of tension and rest, is to ensure 
that his perception of the tension and rest dynamic in the operational environment is 
congruent with the real tension and rest dynamic, and that he encourages his agency to 
respond accordingly. It is not unlikely that bringing his perception of the tension and 
rest dynamic in line with the real tension and rest dynamic is less challenging than 
aligning the agency's response with the real conflict dynamics. However. what an aid 
strategist should not forget, and what the Nepal case might suggest. is that the 
perception of the tension and rest dynamic in the operational environment is less 
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influenced by the real tension and rest dynamics, than by the rhythm of tension and rest 
imposed by aid agencies themselves. 
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PART IV 
CHAPTER 16 The Aid Trinity, Friction, Strategy & The 
Aid Strategist 
16.1 Introduction 
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This exploratory case study research offers a sobering account of the international aid 
community during a significant period of the Nepal conflict (1999 to 2005/06). Within 
the context of an intensifying conflict between Maoist insurgents and those holding 
official power in Nepal, the research suggests a gap between the ideal form of aid 
according to which the aid community in Nepal preferred to operate and the actual 
character of its aid operations during the period under study. 
In describing the ideal form of aid in Nepal during the period 1999 to 2005/06, 
respondents used tenns such as being contextualised, conflict-sensitive, addressing the 
drivers of poverty, being bottom-up, treating warring parties equally and being 
organisationally flexible. However, the actual character of the aid activities could be 
described in tenus of being in denial of conflict and conflict-blind in ternlS of 
operational style, resource allocation procedures and methods. In addition, it was 
suggested that coordination was complicated and insufficient, leading to duplication of 
efforts and related partly to inappropriate donor practices. The result of this all was 
inertia within Nepal's international aid community leading to an inability to address 
the poverty and conflict dynamics in Nepal appropriately. 
Friction could be understood as the hindering force between the perceived ideal form 
of conducting aid operations in Nepal and their actual character, resulting in the 
inability of the international aid community to address appropriately the dynamics of 
poverty and conflict during the years of intensified conflict. The process of friction in 
Nepal is summarized in Annex 16.1. Moreover, the reflective sections of the Chapters 
6 to 15 suggest that it is not very likely that in other settings aid agencies and those 
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who take on the role of the aid strategist290 are able to avoid friction while working in 
similarly turbulent environments. 
This exploratory research is not in the position to create a theory on aid operations in 
turbulent environments, but based on the material presented in Parts II and III of the 
thesis a few suggestions could be made which may inform the understanding and 
analysis of aid operations in turbulent environments and bring something to the fragile 
state debate. 
The remainder of this concluding chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, three 
paragraphs below discuss separately the notions of the 'aid trinity', friction and 
strategy. These paragraphs are linked by the concept of friction. Then, a discussion 
follows about issues related to the aid strategist. This discussion is structured along thc 
triad 'aid trinity', friction and strategy. Each of these four paragraphs suggests some 
possible implications for the current fragile state debate as well. Next, a paragraph 
follows elaborating on the hypothesis and research question of the thesis. After that the 
validity, reliability and limitations of the research are discussed. The chapter closes by 
raising some final reflections and offering some questions for further research. 
16.2 The 'aid trinity' 
The 'aid trinity' concept, fully described in Chapter Five, provides a framework to 
understand and analyse aid operations in turbulent environments and is constructed 
from three interconnected layers. The first layer is psychologically orientated, 
consisting of Passion/ irrationality, Reason/ rationality and Chancel non-rationality. 
The second layer is social and consists of Local people, Conflicting parties and the 
Institutional sphere. The third layer is management-orientated and consists of the 
trinity of Policy, Strategy and Engagement. These three layers are able to interact 
dynamically with each other. Throughout the thesis reflections on aid activities in 
Nepal and aid operations in other turbulent environments are situated within this 
dynamically interacting triad of layers. This exploratory research demonstrates that thc 
290 Note that that the concept of the 'aid strategist' is not that of an individual staff member within an 
aid agency, but a role someone close to strategic decision-making processes could fulfil. See also the 
section in Annex 1.1 dealing with to the aid strategist. 
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trinity model is a useful, if imperfect, analytical tool in the process of understanding 
aid operations and the forceful processes of friction these operations might encounter. 
This theoretical perspective allows us to argue that what happened with the aid 
operations conducted by the international aid community in Nepal during the years of 
growing turmoil between 1999 and 2005/06, however wearisome it might have been 
for policy makers, practitioners and observers, is, if not a normal situation, at least a 
non-exceptional one. However, the framework equally implies that this situation was 
not necessarily a predetermined or unavoidable one; the 'aid trinity' concept leaves 
scope for the possibility that actors in Nepal's aid industry could have been influenced 
to interact or respond differently, subsequently allowing operations, both individually 
and collectively, to follow less sobering trajectories. These possibilities are numerous, 
for example: 
• The institutional spheres of the various aid agencies involved may have developed 
different views and policies on the situation in Nepal, had for example 9/11 and the 
War on Terror not happened. 
• Local communities could have responded differently to the increasing tunnoil In 
the country, for example by resisting violence head-on or fleeing en masse. 
• The conflicting parties could have taken a different approach to each other, 
bringing about an earlier 'end' to the conflict, or extending and deepening the 
conflict, forcing the aid agencies to abandon their development(al) approaches. 291 
In other words, from the theoretical perspective of the 'aid trinity' the trajectory 
followed by development efforts by the international aid community could have been 
influenced by many different factors and could have taken a different shape. 
From a more positive angle one could argue that the way the aid community and their 
operations functioned in Nepal between 1999 and 2005/06 is not necessarily a 
precedent for the failure, poor or sub-optimal perfonnance of future aid operations in 
other turbulent environments. It might indeed be possible that this rather positive view 
prevails, though it must appear unlikely. At first sight the exemplars presented in 
Chapter 11 to 15 might suggest that the aid community in Nepal as a whole and 
291 The Royal Massacre in 2001 could not have taken place, allowing space for an alternative response 
from the monarchy in dealing with the Maoists. 
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individual key personnel or aid agencies functioned inadequately, which may to an 
extent be accurate. However, in the defence of those individuals and agencies who 
worked towards contextualised forms of aid delivery, these individuals and agencies 
were to a large extent guided and constrained by their individual institutional spheres, 
their views on development problems and their solutions, such as for example 
regarding the issue of fragile states in general and Nepal in particular. In other words, 
in this dim presentation of the performance ofNepaJ's international aid community, all 
is not necessarily as it seems. Of course, the turbulence generated by the dynamics 
within the operational environment influenced the strategic behaviour of the aid 
agencies and their collective and individual performance, but this strategic behaviour is 
also, at least in part, a reflection of the 'functioning' of the individual and collective 
institutional spheres of the aid agencies involved. Soul searching, as suggested by 
Bonino and Donini (2009), happens within the aid community of Nepal around the 
question of what went wrong, but should not be limited to the aid actors based in the 
Kathmandu, and should ideally happen in other capitals were the headquarters of these 
agencies are based as well. A comprehensive evaluation exercise along the lines of 
Joint Rwanda evaluation might be a good starting point. 
One underlying theme of the reflective sections of the various chapters is the 
suggestion that if aid operations are closer to what might be perceived as ideal in a 
given context, then the gap between the ideal and reality might be reduced, to the 
benefit of poverty and conflict reduction. So, although the 'aid trinity' allows for the 
possibility of better performance by aid communities and their operations in other, 
future turbulent environments, this is unlikely to materialise for as long as the 
individual and collective institutional spheres of aid agencies resist transfonnation to 
allow agencies to operate in accordance with the perceived ideal in a given operational 
environment. Not transforming themselves to operate in accordance with what is 
locally perceived as the ideal form of aid leads most likely to self-induced processes of 
friction, and processes of friction in turn perpetuate the gap between the actual and 
ideal forms of aid. 
In relation to the fragile state debate the above suggests two points. Firstly, that the 
institutional spheres of aid agencies operating in turbulent or fragile environments, 
should ideally take as a starting point for 'intervention' the actors within the 
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operational environment and their views on the ideal way of operating, as this 
approach theoretically minimises friction. Secondly, the crucial roles, positions and 
modes of operation of the institutional spheres of aid agencies present in a given 
operational environment should not be excluded from the debate or downplayed, as 
they too are a source of friction and playa role in the processes of friction encountered 
by aid agencies and their operations. However, the 'aid trinity' implies that even if 
institutional reform of some sort takes place, there are no guarantees of better 
performance by aid operations in future turbulent environments, due to unavoidable 
friction. The next paragraph addresses the concept of friction. 
16.3 The formidable force of friction/292 
The interview data presented in the thesis provide a clear impression of how friction 
could become embedded in the practice of an aid community and their operations in a 
turbulent and deteriorating operational environment such as Nepal. 
Chapters 7 to 10 demonstrated that friction of a more general nature originated in 
other parts of the 'aid trinity'. namely the institutional sphere of the respective 
agencies, the domain of conflicting parties, or the internal dynamics of aid operations 
in terms of staffing, organisational, planning or partnership issues. The complex 
organisational set up of the aid industry in Kathmandu was also mentioned. Then, it 
was shown that the physical efforts of aid agencies to engage with the physical reality 
of the country were at least in some cases sub-optimal; danger and its (mis-) perception 
within the aid community stifled, at least among some sections of the aid community, 
outreach to local communities. Furthermore, it was demonstrated that the information 
processes present within the aid community did not necessarily match the need among 
aid agency representatives to get a good understanding of the dynamic in the 
operational environment. 
Chapters lIto 15 addressed the notion of strategy and related dimensions including 
superiority of resources, boldness, cunning and tension & rest. These chapters showed 
that friction was also present in these strategy-related dimensions. The aid agencies 
292 For an expose of friction in the realm of war, I would like to refer to Cimbala S.J. (2001), Clausewitz 
and Chaos: Friction in War and Military Policy, Praeger, Westpoint, USA. 
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tended to follow the governmental development plans, without actually strategizing 
their interventions to pro-actively address the dynamic nexus between poverty and 
conflict. In addition, and with the usual exceptions, these chapters seem to show 
deficiencies in quality of resources available, a scarce use of boldness, insufficient 
understanding of the culture of cunning as exploited by the conflicting parties, 
unsatisfactory understanding and response to the tension and rest dynamic in the 
operational environment. 
Nepal's aid community was, alongside their engagement in poverty and contlict 
reduction, engaged in, without necessarily realizing it, a battle against the process of 
friction, at the expense of the first, and tended, by a lack of progress, to make the 
existing conflict 'responsible' for it. What might this say about the notion of friction? 
The thesis shows that friction is a 'formidable force' and is able to manifest itself 
everywhere in the aid delivery process, with various levels of intensity and visibility 
and at any given time. In other words, friction is a multi-dimensional inescapable 
process obstructing the poverty reduction efforts of aid agencies. The thesis showed 
that not incorporating or underestimating processes of friction contributes to sub-
optimal performance by aid agencies. 
The notion of friction might therefore deserve a place in the fragile state debate, as 
there appears a tendency to assume that if we get the discourse, policy and related 
instruments right, then decision-making processes related to aid interventions could 
address, without becoming frustrated, the pertinent issues in countries currently 
labelled as fragile. In other words, understanding the concept of friction might enable 
practitioners and agencies to envisage possible unexpected hindrances and to be 
realistic about what aid agencies and their operations might be able to achieve in 
fragile states. The notion of friction denies the possibility that fragile states can be 
addressed with quick and technical fixes. The following paragraph explores whether 
strategy might be a means to counter friction. 
16.4 Strategy: a counterforce to friction? 
Chapters II to 15 provided not only a picture of the force of friction, but a sobering 
account of the strategic behaviour of the aid community in Nepal in the face of 
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growing instability during the period of research, and of how this was reflected in the 
conduct of aid operations attempting to respond to the existing poverty and contlict 
dynamics. 
In general terms, and with the usual caveats, strategic thought was at best insufficient 
or lacked sufficient contextual understanding and sensitivity. In addition, the elements 
on which strategy was based appeared to be limited, despite a wide range of aspects or 
dimensions warranting inclusion, resources applied by the agencies appeared across the 
board to be insufficient in quality, bold behaviour, with exceptions, was seldom 
exhibited, the cunning behaviour of the Nepali elite was underestimated, and lastly, aid 
agencies and their operations tended to follow their own rhythms of operation or the 
rhythms in the operational environment they were used to, instead of pro-actively 
following and exploiting the dynamics of the contlict. These features all contributed to 
a form of strategic behaviour, which might have hampered the ability of collective and 
individual aid operations to address poverty and contlict reduction more constructively. 
In addition, the ideal form of aid as indicated by the interviewees was not necessarily 
brought closer. 
From the perspective of the "aid trinity' concept it is possible to argue that this form of 
strategic behaviour as exhibited by the international aid community in Nepal is not 
necessarily at odds with what might happen in comparable environments, given the 
presence of friction and the inherent difficulties of getting a (strategic) hold on friction 
in processes of strategizing, as implied in the retlective sections of the chapters in Parts 
II and III in particular. 
However, eschewing strategy with the argument that the forces of friction are too 
strong to make a sensible strategy related to a given turbulent environment is not a 
realistic option as it is more than likely that an aid agency will have to explain to its 
institutional sphere how it wants to translate the set institutional policy into sensible 
engagements. On the other hand an over-reliance on strategy alone in the context of aid 
operations, even if the meaning and application of the term is not diluted too much, 
might not suffice to get the expected results. To take the case of Nepal as an example, 
there is no guarantee that the presence of strategy (ies) in the Clausewitzian sense, 
superior quality of resources, bold behaviour, a good understanding of cunning within 
262 
the culture, and a supple pro-active response to the tension and rest dynamic generated 
by the conflicting parties would have substantially improved the poverty and conflict 
reduction efforts of the various agencies involved. Why? Because, if the 'aid trinity' 
concept is taken into consideration, the operational environment is intrinsically 
dynamic, generating chance and uncertainty. Friction might occur at any time, 
affecting the strategies of the aid agencies. The best one can hope for is that, as well as 
applying a sufficient definition of strategy and including the appropriate elements for 
strategy in a given context, aid practitioners and agencies are able to include 
imaginatively the possibility of friction in the course of implementing these strategies. 
In other words, the strategy of an aid operation or a set of aid operations should ideally 
embrace the reality of friction. Perhaps then strategy might be able to counter friction, 
though given the force of friction, strategy may never be able to overcome it fully. 
What might this mean for the fragile state debate? The above stresses the importance 
of aid agencies in country having the 'freedom' and the resources to strategise their 
operations according to what is locally required and feasible, instead of what is 
prescribed by and acceptable to the institutional sphere, while the outcome stays 
unpredictable. 
16.5 The aid strategist 
The thesis implies that Nepal during the research period was perceived to be a complex 
conflict environment entailing a lot of uncertainty, various levels of danger and various 
other (un) expected obstacles to overcome. These factors not only hampered in various 
ways processes of strategizing and implementation of aid operations, but also 
individuals in key or influential positions within Nepal's international aid industry. 
This paragraph aims to synthesise in general terms the outlook of those individuals, 
exploring them in the context of the 'aid trinity', friction and strategy. 
The 'aid trinity' From the perspective of the 'aid trinity' it seems that the data 
presented suggest that those close or central to key strategic decision making processes 
within aid agencies were management-centric or had a managerial orientation and were 
mainly focused on how aid policy as handed down by their institutional sphere could 
be 'rationally' realised. In others words, prime attention was given to achieving the 
goals of their agencies and their specific operations. As a consequence, over time, most 
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attention was given to defending the structures their agencies operated in and with. As 
a result, key aid agency staff might have felt overwhelmed and perceived the conflict 
as an 'extra-ordinary' deteriorating environment, in the sense that what was happening 
around them was difficult to capture with the conceptual lenses they were accustomed 
to. The perceived abnormality of the situation shocked at least those staff who could 
influence strategic decision making processes. The mismatch between the reality of the 
deteriorating conflict and actual fit of the aid activities pursued may have been spotted 
'in time,' but due to 'chocked' responses from the aid agencies strategic modifications 
to their approach were at best somewhat late. 
For example the data presented in Chapters 8, 9 and lOon physical efforts, danger and 
information, appear to suggest in general terms and with the usual exceptions, that key 
staff within aid agencies had insufficient understanding of the physical requirements to 
reach the most marginalised communities, of the psychological impact on staff of 
danger due to the conflict and of the various levels of reliability of formal and infonnal 
communication channels and the information it produced. Then, Chapters 13, 14 and 
15 suggest the need for boldness on the side of aid agencies. In addition, the level of 
cunning present among Nepali actors, as well as the political-military dynamics 
between the conflicting parties was insufficiently understood and subsequently not 
proactively addressed. Such lack of understanding and awareness affected poverty and 
conflict reduction efforts. 
In terms of the approach suggested by Steed (2009)293, the data presented appear to 
suggest as a general shortcoming among those who were in a position to influence the 
strategic decision-making processes concerning aid operations an insufficient process 
of introspection, empathetic appreciation and empathetic anticipation. 
Introspection helps in understanding how other actors within the aid triangle might 
perceive the operations, agency and ultimately the agency staff member concerned. It 
might have been the case that that staff central or close to strategic decision making 
293 Steed in his book "Piercing the Fog of War" studies aberrations in war and how commanders dealt 
with them to gain victory at the expense of their enemies (2009: 258-263). He suggests an approach to 
conflict situations which could be summarized as consisting of the triad of introspection, empathetic 
appreciation and empathetic anticipation. This approach is used to elaborate on the data from the 
perspective of the nexus 'aid trinity' and aid strategist. 
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processes did not make a sufficiently fair appraisal of themselves or the agency they 
worked for in terms of (personal) skills, abilities, attributes and capabilities. This in 
tum might have led to an unsatisfactory or limited understanding of the available room 
for manoeuvre for the individual, the agency and its aid operations. 
Furthermore, the focus on pursuing organisational goals and defending the structures 
the respective aid agencies worked with and in, did not necessarily encourage 
empathetic appreciation of the actors aid agencies were dealing within the operational 
environment. This did not facilitate understanding of who the key actors within the 'aid 
trinity' were, how they perceived themselves and how they interacted with each other. 
Further, the primarily managerial approach of aid staff hampered empathetic 
anticipation. There was insufficient understanding of how the interactions between the 
various conflict parties and local groups would shape perceptions, attitudes and 
behaviour towards staff and the operations and aid agencies they were attached to. In 
other words, the psychological and sociological dimensions of the 'aid trinity'. namely 
the processes within and between conflict parties and local communities as affecting 
aid agencies, their operations and their staff were not fully taken into consideration and 
prepared for. The partial, though not necessarily biased, view of those in key positions 
within aid agencies allowed additional space for friction to occur, as aid agencies were 
insufficiently prepared to anticipate possible set-backs. 
Friction The thesis paints a grim picture of the poverty and conflict reduction efforts 
by the international aid community in Nepal. As argued in Chapters 7 to 15, this was in 
large part caused by the formidable force of friction in processes of strategizing and 
implementing aid operations. Friction frustrates, not only in terms of aid agencies 
reaching their goals or objectives, but psychologically as well. Almost across the 
board, the respondents tended to be somewhat pessimistic about the perfonnance of the 
international aid industry in Nepal in general and the activities they were involved in or 
had closely observed in particular. This might be a reflection of a certain level of 
personal frustration due to the (extensive) exposure to (un-) expected difficulties and 
an understanding of some of the unintended consequences. 
What the Nepal case appears to suggest is that aid agencies, and subsequently those 
influencing or deciding on key strategic decision-making processes within aid 
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agencies, tended to have unrealistic expectations of what was actually possible within 
the operational environment, ignoring or downplaying friction in terms of simplifying 
Nepal's complexity. There were unrealistic expectations that friction could be avoided 
with the means available, or unfounded optimism that friction could be overcome 
relatively easily. The opposite could also happen, with at least one key respondent 
suggesting that almost nothing was possible. 
Frustration might induce stress, fantasising, stereotyping or showing aggression, 
apathy and depression (Ouweneel 1984). The psychological reactions to frustration 
induced by the force of friction might be a bigger issue for those involved in strategic 
decision-making processes than for an individual aid agency or stafT member. 
Involvements in poverty and conflict reduction efforts take time to create success. The 
data appear to suggest that in relation to friction there is a twofold challenge for those 
involved in key decision-making processes within aid agencies. First, it is a challenge 
to be honest about expectations as to what an aid agency and its operations could 
realistically achieve. Second, within the context of this realism, it is a challcnge to 
maintain a positive mindset or posture vis-a-vis dynamics within the operational 
environment, even if these do not appear hopeful. Such a mindset is vital if the pitfall 
of fatalism is to be avoided. Falling into fatalism may in turn afTect the ability to 
persevere effectively at an individual and agency level with ongoing poverty and 
reduction efforts within the operational environment. 
Strategy It was stated above that respondents suggested that the institutional spheres 
of the various aid agencies did not necessarily provide the most appropriate policies to 
address strategically the poverty-conflict dynamic in Nepal. In addition, strategic 
thought within the Nepal's international aid community was, with the usual exceptions. 
at best insufficient or lacking sufficient contextual understanding to address poverty 
and conflict reduction more constructively. It was also argued that the samc aid 
community held the conflict in Nepal responsible for friction and inertia in the course 
of their operations, instead of their own institutional dynamics. 
Although it is unfair to argue that Nepal's case showed an unlimited range of strategic 
possibilities, individuals able to influence or directly involved in stratcgic decision-
making did not or were not necessarily able to exploit their positions. Given the data 
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available the overall tendency seems to be that the majority of those able to influence 
or decide on strategy favoured, for reasons which might include a lack of moral 
courage, aid policy over contextualised strategy, subsequently focusing their attention 
on strategizing and managing the implementation of the aid policy of their institutional 
spheres. By applying this management orientation, and being strongly orientated 
towards implementing the goals of the institutional sphere via the existing structures, 
the ideal form of aid as suggested by the interviewees became only further away. 
A minority at best of those in a position to influence or decide on the strategic 
directions of aid operations judged the deteriorating situation in Nepal such that thcy 
preferred and attempted to follow an approach whereby aid strategy took priority over 
aid policy on the basis of what was actually relevant and accepted within the turbulent 
dynamic of Nepal, rather than the other way around. In these cases attempts were made 
to mould the strategy of an aid operation according to the ideal fonn of aid in the given 
context. 
Thus a crude distinction might be made between two types of key aid agency statT. 
One type perceived their prime task to be understanding and rendering in operational 
form, which their institutional sphere wanted them to deliver to Nepal. The second, I 
guess a much smaller, group perceived one of their prime tasks to be gaining 
understanding of and judging which modes of operation could deliver the most results 
in attempts to reduce poverty and conflict. The first group appeared to have strategized 
according to a given set of policies; the second group attempted to strategize on the 
basis of the dynamic processes within the context and focussed on what is appropriate 
and acceptable. In terms of Easterly'S distinction between 'planners' and 'searchers' 
(2006), among those who could influence or decide upon the strategies of aid 
operations, the 'planners' outnumbered and overruled the 'searchers'. Furthermore, the 
searchers not only lacked sufficient 'genius' to develop strategies on the basis of sound 
'humanitarian' judgement. but they also lacked critical mass to provide leadership 
within Nepal's international aid community. 
What might the above three points mean for the fragile state debate? The above 
highlights the importance of the human component within aid agencies operating in 
fragile states. Having provided aid agencies the 'freedom' to act on the basis of the 
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local context instead of policies designed by their institutional sphere, there can be no 
guarantee that they will act according to this freedom. Moreover, the presence of 
professional staff possessing the hard managerial skills does not guarantee that this 
freedom is taken. Aid statf involved in strategic decision-making processes should 
ideally possess in addition the more complicated but soft 'skill' of sensing the 
dynamics within an operational environment via the triad of (honest) introspection, 
empathetic appreciation and anticipation. They need to be resilient to the nature of 
friction and have a good sense of judgment to gauge what is locally appropriate and 
acceptable and, equally importantly, show the moral courage to take responsibility. 
thereby increasing the likelihood that aid operation strategies are sutliciently well-
designed and implemented and could make a satisfactory contribution to a reduction of 
the poverty and conflict dynamics in a given context. 
16.6 Hypothesis, research question and reflections on the 
research process 
The study hypothesised firstly that the development industry operating in turbulent 
environments could benefit from ideas grounded in military theory and secondly that 
Clausewitz's theorising on the conduct of war as laid out in his book 0" War. when 
applied in a creative way, offers a fruitful basis to formulate a normative framework 
for (speculative) reflections on aid operations in turbulent operational environments 
such as Nepal. 
The thesis proves the second hypothesis, demonstrating that on the basis of 
Clausewitz's ideas on war. i.e. the notions of the 'remarkable trinity: friction and 
aspects related to strategy, it is possible to formulate a normative framework and to 
further speculative reflections on aid operations. The tirst hypothesis has been partly 
confirmed inasmuch as the thesis proves the relevance of the thinking of one military 
philosopher as a productive basis for reflections on aid operations in turbulent 
environments. However, other military thinkers might be of equal or even greater value 
in informing debate within and practices of the aid industry. One example might be the 
classical eastern war philosopher Sun Tzu. 294 
294 Slim H. (2004) A Call to Alms, Humanitarian Dialogue Center, Geneva, Switzerland. 
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In addition, the thesis in its current shape, and especially Chapters 5 to 15, fonn an 
answer to the study's research question, namely: "How might reflections on aid 
operations in turbulent operational environments. such as Nepal during the period 
August 199910 2005106. appear when inspired by Clausewitz's lines l?f'thoughl and 
conceptualisations of war as laid out in his book On War?" 
Despite its narrow scope, this exploratory research expanded during the course of the 
study in three directions. To begin with, Clausewitz's theorising on war became. 
instead of a model, a source of inspiration to reflect upon aid practices in Nepal. These 
reflections were guided by a concept called the 'aid trinity', inspired by Clausewitz's 
key concept the remarkable trinity. This concept was instrumental in framing and 
focusing the various reflections on aid operations in turbulent environments. Secondly. 
instead of focusing on a wide range of topics and themes highlighted by Clausewitz. 
the research became increasingly concentrated on the various concepts related to the 
theme of strategy. Lastly, following on from the second point. while analysing and 
reflecting on the data, it became clear that aside from the idea of strategy, the notion of 
friction, as used by Clausewitz to explain (un) expected problems in the course of 
military operations, was not only more prominent in the delivery processes of the 
international aid and development community in Nepal than initially envisaged. but 
became a recurring theme throughout the reflective sections of the thesis. 
16.7 The validity, reliability and limitations of the research 
As stated in paragraph 4.7 the validity of the fieldwork is grounded firstly in the 
number of interviews conducted, which, at 70, is more than double the number 
required for exploratory research (Stebbins 2001). In addition, in Nepal. where the 
majority of the interviews took place, a presentation of initial findings was given 
among research participants and further comments were received. It is argued that the 
material presented on Nepal in this thesis is reliable. Research conducted by two 
renowned researchers connected with the Feinstein Centre, based at Tufts University 
and published in 2009, applies a comparable research methodology. focused on the 
perceptions of aid practices in Nepal by aid practitioners, observers and receivers of 
aid, and echoes the general mood of the presentation given (Bonino and Donini 2(09). 
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However, establishing the validity of the reflective sections of the thesis, grounded as 
they are in selected parts of Clausewitz's work, my personal observations and the 
analysis of the collated interview material, is more challenging. These sections are not 
without their limitations. To begin with, the reflections use as a starting point the 'aid 
trinity' concept, a framework which is still being 'tested' for its usefulness and which 
might in itself be worth exploring and refining in greater detail, as it does not explicitly 
address issues such as politics, culture and history.295 Furthermore, the reflections use 
the device of the 'aid strategist' and are thus inevitably aid strategist-centric, which 
might not encourage the reader to empathize with the positions of other actors. This is 
mitigated however, by the 'aid trinity' concept, which underlines the need for a 360-
degree perspective on the processes of strategizing and implementation of aid 
operations. Lastly, the series of reflections on the strategizing and implementation 
processes of aid operations in turbulent environments are not definitive, but open to 
further elaboration and absolutely do not constitute a prescriptive guide for operating 
in turbulent circumstances. Despite these limitations, the research draws attention to 
the potential of the 'aid trinity' framework to act as a 'nonnative foundation' for 
understanding aid interventions in turbulent environments, the value of the notion of 
friction and its potential effects on the practice of aid and development, and the 
importance of paying sufficient attention to strategy while conducting aid operations. 
16.8 Conclusion and research areas remaining 
The juxtaposition of Clausewitz's thinking on war and development practice in Nepal 
during the height of the Maoist insurgency has been fruitful. To begin with, the study 
seems to suggest that the 'aid trinity' is, despite its limitations, a suitable 'normative 
foundation' to analyse, and reflect upon strategizing processes of aid operations, in a 
non-prescriptive manner. Next, it brought to the fore a series of concepts related to the 
problematic theme of strategy, which allowed the assessment of the responses of the 
aid industry in Nepal from a new angle, shedding light on the strategic behaviour of the 
aid industry in the context of turbulence. Moreover, the juxtaposition allowed the 
concept of friction to emerge as a significant force in strategizing and implementing 
processes of aid operations in turbulent environments. 
295 Clau5ewitz also omits such issues in his work (See also Chapter Three). 
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The study presents a rather depressing account of the character of the aid industry in 
Nepal during the years of intensified conflict between the Maoist rebels and Nepal's 
government. The aid industry suffered from inertia, reSUlting in the inability to address 
poverty and conflict dynamics appropriately. Subsequently, aid agencies and their 
operations were, with the usual exceptions, far removed from a localized ideal fonn of 
operating. 
From the theoretical notion of the 'aid trinity' developed in this thesis it can be 
speculated that aid agencies operating in other contexts then Nepal are not necessarily, 
to use Terry's expression, 'Condemned to Repeat' comparable trajectories (2002). 
However, this exploratory study also suggests that the trajectories of strategizing and 
implementing aid operations in turbulent environments might vary, but that aid 
agencies will almost certainly continue to encounter the force of friction in their efforts 
to reduce poverty and conflict. 
Former UN Under-Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs Egeland argues that to address 
the mix of poverty and conflict the will is needed to apply technology, resources and 
institutions (2008: xii). Assuming that it is unlikely in the foreseeable future that the 
overall approach to fragile states will change for the good and that it continues to be 
problematic to strategize aid operations in line with the locally ideal form, Egeland's 
call for more will power to address the mix of poverty and conflict is not sufficient, as 
will power alone is unlikely to be able to overcome the reality of friction. 
Given the existence of friction faced by aid agencies in the course of operating in 
turbulent environments as shown in this thesis, Clausewitz himself might have advised 
the aid industry slightly differently. Instead of will power he might have suggested the 
application of ..... genius overwhelmingly and at the decisive points in particular". 2'l6 
However, the aid industry, not unlike military institutions, encounters some difficulty 
in 'producing' genius and in defining decisive points when it comes to addressing 
296 I make use here of Creveld's caricatured interpretation of Clausewitz (2003: 203). Clausewitz links 
ideas such as (moral) courage, a quick recognition of truth and presence of mind, self-control, self-
confidence, a degree of scepticism and imagination to the notion of genius (H&P: 100-112). He is aware 
that genius is only a partial answer to friction. 
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positively the poverty and conflict dynamic in a given turbulent environment.297 This 
compounds the difficulties of bridging the gap between what might be seen as the ideal 
form of aid and the actual character of aid activities in that given context. 
These Clausewitz-inspired reflections on aid operations in turbulent Nepal bring to the 
fore the fact that those who are in the position to influence fonnally strategizing 
processes of aid operations in turbulent environments might optimise their efforts 
through the application of three character traits or personal skills. The first centres on 
the triad of introspection, empathetic appreciation and empathetic anticipation. This 
might help to understand, for example, the psychological and social dynamics of a 
given context and what might be expected at a managerial level. In addition, a personal 
resilience to friction is beneficial. This might help staff to deal positively with the 
reality of friction faced by aid operations. Lastly, those concerned need a clear 
judgement and moral courage to define and put into effect the most suitable aid 
strategy in a given turbulent environment. Overall, the juxtaposition of selected aspects 
of Clausewitz's theory on war has clearly been of use to a certain degree. and could be 
exploited in further research. This brings us to the conclusion and new areas of 
research arising. 
To begin with. Clausewitz' thinking might be further explored for other ideas which 
could inform a deeper understanding of aid operations, such as the notion of centre of 
gravity, or culminating point of victory. Other military thinkers might equally be 
researched for the same purpose. 
Secondly, the conceptual and practical relevance of the "aid trinity' for aid strategists 
in other turbulent environments in tenns of potential and limitations for the analysis of 
and reflection on aid operations could be further explored. The three interconnected 
layers of the "aid trinity' could also be further investigated and refined, along with its 
suitability for use in teaching. 
297 See also Creveld who argues that Clausewitz's advice on the application of genius to address friction 
is theoretically sound, but is in reality insufficient seen the challenges of the military institutions to 
produce genius (2003:203). 
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Thirdly, the notion of friction in turbulent or fragile environments could be further 
explored, and cases exploring the dynamics of friction could be investigated and 
systematised in order to inform policy-makers (who are in many cases at least a few 
steps removed from the reality of friction) and those tasked with strategizing aid 
operations at country level. 
Fourthly, the strategic behaviour of other aid communities in other turbulent 
environments could be investigated, together with the role of friction in the processes 
forming this strategic behaviour. 
Lastly, there is scope for investigating how those represented in this thesis by the term 
aid strategist, and who are formally and informally in the position to influence or 
decide upon the operational strategy in turbulent environments, perceive their 
positions, and how they make use of their influence and actually do 'strategizing'. 
Explorations of the points above could contribute to building up case material centred 
on the triad of the 'aid trinity', friction and strategy, and subsequently inform debate 
around the nexus of poverty, conflict and fragile states. 
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Annexe 1.1: Key Terms 
This annexe defines several terms central to the thesis, namely the concepts of 
turbulence, aid agencies, aid operations and aid strategists. Another key concept, the 
'aid trinity,' is elaborated on in Chapter Five. 
Turbulence and turbulent environments Several ideas are related to the notion of 
turbulence and the turbulent environment. Firstly, developments occur not in a 
'smooth, linear, ordered and predictable' manner, but as 'rapid, discontinuous and 
turbulent change' (Roche, 1996). 
Secondly, the notion of turbulence implies the existence of conflict and violent 
conflict. Conflict can be expressed as "the relationship between two or more parties ... 
who have, or think they, incompatible goals" (Fisher 2000:4); it is the very actions are 
generated by these relationships that contribute to the dynamics of turbulence. At 
the same, the inclusion of conflict in the concept of turbulence, does not exclude the 
possibility of neutral or harmonious relationships between various actors. The idea of 
violence is also included in the concept of turbulence and turbulent environments, 
and can be expressed as: "actions, words, attitudes, structures or systems that cause 
psychological, social, or environmental damage and/or prevent people from reaching 
their full human potential" (ibid). This can be targeted against individuals or groups 
within a society, which might result in clear human rights abuses (ibid) and/ or 
systematic attempts to obstruct agencies operating in peripheral parts of Nepal.2QS 
Thirdly, polities plays a role in the turbulent environment, generating or augmenting 
turbulence. In the case of Nepal, the constant political manoeuvring between the 
various political parties, Maoists and Monarchy is a good example of politically 
generated turbulence affecting the working environment of aid agencies (See Chapter 
Two). 
298 One example might be the administrative red-tape imposed on INGOs by the Social Welfare Council 
(SWC) around 2003/04 (See Chapter Two). 
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lastly, the interrelated notions of uncertainty and time pressure are also part of the 
concept of turbulence and turbulent environments. Uncertainty relates to what is 
known and unknown within an aid agency and the particular importance for the 
agency of what is not known. Time pressure, or sense of urgency, relates to the time 
required to decide on and implement an action in order to try to avoid an unwished-
for situation or to try to establish an advantageous one. 
Aid agencies In the course of this thesis the term aid agency is loosely applied, 
meaning a donor agency or development- or humanitarian-orientated International 
Non-Governmental Organisation (INGO). The term 'aid agency' does not-and this 
might indicate a western agency-centric perspective- refer to local Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) or Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) or groups such as 
Youth Clubs. 
Aid operation Following on from this rather loose definition of the term aid agency 
the term aid operation also loosely applied, meaning variously a single project, series 
of projects sector-wide programme, of no fixed duration. The term aid operation does 
not solely focus on either development activities or humanitarian activities, but 
includes both. The flexible definitions applied are related to the aim of the thesis. 
The aid strategist According to Gray, describing the role of the strategist in the 
context of military affairs, the strategist is 'both a person who 'does' strategy and a 
person who advises on the 'doing" (1999: 54). Applied to the sphere of aid, aid 
strategists are those persons within aid agencies at country level who are involved in 
the process of strategizing the presence and aid efforts of their respective aid agency 
in a particular country or geographical area. For the purpose of this research the 
concept of aid strategist should be broadly understood. It might include several types 
of staff, such as key management and advisory staff, representatives of headquarters, 
high level consultants or combinations of these. It is unlikely that the above-
mentioned groups of people are constantly involved in 'doing' or 'advising on the 
doing of' strategy within the aid agency. Therefore, it might be worth noting that the 
concept of aid strategist can also be a function, role or task, to be performed 
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alongside a range of functions or roles or tasks. Moreover, the aid strategist may be 
male or female, though to ease expression this thesis uses the masculine form. 
Aid agencies thrive on success. Therefore, the role of the aid strategist within an 
agency is of vital importance. Distant from their international headquarters, country 
directors, heads of mission and their key advisory staff, they face a demanding task: 
confronted with the wide variety of challenges presented by the turbulent 
environment, they have to deliver outcomes that can be presented as success. This 
success can initially be described as by Court et aI., according to lives saved, poverty 
reduced and quality of life improved (2005: 3). 
The responsibility of an aid strategist goes further than establishing success in these 
terms. Other measures of success include being able to fulfil the aid agency 
headquarters' perception of what is important, such as punctual completion of 
administrative requirements (Suzuki 1998). An aid agency might be perceived as 
successful by government departments, local political parties, community groups and 
armed forces (illegal and legal), for as long as the aid agency is acting in their 
interests. If the agency is not able to act in these interests, or aid activity is perceived 
as being in competition with local interests, these protagonists may deliberately 
obstruct the aid agency and its activities.299 In other words a part of the aid 
strategist's role involves the positioning of his agency and operations in such a way 
that it is acceptable to the greatest possible number of interested parties. 
To complicate matters for the aid strategist, success is a double-edged sword. 
Perceptions of an agency's operations, both internally and externally, are not static 
and change with time. What appears successful now may at some future point be 
deemed a failure. Despite good intentions and immense professional efforts, aid 
strategists cannot guarantee success either in terms of lives saved, poverty reduced 
and well being improved or in terms of the generation or reinforcement of favourable 
299 It is recognised that the term aid operations has humanitarian connotations. However for the 
purpose of this thesis the term aid operation embraces humanitarian and development projects and 
programmes. 
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perceptions among all players within a turbulent environment. lack of success may 
generate further turbulence, which may in turn harm the position of other players, 
including other aid agencies. 
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300 Source: www.worldatlas.com!webpagina!countrys/asia!indiansub.htm. accessed on 30/09/09. 
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WAAb : 
Smallest adminls1rCltive unit 
(There ere 36,023 
Wcrds In Nepal) 
Administrative/ 
Political Structure 
ILAI(A: 
VDCIMUNICI~ALITY: 
Clust .. of 9 Wcrds make up Q VDC 
(There ere 391 .. VDCs In NcpaI) 
l:1ust .. of 9 - 35 Wcrds make up Q Municipality 
(There ere 58 Munlclpalltla In Nepal) 
-4- 5 VDCI make up an Ilaka 
(There ere 927 Ilakas 
in Nepal) 
DEVELOP ME NT REGIONS: 
CONSTITUENCY: 
Th_ere 205 
Constituencies In Nepal 
9-19 Dlnrictl make up a ba<clopmellt Rqloll 
(Nepal has beell divided norttl to south Into II development regions) 
DISTRICT: 
Clust .. of 13-1H VDCI 
make up Q District 
(There ere "IS Districts 
In Nepal) 
301 Source: http ://www.un .org/maps/metadata .php.?id=169, accessed on 23/09/09. 
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Annexe 2.3: Timeline of the conflict from 1996 to 2006302 
1996 
13 February: initiation ofthe protracted People's War. First attacks take place in 
Ghorka, Rolpa and Rukum and Sindhuli Districts.303 
19 February: Prachandra, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Nepal, 
takes responsibility for the attacks in a public statement. 
June: Maoists initiate secondary plans focused on deliberately developing a 
guerrilla war. 
1997 
January: Maoist attack on police post in Ramechape district. 
June: Maoists introduce third plan focused on revolutionizing the guerrilla war. 
1998 
Throughout the year a series of smaller attacks are conducted by the Maoists in 
the districts of Rukum, Jajarkot, Kavre, Parsa and Dhanusha. 
May: Government initiates police operation Kilo Sierra Two. 
1999 
Throughout the year a series of attacks on (sub-) police posts are conducted by 
the Maoists in the following districts: Latipur, Salyan, Kalikot, Baglung, Rolpa, 
Kalikot, Ghorkha, Jumla, Ramachap, Jajarkot, Kavre and Dolpa, Parsa and 
Dhanusha. 
2000 
Throughout the year a series of attacks on (sub-) police posts are conducted by 
the Maoists in the following districts: Jumla, Nuwakot, Salyan, Rolpa, Pyauthan, 
Gulmi, Rukum, Ghorka, Nawalparasi, Jhapa, Morang, the district town Dunai in 
Dolpa, Lamjung and Ramachap. 
June: Maoists introduce a special"shock" programme. 
December: first People's Government formed in Rukum. 
2001 
February: Maoists organise their second national congress. 
Throughout the year a series of attacks on (sub-) police posts and camps are 
conducted by the Maoists in the following districts: Rukum, Dailekh, Dolakha, 
Rolpa. 
302 This timeline is an abridged version of Hisila Vami or comrade Parvati's reading of events (2007) 
combined with material from other sources including the BBC timeline and my own observations. The 
timeline presented by Hisila Vami might be correct, however some 'details' e.g. amounts of weaponry 
taken or casualties inflicted or suffered might not be so. For example, in relation to the attack on Beni, 
the District headquarter of Beni, the information I received from observers who visited almost directly 
after the attack suggested to me that the RNA did not suffer 150 casualties or the PLA only 7 as 
suggested by Vami. According to one observer it was the town's population that initiated the violence, 
in part due to the RNA's behaviour in favour of the Maoists (Personal conversations with observers, 
March 2004). 
303 Maoist attacks on police facilities and at a later stage on the military were partly aimed to at 
capturing weaponry and ammunition. 
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1 June: Crown Prince Dipendra kills King Birendra and close relatives in a shooting 
spree and fatally injures himself. 
4 June: Prince Gyanandra crowned as King, after the death of Crown Prince 
Dipendra. 
August: first ceasefire. 
21 November: breakdown of the first ceasefire. 
23 November: Maoist attack on military bases in Ghorai, headquarters of the 
Rapti zone, Dang District and the military facilities in Syangja Bazar, allowing the 
Maoists to capture a very substantial amount of modern weaponry and 
ammunition. 
25 November: Military facilities in the Solukhumbu district attacked. 
King Gyanendra declares a state of emergency and orders the army to crush the 
Maoists rebels, leading to escalation of violence. 
2002 
Throughout the year the Maoists engage in a series of attacks on (sub-) police 
posts and military facilities and pitched battles in the following districts: Kavre, 
Sarlahi, Saylan, Dang, Rolpa, Rukum, Salyan, Sindhuli, Sandhikharka, Ockhaldunga, 
Ghorka, Jumla (headquarters of the Karnali zone), Sirahi and Dang. 
May: Parliament dissolved by PM Deuba in anticipation of elections, renews state 
of emergency and calls for elections in November.304 
July: PM Deuba dissolves all local elected bodies, resulting in not having any local 
elected representatives in place throughout the country.30S 
October: King Gyanendra dismisses Deuba, installs Chand as new Prime Minister, 
and puts off elections indefinitely. 
2003 
January: Maoists and government declare a ceasefire and start engaging in a 
series of peace talks. 
May-June: PM Chand resigns and King Gyanandra installs Thapa as new premier. 
17 July: Royal Nepali Army kills 19 unarmed Maoists in Doramba, Ramachape 
district. 
August: 7 month-truce ends when Maoists pull out of peace talks. 
Beginning of autumn: Ten donors develop and undersign the Basic Operating 
Guidelines. 
Resumption of violence until the end of the year with (multiple) clashes in districts 
such as: Kailali, Doti, Saptari, Banke, Ghorka, Makwanphur, Morang, Mahottari, 
and Kapilvastu. 
2004 
Throughout the year the Maoists engage in a series of attacks on (sub-) police 
posts and military facilities, pitched battles and ambushes in various districts 
including: Chitwan, Khotang, Morang, Dandeldhura, Dang, Bhojpur, Dhanusha, 
Dolakha, Doti, Parsa, Salyan, Sirahi, Mugu, Dhading, Kailali, Arghakanchi, 
Makwanphur, Bardia. A police post at the edge of Kathmandu was also attacked. 
304 Gersony 2003: 41 
305 Ibid. 
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Throughout January: the Maoists declare eight autonomous regions: Magarant, 
Tamang, Bheri-Karnali, Madhesh, Seti Mahakali, Tharuwan, Tamuwan, and Kirat. 
May: His Majesty's Government of Nepal organises the Nepal Development 
Forum which barely acknowledges the existence of conflict. 
August: Maoists decide in their Central Committee Meeting to move militarily 
towards a strategic offensive. 
2005 
Throughout the year the Maoists continue their attacks in attacks in districts such 
as: Dhankuta, !lam, Sarlahi, Parbat, Kanchanpur, Dhanusha, Kailali, Morang, 
Okhaldhunga, Rukum, Dolakha, Siraha, Kavre, Bhojpur, Arghakanchi, Kalikot. 
1 February: King Gyanandra dismisses PM Deuba and his government, reinstates 
the state of emergency and assumes direct power, citing the need to defeat the 
Maoists. 
17 September: Maoists declare 3 month-long unilateral ceasefire. 
November: Maoist and main political parties agree on a programme to restore 
mUlti-party democracy. 
3 December: Maoists decide to extend ceasefire by another month despite the 
killing of one of their commanders in a helicopter air raid. 
2006 
2 January: Ceasefire breaks down, after which violence resumes, with attacks for 
example on Nepalgunj and locations within the Kathmandu valley. 
1 February: Tansen district headquarters attacked. 
April: Following weeks of street protests King Gyanandra agrees to reinstate the 
parliament, curtailing the King's powers from May. 
November: the government and Maoists sign a peace accord, declaring a formal 
end ofthe 10 year-insurgency. 
283 
Annexe 3.1: Military Enlightenment & Romanticism compared 
306 
Issues Military Enlightenment MIlitary Romanticism 
Type of war Wars of Kings Wars of People 
Concept of war Rational concept with War is a human phenomenon 
formulaic rules and principles ruled by psychology and will 
Appreciation of Talent possessed by Talent is more broadly defined 
talent individuals able to work within and plays a more crucial role in 
the rules and principles of war the conduct of war 
Perception of Rules promise timeless Conduct of war is a historical 
rules universality and govern phenomenon that differs from 
predictable elements of war age to age and place to place; 
appreciation of chance 
Perception of Risk avoidance via routine Accept high risks and therefore 
risk practices the possibility of a high level of 
casualties 
Preferred way Siege warfare Battle in the open field 
of waging war 
Focus Operational principles related Strategy and the nature of war 
to tactics and campaigns 
The way in Assumption of universal Description assumes change and 
which war is principles, but description avoids universality, but discusses 
described transitory aspects of war themes that travel well 
Conduct and War is a science War is an art 
study of War 
Key to success Mechanical rules Human psychology and 
in war personality are key due to inter-
activity and unpredictability 
Role of Genius Role of genius is restricted by Genius is placed above and 
the rules outside the rules. Individual 
knowledge, judgement and 
creativity are key 
View of stability Emphasis on predictable Chance is an unpredictable reality 
certainties in order to of war and as a consequence 
minimize casualties and there is willingness to accept 
financial costs more losses 
The importance Battle is key to war and needs to 
of battle be decisive 
Source: derived from Lynn (2004: 190-200) 
306 This overview does not pretend to be complete, but it does indicate the clear differences of opinion 
regarding the conduct of war in Clausewitz's era. 
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Annexe 4.1: Overview of research participants, interview date 
& location 
Research participants listed on Date of Interview location 
alfabethical order 
1. Anthony Titley 21/01/08 london, UK 
2. Arend van Riesen 15/02/08 Kathmandu (KTM) 
3. Dr. Arjuna Parakrama 11/03/08 KTM 
4. Dr. Baburam Bhatterai 10/03/08 KTM 
5. Barbara Adams 14/03/08 KTM 
6. Bert Jan Bouman 06/01/08 Zwaagwesteinde, NL 
7. Dr. Bishnu Pathak 07/02/08 KTM 
8. Dr. Bishnu Upreti 20/02/08 KTM 
9. Biswo Ulak 28/02/08 KTM 
10. Dan Huntington 22/01/08 Oxford, UK 
11. Prof. Dr. David Seddon 18/12/07 Norwich, UK 
12. David Wood 09/03/08 KTM 
13. Dr. Devendra Ray Panday 04/03/08 KTM 
14. Dhaka Ram BM 05/03/08 KTM 
15. Oil Bhr Ma"a 28/02/08 KTM 
16. Dipendra Tamang 08/02/09 KTM 
17. Dr. Don Messerschmidt 14/02/08 KTM 
18. Dr. Frank van Schoubroeck 14/01/08 Oosterbeek, N L 
19. Gael Robertson 23/02/08 KTM 
20. Dr. Genevieve Federspiel 27/09/09 KTM 
21. Gerrard Ferrie 18/02/08 KTM 
22. Graham Chaplin 02/12/07 St Goran, UK 
23. James Chinnery 07/03/08 KTM 
24. Jan Morrenhof 05/03/08 KTM 
25. Jan Roukema 25/02/08 KTM 
26. Jean Bertrand Lebrun 21/02/08 KTM 
27. Jennie Collins 26/02/08 KTM 
28. Dr. Jit Gurung 03/03/08 KTM 
29. Dr. Joerg Frieden 30/09/08 Bern, Switzerland 
30. John Beevan 22/02/08 KTM 
31. John Evans 23/02/08 KTM 
32. John Tyynela 06/03/08 KTM 
33. Kathrina Danielsen 15/01/08 Oosterbeek, NL 
34. Dr. Kedhar Matthema 12/03/08 KTM 
35. Kirstie Kirjavaine 09/02/08 KTM 
36. Kiyoko Ogura 15/02/08 KTM 
37. Dr. Krishna B. Bhattachan 03/03/08 KTM 
38. Kum Gurung 07/03/08 KTM 
39. Leila Abu Gheida 14/03/08 KTM 
40. Lucia de Vries 08/02/08 KTM 
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41. Marieke Schouten 14/01/08 Utrecht, The Netherlands 
42. Dr. Mark Galpin 05/12/07 Eynesham, UK 
43. Mark Segal 20/08/07 London, UK 
44. Dr. Mark Turin 12/02/08 KTM 
45. Martin Hermann 19/09/08 Copenhagen, Denmark 
46. Matthew Kahane 17/02/08 KTM 
47. Dr. Narayan Manandhra 21/02/08 KTM 
48. Paul Handley 29/09/08 Geneva, Switzerland 
49. Peter Neil 07/02/08 KTM 
50. Phil Lindsay 24/02/08 KTM 
51. Phillip De Clerc 27/02/08 KTM 
52. Dr. Prabin Manadrahan 04/03/08 KTM 
53. Dr. Ram Rizal 11/03/08 KTM 
54. Dr. Renato Libanora 09/02/08 KTM 
55. Richard Ordell 12/03/08 KTM 
56. Dr. Roderick Chalmers 10/03/08 KTM 
57. Ruth Marsden 28/02/08 KTM 
58. Sara Shneiderman 11/02/08 KTM 
59. Dr. Sean Deely 19/02/08 KTM 
60. Shaha Gurung 13/03/08 KTM 
61. Dr. Shibesh Regmi 25/02/08 KTM 
62. Shiva Hari Dahal 05/03/08 KTM 
63. Sjoerd Nienhuis 16/01/08 Hilversum, NL 
64. Stephen Noble 27/02/08 KTM 
65. Stine Heiselberg 14/03/08 KTM 
66. Susan Clapham 16/02/08 KTM 
67. Thakur Dakhal 24/02/08 KTM 
68. Dr. Thania Paffenholz 29/09/08 Geneva, Switzerland 
69. Tim Holt 26/02/08 KTM 
70. Tony Vaux 04/01/08 Penrith, UK 
Annexe 4.2: list with interview prompts 
Clausewitz inspired reflections on aid operations in turbulent 
environments: The case of Nepal (1999-2005) 
Interviewee: ........................ . 
Date 0/ interview ................. . 
Location ............................. : 
Recorded: yes/no 
Recording code: .... 
List of prompts 
Friction and strategy related: 
• Characteristics of ideal way of aid delivery 
• Sources of friction related to: 
o Danger 
o Physical efforts 
o Information 
o Friction in general 
• Character of Strategy 
o Elements of strategic 
o Boldness 
o Perseverance 
o Superiority of resources 
o Cunning 
o Concentration of resources 
o Strategic reserve within aid agencies 
o Tension and rest 
o Character of aid in Nepal 
Miscellaneous: 
• Operational space 
o Maintenance of development space 
o Creation of humanitarian space 
• Engagement 
• Centre of gravity 
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Annexe 5.1: From remarkable trinity to 'aid trinity': summary of 
modifications 
Triad or ~ 'Remarkable 'Aid trinity' Source Layer Triad Issue trinity' 
Terms Passion, Chance & Passion/irrationality, Field 
Psychological Probability, Reason -7 Chance & probability/ experience, 
non-rationality, Humanitarian 
Reason/rationality literature 
Orientation War-like/ passion -7 Humanitarian/passion 
primarily related to ranging from love to 
hate hate 
-7 
Focus of Each quality has a No quality has a single 
psychological prime focus related to focus 
qualities one element of the -7 social trinity 
Status of Static -7 Dynamic/fluid Field 
psychological experiences 
quality 
-7 
Type of social People, army & local people, Field 
Social groupings commander, Conflicting parties, experiences 
government -7 Institutional sphere 
Character of Assumption: social Assumption: social Actor-
social group is single or -7 grouping has multiple orientated 
groupings homogenous actors approach 
-7 
Type of Primarily single Multiple relationships 
relationships relationships between between clusters 
clusters 
~ 
Character of Primarily uni- Primarily multi-
influence directional over time directional over time 
Boundaries of Social groupings ~ Social groupings might Field 
social mutually exclusive overlap experiences; 
grouping Actor-
~ oriented 
approach 
Role of social Encompasses war Aid operation is shaped 
triad and embedded in a 
social triad, but has an 
impact this triad as well 
Central Terms Fighting, policy and Engagement, policy and (Smith 2005) 
activities strategy strategy 
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Annexe 5.2: Two alternative models to analyse aid operations 
THE 'DERO STRUCTURE' AND THE 'IRON TRIANGLE' 
This annexe presents two models. By showing their disadvantages, hopefully the 
advantages of the concept of 'aid trinity', will be thrown into relief. The first model is 
a scheme produced by Borton reflecting a series of relationships within a consortium 
of aid agencies operating together in Darfur (Borton: 2005). The second model is 
presented by Gould in his book 'New Conditionality' and called the 'Iron Triangle,' and 
is a conceptual frame to analyse public policy processes related to Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Plans (PRSPs) (Gould: 2005) . 
Borton's visualisation presents the relationships of the Dafur Emergency Response 
Operation (DERO) consortium operating in Darfur/ South Sudan. It represents the 
complex network of relationships within the DERO consortium, a network of 
relationships that the DERO director needed to manage, as shown in figure 5.2A. 
Figure S.2A: The 
DERO Structure 
Source: Borton 200S 
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The second model, presented below, is called the 'Iron Triangle'. This framework is 
designed by Gould to indicate the public policy arena in which PRSPs are designed 
(2005: 5). The 'Iron Triangle' is a visual representation of the relationships between 
civil society, government and donors for the purpose of organising sector-wide 
programmes and is presented in figure 5.2B. 
Figure S.28: The Iron 
Triangle 
Non-state " 
I 
I 
I 
~ 
<f> 
I 
I 
Donor I 
i 
State 
, 
<V 
Source: Gould 2006 
The strength of Borton's model is that it gives a fairly good, aid operation-specific, 
representation of how actors within the relief system, from donors to beneficiaries, 
are connected with each other. However, from a turbulence perspective, the 
deficiencies of this model are threefold. Firstly, the model appears to represent a 
linear top-down approach, from donor to beneficiary. Secondly, crucial actors able to 
influence dynamics of the context in which an aid operation operates are not 
included, namely the various conflicting parties and the intended beneficiary groups. 
Thirdly, and following on from the second point, the model does not show the 
possibility of interactions between conflicting parties and the beneficiaries, which in 
turn affects the dynamics of turbulence. 
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The 'Iron Triangle' visually represents the relationships between civil society, 
government and donors for the purpose of organising sector (-wide) programmes. 
Again from a turbulence perspective the problems with this model are at least 
threefold. Firstly, the model seems to assume, perhaps partly because of its name, 
static relationships between the three groups constituting the triangle. This seems an 
unreasonable assumption even in a stable context. Secondly, the model assumes a 
government able and willing to deliver services to their citizens (who are not included 
in the model - a further problem). In the case of Nepal, the government may have 
been willing, but, in the turbulent context it had to operate in, was unable to deliver, 
in turn compounding the deteriorating dynamics in the country. Thirdly, the model 
does not allow for the option of the government being part of a conflict. Again, in the 
Nepali case, the government was, together with the Maoists, centre stage in the 
conflict and therefore wholly enmeshed in the turbulent environment (see Chapter 
Two). So, the 'Iron Triangle' model might serve a purpose when dealing with non-
violent and stable circumstances, but in cases such as Nepal, the model is not helpful 
in thinking through poverty reduction strategies. 
Borton's and Gould's models might share one further drawback. The two models 
seem to perceive relationships between actors as above all technocratic and rational, 
overlooking the potential role of emotional factors or the possibility of change and 
luck. While rationality is without doubt important and relevant, emotions, luck and 
change are nonetheless part and parcel of a turbulent environment. As we saw in 
Chapter 3, Clausewitz places this psychological trinity of reason, passion and chance 
centrally in his thinking about the conduct of war. This thesis postulates that this 
psychological dimension is a key advantage of the 'aid trinity' as presented above. 
Annexe 16.1: Ideal and actual character of Aid operations in 
turbulent NepaP07 
Ideal form of aid in Actual character of 
turbulent Nepal collective aid operations Result 
in turbulent Nepal 
• Contextualised 
• Conflict-blind in terms 
• Conflict-sensitive of operational style, 
resource allocation, 
• Addressing the drivers procedures & methods 
of poverty 
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• Denial of the conflict • Inertia resulting in the 
• Bottom-up inability to address 
• Insufficient and poverty and conflict 
• Treating warring complicated dynamics 
parties equally coordination and appropriatello
8 
duplication of efforts 
• Orga n isationa I 
flexibility • Inappropriate donor 
practices 
• etc. 
307 The ideal column in this table is constructed on the basis of Chapter 6 On ideal form of Aid. This 
chapter provides an overview of how respondents described the ideal way of intervening in Nepal 
during the study period. 
308 One centrally placed respondent summarized the character of dynamics within the international 
community of Nepal as Inertia (A16). Inertia is not the same as inactivity. The aid community was, 
according to my observations, extremely busy, but rather like a group of people pushing a large rock 
from all sides at the same time, without necessarily having a clear idea as to what should be done with 
the rock and to what purpose. In addition, inertia does not imply that the aid community was not in the 
position to contribute to a peace deal between the various parties involved in Nepal's conflict. 
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